Lecture VI

IV. I now pass to the consideration of the theory that regards Right as the foundation of Moral Obligation.

In the examination of this Philosophy I must begin by defining terms. What is Right? The primary signification of the term is straight. When used in a moral sense it means fit, suitable, agreeable to the nature and relations of moral agents. Right is objective and subjective. Objective right is an idea of the fit, the suitable, the agreeable to the nature and relations of moral beings. It is an idea of that choice or ultimate intention, and of the consequent course of life which is befitting to or obligatory upon moral agents. Objective right is moral law. It is the rule of moral action as it lies revealed in the ideas of the reason of every moral agent. Thus, strictly speaking, objective right is subjective law. This idea or law of reason is subjective as it lies in the mind of the subject of it. But as a rule of action or rather of ultimate intention, in other words, regarded as a rule or law of right, it is objective right and subjective law.

Subjective right is synonymous with righteousness, uprightness, virtue. It consists in or is an attribute of that state of the will which is conformed to objective right, or to moral law. It is a term that expresses the moral quality, element, or attribute of that ultimate intention which the law of God requires. In other words still, it is conformity of heart to the law of objective right, or, as I just said, it is more strictly the term that designates the moral character of that state of heart. Some choose to regard subjective right as consisting in this state of heart, and others insist that it is only an element, attribute, or quality of this state of heart, or of this ultimate intention. I shall not contend about words, but shall show that it matters not, so far as the question we are about to examine is concerned, in which of these lights subjective right is regarded, whether as consisting in ultimate intention conformed to law, or, as an attribute, element, or quality of this intention.

I would here repeat a remark made on a former occasion, that since moral obligation respects the ultimate intention, that is, the choice of an end for its intrinsic value, moral obligation must imply the perception or idea of the valuable. Until the mind perceives or has the idea of the valuable developed, it cannot have the idea of moral obligation and consequently of right and wrong developed. If moral obligation respects the choice of an end, the obligation cannot exist until the end is apprehended. When the end is apprehended the affirmation of moral obligation to choose it, and of the rightness of compliance, and the wrongness of noncompliance with the obligation, is made by a law of necessity. The mind is so constituted that when the idea of the intrinsically valuable is developed, the correlated ideas of moral obligation, of right and wrong, of praise and blameworthiness, of justice and injustice, &c., are developed by a law of necessity.

The theory under consideration was held by the ancient Greek and Roman Philosophers. It was the theory of Kant, and is now the theory of the transcendental school in Europe and America. Cousin, in manifest accordance with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words; "Do right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the sake of the right. Morality has to do with the intentions."—(Enunciation of moral lawElements of Psychology p. 162.) Those who follow Kant, Cousin and Coleridge state the theory either in the same words, or in words that amount to the same thing. They regard right as the foundation of moral obligation. "Will the right for the sake of the right." This, if it has any meaning, means, Will the right as an ultimate end, that is, for its own sake. Let us examine this very popular philosophy, first, in the light of its own principles, and secondly in the ,' light of Revelation.

1. In the light of its own principles. And, (1.) This philosophy strenuously maintains that Moral Obligation respects the ultimate intention only, that is, that it respects the choice of an ultimate end. It also maintains that to choose an ultimate end is to choose something for its own intrinsic value, either to self or being in general, and not as a means or condition of any other end. This, it will be seen, is the same as to say that the choice of an ultimate end is the choice of the intrinsically valuable to being, that is, to self or to the universe. This, again, it will be seen, is the same as to say that ultimate intention is and must be synonymous either with good will to being in general or identical with disinterested benevolence, or with willing good to self in particular. But how does this teaching consist with choosing the right for the sake of the right? Are the good of being, the intrinsically valuable to being, and ihcrighl the same thing? Are the right and the intrinsically valuable the

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same thing? Are the right, and the highest well being of God and of the universe identical? To choose, will, intend the highest good of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, or for its own value, is right. For this is choosing the proper, fit, suitable, right end. But to will the right for the sake of the right is to will another end, and this is not right. To will the good for the sake of the good, that is, to will it disinterestedly, is right. But to will the right for the sake of the right, is , not right.

But does this philosophy mean that right is the supreme and ultimate good upon which intention ought to terminate? If so, in what sense of the term right does this theory regard it as the intrinsically and supremely valuable? Is it in the sense of Objective Right? But Objective Right is a mere abstract idea or law. It is impossible that this should possess any intrinsic value. It may be and is a condition or means of virtue, and hence of ultimate satisfaction or good, and therefore may be relatively valuable. But to make a mere idea of the reason, an abstract idea or law the intrinsically valuable thing which all moral agents are bound to choose as the supreme good, and to which they are bound to consecrate themselves for its own sake, is absurd. To prefer this to the highest well being of God and the universe is notright. It can not be right.

(2.) It is absurd to talk of making objective right an ultimate end. Make law an ultimate end! Law is a rule of choice or willing, as this philosophy maintains. But what does law require a moral agent to will, choose, intend? Why, according to this philosophy,it requires him to will, choose, intend no end whatever but itself. A very important law surely that requires its subject to will only its own existence and nothing else! And what is its own existence or self that it should make itself the supreme good? Why, forsooth, it is a mere abstract idea. But it is impossible for the mind to choose this as the supreme good, or as an ultimate end, for the plain reason that it can not be regarded as intrinsically valuable.

(3.) It is absurd to represent the moral law as requiring its subjects to make itself the end to which they ought to consecrate themselves. The law must require the choice of some intrinsically and supremely valuable end. This must be the highest good or well-being of God and of the universe, and can not be a mere abstract law or idea. What, a mere idea of greater intrinsic value than the infinite and eternal happiness or well being of God and of the universe! Impossible.

But does this philosophy teach that subjective right is the foundation of moral obligation? Subjective right is a compliance with moral obligation, and can not therefore be the foundation of the obligation. Subjective right, is virtue, righteousness. It must, as has been said, consist either in ultimate intention, or it must be a quality or attribute of that intention. If it be regarded as identical with that ultimate choice or intention which the moral law requires, then, according to this philosophy, moral agents are bound to choose their own choice or to intend their own intention as an ultimate end, that is, to intend their own intention for its own intrinsic value. This is absurd arid nonsensical.

If subjective right is to be regarded, not as identical with ultimate choice or intention, but as a quality, element, or attribute of the choice or intention, then moral agents, if this philosophy be true, are under a moral obligation to choose, will, intend nothing out of their choice or intention, but to choose or intend an element, attribute or quality of their intention as an ultimate end. Upon one supposition ultimate intention must terminate upon itself as an end; upon the other it must terminate upon a quality or attribute of itself. Either supposition is a gross absurdity and an impossibility. What! choose my own choice as an end! This is a natural impossibility. Choose an attribute of my own choice as an end or object of the very choice of which it is an attribute! This is equally a natural impossibility. Choice must of necessity terminate on some object out of itself, else there is no object of choice. Thus we see that subjective right cannot be chosen as an ultimate end, because it is not an ultimate. In what possible or conceivable sense, then, can right be the foundation of moral obligation? I answer in no possible or conceivable sense. It is grossly inconsistent and self contradictory for this philosophy to maintain at the same breath, that moral obligation respects the choice of an ultimate end, and that right is the foundation of moral obligation. Why, right, as we have just seen, consists either in the law or idea of obligation, or in obedience to this law or obligation. It is therefore stark nonsense to affirm that right is the foundation of the obligation. • Obedience to law, can not be identical with the reason for this obedience. Compliance with an obligation, can not be identical with the reason or foundation of the obligation. In other words, intending in accordance with obligation, earl not be identical with the thing or end intended. If objective right be the end to be intended, then obedience to

I!' the law is identical with choosing the law as an ultimate end.

| Choosing the law as an ultimate end is obedience to the law! (4.) But here it is objected that we really affirm our obligation to love God because of his moral excellence. To this I reply—That this objection in the mouth of a Rightarian must mean that it is right to love God for or because of his moral excellence and that we are, bound to love Him because it is right? But to love Him because it is right, and to love Him for his moral excellence are not identical. The objection involves a contradiction. This love, let it be remembered,^is willing, intending an end. But what am I bound to will or intend to God in view of his moral excellence. Am I bound to will his goodness as an end? This must be, if his goodness is the foundation of the obligation, for as we have repeatedly seen the reason for choosing any thing as an ultimate end and the end chosen are identical. But to will the divine goodness, which consists in benevolence, as an ultimate end is absurd. But am I to will the right for the sake of the right? Is this loving God or willing any thing to Him? Or am I to will good to God because it is right to will good to Him? This is absurd and a contradiction. To will good to God as an ultimate end, is to will it for its own sake or because of its own intrinsic value. It is impossible to will good to God for its own sake, because it is right. It is the same as to will good to God for its intrinsic value, yet not for its intrinsic value, but because it is right. This is willing the right and not the good as an end. The assumption, that we affirm our obligation to love God to be founded in his moral excellence, will be fully considered in its proper place, I would only here remark that it is not very consistent in a rightarian to urge this objection.

(5.) But right here it will be well to inquire into the ground of the mistake of rightarians. Kant, and if consistent, all rightarians, consider the law itself as imposing obligation, and therefore of course as being the foundation of obligation. Hence Kant affirms that ethics or morality or virtue does not imply any religion, but only the adoption into the will of a maxim, " at all times fit for law universal." He holds that the mind needs no end upon which to fix, nothing at which to aim beside or out of the law itself; nothing to intend, no motive out of the precept or maxim itself, but simply the adoption of the maxim just named, and which Cousin expresses thus, "Do right for the sake of the right," or "Will the right for the sake of the right." Now it is a fundamental mistake to represent the law itself, as imposing obligation, and therefore as the foundation of the obligation. Law is a rule according to which moral agents are bound to will. God and reason affirm their obligation to will in accordance with law, or in other words, to will that which the law requires. But the law requires that something shall be willed for its own sake, and this is the same as to say that the end to be willed deserves to be willed on its own account, which again, is the same as to affirm that the obligation is founded, not in the law, but in the end which the law requires us to seek. The law requires us to seek the end simply and only because of its intrinsic value, and not because the law a can of itself impose obligation. Now the idea that right or law can impose obligation is founded in a radical misapprehension of the nature of law. It is a rule of willing or a rule that declares how moral agents ought to will or what they ought to choose. But it is not the foundation of the obligation to choose that which the law requires to be chosen as an end. For the reason for choosing this is and must be its intrinsic value, and were it not intrinsically valuable, the law could not require it to be chosen as an ultimate end. But for its intrinsic value, a requirement to choose it as an ultimate end could not be law. Objective right and law, as we have before seen, are identical. If right is the foundation of obligation, then law is the foundation of obligation. This is and must be Rightarianism. (But it is a gross absurdity and a contradiction to make the law requiring the choice of an ultimate end or of something for its own intrinsic value, the reason, or foundation of the obligation instead of the intrinsic value of that which is to be chosen for its value. Nothing can by any possibility impose obligation to choose an ultimate end but the intrinsic value of the end. Neither law nor any lawgiver in earth or heaven can impose such an obligation. This philosophy represents the moral law as requiring its subjects to will the right for the sake of the right or to will the right as an ultimate end. Of course it must represent subjective right or virtue as consisting in willing objective right or as an ultimate end. This we have seen is absurd.

2. But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.

(1.) In the light of the Moral Law. The whole Law is ex

C:ssed by tlrc Great Teacher thus: "Thou shalt love the rd thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbor as thyself." Paul says "All the Law is fulfilled in one word— love:" "therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Now it is admitted by this philosophy, that the love required by the Law is not a mere emotion, but that it consists in willing, choice, intention; that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or in the choice of some thing for its own sake, or which is the same thing, for its intrinsic value. What is this which the Law requires us to will to God and our neighbor? Is it to will the right for the sake of the right? But what has this to do with loving God and our neighbor? To will the right for the sake of the right, is not the same as to love God and our neighbor, as it is not willing any thing to them. Suppose it be said, that the Law requires us to will the good, or highest blessedness of God and our neighbor, because it is right. This, as has been shown, is a contradiction and an impossibility. To will the blessedness of God and our neighbor in any proper sense, is to will it for its own sake, or as an ultimate end. But this is not to will it because it is right. To will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value, is right. But to will the right for the sake of the right, is not right. To will the good because it is good, or the valuable because it is valuable, is right, because it is willing it for the right reason. But to will the right because it is right, is not right, because it is not willing the right end. To will the good because it is right, is not to will the good as an end, but the right as an end, which is not right. The Law of God does not, can not require us to love right more than God and our neighbor. What! right of greater value than the highest well-being of God and of the universe? Impossible. It is impossible that the Moral Law should require any thing else than to will the highest good of universal being as an ultimate end. It is a first truth of Reason, that this is the most valuable thing possible or conceivable; and that could by no possibility be law, that should require any thing else to be chosen as an ultimate end. According to this philosophy, the revealed law should read: "Thou shalt love the right for its own sake, with all thy heart and with all thy soul." The fact is, the Law requires the supreme love of God, and the equal love of our neighbor. It says nothing, and implies nothing about doing right for the sake of the right. Rightarianism is a rejection of the Divine Revealed Law, and a substituting in its stead an entirely different rule of Moral Obligation, a rule that deifies right, that rejects the claims of God, and exalts right to the throne.

(2.) "Whether therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Does this precept require us to will the right for the sake of the right, or is it in spirit the same as the Law? The same as the Law, beyond a doubt.

(3.) "Do good unto all men, as ye have opportunity." Here again, are we required to will the right for the sake of the right, or to will the good of our neighbor because of its own intrinsic value? The latter, most certainly.

(4.) Take the commands to pray and labor for the salvation of souls. Do such commandments require us to go forth to will or do the right for the sake of the right, or to will the salvation of souls for the intrinsic value of their salvation? When we pray and preach and converse, must we aim at right, must the love of right, and not the love of God and of souls influence us? When I am engaged in prayer, and travail day and night for souls, and have an eye so single to the good of souls and to the glory of God, and am so swallowed up with my subject as not so much as to think of the right, am I all wrong? Must I pray because it is right, and do all I do and suffer all I suffer, not from good will to God and man, but because it is right? Who does not know, that to intend the right for the sake of the right in all these things instead of having an eye single to the good of being, would and must be any thing rather than true religion?

(5.) Examine this philosophy in the light of Scripture declarations. "God so loved the world that he gave his only / begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him, might not perish, but have everlasting life." Now, are we to understand that God gave his Son, not from any regard to the good of souls for its own sake, but for the sake of the rightl Did He will the right for the sake of the right f Did He give His Son to die for the right for the sake of the right, or to die to render the salvation of souls possible, and for the sake of the souls? (6.) Did Christ give Himself to die and labor for the right for the sake of the right, or for souls from love to souls? Did prophets, and apostles, and martyrs, and have the saints in all ages, willed the right for the sake of the right, or have they labored and suffered and died for God and souls from love to them?

(7.) How infinitely strange would the Bible read, if it adopted this philosophy. The Law, as has been said, would read thus: "Thou shalt love the right with all thy heart;" "Whatsoever ye do, do all for the sake of the right;" "Do the right unto "men for the sake of the right;" "God so loved the right

for the sake of the right that he gave his only begotten Son, to do the right for the sake of the right." Should we interrogate the holy men of all ages, and ask why they do and suffer as they do, with this philosophy, they must answer, We are willing and doing the right for the sake of the right. We have no ultimate regard to God or to the good of any being, but only to the right.

(8.) But take another passage which is quoted in support of this philosophy: "Children obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right." Now what is the spirit of this requirement? What is it to obey parents? Why, if, as this philosophy holds, it must resolve itself into Ultimate Intention, what must the child intend for its own sake? Must he will good to God and his parents, and obey his parents as a means of securing the highest good, or must he will the right as an end for the sake of the right, regardless of the good of God or of the universe? Would it be right to will the right for the sake of the right, rather than to will the good of the universe for the sake of the good, and obey his parents as a means of securing the highest good?

It is right to will the highest good of God and of the universe, and to use all the necessary means, and fulfill all the necessary conditions of this highest well-being. For children to obey their parents is one of the means, and for this reason it is right, and upon no other condition can it be required. But it is said that children affirm their obligation to obey their parents entirely irrespective of the obedience having any reference to or sustaining any relation to the good of being. This is a mistake. The child, if he is a Moral Agent, and does really affirm Moral Obligation, not only does, but must perceive the end upon which his choice or intention ought to terminate. If he really makes an intelligent affirmation, it is and must be, that he ought to will an end, that this end is not, and can not be the right, as has been shown. He knows that he ought to will his parents' happiness, and his own happiness, and the happiness of the world, and of God; and he knows that obedience to his parents sustains the relation of a means to this end. The fact is, it is a first truth of Reason, that he ought to will the good of his parents and the good of every body. He also knows that obedience to his parents is a necessary means to this end. If he does not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a Moral Agent, or to make any intelligent affirmation at all; and if he has any idea of obedience, it is, and must be only such as animals have who are actuated wholly by hope, fear and instinct. As well might we say, that an ox or a dog, who gives indication of knowing in some sense, that he ought to obey us, affirms Moral Obligation of himself, as to say this of a child in whose mind the idea of the good, or valuable to being is not developed. What! does Moral Obligation respect ultimate intention only; and does ultimate intention consist in the choice of something for its own intrinsic value, and yet is it true that children affirm Moral Obligation before the idea of the intrinsically valuable, is at all developed? Impossible! But this objection assumes that children have the idea of right developed before the idea of the valuable. This can not be. The end to be chosen, must be apprehended by the mind before the mind can have the idea of Moral Obligation to choose an end, or of the right or wrong of choosing or not choosing it. The development of the idea of the good or valuable, must precede the development of the ideas of right and of Moral Obligation.

But here again, I must bring into view the fundamental error of this philosophy, to wit, that right is the end to be willed. Right, as we have seen, is objective or subjective. Objective right is an idea, a law. Subjective right is virtue. But virtue, as it consists in love, or willing, can not be an end. Objective right, or law, can not be an end. To will objective right as an end, would be to will the idea, or law, as an end. This is absurd, as we have seen. What sort of a law would that be that required that nothing should be willed as an end but itself? This could, by no possibility, be Law, Law is that which declares what ought to be willed as an end, or for its own intrinsic value; and what law would that be, which instead of requiring the highest good of God and the universe to be chosen as an end, should require the rule, law or idea itself to be willed as the ultimate and supreme good? Surely this would not, could not be law. The law of God, then, is not, and can not be developed in the mind of a child who has no knowledge or idea of the valuable, and who has and can have no reference to the good of any being, in obediencc to his parents.

It is one thing to intend that which is right, and quite another to intend the right as an end. For example, to choose my own gratification as an end, is wrong. But this is not choosing the wrong as an end. A drunkard chooses to gratify his appetite for strong drink as an end, that is, for its own sake. This is wrong. But the choice does not terminate on the wrong, but, on the gratification. The thing intended is not the wrong. The liquor is not chosen, the gratification is not intended, because it is wrong', but notwithstanding it is wrong. To love God is right, but to suppose that God is loved because it is right, is absurd. It is to suppose that God is loved, not from any regard to God, but from a regard to right. This is an absurdity and a contradiction. To love or will the good of my neighbor, is right. But to will the right, instead of the good of my neighbor, is not right. It is loving right instead of my neighbor; but this is not right.

(9.) But it is said that I am conscious of affirming to myself that I ought to will the right. This a mistake. I am conscious of affirming to myself, that I ought to will that the willing of which is right, to wit, to will the good of God and of being. This is right. But this is not choosing the right as an end.

(10.) But it is said again, "I am conscious of affirming to myself, that I ought to will the good of being, because it is right." That is, to will the good of being, as a means, and the right as an end! which is making right the supreme good and the good of being a means to that end. This is absurd. But to say, that I am conscious of affirming to myself my obligation to love or will the good of God and my neighbor, because it is right, is a contradiction. It is the same as to say, I ought to love, or intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an ultimate end, and yet, not to intend the good of God and my neighbor, but intend the right.

(11.) But it is said, that "I ought to love God in compliance with, and out of respect to my obligation; that I ought to will it, because and for the reason that I am bound to will it." That is, that in loving God and my neighbor, I must intend to discharge or comply with my obligation; and this, it is said, is identical with intending the right. But ought my supreme object to be to discharge my duty—to meet obligation instead of willing the well-being of God and my neighbor for its own sake? If my end is to do my duty, I do not do it. For what is my obligation? Why, to love, or will the good of God and my neighbor, that is, as an end, or for its own value. To discharge my obligation, then, I must intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an end. That is, I must intend that which I am under an obligation to intend. But I am not under an obligation to intend the right, because it is right, nor to do my duty because it is duty, but to intend the good of God and of my neighbor, because it is good. Therefore, to discharge my obligation, I must intend the good, and not the right—the good of God and my neighbor, and not to do my duty. I say again, to intend the good, or valuable, is right; but to intend the right is not right.

(12.) But it is said, that in very many instances, at least, I am conscious of affirming my Moral Obligation to do the right, without any reference to the good of being, when I can assign no other reason for the affirmation of obligation, than the right. For example, I behold virtue, I affirm spontaneously and necessarily, that I ought to love that virtue. And this, it is said, has no reference to the good of being. Are willing the right for the sake of the right and loving virtue, the same thing? But what is it to love virtue? Not a mere feeling of delight or complacency in it? But it is agreed, that Moral Obligation respects the ultimate intention only. What, then, ^ do I mean by the affirmation, that I ought to love virtue? What is virtue? It is ultimate intention, or an attribute of v ultimate intention. But what is loving virtue? It consists in willing its existence. But it is said, that I affirm my obligation to love virtue as an end, or for its own sake, and not from any regard to the good of being. This is absurd, and a con- v tradiction. To love virtue, it is said, is to will its existence as an end. But virtue consists in intending an end. Now, to -j love virtue, it is said, is to will, intend its existence as an end, for its own sake. Then, according to this theory, I affirm my obligation to intend the intention of a virtuous being as an end, instead of intending the same end that he does. This is .' absurd. His intention is of no value, is neither naturally good nor morally good, irrespective of the end intended. It is neither right nor wrong, irrespective of the end chosen. It is therefore, impossible to will, choose, intend the intention as an end, without reference to the end intended. To love virtue, then, is to love or will the end upon which virtuous intention terminates, namely, the good of being, or, in other words, to love virtue, is to will its existence,ybr the sake of the end it has in view, which is the same thing as to will the same end. Virtue is intending, choosing an end. Loving virtue is willing that the virtuous intention should exists/or the sake of its end. Take away the end, and who would or could will the intention? Without the end, the virtue, or intention, would not, and could not exist. It is not true, therefore, that in the case supposed, I affirm my obligation to will, or intend, without any reference to the good of being. (13.) But again, it is said, that when I contemplate the a

Moral Excellence of God, I affirm my obligation to love him solely for his goodness, without any reference to the good of being, and for no other reason than because it is right. But to love God because of his moral excellence, and because it is right, are not the same thing. It is a gross contradiction, to talk of loving God for his Moral Excellence, because it is right. It is the same as to say, I love God for the reason that he is morally excellent, or worthy, yet not at all for this reason, but for the reason that it is right. To love God for his Moral Worth, is to will good to him for its own sake, upon condition that he deserves it. But to will his Moral Worth because it is right, is to will the right as an ultimate end, to have supreme regard to right, instead of the Moral Worth, or the well-being of God.

But it may reasonably be asked, why should Rightarians bring forward these objections? They all assume that Moral Obligation may respect something else than ultimate intention. Why, I repeat it, should Rightarians affirm that the Moral Excellence of God, is the foundation of Moral Obligation, since they hold that right is the foundation of Moral Obligation? Why should the advocates of the theory, that the Moral Excellence of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, affirm that right is the foundation, or that we are bound to love God for his Moral Excellence, because this is right? These are gross contradictions. There is no end to the absurdities in which error involves its advocates, and it is singular to see the advocates of the different theories, each in his turn, abandon his own, and affirm some other, as an objection to the true theory. It has also been, and still is common for writers to confound different theories with each other, and to affirm, in the compass of a few pages, several different theories. At least this has been done in some instances.

Consistent Rightarianism is a Godless, Christless, loveless philosophy. This Kant saw, and acknowledged. He calls it pure legality, that is, he understands the law as imposing obligation by virtue of its own nature, instead of the intrinsic value of the end, which the law requires Moral Agents to choose. He loses sight of the end, and does not recognize any end whatever. He makes a broad distinction between morality and religion. Morality consists, according to him in the adoption of the maxim,"Do right for the sake of the right," or "Act at all times upon a maxim fit for law universal." The adoption of this maxim is morality. But now, having adopted this maxim, the mind goes abroad to carry its maxim into practice. It finds God and being to exist, and sees