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Nous, Logos, Pneuma

NOUS, LOGOS, PNEUMA.'
Sec. V.

When the eternal person who was manifested in Jesus Christ is called by John o X07o?, we are plainly pointed back thereby to an intrinsically divine archetype of the created human X07o?. Humanity is 0eoO 761*o? precisely for that reason, that it is essentially distinguished by means of the X07o? from the aXoya fwo, which know that which they know—<f>vaiKw<;, not \oyiKw<; (Judg. x.). Nevertheless o Xdyo<;, as the name of the eternal person manifested in Jesus Christ, signifies not ratio, but oratio or verbum. In the New Testament Scripture

1 V. Zezschwitz, Profangriicitat und bibl. SpracJigeist, p. 33, objects to this triad, because the bringing forward of Xo'yof as an independent capacity of the spirit contradicts the biblical usus loquendi, which constantly rejects Xiyo; in the sense of reason, and because *»fD/t« occupies a position which contradicts its meaning. But (1) they are not three independent capacities of spirit which I put forth in the above triad, but the three factors in which, as in the theogonic procession of the Trinity, the human spirit-life is brought to complete development. (2) I do not understand (as the reader will find) Ao'yof in the sense of reason, but in the sense of word; and find the circumstance not a little favourable to my parallel of the divine type, that the Scripture so constantly rejects the former meaning, guarding thereby against the arriving at a false representation of the divine Logos, by starting from the constituent factors of the human spirit-life. (3) It need not appear strange, that within the pneumatic nature of man is assumed the existence of a Pneuma in a narrower sense, since even within the pneumatic nature of the Godhead we distinguish a Pneuma in a special sense. This, moreover, answers the objections of the eminent Swedish physician, 0. H, Witt, in his work on empirical and biblical psychology, Sjiilen, i vormalt och sjukligt tillstand (the soul, its normal and morbid condition), Pt. i. (1858), p. 84, that Logos nowhere occurs in Scripture as a part of man, and Pneuma does not occur in a double signification. Even Krumm, in his treatise de notionibus psychologies Paulinis (1858), finds in the above triad a strange divisio spiritus in tres partes, and remarks against it, (1) that Xiyo; is not at all a conception of biblical psychology; (2) that he does not perceive how imtiifix in the narrow sense is distinguished from xxplix. But it is only in the immediate meaning of ratio that it is not a conception of biblical psychology, but probably in the meaning oratio (word and faculty, or gift of the word) it is a most weighty and important one; and if human 'mfv/ix is distinguished from human toi;, vtfvfix can certainly not coincide with x.xpltx, because, even according to the repre

generally, X6yos nowhere occurs in the meaning ratio, not even in John among his many other significations,—a fact which, as observed by an ancient investigator of biblical psychology, has its reason in a divine decorum.1 In the Johannean writings it means throughout the Word, sometimes the individual word, as an expression of Jesus, John ii. 22; of God, x. 35 ; of the prophet, xii. 38; of the Scripture, xv. 25; of the people generally (proverb), iv. 37; sometimes the entire word of Jesus, as e.g. viii. 31, if ye remain iv rw X6yw rw ifiw; or of God, e.g. xvii. 17, o X070? o ao<t a\^Oeia iariv, both of which are essentially one and the same word (xiv. 23). Thus also 6 X07o?, John i. 1; 6 X6yos Tjjs 1 John i. 1; o X07o? Tov

Qeov, Apoc. xix. 13, will signify respectively the Word, the word of life, the word of God. Elsewhere it is the word of the proclamation, the tenor of the p^fiara Tov Qeov, which is so called

sentation and usns loquendi of Paul, discursive reflective knowledge is a function of the xapS/a itself: for man knows the mystery of his salvation by the enlightened eyes of his heart (Eph. i. 18), in which the light of spiritual knowledge shines forth out of darkness (2 Cor. iv. 6). In his passion for system, Krumm attributes to the apostle a different mode of conception from all the rest of the biblical writers, even from Luke (vid. Luke i. 51, xxiv. 25), in that he (and this is the fundamental thought of his whole treatise) makes him the author of the division of the iwtvfiK into »avf as intelligendi organum, and xapl!a as sentiendi organum, and limits the reference of the passages, in which the heart appears as the organ of knowledge, to immediate experimental knowledge as perception. But, in truth, it is the case in Paul's writings, as everywhere in the Holy Scripture, that x.apbla is the internal spiritual-psychical hearth of man's life, and, moreover, the workshop of the M^htk (Phil. iv. 7). On the other hand, Paul gives us in the Hellenic »ov;, less frequently used than xatlla, the first member of a distinguishing of the spiritual process of life in itself, to which xapota is in no way the second member; but irnvfca Tov voi; (Eph. iv. 23) is at any rate the closing link. For the rest, Krumm more nearly agrees with the above triad than he thinks; and though this Sec. V. looks to him strangely theosophic, we will still not be angry with the young philosopher, since even he acknowledges the important premiss, Spiritus humanus et substantia et efficientia simillimus est divino (p. 20), which we have ventured to consider somewhat more deeply, and will confidently await the result which Gbschel, agreeing with us, states, confessing out of his riper and richer experience (in p. 37 of his work, iiber den Menschen diesseits und jenseits), " He who considers himself in his thinking, will learn from his own experience to distinguish »ov;, Xo'yosi and irntifta Tov voo;"

1 H. W. Clemm, Schriftgemdsse Gedanken von der Kraften der menschlichen Seek (17C0), p. 90.

(comp. John vi. 68 ; Apoc. i. 2, 9, etc.). The word of the proclamation, and the word that appeared in Jesus, are distinguished in such a way, that the latter is the personal Word, which preceded the former; and in it God has from everlasting given to His counsel of love an objective existence in His own sight. Moreover, that He, in this everlasting Word, has not only expressed His will, but also His nature, in His own presence, John affirms in the brief 0eo? 6 X070?. The Pauline testimonies which lead up to John i. 1—e.g. Col. i. 15-17 ; Heb. i. 3 —say it still more circumstantially; and if further proof were needed for this metaphysical apprehension of the Logos, it would be found in Philo: for it is an undeniable fact, that the Johannean doctrine of the Logos is not without relation to the doctrine of Philo. The apostolic proclamation does not scorn the forms of ideas already coined by the Alexandrian philosophy, but it fills them with the contents that are presented by the history of their New Testament realization. As Christianity withdrew the limits from the spirit of the Old Testament revelation, and separated the imperishable gold of its substance from the dross of the cosmical elements, so it became a refining fire for Hellenistic and Hellenic philosophy, the transfiguration and consecration of what was true, and of the forms in use in both, for the presentation of the truth.

The admitted propriety of the assumption is sufficient for us here, that o X070?, in the trinitarian sense, is the God-spoken eternally personal Word, which comprehends in itself God's nature and will. From this assumption we can much more clearly apprehend the antitypical threefold spirit-life of man. That in man which wills, thinks, and experiences, is called in the general irvevfia, as God is the Tri-personal irvevfia. But in the self-conscious irvevfia are distinguished voC?, X07o?, and 'rrvevfia, as a copy of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

That which, or by means of which, the self-conscious spirit thinks and wills, is called vov< ; (mens, animus, as distinct from anima), or also Sidvoia (ratio). According to its etymon, rot/?, from the Sanscrit root gnd, signifies spiritual perception and comprehension (for >yww?, as nomen, narus, navus, for gnomen, gnarus, gnavus), certainly only the thinking nature ;1 as also

1 Vid. Autenrieth on v. Nagelsbach's Homerischer Theologie (1861), p. 393.

mens (fievos, v. Passow), Sanscr. manas, is named from manmnd, to think; but the will (OeXnaisi) allows itself to be taken up into the thought (yoelv, SutvoeiaOai), inasmuch as all will is an endeavour of the spirit, from a ground that has become conscious, towards an object that has become conscious, and thus is enclosed on both sides by thought: so that again the thought is a seeking—and, as such, a will—of that which is to be found.1 This is the universal scriptural view, on which account, e.g. njn (Kjn)—whence rnjn, jvjn, jn—unites in itself the ideas of will or endeavour, and of thought (comp. especially Ps. cxxxix. 1, 17). That vow is both, as well the willing as the thinking faculty in man, is seen from Hom. vii.: in man, when by the divine law he has attained to consciousness about what is good and evil, commences a conscious will for the good that is known and approved of God. The subject of this will is his vow. The moving causes of conduct lie herein, effectuated by the thought (Rom. xiv. 5). Thus the same by virtue of which man thinks and determines himself, the thinking and willing faculty in him, is his vow- As the will of the vow is to be distinguished from longing, so is its thought to be distinguished from conception, and its knowledge from perception. The dopaja of God are called (Rom. i. 20) voovfieva: the created world is perceived lcaOoparcu by man when his eye falls upon it; and in penetrating through the multiplicity of that which appears thus and thus, to the root of the origin thus and thus constituted, he attains by means of his row the idea of the Godhead. In a similar sense, the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 3) pronounces the fact of the origination of the world by the word of God to be a voovfxevov of faith, scil. of the believing vow. To recognise the not phenomenal eternal source of origination of the visible universe beginning in time, is a concern of the vow. And in Apoc. xiii. 18, comp. xvii. 9, it is the voik which unriddles the cipher of the future. Thus voeiv is the radical, ideal, penetrating thought and knowledge, directed to the essence of things, and which, in a word, are spiritual or rational, and in conformity thereto, the will determining itself; and these distinct from the kindred psychical facts of presentation, perception, and desire.

The product of the vovs is the X070?; for the human spirit, as 1 Similarly Gregory of Nyssa, in Mbller, l.c.p. 27.

not merely endowed with consciousness, but with self-consciousness, for that very reason is also, as the Targums (Gen. ii. 7) interpret, t&ty?1? ue. speaking spirit—spirit capable of speech.1 The vow is related to the X070V, as the speaking X070? (ratio) to the spoken X070? (oratio, verbum). In the New Testament Scripture, as already observed, X070? in this signification does not occur; but its use of X071iCo?, 0X07o?, 'koy%eadcu, avaXoyi^eadai, avWoyl£eadai, Xoyiafio^, Suikoyiafio<;, goes back to this aspect of the idea: X070? is distinguished from <f>wvrj and fr^w, as the speech or word of a personal nature endowed with X070? (capacity of thought). This twofold X070?, the thinking and the spoken, is related, according to Philo's expression, as 707<y77 and airopporj; and as X070? in the former sense is a capacity or an efficiency of the vow, so in the latter sense the X070? is the organ of the vow: they are related, once more to quote from Philo, as Moses and Aaron (Ex. iv. 15)—lrrrofto\ew Xoyov vow? What we are here asserting, is nothing foreign to the Scripture. The Old Testament use of the word proceeds from the essential identity of thought and speech, for "IDK signifies both,—the thought as inward speaking (with or without iai>3), and the speech as audible thinking; just as also n3n and ffp (LXX. ficXerav, a£oXea~^eiv) denote meditation, as wholly internal, or as faint, solemnly audible, speaking. Thinking and speaking, spirit and speech, are necessarily associated. Human speech, indeed, is effected psychically and corporeally, and is indissolubly bound to this agency; but speech in itself, even in the pure spirit, even in the Godhead itself, is inseparable from thought, for the word is the comprehension of the thought. But that word which, according to Rousseau, it is necessary to presuppose in order to supply the foundation for3 the human use of the word, is finally no other than the word of all words—the archetypal Logos.4 Now and X07o?, in the way of likeness, stand

1 In the later Hebrew scholastic language, 1a"iDn is the speaker, Arab. en-natik, and thus, as related to it, man, and mzflDIvE'San, the speaking soul, Arab, en-nefs en-natikeh, and so, as akin to it, anima rationales.

8 Vid. thereupon Grossmann, Qusestionum Philonearum, p. 11 (1829), 4.

* See Bautain, Experimental-psychologie, transl. by Dalhoff, ii. 145156.

4 See my Jesurun, pp. 43-45; and besides, the opinion of Hamann in. reference to the origin of language ( Works, iv. 33; comp. Gildemeister, Leben

in such essentially necessary relation as God the Father and God the Son ;1 for if we wish to name Him in a way corresponding to 6 as the Son's name, the Father is 6 vow, scil. 6 Twv Okwv vovs (Philo), 6 atSio? J/oo? (Athenagoras), 6 reXeto? vovs (Justin), i.e. the absolute nous, whereof it is said, rt? eyvw vov v Kvpwv (Isa. xl. 13, LXX.; Rom. xi. 34; 1 Cor. ii. 16). His nous, which designed the plan of the universe, is unsearchable; and there are infinitely many of the divine words proceeding from this nous: for of His thoughts (Tjf!!, Ps. cxxxix. 17), how immeasurably great is the sum I But the Son as Logos (K'ifp'o; and Jerus. Targum, Gen. xxviii. 10, K^31! or f^3'!I) is the one eternal self-thought of God—ivvorjfia Tov Qeov (in Clemens Alex.)—the thought of His whole proper nature, made objective, independent, personal in the Word—the Word absolutely —the Word of words. As the Logos is the basis of all other thoughts and words of God, so He is the archetype of the human Logos—of the thought of the Ego first of all, in which man becomes objective as a person, and of the word for it; then of all, on this foundation of the self-consciousness, comprised in thought and word of the self-fulfilling thought or inward speech. For the voelv does not begin until man becomes objective to himself as Ego; and this voelv is no otherwise possible than by the originating thought, completing itself by taking upon it the form of the word. Intelligible speech is only the sensibly perceptible announcement of this inward speech of the X07o? ivSidOeros.2 Thoughts, according to a biblical figure, are branches (^Vf or D'BJH?', Job. iv. 13, xx. 2; Ps. xciv. 19, cxxxix. 23) and words, are flowers and fruits, which, rooted in the spirit, and springing from it, blossom and ripen forth through the mouth and lips (Isa. lvii. 19 comp. Prov. x. 31, Prov. xviii. 20 comp. xii. 14, xiii. 2). Man thinks by speaking inwardly: this speech often passes rapidly away

Hamanns, ii. 63). All that man heard in the beginning, saw with his eyes, and his hands handled, was a living word, for God was the Word.

1 As in man is Logos creatus, says Ph. Nicolai, quoted by Rodwell, I.e. p. 199, thus God the Father has Logon seternum increatum.

8 Precisely thus Eusebius says on Ps. lvii. (lvi.) 5: Our Logos, which has its substance in syllables and words and names, and is spoken out by means of tongue and voice, is not properly and truthfully to be called Logos: for it has another as a producer—the inward Logos; and this only is specially and properly to be called the true Logos.

'without observation; but they are always words by which the thought is thought, as all reckoning, even the most rapid, is by means of figures. To think apart from language, is to thinkapart from thought itself. Unreflected consciousness without language is possible, as manifestly in the case of brutes; and as it is a condition of being Ego, as foundation and ground, whence the realized self-consciousness and the realized conscious self-determination are developed, so consciousness reflected in itself is, moreover, possible without language, as was manifest in the first created man. For there was implanted in him, indeed, the capacity of speech, but not the speech itself. His first condition was an intercommunion of speechless love for the God of his origin. His will, produced by his condition of Ego, but still not enlightened by actual self-consciousness, inclined thankfully to the will to which he was indebted for his being; and from this relation of self to God, proceeded a feeling of delight, which still lay at the threshold of selfconsciousness, and was no precipitate of darkened conceptions, but, so to speak, a chaos of ideas that were not yet lifted up into light. The external world copied itself in his senses, and presented itself in psychical forms of perception before his soul: his spirit was only first turned to this world of forms actu directo; the apperception, the transformation of these forms of intuitive perception into ideas, was first impending; but as soon as this spiritual efficiency began, language also began with it: for the moulding of the contents of the supersensuous, or of the sensuous, consciousness, is thinking ; and this thinking is, as such, speaking also, internal first of all; and inasmuch as man is a spirit-embodied being, not purely spiritual, but spiritpsychical, wherein the word is as absolutely pre-formed, as it is subsequently uttered by means of the bodily organs of speech. What is related to us in Gen. ii. 19 is not the first genesis of language. By way of illustration, however, it is there set fortli to us how language came into existence. Previously the individual kinds of beasts had been presented by means of the five senses, as objects for the primal man's consideration; but now that those considerations which sensible perception had supplied to him, become to him an object of inward contemplation, his spirit forms from them ideas: he grasps them as compact, strongly outlined thoughts; or, which is the same thing, he gives to the beasts names, which are the apprehended expression of the impression that proceeds from the individuals, and is now spiritually apperceived or comprehended.1 We may here forego the question as to the original formation of language, whether Adam's language came to perfection by the spiritual ground of things itself being that which entered into the region of his spiritual being, and then assuming for his Ego the form of the inward word.2 It is only necessary here for us to observe, that, beyond all doubt, language was the creation of the spirit, as distinguished from the soul; and, moreover, the creation, sensibly and psychically accomplished, of the spirit capable of speech, and in itself actually created (even apart from the fact of association) in need of language. Certainly the primal man was the only one whose existence preceded language: subsequently, language has a concrete subsistence independent of man, by which his special capacity of speech is determined ab extra, and his spirit is replenished with material already formed and regulated. And assuredly, as there subsists for us a knowledge only imperfect and still unrealized in any scientific method, about the value of the meaning of words in their relation to things; language, as a transmitted possession, is for us only a system of conventional signs of ideas, which we have instinctively appropriated to ourselves. And this language which we speak is one of many: it bears absolutely the stamp of the individual character of the people to which we belong: it is no more a speech of the beginning, the pure language of the divinely formed spirit: it remains, inasmuch as it was transmitted, always something more or less external to the thinker, however natural it may have become to him, and however masterfully he may handle it: deeply as he penetrates it, it is still to him always a substance more or less opaque; and thus it limits and obscures his thought, just as much as it inexpressibly effectuates it. None the less, in itself, language is, and remains—apart from its materializing produced by the fall of man, and its nationalizing produced by the confusion of tongues—a shadow of the divine Logos; and, in its

1 Comp. Steinthal, Charakteristik der hauptsachtlichen Typen des Sprachbau's, 1860, p. 76.

1 See thereupon the anonymous (theological) work on Language and its relation to Psychology, Freiburg, vol. i. I860.

indissoluble connection with the thinking spirit, a shadow of the unity of nature and life between the Father and the Son.

In this analysis of the life of the spirit, as it lives itself forth, we are upon a biblical and experimental track, which must lead us, from this beginning, and by this means, to a right result. The human understanding, thinking to and fro, comes to the word, and by the word it advances further. It meditates, and breaks forth, as it were, out of the chrysalis, and wheels round, and, as in birth-pangs of thought, attains to form and shape—to the sharply outlined thought-investiture of the word. The word is the means, the organ, the conditioning of thought; the word is the expression of all will and thought, whereby it first of all comes to itself by defining itself. But the third and final stage is that in which words are at an end, where the understanding is at a pause,—where the spirit, although in a more realized sense, is again in thought, as in the beginning before the birth of the word. Then the thought and will, which serve to develop the spirit, and find their expression in the word, cease without a word: the crown of the word is the spirit without the word — the innermost sanctuary of the heart.1 This is what the apostle means in Eph. iv. 23 (comp. Rom.' xii. 2) by irvevfia Tow I/oo?. There is thus not only a vovs, which according to its nature belongs to the irvevfia, and in the natural man is i/oO? rrjs aapKos (Col. ii. 18), instead of vow rov irvevfiaros; but, moreover, a irvevfxa which, according to its nature, belongs to the vovs, and is therefore inversely called irvevfia rov voos.2 What kind of a irvevfia this is, is to be gathered—although it has escaped the commentators3—from 1 Cor. xiv.; for here—vers. 14, 15, 19—the apostle, speaking of the speech with tongues, distinguishes between a human irvevfia and the human vow. Five words spoken Sut rov voos fiov, he says, are more profitable for the church, than ten thousand iv yXwaay; and wherefore? Because the five words serve for the instruction of others, and the ten thousand do not: it may be, then, that a Siepfxijvem-qs translates them into

1 According to Goscbel, Der Mensch. diesseits und jenseits, p. 86.

J The Latin mens animi, by which Krumm, de notionibus Paulinis Psychol, p. 23, renders it, does not correspond. Hnvfta Tov »oov is, on the other band, animus (spiritus) mentis.

3 See, on the other hand, Hilgenfeld, Glossolalie, p. 56.

the language commonly understood. Inasmuch as the five words proceed from the i/0D? thinking in its reflected consciousness in the mother tongue, they are all ideally intelligible, and capable of being expressed in language. But he who prays or sings yXwaafi, prays or sings not Toj Vol, but Tgs irvevfiari; and therein his i/oO? is aKapiros. The actuality of the consciousness is forced back by the divine influence, which absolutely takes possession of him who is speaking with the tongue: the operation of thought of the vovs, bringing forth fruit in thoughts and words, benefiting itself and others without any further agency, ceases. The divine influence occurs in the human region of immediate experience and intuition, and expresses itself in a language corresponding to this immediateness, not passing through the vovs of the actual utterer, and thus therefore unintelligible to the vovs of the hearers. The apostle calls this region of immediate experience and intuition, the irveDfia, as distinct from the vov?, of man. It is the spirit in the narrower sense (distinguished from irvevfia in a wider sense, as 1 Cor. v. 3, vii. 34, 2 Cor. vii. 1), as experiencing, and especially as seeing with immediate intuition—the image of the divine irveZfia ayiov. For as the activity of the loving will and the loving thought of the Father and the Son in the Holy Ghost goes forth into the actual condition of loving experience, in which loving will and loving thought are reciprocally satisfied, and as it were combined; so the human irvevfia in this narrower sense is the seat of the experience of the divine love, and of the immediate intuition of its mysteries (D^O and nK"}, Ps. xxxiv. 9);—a Tertium in which will and thought, passively surrendering themselves to a new form of love, blend and dissolve.1

1 Even Krumm understands wivfia (1 Cor. xiv.) of the capacity of mystical intuitive absorption into the divine depths; and gives, to my apprehension of it, involuntary testimony, when he says, p. 18, "Cogitatio in spiritu nondum sejuucta est a sensu et voluntate, sed hae tres actiones una quasi comprehenduntur;" and when, p. 67, he observes upon the boasting spirit-seer puffed up, Vito Tov »oo; rij; oapxi; (Col. ii. 18), "twrteovf Christiana atque verae revelationes in spiritu gignuntur" (in The Heart, Not In The Fanct). For if »oCf as the capacity of reflective thought, and xaooi'a as the capacity or organ of immediate experience and perception, be distinguished from the irnifca, as from the undivided unity of both, then becomes absolutely necessary also the distinction of a irriiifiu in the

But as man is by nature, it is not the divine love which man experiences in this his irvevfia. The rot)? has become vow Ttj? aapKb<;, given up to the flesh (comp. Prov. xxxi. 3; LXX. SiSovai Tov vovv fuvai^i); the Sidvoiai, like the deKrjfuna, are determined by the flesh (Eph. ii. 3); and the irvevfia, in its God-resembling nature, glowing and panting with love (1 Thess. v. 19; Rom. xii. 11; Acts xviii. 25), is, as it were, extinct and dead. The true nature of the irvevfia is not indeed destroyed, but it is buried beneath a tendency which contradicts it. Therefore man needs to be renewed (ro~> irveifiari Tov Wo?, Eph. iv. 23). "But ye," says the apostle (Eph. iv. 20-24) to his christianized heathen readers, contrasting them with the actual heathens,—" but ye have not so learned Christ; if so be that ye have heard Him, and have been taught in Him, as the truth is in Jesus: that ye should put off,1 concerning the former conversation, the old roan, which is corrupt in consequence of the lust of delusion; and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." The renewing will makes spiritual again the vow, this fundamental power of the human spirit, which has become fleshly, and therefore comprehends irvevfia Tov Wo'?, which, instead of heing penetrated by the Holy Spirit, whose image it is, is possessed by the spirit of this world. It is the life of the heart that is meant, which on the one hand is the summative unity into which the willing and thought-forming activity of the wO? is dissolved; and, on the other, the secret spring whence the wO? receives its impulses, which it adopts into consciousness, and translates into acts of will.* Here divine love gives to man to taste its hidden manna. Here God and the soul, which are not according to substance

narrower and wider sense,—namely, a *rtvfix proving itself in thinking and experience, and one that proves itself in both at once.

1 The additional iy.i; is in itself not opposed to this association of the infinitive with ilibixi*rt; and, moreover, the repetition of the subject here is explained as occasioned by the parenthesis. Vid. Alex. Buttmann, Gramm. of the New Testament Language, p. 235.

* Tittvfix Tos voo'f resembles very closely the Homeric ivfii;, e.g. in the combination, xxroi 0pircc xxX xttrd ivfion (in mind and heart). I do not find that this important psychological idea is illustrated by anybody satisfactorily, or at least searchingly, (Schriftb. iii. 292, "renovation to a newly inspired personal life;" v. Zezschwitz, "the spirit which reigns in the ntv;,

and nature one, become one through love.1 Here is the standing-place of the peace of God, which overpasses iram"a vow (Phil. iv. 7); here is the bottom of all ethically profound experience (vid. Luke i. 47; Mark viii. 12; John xi. 33, xiii. 21, and elsewhere); here, the sanctuary of all immediate communion between God and man.2

In Scripture, the innermost threefold personal life is called 6 eaw avOpanros (Rom. vii. 22; 2 Cor. iv. 16; Eph. iii. 16); and in reference to the unity of its origin, its seat and home,

0 Kpt/7Tro? r?}? *ap6Yas dvOpmros, the hidden man within the heart (1 Pet. iii. 4). These ideas do not belong exclusively, as does 6 Kaivbs (yeos) avOpwiros, to the life of regeneration. Every man is, as such, an external nature subject to the perceptions of sense, and an inward nature not sensibly perceptible; although, in the position of nature the inward man

the spiritual power of the sense;" Krumm, interna spiritus restoration, except only perhaps H. W. Clemm, in his Scriptural Thoughts of the Powers of the Soul (see the epitome in the Appendix of Div. V.). Luther, in his translation, "in the spirit of your heart," points in the right direction; for heart is " the deepest inwardness of the free personality, in which thought and will rest, together with the testimony of the conscience, in immediate unity" (Schoberlein, Jahrbuch, 1861, p. 53). Only the genitive ought not to be taken appositionally, as Master Eckhart (p. 817 of the Pfeiferschen Ausg.): in the inner spirit, which is called mind,that is, in the heart.

1 See G. Charles Schmidt, Etude swr Jean Rusbroek (1859). It is, as Luther says on one occasion {Opp. Lat. xviii. 252, ed. Erlang.), thalamus conscientise ubi sponsus et sponsa soli cubant.

2 Anastasius of Sinai, in his beautiful and thoughtful work on man's creation after God's image and likeness, which at first was edited by Jo. Tarinus, together with Origenis Philocalia (Paris 1618, 4), recognised the importance of 1 Cor. xiv. for the assertion that the Spirit is a ftoul; i» Tpiaii xai zpia; i» fio»aii: Oti y°lp xai ftla fort rri oiala (i \pvxq) xai ov ftia rji tuipi'if rq; iavrti; fMpZi, 0aQi; 6 uitu»' i^aXp imtvftari, \pahu xai vol' irpocti^oftai ru Tmivftari, xpooii%oftat it xai Hoi (1 Cor. xiv. 15). According to Anastasius, the ^vjci? corresponds to God the Father; the »o£f or ~Koyo; to God the Son; the wtifca (irnifta rov »o5) to the Holy Ghost; which (scil. ir>iifca) he designates as To £ut/x,,k xai avo'rarix.01> xai avff!eXr,purixoii, so far as the intelligent soul has in the spirit the condition and the completion of its life. It is plain that this is not the right conception of the irnifta attributed to the \pvxv votpd (hoy/xij in

1 Cor. xiv.), but Anastasius is on the right track; and so much the richer in grand and true thoughts is his comparison of the Son to the word born from the soul (oratw), whose internal silent origination ho regards as the copy of the internal divine birth of the Son, and whose external origina

has lost its independence of the outer, and is estranged from its true being. But, moreover, distorted as the life of the inward man is, still the features of the archetype are recognisable therein. "Ego et Pater," says the Lord to the soul, "et caritas nostra unus Deus sumus, tu mens rationalis et verbum et dilectio tua unus es homo, ad similitudinem auctoris tui factus, non ad aequalitatem; creatus nempe, non genitus. Eecede ab his quae infra te sunt, minus formosa quam tu es. Accede formatrici formae, quo possis esse formosior, eidemque semper adjungere, quia tanto ab illa speciei amplius capies, quanto te illi caritatis pondere magis impresseris."1

But—a consideration which inevitably obtrudes itself—is then experience the unity in which will and thought coincide, and not rather the unity out of which both proceed? To this we answer, for the present, that as, in the triune life of the

tion, effected by the instrument of language, he regards as the copy of the temporal birth of the Son: "For the word is first born in the heart, in incomprehensible and incorporeal manner of birth, and remains unrecognised in the internal nature of man; then it is born in a second and corporeal mode of birth by means of the lips, and this without destroying its connection with the soul which bare it: this is a general, manifest, and instructive resemblance of the two births of God the Logos." Augustine formulates his trinitarian conception of the human spirit variously,—now as memoria, inteUigenlia, voluntas, or mens, intelkclus, voluntas (as, after him, Thomas Aquinas, Dante in Purg. 25, 83, Eckhart, Rusbroek, and others);— now as esse, velle, scire, or also esse, novisse, diligere; and in conformity therewith, mens, notitia sui, amor. Jo. Scotus Erigena, on the other hand, distinguishing after Dionysius Areopagita the three divine hypostases as timid, lvvxfii;, iripytm (a distinction which is partially founded upon misunderstood passages of Scripture), divides also the spiritual nature of man into essentia, virtus, and operatio. None of these triple divisions is capable either of biblical, or logical and empirical examination. On the other hand, Erigena approaches the true state of the case when (as 'he thinks without self-contradiction) he distinguishes in yet another manner. "Quid tibi videtur," he asks, de div. nat. ii. 23, "de famosissima nostras naturai trinitate, quse intellectu et ratione et sensu intelligitur? Sensum autem dico non exteriorem sed interiorem;" in Greek, as he himself states them further on, nol';, *iyo;, otxvoix, the tres motus animse according to Dionysius, and mediately according to Proclus. Verbally, Gregory of Nyssa entirely agrees with us, in his work on the likeness of God, separating v»tv[ix, A&yof, vov;, as factors of the human trinity; but he adopts these words more in a philosophical than a biblical sense.

1 Claudianus Mamercus, de statu animsc, i. 26 (partially according to Philo) ; p. 96, the edition of Casp. Barth.

Godhead, all three acts of life are together immanent in everlasting presentness, without temporal sequence; so also in the threefold life of the human spirit, all its impulses so work one into the other, that every individual one, although prevailing at the same time, bears the others in itself. A more satisfactory answer will occur when we analyse—as we are now about to do—the nature of the human soul.