Note 1, page 4.

EPIPH. 1. c. 1:—Kal oxrrot rh crrepeh. rov Krjpvyfiaros fief/MnjKcujiv. C. 32 :—Ti co(f>eXei rjpJas rj Tov 'latawov 'AiroicdXtryfris; Whether they rejected the doctrine of the Logos altogether, or not, is not quite clear from what Epiphanius reports. It is true he designates them (c. 3), irainairaaiv dWorplovs rod KrjpvyfiarTo<; T?)s akrjOeias; but, from the connection, we should judge him to refer to their rejection of the Gospel of John. Besides, the name Alogi was given to them, not because of their rejection of the doctrine of the Logos, but because they rejected the strongest witness for it in the canon,—a course the more irrational, as, apart from this critical point (c. 4), T^ 7aa fjpltv irurreveiv Bokovai, and as they protested against being at all charged with the Ebionism and Docetism of Cerinthus. They represent Cerinthus as the author of the Gospel which they repudiate. Epiphanius was quite justified in entertaining a low opinion of such criticism. The isolated voices which in recent times have attached importance to this criticism, have given in their adherence, not to its positive, but solely to its negative aspect, that John was not the author of the Gospel which bears his name. But the two things cannot be separated. On the contrary, an attentive reading of Haer. 51 shows that, in their view, the beginning of the Gospel—which passes so rapidly from the o X07o? aap^ iyevero to the calling and witness of the Baptist; contains no reference to a history of the childhood of Christ; at once brings the Incarnate One into connection with the Baptist; in chapter i. 6 (compare i. 11) appears to represent the Baptist as having made his appearance prior to the incarnation, and first mentions the act of baptism supplementary,—was fitted to favour the heresy of Cerinthus. This is the abrupt feature, the feature favourable to Docetism, which they supposed themselves to find in the Gospel of John; and the contradictions which they discover between the fourth and the other three Gospels may be all reduced to this one point. Herein lies the reason of their doctrinal criticism; and it is useless for Heinichen to attempt to show, on a priori grounds, to wit, from the malice of Epiphanius, and so forth (pp. 42 ff.), that the Alogi attributed the Apocalypse alone to Cerinthus. If they followed the example of others in regard to this latter point, it is easy to see that they might the more strongly incline to use similar language relative to the Gospel; nay more, I should be almost surprised if modern critics did not adopt this view of the prologue, and, with the Alogi, find Cerinthianism in it. What they otherwise say,—namely, that according to the first three Gospels, one Passover alone took place during the official life of Christ; according to John, two,—does not give a very favourable idea of their ability for historical criticism. For the first they derived not from the Synoptics, but from a false explanation of the passage relating to the gracious year of the Lord, rather usual at that time; and the second is false, for, according to John, more than two Easter festivals occurred during the interval between the baptism and the death of Christ. Finally, also, their doctrinal acuteness must have been very limited, or else they could never have so completely failed to see the relation of the Gospel and Epistles of John to Docetism and Ebionism. The Alogi appear to have laid chief stress on the practical intelligence, not without a certain degree of superficial illuminism. Compare Neander's "Church History" 2, 908 (Germ. ed.). They cannot be shown to have had Marcionitic tendencies. We may remark by the way, that the Alogi did not venture to describe the Gospel of John as a new work; but completely harmonized with the tradition of the Church in relation to the date of its composition. Indeed, Cerinthus was a contemporary of the Gospel of John. This testimony, given as it was about the year 170 after Christ, deserves notice. Had they had before them a single trace of the recent origin of the Gospel of John, they must certainly have made it the chief basis of their attack.

Note 2, page 6.

It may be justly questioned whether this Theodotus did deny the supernatural birth of Christ. At all events, the words of Tertullian, in "de prsescr. haeret." 53, imply the contrary,— he maintained that Christ was a mere man, and denied that He was God, though he believed Him to be born of the Holy Ghost from the Virgin Mary, "sed hominem solitarium atque nudum, nulla alia prae coeteris nisi sola justitiae auctoritate." Theodoret also says (Haer. fab. 2, 5),—" He taught the like doctrine with Artemon." The testimony of Epiphanius, who attributes to him the words (Hair. 54),—" Christ was born of the seed of a man,"—cannot prove the contrary. For, in the first place, Epiphanius makes the same remark concerning his school, which, so far as we are acquainted with Theodotus the Argentarius, is not correct. In the second place, it does not follow, from the denial of the birth from a virgin, even if it should be attributed to the elder Theodotus, that he therefore denied the supernatural birth of Christ. For Theodotus might still have assumed a divine act in connection with the origin of Jesus; nay more, he did assume this, according to the testimony of Epiphanius himself. He says that Theodotus appealed to the circumstance of its being written, not "the Spirit of the Lord will be in thee" (yevrjaerai eV aol); but, "the Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee" (Luke i. 35): by which he intended, on the one hand, to acknowledge the action of God in connection with the birth of Christ; and, on the other hand, to exclude the incarnation of the Holy Spirit (compare Epiph. 54, 3), or of the Logos, if with Justin Martyr we understand 'nreCyu.a and Swafiis to signify the X070?. He deemed Christ to be the prophet who mediates between God and men; retaining hold, however, solely on the humanity of Christ, and appealing merely to Deut. xviii. 15; Jer. xvii. 9; Isa. liii. 3; Acts ii. 22; 1 Tim. ii. 5. His mediatorship he undoubtedly regarded as grounded in His higher divine gifts, and, above all, in His righteousness. Nay, further, when we consider that, according to Epiphanius, he was a learned man, who stood in connection with many heretics, and when we remember, besides, that his disciple Theodotus the Vol. 11. 2 E

Money-changer evinced an affinity with the Valentinians, and was the founder of the Melchizedekians, we may very fairly raise the question, whether Epiphanius did not misunderstand the position, "Jesus was born of human seed," if he really did lay it down. For, in the Excerptis Theodoti in Clemens Alexandrinus (whose doctrinal principles Neander, for example, in his "Genetische Entwickelung, etc.," p. 189, attributes to the Money-changer, and which certainly belongs to this school), much is said of the <rrrepfjia apprjvucbv (see 2, 21, 39, 40), from which the elect souls are derived, and Christ in particular (17). In this case, however, the cnrepp. a apjyqviicbv is said to denote Christ's origin from the ao<pia.

Note 3, page 7.

Theodoret, Haer. Fab. 2, 6:—Toiis Be MeXyiaeSeiciavovs rfirjfJM fiev elvcu Toutav (the Theodotians) <f>aal, Kaff ev Bk povov Bia(fxovelv, To Tov MekyiaeBeic riva /eal Oelav /cot fieyurrtjv viroXap.{3dveiv icar' elKova avrov rbv Xpunov yeyevfjaOcu. *Hp^e Be r?)? alpecrems rainrjs ciXXo? QeoBoros apyvpofioifios Tijv reyyrjv. Tertull. de praescript. haeret. 53:—Alter post hunc (after the Byzantine Theodotus) Theodotus haereticus erupit, qui et ipse introduxit alteram sectam, et ipsum hominem Christum tantummodo dicit ex spiritu sancto ex Virgine Maria conceptum pariter et natum, sed hunc inferiorem esse, quam Melchisedech.—Nam illum Melchisedech praecipuae gratiae coelestem esse virtutem, eo quod agat Christus pro hominibus, deprecator et advocatus ipsorum factus: Melchisedech facere pro coelestibus angelis atque virtutibus. Nam esse illum usque adeo Christo meliorem, ut airarmp sit, ap.'fyrmp sit, wyeveaXoyrrros sit, cujus neque initium, neque finis comprehensus sit aut comprehendere possit. Christ is, therefore, merely compared with Melchisedek in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Note 4, page 8.

As further disciples of the elder, we find mentioned Asclepiades, Hermophilus, Apollonides, Natalius (Euseb. 1. c.). So completely do these later Ebionites betray their connection with Gnosticism, which had notwithstanding despised the human aspect of the Person of Christ, that the Theodotus mentioned by Clemens Alexandrinus (Exc. 2) gave even to baptism a similar meaning to that given it by older Gnostics, in order to be quite certain of describing the human aspect of Christ as that which presented the ovala. Instructive in relation to the conception of ovala at this period, is the fragment of Clemens Alexandrinus in Fabric. Opp. Hippolvti, T. 2, 74. The fundamental idea is To Kaff eavrov v<f>eoro<;, whether it be inorganic or <f>vrbv, or efiyfrityov alaOryrucov, £a>oi/, or, in addition to the latter, XoyiKov also, like man. Ovala, therefore, is always the essential element of a thing, its substance. Hence we can see how, in certain circumstances, ovala might be used to denote that which we understand by Ego or personality; only that ovala then stands for the completely undefined notion of personality. In the Trinitarian Controversy, during the fourth century, ovala and Viroaraais were separated. Compare also Ang. Mai Collectio nova, T. 7, 52 ff.; Suicer. Thesaur. s. v.

Note 5, page 12.

Baur 1. c. pp. 297 ff. attributes greater importance to the moral perfection of Christ in connection with His glorification, than the authorities warrant him in doing. Nay more, in opposition to his own account (according to which, on the one hand, divine Wisdom exerted a permanent influence on, and heightened the spiritual and moral power of Christ, and on the other hand, there dwelt in the man Jesus a divine principle, developing itself in Him, p. 298), he remarks in conclusion (p. 305),—" The divine Logos works, it is true, upon the man, but the Logos is properly and essentially merely the inner man himself" (nowhere does Paul go so far, but merely compares the Logos in Christ, in so far as He is a mere quality and not hypostatical, with another common personification, the inner man, which also simply signifies a 7tom>tr??); "and man therefore can, by himself, through the progressive development and perfection of his moral power, arrive at divine dignity." Such an universalization of the divine Sonship cannot be historically established; nor can the idea of the man Jesus raising Himself to perfection by moral power. On the other hand, Neander, in avoiding these faults, has wrongly overlooked the moral element in Christ's irpoKvrrrj and waOriai<;.

Note 6, page 12.

In other respects also, Paul evinced little honesty. Eusehius styles him Kpinfrlvovs, a7rarrjXo? (7, 29). In the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity, he endeavoured to accommodate himself to the Church expressions, Holy Ghost and Word. Thus he teaches also a X070v irpo<fyopucos. Anacephal. 2,146:—X070v irpofopiicbv avrbv (tov Xpiarbv) ayrjuaruras (comp. Theodoret. Haer. Fab. 2, 8). Naturally, this X0709 is impersonal; He is merely God conceived in a particular lirivoia or activity. Eusebius tells us (7, 29), that at the Synod of Antioch, held in the year 269 on Paul's account, a learned presbyter, by name Malchion, compelled him to give utterance to his real opinions, after he had for a long time taken refuge behind ambiguities. At this Synod there were present, besides a great number of other teachers, Firmilian from Cappadocia, the brothers Gregory Thaumaturgus and Athenodorus, and so forth (see Eusebius 7, 28, 30). They all agreed in describing Paul's doctrine as an innovation, a revival of the already condemned heresy of Artemon;—indeed, their confession contained already a more fully developed, far higher doctrine of the Son of God and of Christ. Paul, on the contrary, held an isolated position in the discussions of the Synod. In this respect, there was a marked difference between his age and that of Arius. Artemonites there undoubtedly continued to exist, but they did not hold a position within the Church (Euseb. 5, 28; and 7, 30, ed. Heinichen 1. c. p. 404). Still, Paul does not seem to have entirely lacked disciples, although they too were excluded after the Synod of Antioch (compare Athan. de Synod. c. 26). It is simply one of that scholar's daring, but historically unjustifiable propositions, when Baur (1. c. p. 305) maintains that Paul's view, and that too in the form in which he gives it (see Note 5), is to be regarded as a general type of a determinate doctrinal system. It is true, he was Bishop of Antioch, where we shall find kindred views subsequently upheld by Lucian, but still Lucian himself was very different from Paul.

Note 7, page 19.

Compare, besides the above, Melito in Routh 1, 115;—he taught Qebv 6p.ov re ical avOpayrrov riXewv, Bvo ovalas: further— To aki)9e<; ical cupavraarbv Tt)? "tyvyfjs avrov Kcu rov crcofidrOS rfpi Kaff fjfias avOpcoirlvrjs <pvaeco<;. Further, may be compared Socrates, H. E. 3, 7 :—Ovtco yap iravres oi 'rrakcuorepoi irepl Tovtov X6yov yvpvvdaavres eyypcupov rjfilv Karikiirov ical yap Elprjvaios re Kox Kxtj/itj?, ''AiroXivapw<; re o 'IepairoXirtj<; ical Xepairlav efiyfrvyov Tov evavOpwirqaavra iv rols irovrjOeiaiv avrols Xoyoi s d>? ofwKcr/ovfievov avroi<; (pcuTKOvaw ov firjv aXXa Kox t) Sia BijpvWov Tov <£tXa8eX$1'a? 777s ev A pa ft'ia hrUricoirov yevofievrj avvoho<; ypd<povaa BrjpvWqt ra avra irapaBiSaicev. ,Slpir/evrjs Be iravraypv iv rot? (pepofievois avrov ftifiXluK, efiyfrvXpv Tov ivavOpmirrjaavra dlSev. Eusebius and Pamphilos testify that Origen, he goes on to say, was not the first to lay down the principle; aXka rrjv Tt}<; etwcXijatkw pA)<rriicrjP ipfi^vevaai iraparBoaiv. These words, like the commencement of the chapter, in which he believed it necessary as it were to justify Athanasius and the bishops of the Synod of Alexandria who taught that Christ had an human soul against the charge of innovation, sufficiently prove that that doctrine had not, up to this time, been completely adopted by the Church;—neither as to all the momenta thereof, nor with sufficient insight into the full consequences of its denial.

Note 8, page 20.

Adv. Prax. 20, 26. When Baur (1. c. p. 254) maintains that the polemic of these Monarchians (as also of the Alogi) against the Church's doctrine of the hypostatical Logos is incompatible with the supposed fact of the Gospel of John having already long been in existence and operation in Asia, I can only say, that I am surprised, and that it betrays a misapprehension of the course of development run by the doctrine of the Logos.—What was it not possible for heretics to do, who, to use the words of Irenaeus, like bad wrestlers, were accustomed to lay convulsive hold on one member of the truth? Finally, like Theodotus of Byzantium, Praxeas also recognised the Gospel of John, though he at the same time clung to his theory; not to mention other more recent and more pertinent cases (compare adv. Prax. 23-25). As to the Romish Church, that is, the pretendedly Ebionitical Church,—if it had been really Ebionitical, it must plainly have taken the greatest offence at Praxeas. Whereas, on the contrary, we know from Tertullian that at first he found in Rome much sympathy, even with the Bishop himself. How is it possible, then, to regard the favourable reception accorded to Praxeas as a proof of the Ebionism of the Church at Rome in the second century? Supposing the Church did incline to Patripassianism prior to the coming of Praxeas, they must have believed that the Most High God Himself appeared in Christ, though not a particular hypostasis;—for regard to the divine unity prevented them believing the latter. If we take into consideration, that the teachers who at that time taught most definitely that the Son was a distinct hypostasis, did not free themselves from a certain measure of Subordinatianism, which was favourable to Arianism or Ebionism, we are compelled to say,—Patripassianism was really further from Ebionism than these teachers of the Church; and that, what was intended to prove the Ebionism of the Romish Church, is a proof to the contrary. A fresh warning not to treat the ideas, "Judaizing Christianity" and " Ebionism," as interchangeable. Judaizing the Patripassians may be termed, because they clung so rigidly to the unity of God in the Old Testament sense; but they were not therefore Ebionites. For the one God in whom they believe, does not abide shut up in Himself, but manifests His essence in the form of actuality; appears in, nay more, becomes, a man.

Note 9, page 23.

The passage runs as follows (c. 27) :—" Et de hoc quaerendum, quomodo sermo sit caro factus. Utrumne quasi transfiguratus in carne, an indutus carnem? Immo indutus. Ceterum Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut aeternum. Transfiguratio autem interemtio est pristini. Omne enim, quodcunque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse, quod f uerat, et incipit esse, quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse.—Si ex transfiguratione et demutatione substantiae caro factus est, una jam erit substantia Jesus ex duabus, ex carne et spiritu mixtura quaedam, ut electrum ex auro et argento, et incipit nee aurum esse, i. e. spiritus, neque argentum, i. e. caro, dum alterum altera mutatur et tertium quid efficitur. Neque ergo Deus erit Jesus, sermo enim desiit esse, qui caro factus est; neque caro, i. e. homo, caro enim non proprie est, qui sermo fuit. Ita ex utroque neutrum est, aliud longe tertium est, quam utrumque." Hippolytus informs us that this was the view held by Beron. My opinion is not that Praxeas actually taught the view in question; but that it appeared to Tertullian a possible and nearly-lying deduction from his theory—nay more, to constitute a proper termination thereto. We may here beforehand direct attention to the circumstance, that Beron in Hippolytus, and at a later date Apollinaris, arrived at similar conclusions from similar premises. Servetus and Schwenkfeld are examples of the same thing in recent times.

Note 10, page 28.

Epiphan. h«r. 57, 8. Ti ow ipei Norrrbs iv ry avrov avorjala; pJrj iv Toi ovpavm aap^ fy; and so forth :—which words are partially borrowed by Hippolytus (c. Noet.),—Tl ovv ^ryret . . .; /iifrt ipel, cm iv ovpava aap^ ty; C. 17 :—ov yap tearet (f>amaaiav 17 rpo7njv, dXX' akrjO&9 yev6p.evo<; avOpasiros ty. It would seem, therefore, that the theory of Noetus contained, though in vague outlines, the doctrine of the <pvai<; aeaapKcopAvrj advanced at a later period; naturally, with the difference, that he repudiates the Trinity, and consequently refers the incarnation, with the iraOiyrov, etc., not to the Logos, but to the Father Himself. At this point, therefore, it becomes for the first time clear, that even now it was necessary to oppose the arpeirrov avaXKouorov, davyyyrov of the two natures, although not in these precise terms, to those who aimed at constituting the Father and humanity an unity without distinction in Christ. At a higher stage, the very question which now occupied the Church in relation to the Father, was raised again in relation to the Logos. Had this position of the matter been properly understood, the chief objection against the genuineness of Hippolytus' work against Beron must have fallen to the ground of itself.

Note 11, page 29.

Compare "Hippolytus contra Beronem et Helicen" (jcara Brjpavos Ka\"HXuco<;), in Fabric. 1, 225, who conjectures that we ought to read, ical tfkiiccor&v alperiK&v. I consider the work from which these fragments were taken, and which bore the title irepl OeoXoyuis ical aapiccbaem, to be genuine. The eight fragments relating to Beron appear to me to be taken from the larger work of which the treatise against Noetus formed a part: —indeed, the Biblioth. Max. iii. 261 introduces the treatise against Noetus with the similar title, "De Deo trino et uno et de mysterio incarnationis." Its commencement also shows that it formed part of a greater whole. The work appears, too, to have been designated "Memoria Haeresium" and "adversus omnes haereses." The arguments against its genuineness, so far as they deserve consideration, are the following (compare Christ. Aug. Salig's "De Eutychianismo ante Eutychen." 1723, pp. 26 ff.; Hanell's "De Hippolyto Episcopo," 1828, p. 41) :— 1. His style of representation is heavy and obscure; his proofs are philosophical, not exegetical:—both which things are opposed to the manner of Hippolytus. But the work, although requiring thought, is not more difficult to understand than, for example, many passages of the treatise against Noetus. In the latter, in particular, the entire discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity is quite as difficult, and its tone quite as philosophical. Besides, it must be borne in mind, that we only possess fragments of the work against Beron, selected for a particular purpose, and relating to a subject which is comparatively little fitted for an exegetical treatment.—2. The work presupposes a definite heresy, which reminds us of Apollinaris and Eutyches (Hanell, p. 42); nay more, the word ivepyeia, which plays so great a part here, reminds us of the Monotheletic controversies. And we cannot suppose the author to have refuted an heresy which had not yet been devised.—We have already subjected this reason to a preliminary examination in Note 10. Only those can attach importance to it, who fail to perceive how necessary it was in the development of Christology that, prior to the determination of the doctrine of the Trinity, the same synusiastic theories should make their appearance, as were set forth at a higher stage, and in a more fully developed form, subsequently to the Council of Nicaaa. After the Nicene Council, it was regarded as a settled point, that the divine in the Person of Christ was the Logos, who is decidedly distinct from the Father; but there were not a few (as the Monophysitic controversies from the time of Apollinaris onwards show) who knew of but one method of securing the divine-human unity of the Person, to wit, by clinging to the unity of nature; for though, in itself, it consisted of two momenta, they represented these momenta as passing over into each other. "Was it not necessary, then, that prior to the Nicene Council,—at a time when, though the conception of the divine in Christ in its relation to the Father was still a very indeterminate one, the unity of the Person of Christ, the union in Him of the divine and human, was unquestionably recognised,—there should be preludes of the attempt to view the divine and human aspects of the Person of Christ in each other? Is not the history of Christology even during the prse-Nicene period full of such attempts! But a simple reference to what has preceded is enough to show, that Beron by no means stood alone in the first half of the third century. Tertullian, as we have previously shown (p. 23 f.), makes frequent allusions to heretics, who endeavoured to establish the unity of the Person of Christ by representing the one nature as passing into the other (transfiguratio; in Hipp. c. Noet. 17, rpoirrf). The objection which is derived from the word evepyeia scarcely deserves a refutation. If the expression OeavBpucfj evepyeia, or some such other one, had been used, it might be suspicious; but no such expression can be found in the fragments. Indeed, I cannot understand how it is possible to find anything particular in the word, when we know from the writings, for example, of Origen and Paul of Samosata, that it was in common use at that period.—3. The argument drawn from Theodoret's not adducing any testimonies from this work in his refutation of the Apollinarists, is allowed to be feeble even by Iliinell himself; but it completely loses its force when we take into consideration the fragments preserved by others from the work "de Theologia et Verbi incarnatione" (Fabr. 1, 235; 2, 45; A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 7, 14, 68), and which harmonize completely with the otherwise well accredited doctrine of Hippolytus.—4. What does Hanell mean by denying the first of these fragments (Fabr. 2, 45) to be the work of Hippolytus, because the words, To BeXeiv eyei 6 0eo?, ov To firj OeXeiv, do not secm to him to betray the lover of philosophy? Does not the fragment in Fabr. 1, 280, from the "Cantic. trium puerorum," harmonize most fully with this theory of the freedom of the will? Does not the decided protest raised against all rpembv in God, in the first fragment c. Beron, agree perfectly with the procedure of Hippolytus, in attributing merely volition and refusing to attribute non-volition or permission to God, for fear of introducing a rpeirrbv into His essence?—5. That, further, Hippolytus most decidedly opposed the duality of the natures to every species of avy)(yai<; thereof, and that the terms ovyyyai<;, alamos, rpoirfj, ivepyeia (c. Beron, Fragm. 5, 8, 1), were certainly familiar to him, is plain, for example, from c. Noet. 17, and Pfaff s fragment in Fabr. 1, 282. No less is the early character of the work evident from the circumstance, that where later writers say 6fioovaio<;, it uses the terms ofuxpvrfc and 6jm>^>vxo<;; whereas 6fioovaios never occurs at all. See Note 4.

Note 12, page 41.

Baur's view (1. c. 284 ff.) does not square with the words of Eusebius. For how could Beryll have taught that the "TrarpiKrj Oe6rrj<; (not merely Ovafiis) was in Christ, if his conception of Christ were Ebionitical, essentially the same as Artemon's? We should then have expected a totally different description of Beryll's views, and a totally different polemic against them: moreover, it is scarcely likely that an Ebionite would have so readily yielded ground to Christian truth as Beryll is said to have done. Baur translates as though, according to Eusebius, Beryll denied the Oeorq<; of Christ; but he merely denied the ISia Oeorry; prior to the incarnation, that is, the hypostatical Logos with pre-existence, scarcely, however, His post-existence. For, as Fock justly remarks, the passage in Eusebius constantly uses the present of the Redeemer, and alludes to Him as one still present. Besides, he was not charged with error on this point; and from our statement of his views it will be evident, that he could have had no ground for representing the Person of Christ as transitory, but that, in his case (as already in that of Beron), Patripassianism had taken the forward step of ensuring the eternity of the humanity of Christ. If it could be affirmed, in the manner in which Baur affirms it, that Beryll believed the humanity to be the personific element in Christ, and conceived the divine to be a mere power, he must have laid the greatest stress on the soul of Christ, because, without it, a human personality would be inconceivable. Instead of that, we find that the Synod, which addressed an epistle to Beryll, gave special prominence to the soul of Christ (Socr. H. E. 3, 7). Grammatically, also, this interpretation is inadmissible. 1. The most natural explanation is, that the words, Oeorryra ISiav e^eiv, have the same subject as the preceding words—Tov icvpvov /ii) irpov<pecrravai. Now, in the latter, icvpios evidently stands for the higher nature of Christ; for Beryll would not have merited blame for denying pre-existence to the human nature or to the divine-human unity. Consequently, the higher nature of Christ must also be the subject of the words, Oeorryra ISiav Ovk eyeiv; and the meaning cannot be that which Baur brings out, to wit, "the humanity of Christ had no ISla Oe6rrjs" (where ISla, moreover, would be completely superfluous); but, "the higher nature of Christ had no lSla Oeorrj<;, as had the Logos or Son;" the divine in general, the ^eorijs irarpucrj alone was in Him. Only when we thus take the iBla Oean)<;, in agreement with what precedes, as equivalent to toYa, that is, rod vlov Oeortp'a, does the antithesis irarpucrj Oeorrjs become clear.—2. Baur takes the word ep.iroXtreveaOai in the sense—"to be a citizen alongside of a citizen;" that is, the expression implies that the irarpiKrj Oeonj<; merely dwelt, as it were, side by side with another citizen, to wit, the personal humanity of Jesus; from which he deduces the further conclusion, that Beryll conceived the indwelling of God in Christ, under the category of influence and moral union. But, even supposing the explanation were lexicographically justifiable, the conclusion referred to would be too hasty. For, inasmuch as, on the explanation adopted, two persons must be supposed to have co-existed in Christ; why should this be reduced to a mere influence of the divine power? Baur ought rather to have attributed to Beryll the assumption of a double personality in Christ. Besides, the works of Hippolytus (which Baur, it is true, has left unnoticed) show us, that the word e/«roXireveaOai was used in an entirely different sense. As eViS^/iua was employed even at this time to denote the incarnation, so the Church, which repudiated the notion of a duality of persons, and of the separate personality of the human nature, in Christ, adopted the term ifiiro7ureveaOai, which, with its dative, was used as about an equivalent to ivavOpanrelv (compare, for example, adv. Noet. 12 with 4). So that this word can by no means be regarded as having an Ebionitic stamp.— 3. Finally, as regards the word irepir/pcuprj, a more careful consideration of the writers of this period shows us, that we must be very cautious in transferring our idea of personality, in the sense of the Ego, to them. Our idea of personality, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, presupposes very complicated processes of reflection; and we shall altogether fail to see that the Church's doctrine of the Person of Christ and of the Trinity made real progress, if (as I did myself in the first edition of this work, and as Baur repeatedly does) we start with the presupposition, that our idea of personality was familiar to every period, instead of regarding it as a result of the conflicts of many centuries. Only by keeping these remarks in view can the changes in the use of such terms as ovala, {rn-oaraai?, irpoaayrrov, be understood and followed. For example, " own proper personality," is not a correct rendering of the words, tola over tias irepvypa<prj (although such is Neander's opinion; see his Church History 1. c. 1020, Note 1, German Edition); they signify rather simply, "circumscription," "determination," and contain directly no trace of the "Ego." In the formation of this expression, on the contrary, we find an unmistakeable reflection of the point from which ancient thinkers started in seeking the idea of human personality, to wit, limitation through the body, or individuality. See Note 4; and compare Nagelsbach's "Homerische Theologie," Section Seventh. Of course there is an analogous specific distinction between those who regarded the divine, and those who regarded the human, as the proper substance of the Person of Christ, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between those who represent the divine nature alone, and those who represent the human nature alone, as the personific element; only that, until a determinate idea of personality has been arrived at, he who says merely, "Christ was filled with divine power or Oearrjs" might mean the same as he who says, "God dwelt personally in Christ,"—namely, if the former does not apply the word personality also to the humanity. For the rest, the word irepvypatyrj was applied already at an early period to God, or the pre-existent Logos. Compare above in connection with Theodot. Excerp. 10, 19; Orig. in Joh. 1, 42, Vol. iv. 47. There it is equivalent to inr6aroai<;. On the other hand, in Hippol. c. Ber. Fragm. 1, we read,—'O Xoyo<;<f>vaiKf}<; aapicos irepvypacpfjs avao~y6p.evo< ; iraarj<; efc o irepvypcupr)s fiep.evrjicev. Fragm. 4: 'H Oe6nyro<; ivepyeia Itcurt)< ; iicros Kara <f>vo~iv irepvypacfriy; Siafievovaa SUXapn^e Bid aapicb<; <f>vaei ireirep(wfiivfi<;- ov yhp irtyvice irepiypd<peaOai yev^rrj cpvaei To Kara <f>vaiv ar/evryrov. There, irepiypatyrj is not equivalent to V7roara<w, but signifies "limit."

Note 13, page 43.

The same ambiguity characterizes his doctrine also, according to the account given of it by Eusebius. It contains the contradiction that, on the one hand, in the interest of Monarchianism, the pre-existence of the Logos and His I8la Oeorry; are denied, and no step is taken in advance of the simple divine or ir<irpucrj Oe6rrj<;: on the other hand, the entire mode of expression would lead us to suppose that, precisely like the Beron of Hippolytus, he represented the divine itself as made subject to limitation, through the incarnation. For if, with Baur, we were to take the words iZCa ovo~las "rrepir/pcufiq with irarpiKrj Oeorrj<;, as though Beryll meant to say,—"Christ was a man who was the subject of special divine influence," the expression for this very obvious thought would be too forced and prolix. For that a man is an IZla ovalas irepvypa<prj, and that as a mere man he has no JZla Oeorry;, is self-evident. Neander, therefore, appears to me to have approached in the main nearer the truth, and still more Schleiermacher; though Baur is probably right when, in opposition to them, he urges that Beryll attached greater significance to the humanity of Christ than is commonly supposed. But it seems to me impossible to form a clear conception of this significance, if, as it has almost become customary to do, we make it our aim to strip this line of thought as much as possible of all trace of Patripassianism; for it must have been stirred by both religious and speculative considerations, when it represented God as a suffering God, and asserted His intimate participation in finitude. The defect was simply that Patripassianism unavoidably tended, even against its own will, towards an ethnic mutability of God, because it did not take its stand definitely enough on the ethical idea of unbounded participative love. In one aspect, indeed, the line of thought which we have considered is the proper continuation of that principle of love which Marcion had more energetically brought to light and advocated. But the view taken of these unquestionably difficult questions is still bungling. In consequence of the lack of the intermediate links, the love which they set forth threatens constantly to become a merely physical thing, and the entire tendency acquires a pantheistic character, shared also by Monophysitism, which was the revival thereof at a higher stage. Nay more, the Manichaeism which made its appearance some few decennia after Beryll or Beron, was a degenerate pagan form of this same tendency. For the rest, this age was so stirred by such questions, that theories of this nature were probably developed in much greater variety than has been commonly supposed. Indeed, traces enough of their actual existence are discoverable, though we must not make it our aim, as some do with a confidence that I cannot share, to reduce back all doctrines which bear any resemblance to each other, and are anonymously handed down, to one common source. For example, when Origen (see his Comm. in Joh. T. ii. 2) speaks of those who, out of anxiety for the unity of God, denied to the Son an independent subsistence of His own (tStorryra Tov vlov irepav irapa Ttjv Tov irarpbsi), and distinguished Father and Son merely in name, he is said to refer to the same party with the Patripassians (as in the above-mentioned passage from the Apology of Pamphilus, T. iv. 22; or as in his Comm. in Joh. x. 21, Vol. iv. 199, and c. Cels. 8, 12, Vol. i. 750). But when in the first quoted passage (in Joh. ii. 2) he mentions, as the second class, apvovplvovs Tjjv Oeonp-a Tov vlov, riOivras Be airov Ttjv ISiorrjra ical Ttjv ovalav Kara irepiypa<fn)v rvyydvovaav erepav Tov irarpos; and in the further passage, cited by Pamphilus,—"Sed et eos qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum pracognitum et praedestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem, ne illos quidem sine periculo esse, ecclesiae numero sociari;" or when Greg. Thaum. (A. Mai 1. c. 7, 171) alludes to men who, though they conceived Christ to be filled with deity, really allowed no distinction between Him and the saints and prophets, but approximated to heathenism or Judaism by offering worship to a man endued with divine power; for it is heathenish irXrjpaOevra OeoTqro<; aefieiv, Jewish, to regard Christ as a Kriafia:—there is undoubtedly a relationship between them, but we can scarcely be warranted in identifying them all, either with each other or with Beryll, or with any other teacher. The passage cited from Origen by Pamphilus reminds us of what Eusebius says respecting Beryll, and may very well relate to him; for it does not attribute Ebionism, but rather the contrary, when it speaks of the "deitas Patris:" which is further evident also from the mild and rather warning character of the judgment pronounced by him. Still its identity with Beryll is by no means certain; for we miss an essential feature noticed in the account given by Eusebius, namely, that when it became incarnate, the irarpiKrj Oe<rrq<; took up into, or posited in, itself a limitation, a irepvypa^yq. Through the omission of this feature, the description becomes vague and indefinite enough to suit many others, for example, the Alogi. At the same time, this feature may lie in the first passage (in Joh. ii. 2); for the party there mentioned, posited the IStorry; Tov vlov, and said,—His ovcria is Kara irepvypcufyqv erepa irapa Ttjv rod 7rarpos. But they again denied the Oeorrjs, and not merely the ISia Oeorr)<;, of the Son; they would therefore appear to have been Ebionites, and cannot have been identical with the previous ones. Schleiermacher also (1. c. 532), and with him Fock and Rossel, seems to hint at the same view of the matter. The words of the latter passage can only be referred to Beryll, or better to those who resembled him, if we understand them to deny the Oeorrj<; of the Son not absolutely, but "ad tempus," or on the ground of the Kevaxris, by which God posited Himself as a man. In favour of which meaning might be adduced the consideration, that otherwise in this connection also the following words, from riOevres Bk to irarpos (see above), would have far too wide a scope, if they were merely intended to state that Christ was a man, and indeed a man whose ovcria Kara irepvypaxprjv erepa irapa r. r. ir.; for the latter point would only have been regarded as too selfevident by Ebionites. Whereas, on the contrary, these widereaching words acquire their full and sufficient import if we suppose them to set forth an opinion which, according to the account given in the text, resembled either that of Beron or that of Beryll. They would then refer, namely, to a form of their doctrine, in which fuller development had been given to the very nearly related element, to wit, that by the Kevaais a distinction, a section (airoicoirrj) of the divine essence in general, or a second rrpoaayrrov in addition to that of the Father, was brought to pass (compare Orig. in Job.. T. xx. 16: de princip. 4, 31); a form with which Gregory Thaum. also was acquainted, and which constituted a point of transition to Subordinatianism (see Note 1, page 34). But I should be unwilling to lay any particular stress on this explanation. It must always be a perilous thing, supplementarily to give definite names and shapes to the authors of systems which have been anonymously and vaguely handed down. Nor would Baur have been able so confidently to refer the passage in Joh. T. ii. 2 to Beryll, if he had considered that Origen began his commentary on John as early as A.d. 219, and that, according to in Joh. vi. 1, andEuseb. 6, 24, the first five tomes thereof were ready before A.d. 231; whereas the discussion with Beryll took place far later, to wit, in the year 244; although I, for my part, should by no means decidedly conclude from this circumstance, that Beryll could not be meant. For Origen had been even at an earlier period in Arabia; and in that land, where mystical and theosophic movements were the order of the day (see Ullmann, p. 8), might easily long before have become acquainted with the opinions entertained by Beryll or those related to him, especially as Beryll must have attained to an advanced age about the year 244, and was then designated Bishop. For this reason, also, it is not improbable that Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus Romanus, in Arabia, named Abulides in the East, may have had fruitless discussions with Beryll prior to 244, although we have no information to that effect, unless where Beron is mentioned we ought to understand Beryll. Eusebius also (see his H. E. 6, 20) sets Beryll and Hippolytus together. Completely indefinite is the description given by Gregory of those who worshipped a man filled with deity. It looks like what we know of Paul of Samosata and his followers; but, as we shall soon see, might also have belonged to the school of Sabellius.

Note 14, page 59.

He had this realistic tendency, and therefore also substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity, even prior to his adoption of Montanism. Indeed, he gives utterance to it already in his Apologeticus, c. 21. In the Adv. Prax. he gives the "Regula Fidei," which contains the belief in a real Trinity, and says, —" Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurrisse probabit novellitas Praxeae hesterna." "As always, so now more than ever, instructed by the Paraclete, who leads into all truth, we believe, indeed, in one God, but agreeably to the divine order which we call oeconomia;" c. 2, 13, 30. Tertullian himself, therefore, in a work intended to justify Montanism, and to confute its opponents, confesses that, prior to coming under the influence of Montanism, he held, with the Church, substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity as he now expounds. Indeed, altogether apart from what has been previously advanced, it must in itself be much more likely that the later Montanism was modified and rid of its character of abruptness by the influence of the doctrine of the Trinity settled by the Church, was purified by the principle of gradualness and order defended by Church teachers like the author of the Epistle to Diognetus or Irenaeus, and was brought to the recognition of the divine oeconomia and its orderly course, than that the Church was led to the doctrine of the Trinity through the influence of Montanism.

Note 15, page 83.

Baur also, in his large work on the Trinity, has left him entirely unnoticed; and Hiinell gives an inaccurate and incomplete picture of him (1. c.). Reuter has justly directed attention (see the "Berliner Jahrbiicher," 1843) to the importance of the man, who was not only ranked among the first by his own age, but stood high in the esteem of Eusebius, was much used by Epiphanius (for example, Haer. 31), and on the ground alone of his work, irpbs airdaas ra<; a!peaei<; (Euseb. H. E. 6, 22; Photius Cod. 121), occupies a high position as an Haeresiologer. We know from Photius that the work commenced with Dositheus, ended with Noetus and the Noetians (Phot. 1. c.), and discussed the Nicolaitanes, Montanists, Cainites, Marcion, and Valentine. The Valentinian sect (of which the Beron referred to in the text was an offshoot) appears to have made an effort at the beginning of the third century to enter into closer connection with the doctrine of the Church. We have previously remarked the same course of procedure adopted by the school of Marcion. This is proved, after his fashion, by Apelles, who inclined towards Valentinianism; by Alexander (Tertull. "de Carne Christi" 15, 16), who taught that Christ truly suffered; and by the afore-mentioned Beron. For the rest, in considering VOL. II. 2 F

the question of the genuineness of the writings of Hippolytus, we must take our start from the fragment of his work against the heresies, entitled "Against the Heresy of Noetus." That the haeresiological work with which Eusebius was acquainted, and which Epiphanius used, was identical with that read by Photius, no one will doubt. But as the work seen by Photius concluded with Noetus, and the fragment extant on Noetus, which was invariably attributed to Hippolytus, not only concludes in a manner suitable to the termination of an entire work, but begins also in such a manner as to show that it is a fragment, and not a homily, as the title of the Vatican manuscript represents it; nay more, the fragment of a work in which other heresies had been spoken of, consequently of an haeresiological work,—we have every reason for assuming it to be the last part of the work with which Eusebius and Epiphanius were acquainted. To this must be added, that Gelasius, Bishop of Rome (Fabric. 1, 225) adduces a passage which is identical with c. 18 of our fragment, the commencement being taken from c. 11 and 12 or 17. Still more striking are the inner grounds. For the views of the author are so peculiar, that they could no longer have been put into the mouth of an orthodox teacher of the Church even in the fourth century. They set before us the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity at a stage at which it had not yet been warned by Arianism of the consequences of teaching that the Son first attained an hypostatical existence outside of the divine sphere, at the creation of the world. The author still adhered to that more harmless form of Subordinatianism, the very inner inconsistency of which impelled it to further progress and to the exclusion of all inadequate elements; and there could be no doubt whatever that, when the time arrived for deciding between Athanasius and Arius, he could not possibly feel drawn towards the latter. He had not yet reached the stage at which Origen stood; on the other hand, we find that, as compared with Tertullian, he took up a more decidedly antagonistic position relatively to the continuous patripassian movements. The work, therefore, of which this fragment formed a part, must be concluded, on inner grounds, to have been written between Tertullian and Origen; and this would exactly suit Hippolytus, who is said, by Gelasius, Bishop in Arabia, to have addressed a letter to the wife of Philippus Arabus. This fragment shall furnish us, to use one of his own figures, with the warp into which we shall weave our image of Hippolytus. I further believe myself justified in describing as genuine, among the works bearing upon Christology, that which treats of Antichrist. As he occupied himself greatly with chronological studies, and wrote a commentary on Daniel (compare Fabr. 1, 272); and as the Catenae on the first three Gospels (compare on Matt. xxiv.; Luke xxi.) show that he had bestowed much thought on the subject of Antichrist; and, finally, as the style and thoughts are both archaic (Photius makes the same remark),—there seems to me to be no ground for doubting the genuineness of the work. Further, in it Hades plays a great role (c. 11, 45); hence also the work, Xoyos 7ry>o? "EXXrjvas, of which the treatise entitled Kcna JTXarmva (Fabr. 1, 220 ff.) formed a part, and the fragment in A. Mai's Coll. Nova (7, 12), may very fairly be assigned to him. With the Christological principles of the treatise against Noetus, and of the work on Antichrist, harmonizes also the X0709 el<; rd ar/ia Oeo<f>dveia: compare c. 6 with c. Noet. 18. Chapter Third of these homilies appears indeed to contain the doctrine that Mary remained a virgin even subsequently to the birth of Christ, against which Tertullian strongly protests. But, in the first place, even the discourse at the Feast of Epiphany, attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgusx contains this doctrine; in the second place, perhaps Tertullian's serious defence of the true view may be a sign that an antagonistic view was beginning to be taught; and, in the third place, another explanation of the passage seems to me to be more probable than the one referred to (see Note 3, page 95). This doctrine may have been first taught by Docetists, who were willing to recognise the birth of Christ,—for example, by the Valentinians,—and have then commended itself to the Church of this age on other grounds. Indeed, the history of Montanism shows a similar course of things. The teachers of the second century, and in particular Tertullian, were concerned to assert the complete truth of the incarnation of Christ on quite different principles from Hippolytus, as we shall soon see. As far as concerns the remaining fragments, that of Mai 7, 134, is preserved in Latin by Leontius (Fabr. 1, 266), in greater compass; that of Mai, p. 68, we possessed previously in Greek (c. Beron. Fabr. 1, 227). The fragment (Fabr. 1, 266) from his commentary on Genesis is attested by Jerome; and the fragments, Fabr. 1, 267-269, by Theodoret. The remaining Christological fragments from the commentary on Genesis (Fabr. 2, 22-31), and the "Demonst. c. Jud." (Fabr. 2, 2-5), are as far from causing difficulty as the trinitarian and Christological fragments, 1, 267 to 281. Doubt may be thrown on the fragment 1, 282, because of the superscription taken in conjunction with its doctrine of the Eucharist. On the other hand, the work irepl yapiapArav is above suspicion, with the exception of the uncertain title; though there is nothing in it of importance for our purpose, if we except the confession of faith (246), which is brief, simple, and archaic in its character. Spurious, on the contrary, is that communicated by Joannes Antioch. (Fabr. 2, 32), which is completely Monophysitic in tone, and contradictory of all the accredited Christological views of Hippolytus.

Note 16, page 89.

Herewith Hippolytus aimed at showing that he was justified in giving to the Logos also the name Son. It is very remarkable that the Monarchians, to whom he was opposed, raised no objection to the use of the word Logos, nor even against the position that the Logos became flesh. But they protest, as against an innovation, a l~evov, against identifying the Logos with the uto?, in that they explain the word X070? so that it retains no hypostatical significance, and assert that this was the sense in which it was used by John. 'IcBai/1^7s fiev ycip Xe7et Xcyyov, aW' aXkw; aWr)yopei. Two things herein are remarkable. Firstly, we see again the groundlessness of Baur's argumentation, that Patripassianism furnishes an indirect but powerful testimony against the authority or genuineness of the Gospel of John, seeing that the doctrine of the Logos plays a great role with John, and that it was rejected by the Patripassians. For, inasmuch as both understood how to get over the difficulty, by adopting a peculiar interpretation, John could by no means have brought about a collision. On the contrary, the adherents of this tendency believed the Gospel of John to furnish the strongest scriptural proofs in their favour. In the second place, the assertion of the opponents, that it was something new to identify the Logos with the Son, and thus to ensure to the Son a premundane hypostatical existence, if it deserve credit, introduces us very plainly to an age in which all alike were thoroughly convinced that the higher nature of Christ was of one substance with God; but in which also the inclination to assert for that higher nature an hypostasis of its own, which we found so strong and lively at the commencement of the second century and subsequently, had almost died out in the neighbourhood of Noetus. The reason whereof being, that the Christian mind had laid firm hold on that which it considered preliminarily to be the main point; to wit, that the person of the eternal God Himself had drawn near to men in Christ, which seemed possible, without ascribing to the Son an independent hypostasis of His own. Even the Fatripassians could say, The wisdom, the understanding, the omnipotence of God, became man in Christ; and, in point of fact, they recognised the eternity of the hypostasis which appeared in Him even more fully than the Church teachers whom we have noticed, for they conceived the one hypostasis acknowledged by them—that is, God Himself, the Father—to have personally appeared in Christ. Therein lies also a further evidence of the high antiquity of this work, nay, even of its composition during the first half of the third century. For, as the indifference to the hypostasis of the Logos and of the premundane Son, which was so markedly a characteristic of Tertullian, presupposed the entire course of the doctrine of the Logos depicted above, so, on the other hand, no later writer could have made the concession made by Hippolytus (c. 15 init.), that the identification of the Logos with the Son, who had always been conceived to be hypostatical, was a new thing, although justified by Faul and Apocalypse xix. 11. When we ask historically, what was new and what was old, we must undoubtedly reply,—It was new to employ the word Son, in this distinctly doctrinal sense, to denote the momentum of personality; for at an earlier period the term, Son of God, had been applied, not merely to the pre-existent second hypostasis, but also to the entire earthly personality of Christ—a thing which now, when writers aimed at greater precision, was no longer suffered, or suffered solely out of regard for the higher nature of Christ. This clearly defined use of the word owed its rise to the necessity (a necessity whose grounds we have previously pointed out) of establishing the hypostasis of the Son by other means than by the doctrine of the Word and the Sophia, the union of which in the Logos, after the manner indicated, sufficed solely to establish the divine essence of the Son. The perception of this necessity impelled the Church to endeavour to seek another basis of the hypostasis of the Son; but it was tempted to aim at securing this object, in the first instance, by connecting the genesis of the hypostasis of the Son with the genesis of the world: thus, of course, gliding into thoughts of an Arian tendency,—not, indeed, in relation to the essence, certainly, however, in relation to the personality of the Son. That from the days of Tertullian onwards, stirred especially by the influence of Patripassianism, the Church aimed with renewed energy at asserting for the Son a distinct hypostasis,—this was old; for that the higher nature of Christ was a pre-existent divine hypostasis, had long been allowed to be a fact, although, as we have remarked, less attention had been bestowed on it from the end of the second century onwards. But the mode of establishing that He was or became a person was new; for earlier writers had not gone so far as, out of regard to the divine unity, to remove the hypostatical element in the Son outside of the inner divine sphere. This new feature soon became antiquated, it is true, and passed away; indeed, those who insisted on it could not avoid falling into the Arianism which they did not desire to adopt. To the praise, however, of the Church teachers whom we here have in view, it must be said, that they did their best to oppose that Arian tendency, which threatened to reduce the hypostasis, and not merely the hypostatical element, of the Son to a mere creature. And that not only by always requiring truly divine essence to be attributed to the Son, but also by endeavouring to bring the Son, although outside and alongside of God, yet into the most intimate relation to the inner Logos of the Father. Tertullian, as we have seen, aimed at pointing out the existence of the potence of Sonship and incarnation in the inner, eternal essence of God, the inner Word; Hippolytus appropriated to the X070? aaapico<; in God, also the name of Son, in particular on account of His destiny to incarnation,—a course which he himself, as we have said, allows to be to a certain extent an innovation, but which was at the same time in agreement with Scripture. Its adoption may be taken as an indication that he was unwilling, and very justifiably, to be content with an hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, whose origin and subsistence lay outside of the inner essence of God; and that he felt compelled to give it a seat in the inmost sphere of the divine. This effort, as, on the one hand, it was evidently closely allied to the tendency which prevailed in the earlier days of the Church's existence (a thing to which Patripassianism also, in its peculiar way, testifies), so, on the other hand, it was the forerunner of that doctrine of the Trinity which was laid down by the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea, and which made its appearance in the course of the third century, so soon as the Arian elements contained in the systems of the Church teachers, above referred to, began to be consolidated to an independent and self-consistent whole. The remark just made remains true, although we should have to grant that the attempt to unite the hypostasis of the Son with the inner Logos could not realize its object, so long as no other basis of the doctrine of the Trinity was discovered in God Himself than the illusory one of the multiplicity of the divine attributes (for example, wisdom). That this was insufficient, is clear alone from the consideration, that a Trinity does not result at all, if the divine attributes are to be taken as so many potences of hypostases. In that case, to reply to Hippolytus with Hippolytus himself, God is 71-0X11?, not a Trinity. Furthermore, until the conception formed of God had been transformed, and thus a different foundation laid for the distinctions of the Trinity, that connection of the wisdom and omnipotence of God with the mundane Son involved a partial retrocession to the very ground which had just been quitted, with the design of establishing the hypostasis of the Son on a surer footing than the doctrine of the Logos was able to afford. But although we perceive here a remainder of the obscuration of the insight which we have praised above, this defect is fully counterbalanced by the consideration, that the reduction of the mundane Son back to the inner divine essence, thus commenced, was also the commencement of the rejection of creatural and Arian features from His hypostasis. So that the very same thing which we found accomplished during the second century in relation to the essence of the Son, we now find accomplished in relation to His hypostasis. For, in the second century, the Logos was brought far nearer to the essence of the created world than was the case in the third ;— He was conceived to he immediately (that is, without the mediation of ethical categories) the world itself, in its ideal aspect, the Koafw; vorjros; on which view, justice could not be done to the idea of creation. That was cast aside towards the end of the century through the acquisition of the "stamina" of the Christian idea of God, during the conflict with the many forms of Gnosticism; and although we can trace the influence of the earlier theory in Tertullian, who regarded the inner divine Logos as also the idea of the world; and although the entire distinction between the inner Logos and the mundane Son bore a certain analogy to the doctrine of the Xo'yo? evBtaOero<; and irpo<popircb<; rejected by Irenaeus, we must not forget to notice the step taken in advance, in that the X070s evZtd#6'7-o? and irpotpopucos, in its new, higher potence, was no longer represented as containing the idea of the world, both as resting in God and as actually realized, but was rather taken to denote the inner divine reason on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the reason after it had become hypostatical, or a Son. In other words, the distinction now drawn between Logos and Son, instead of relating as heretofore to the product, in the idea of the world, related to the idea of God Himself; although, in the first instance, a precipitate resort was made to the world, in order to secure the hypostasis—not the divine essence—of the Son.

Note 17, page 97.

Patripassians of the earlier kind failed also to advance beyond the idea of a theophany. So that the result described above in connection with the Trinity, reappears also in connection with Christology:—the teachers of the Church at this period still stand on the same basis as their opponents. Clinging as they still did to their premises, they were unable to attain the mastery over them. It is instructive to observe how the doctrine of the absolute unchangeableness of God led the teachers of the Church to the like theophanical result, as the doctrine of the immediate passibility of God, held by their opponents of the so-called Patripassian school. Both were necessitated to regard the humanity as impersonal, as a mere husk of God. We have already indicated that the idea of God, which on both sides was still dominated by physical categories, only needed to be taken in an ethical sense, in order to the doing of full justice to the immutability of God on the one hand, which the Patripassians misapprehended, and on the other hand, to open up the prospect of a much more intimate participation of God in the finite, without endangering His divine essence, than Hippolytus judged admissible.

Note 18, page 110.

De princip. 1, 2, 2:—" Quomodo extra hujus sapientiae generationem fuisse aliquando Deum Patrem vel ad punctum momenti alicujus quis potest sentire vel credere—? Aut enim non potuisse Deum dicet generare sapientiam antequam generaret, ut eam, qua? ante non erat, postea genuerit, ut esset; aut, potuisse quidem et, quod dici de Deo nefas est, noluisse generare, quod utrumque et absurdum et impium esse omnibus patet, id est, ut aut ex eo, quod non potuit, Deus proficeret ut posset, aut cum posset, dissimularet ac differret generare sapientiam. Propter quod nos semper Deum Patrem novimus unigeniti Filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis, sine ullo tamen initio, non solum eo, quod aliquibus temporum spatiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem, quod sola apud semetipsam mens intueri solet, et nudo ut ita dixerim intellectu atque animo conspicari. § 4 : Est namque ita aeteraa ac sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatus ex luce. Non enim per adoptionem spiritus Filius fit extrinsecus, sed natura Filius est. § 7: Deus lux est; Splendor hujus lucis est unigenitus Filius ex ipso inseparabiliter velut splendor ex luce procedens. §10: Pater non potest esse quis si filius non sit. The Father is not omnipotent prior to the birth of wisdom; per filium omnipotens est pater. Ever created thing accidentem habet justitiam vel sapientiam, et quod hoc quod accedit, etiam decidere potest, gloria ejus sincera et limpidissima esse non potest. Sapientia vero Dei, quae est unigenitus Filius ejus, quoniam in omnibus inconvertibilis est et incommutabilis et substantiae in eo omne bonum est, quod utique mutari atque converti nunquam potest, idcirco pura ejus ac sincera gloria praedicatur. 4,2, 8: Sicut lux nunquam sine splendore esse potuit, ita nee Filius quidem sine Patre (Pater sine Filio ?) intelligi potest, qui et figura expressa substantiae ejus et Verbum et

Note 21, page 120.

Baur (1. c. 204 ff.) gives it as his opinion, that Origen vacillates between a generation out of God's will, and a generation out of God's essence; and refers to " in Joann." T. xx. 16, as containing the former view. The point, however, is to discover the cause of this vacillation. Had Baur taken this course, he would perhaps have been able to confine the vacillation within very narrow limits. Neander starts with the view—one with which I am unable to agree—that the doctrine of the identity of the essence of the Son with that of the Father was gradually arrived at, and first clearly taught in the West, during the third century; that, on the contrary, Subordinatianism had its home in the East, from the days of Origen onwards; and that, in order to exclude Emanatism, Origen assumed that the Son originated from the will of God. The first-mentioned point is contradicted both by Patripassianism and by a whole series of Church teachers of the second century; and the Subordinatianism of Tertullian and Novatian, so far from being weaker than that of Origen, is, taking all things into consideration, stronger. As far as concerns Emanatism, Origen, it is true, was opposed to it in its coarsely sensuous forms; he could neither allow of a division in God (airoKom-rj), nor of a "fatum" above God, necessitating the Father to the generation of the Son. But he was not therefore obliged to represent the generation of the Son solely as a matter of the "liberum arbitrium" of God. He did not even trace the origin of the world to that "liberum arbitrium." On the contrary, he held that the divine will was the unity of freedom and necessity. If, however, it should be replied,—The existence of the Son is undoubtedly not accidental, in the sense, namely, in which the world's existence is not accidental; but still the Son, no less than the world, owes His existence to that divine will in which freedom and necessity are combined; out of the divine essence, on the contrary, neither the world nor the Son is derived ;—we shall shortly give it closer consideration. Eitter (see his "Geschichte der christlichen Philosophic" i. 493, 501) represents the Son as brought forth by the will of the Father, though out of His essence. He justly recognises that the essential tendency of Origen's teachings was to show that the entire fulness of the Deity dwelt in the Son; and that the Son is not to be regarded as a creature, but as the creative spirit, the true Mediator, of equal perfection with the Father. The subordination of the Son and the appearance of a commixture with creatures did not attach to the doctrine which he really meant to teach, but merely to the imperfect development thereof: they were a remnant of the sensuous ideas, which prevented him from seeing the difference between the dependence of the Son as generated, and the dependence of creatures. The assumption of the imperfection of the creation must also have reacted on the conception he formed of the creative power of God (that is, of the Son, or Word). Possibly, however, a certain degree of subordination may be shown to be grounded in Origen's conception of God; but no less also His equality with the Father.

Note 22, page 129.

The chief passages relating to this personification (Personwerdung) of the divine will in the Son, who proceeded independently eternally forth from the divine "Mens" (Augustine uses the word "memoria"), through the self-duplication of God, are collected in Note 1, page 125. In the "de princ." 1, 2, 6, he teaches, that to describe Him as the image of God, is to affirm "naturse ac substantia: patris et filii unitatem. Si enim omnia, quae facit pater, hsec et filius facit similiter, in eo,— imago patris in filio deformatur, qui utique natus ex eo est velut quaedam voluntas ejus ex mente procedens. Et ideo ego arbitror, quod sufficere debeat voluntas patris ad subsistendum hoc, quod vult pater. Volens enim non alia via utitur, nisi qua consilio voluntatis profertur." It might appear as though, in the last words, he returned completely to the stage at which Tertullian and Hippolytus stood, apportioning all to the will instead of to the essence of God. We must not, however, overlook the "ideo," which refers to what has gone before. God's will being of such a nature that it can personally objectify itself in the duplication of God, therefore, says he, it appears to me unnecessary to resort to anything else than the will; in other words, if the divine will were merely creative, we should have to leave it out of consideration in the present case. If Origen had intended, as Baur maintains (1. c. p. 207), by the mention of the will, to represent the origin of the Son as the work of a kind of divine caprice, he must have contradicted his own position, that for the Father to have a Son, a perfect image, was a good; and that to bring forth the Son belonged as truly to the essence of the Father as brightness belongs to light. Moreover, Origen does not allow the existence of such a thing as caprice in God. But he does not even content himself with a creation of the Son by the will of the Father, grounded-in rational necessity or rational freedom. For, apart from the consideration that the idea of an immediately creative will of the Father was something foreign to his conception of God, he says (see Note 1, page 116, and Note 19, Appendix), He was the divine Will proceeding forth from the divine "Mens;" He was the will as proceeding; how can He have been created by this will? The words "consilio voluntatis profertur" exclude all caprice; though, at the same time, they are an outflow of the defect already mentioned, of conceiving the Father to be self-conscious in and by Himself, and not in and with the Son. But the idea of purpose, of decree, cannot lie in the word "consilio;" for that would involve His being a creature, and contradict Rom. i. 5, according to which the Son cannot be the object of a divine decree. In the original Greek probably stood yvcofiy, which was intended to set forth the divine will, which emanates and becomes a person, as conscious; that is, it was intended to set aside the passivity and unconsciousness which attach to the common Emanatism. With this explanation harmonizes the immediately following polemic against such emanatistic doctrines. "Magis ergo," he concludes, "sicut voluntas procedit e mente (this favourite expression of Origen's shows that he deemed the so-called generation of the Son to be quite as truly His own act as the act of the Father) et neque partem aliquam mentis secat neque ab ea separatur aut dividitur, tali quadam specie putandus est Filium genuisse, imaginem scilicet suam, ut sicut ipse invisibilis est per naturam, ita imaginem quoque invisibilem genuerit.—Imago ergo est invisibilis Dei patris Servator noster; quantum ad ipsurn quidem patrem, Veritas, quantum autem ad nos, quibus revelat patrem, imago est, per quam cognoscimus patrem."

Note 23, page 140.

We can scarcely do otherwise than characterize it as play, when some make the play on words in which Origen indulges the corner-stone of his doctrine, deducing from his derivation of ifrvyrj from yfrvXco, and his supposition that y^vyrj denotes cooled down irvevfia, the conclusion that he conceived Christ's soul also to be not entirely free from impurity. When Baur—not very confidently, it is true—gives utterance to this conjecture, he overlooks the numberless passages in which the perfect sinlessness of the soul of Christ is maintained in the strongest terms (compare ad Rom. 3, 8; 6, 12; in Joann. T. xx. 17; de princ.

2, 6, 3, 4, 5; 4, 31), and has not properly considered Origen's course of thought; otherwise he would have seen that the accessibility of the soul to suffering, and its subjection to finitude, as taught by him, was based, not on the guilt, but on the love of Christ, which condescended to us and became a curse for us. In Paul also was a reflection of this love, which neither vanishes nor cools down, in that it is ready to become a curse for others, but during its humiliation remains what it was as love, though, instead of enjoying the blessedness naturally belonging to it, sympathizingly makes the unhappiness of the brethren its own (compare the passages quoted, page 134 f.). In general, moreover, Origen did not understand yfrvyjj to mean merely something cooled down, but frequently something substantially good; nor did he regard the human soul as a mere cooled down irvevfia. Thus he calls the Logos the soul of God, speaks very frequently of holy souls, and therefore uses tyvxrj in its usual sense of an individual spiritual being, which also, as such, may proceed forth from the hand of God: compare ad Rom. iii. 8. The soul of Christ was foreordained to be a sacrifice; de Martyr. 47; Xoyiiaj i{nryrj. In Joann. T. xiii. 25,yjrt^?) Sucaia; xiii.

3, Oeiorepai yfri^al; T. x. 16, Bvvarai Kox (pvaei lepov elvcu 17 ev<pvrj<; ev X6ycp "tyvxrj Bih rbv crvfnre<f>vKOra Aoyov: 13, 43; 20, 7. The acrrpa also are e/ty|ri^a, and the Logos 1/x.i/rir^o?. In Joann. T. ii. 25, xiii. 25.

Note 24, page 141.

Compare de princ. 2, 1, 2; 3, 3; and the passage quoted above, 2, 6, 3, 5; 3, 5, 7, 8; c. Cels. 8, 72; ad Rom. L. 5, 10. Origen's conception of freedom was by no means so formal as appears commonly to be supposed. His doctrine of a final airoicardarcu7is, after all possible delays, relapses, purifications, shows clearly that he looked upon grace as a power which overarches even freedom, without, however, exercising physical constraint. He regards not merely choice or caprice as freedom, but whatever stress he lays on the middle momentum or stadium of the idea of freedom, represents it as preceded by the essential connection of the spiritual nature with the Logos, or by essential freedom; and, on the other hand, in that perfect love which is the goal, he sees neither the possibility of evil nor unfreedom, but rather the union of freedom and ethical necessity. At all the lower stages, says he, ad Rom. L. v. 10, a relapse is possible; but where there is the love of the whole heart, it preserves from the possibility of a fall. If, as the Apostle says, nothing can separate us from the love of God, the faculty of choice camwt separate us. It remains, it is true; but the power of love is so great, that it draws all powers and all virtues to itself, especially since the love of God manifested itself as prevenient. The free grace which apparently renounces the law, establishes the rule of love in opposition to caprice and to freedom of choice.

Note 25, page 147.

The correctness of the above exposition, which starts with the conviction that Origen is by no means chargeable with vacillation in his teachings regarding God, but, on the contrary, remained in the main self-consistent throughout,—that, in agreement with this his conception of God, he always, and very distinctly, assigned essentially the same position respectively to the Logos, to Christ, and to the world,—and that he by no means at one time conceived the entire divine essence to be present, for example, in Christ, and at another time regarded the Logos as a mere creature,—finds confirmation in the circumstance, that it appears to furnish an explanation of his strange doctrine of several worlds successively following upon each other. As God is the goal of the world, and His inmost essence abstraction from all multiplicity and finitude, the world is threatened, the nearer it approaches perfection, the more with complete absorption into God: nay more, in order to attain perfection, it must be raised above its own nature; in other words, it must really cease to exist. Feeling this, Origen was driven to seek for a counterpoise, especially as he held the existence of the world to be a great good for God Himself. For this reason, he keeps the world as long as possible undergoing processes of purification,—processes which he represents as continuing even after the resurrection. On the same ground, also, he leaves the matter open, and conceives it as a possibility, which may become an actuality, that freedom should, by renewed apostasy, prolong that relative independence of God, which he was able to deem perfect solely outside of God, not in Him. And thus the unreconciled antagonism between finite and infinite in his system assumed the form of a doctrine of objective alternating worlds; and the same thing assumed subjectively the form of an alternation between mystery and revelation (see Martensen's "Meister Eckart"). With this is further intimately connected another point. Corporeality he represents at one time as the product of sin, or at all events as the seal of imperfection, the existence of which is therefore threatened when it approaches perfection: at another time, he deems it to be that through which the ideal world first becomes a reality; and accordingly posited its existence as eternal. That perfection would bring at once the most intimate union with God, and the most complete confirmation of individuality, Origen was as yet unable to see; because he neither viewed individuality as a work of God, nor reckoned it as a part of the divine creation. He regarded it as grounded, not in God's idea of the world, but solely in the freedom of man. Thus viewed, however, it had a very doubtful existence. The eternal and true element in the idea of the world does not extend to the concrete and individual, but is merely the potential creation, the teoa/io? Votjtos. The actual world, on the contrary, in his representation, hovers constantly, so to speak, between existence and non-existence; and accordingly very much that he posits at one time, becomes at another time doubtful. This alternation between position and negation, however, which characterizes his system at so many points, was grounded, not in caprice and unsteadiness, but in his conception of God, which still suffers from the contradiction of constituting the lowest and most abstract determination the inmost essence and highest element of God, though Origen himself elsewhere saw clearly enough that the spiritual determinations are the highest. It was reserved, however, for the teachers of a later period to perceive the erroneousness of Origen's notion, that the divine essence contained within itself a fulness of VOL. II. 2 G

qualities, of which those embodied in the divine volition and knowledge are but a feeble copy; and to acknowledge that spiritual love is itself the inmost essence of God, His uncreated being; and that consequently the Son, if He be actually in relation to will and intelligence of a truly divine nature, may also be of one substance with the Father. The task then becomes to establish the distinction between the Father and the Son in another way; for this distinction could not be established without subordinatian and modalistic vacillations, so long as the Father was identified with the ungenerated divine essence, instead of the same essence being attributed to the Son equally with the Father. If we take for granted at the very outset that the true distinction cannot be established unless we suppose that the Father, for the sake of knowing Himself, objectified His knowledge and will eternally in the Son, we find Origen far removed therefrom; for he believed the Father to know Himself in Himself, and not in the Son, His image. Still we may say,—Origen also represents the Father as becoming objective, and, as issuing forth out of the inner depths of His being, in the Son, who is His evipyeia; but He did not contemplate Himself in the Son as in the mirror of Himself, but merely an imperfect image, not equal to the one only archetype, Himself.

Note 26, page 153.

Baur has rightly directed attention to the fact, that Marcionitism (which even during the fifth century, to judge from Theodoret's letters, had many adherents in the East, and, according to the above exposition, was intimately allied with Patripassianism) subsequently passed over into Manichaeism. The occasion thereof was the rigid antagonism posited between Law and Gospel. But Sabellianism also offered a point of connection for this antagonism, in that it represented the earlier revelations as disappearing when a new one was given; for example, the law disappeared when Christ came. Athanasius also (c. Ar. 4, 23) charges it with dividing the Testaments (Siaipelv T«s BiaOijicas, teal firj rrjv erepav Tt}? erepa<; eyeaOeuMaviyalcovTo iirfn)Sevfia). Manichaeism proper, which arose about the year 260, like Patripassianism, subjected the divine in the world to physical suffering, to wit, through matter; and its doctrine of the "Jesus patibilis omni suspensus ex ligno" (see August. c. Faust. 20, 2; compare Baur's "Das manichaeische Religionssystem," pp. 71 ff.) may be regarded as a cosmological extension, though also a dissipation, of Patripassianism with its more soteriological character. Only in one aspect, it is true; for though both alike attribute suffering in the physical sense to God, Patripassianism represents Him as subjecting Himself thereto by assuming an external, visible shape; whereas Manichaeism teaches that the sufferings of the pure lucific principle arise from an antagonistic primal dark principle. We shall find afterwards that Sabellianism was finally driven to Dualism, and that, with its rigid conception of God, it was unable to allow even of a creation, and was compelled to fall back on an eternal vXrj; but the presages of this course of things are discernible even in the earlier forms of this tendency. For, so far as the one God converts Himself into corporeality, as they in part teach, notwithstanding that they retain their Monism, and only their conception of the one God comprises contradictory elements, the reality of the incarnation and of the birth from Mary was threatened. Now, when the adherents of this system, with a view to escaping the danger of Docetism, represented God as assuming from without that which constituted Him passible, to wit, His body, we have an entrance of God into passible matter, similar to that which Manichaeism sets forth in its "Jesus patibilis," or its Bvvafus iraBrjnKrj. The more, then, all obscuration and darkness are removed outside of the pure divine essence, that is, the more the pure divine essence is fixed in its immutability, the more, as we shall see, does the Sabellian system become affected by Dualism, until at last it is unable to allow the one Divine Being to be even the cause of the world, and is therefore necessitated to represent the world as having its principle in itself, and as a second primal principle standing over against the first. Clearly, however, Sabellianism contained this Dualism merely in the form of a consequence, of which its adherents were partially unconscious, whereas it was the constitutive principle of Manichaeism. Sabellianism differs essentially, not only from Manichaeism, but also from the milder Platonic form of Dualism, in that it scarcely occupied itself at all with the question of the creation of the world, and limited its inquiries entirely to the already existing world; the other two systems were decidedly cosmogonical. The same remark may be made also of the Sabellianism of Schleiermacher. This is not the place to give a more detailed account of the Manichaean Christology. Compare Baur, who says (1. c. p. 407),—" The Christ of Manichaeism has nothing but the name in common with the Christ of Christianity." It is an expression catachrestically, traditionally adopted. The Manichaean Christ is the universal lucific Spirit, enthroned in the sun and moon, the pure efflux of God, represented perhaps as the pure archetypal man, between whom, however, and their "Jesus patibilis," or the seed of light enchained and suffering in every plant, etc., there is a clear difference. The latter is bound and commingled with matter (owa/«? iraQrjrucrj). For whereas the second divine Swafus, the SrjfiiovpyiKrj, the world-forming Svvafus, is only able to set limits to the dominion of matter by bringing the world into order, but was unable to rescue the light-germs confined in it; a third power, Christ, the form which is enthroned on the sun, draws all related elements out of matter upwards to the light of the sun. Baur. 1. c. pp. 205, 291. This Christ, therefore, cannot be born; for birth would bring with it the loss of the purity which gives Him redeeming power. In general, that physical and cosmical process of redemption is by no means connected with the person of the historical Christ, although the Manichaeans frequently use Him as an allegory of the Christ on the sun, to wit, so far as the inmost essence of Jesus, which came to light at His transfiguration on the mount, like the essence of every "Electus," may undoubtedly be designated pure and divine. But quite as truly, and even more fully, is the historical Christ a mere allegory of the "Jesus patibilis," who himself needs redemption in his sufferings. On the Christology of the Priscillianists, who diffused Manichaeism in the East from the fourth century onwards, compare Liibkert's "de Haeresi Priscillianistarum," 1840, pp. 25-29. Similar phaenomena manifest themselves in connection with the Bogomils (compare Gieseler's "de Bogcmilis Comment.") and the Cathari. According to Augustine (ad Oros. c. Priscill. et Orig. C. 4, T. x. 735, ed. Maur. 2 a.), the Priscillianists were Sabellian in their doctrine of the Trinity. It is also allowed that the Sabellians made use of the Gospel of the Egyptians, which contains dualistic elements. Augustine says (1. c.),—" Priscillianus Sabellianum antiquum dogma restituit, ubi ipse pater, qui Filius, qui et Spiritus S. perhibetur." Similarly Orosius, Leo the Great, and others. Leo's terming them, besides, Patripassians, is plainly explicable from the character of their Christology. But when he entitles them also Arians, he is certainly chargeable with inaccuracy, especially in view of the position—" Christum innascibilem esse," which probably related to His divine nature, which it was thus intended to put on a level with the Father (Cone. Tolet. Reg. fid. Anath. 6); though, as Lijbkert justly observes (p. 25), it may undoubtedly be explained from the Emanatism which, according to the same Council, the Priscillianists combined with their Monarchianism, as did also the Arians. "Credimus," says the Council (Anath. 14), "Trinitatem indivisibilem indifferentem; prater hanc nullum credimus divinam esse naturam." The Priscillianists are charged with entertaining the opinion, "esse aliquid, quod so extra divinam Trinitatem possit extendere." It is not likely, however, that they represented these emanations as concrescing into definite hypostases. A cunon of the Synod. Bracarensis says,—" Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem alia nescio qua divinitatis nomina introducit dicens quod in ipsa divinitate sit Trinitas Trinitatis, sicut Gnostici et Priscilliani dixerunt, anathema sit." How it was possible for Sabellians to arrive at propositions concerning a double or triple Trinity of this nature, which had been already laid down by Neo-Platonists, for an explanation see Note 31. As the Pri£ cillianists looked upon the body as the seat and work of the devil, they could not attribute an earthly body to Christ; hence the charge of Docetism brought against them by Leo. According to the Cone. Tol. Anath. 6, they denied also the human soul of Christ. Had they remained simply content with denying to Christ both human body and human soul, they would not have deserved even the title of heretics, for they would have cast aside the fundamental idea and fundamental fact of Christianity. (See Note U, vol. i., on the true conception of Heresy.) With this, however, it does not harmonize to say that they maintained "Deitatis et carnis unam esse in Christo naturam" (1. c. Anath. 13). These words, namely, imply, that they assumed the existence of something analogous to matter in the divine nature itself, of which they took a physical view. In harmony therewith is also the further charge of teaching "Deitatem Christi convertibilem esse et passibileni" (1. c. Anath. 7), which, with their Monarchianism, caused them to be blamed for Patripassianism. This admission of finitude into the nature of God, indicates undoubtedly that the original Dualism had begun to be conciliated and weakened down; but even the old Manichaiism had done the same with its " Jesus patibilis." For this reason I consider unsatisfactory the view to which Liibkert inclines (1. c. pp. 27, 28), plainly through not paying sufficient attention to the many appearances which speak of a rpoirrj of God, or of an origin of the body of Christ from the essence of God,—to wit, that this conversion was not objective, but merely subjective, symbolical or Docetical; the effect of which would be, contrary to his own intention (p. 28), to reduce the entire historical appearance of Christ to a mere illusion. There is the more reason for accepting this supposition, as, according to Leo, they taught the birth of Christ from the Virgin; not, indeed, as Neander rightly remarks, in the sense of the doctrine of the Church, but still in the sense that He passed through Mary with the glorious body which He brought with Him from above, and which He derived from God. They may indeed have supposed that this heavenly or divine body appeared to be sensuous to the sensuous, to the spiritual, spiritual, according to their different power of apprehension; but still a real and objective union of God with the "caro" took place. How far they admitted suffering also into this divine "caro," is difficult to say; at all events, it contains the element of finitude. As they denied the resurrection of Christ, they must have denied either the susceptibility of His body to injury, or the continuance of His corporeality. Against the latter alternative is the objection, that they can scarcely have been willing to give up a body derived from the divine nature to the kingdom of earthly matter. But in that case, Christ's body, which is supposed not to have needed resurrection, cannot have experienced injury and death; in the place of the resurrection must be substituted the ascension; and, accordingly, His sufferings must undoubtedly be deemed Docetical.

Note 27, page 158.

Decidedly favourable thereto is Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25 (see Note 1, page 153). Contrary thereto appears to be the passage 4, 13, where we read,—El roivw f) /toro? irXarvvOelaa yeyove rpids, fj Be fiovas eariv 6 irarrjp, rpiAs Be irarrjp} vtoy, ayiov irvevfuv ivpSyrov fiev, irXarvvOeiaa 17 p.ovas irdOos vrrefieive, ical yeyovev orrep Ovk fy,—to wit, acofiahrXarvvOtj yap Ovk ovaa irKarela. "Emira, el airri) 17 fiovds eirXarvvOrj els rpidBa,6 avrbs dpa irarrjp yeyove ical vlbs ical wevfia Kara XafieWiov eVro? el fir) 17 XeyopAvrj irap avrc o fiovas dWo Tl ecrrt 'rrapd Tov irarepa. Ovk en ovv irXarvveaBai (sc. airbv) eBei Xeyeiv (al. Xoyov) dX\' rj fiovas rpiStv irovryrwrj, coare elvai fiovdSa, elra ical irarepa ical vlbv ical irvevfia. But even it does not prove, either that Sabellius consistently carried out the distinction between the Monas and the Father, or that he gave distinct utterance to it (for otherwise Athanasius could not have spoken so doubtfully regarding it); the utmost it proves is, that Sabellius sometimes verged towards the distinction (compare Neander's "Church History," ed. 2, vol. ii. pp. 1024 f., German Ed.). Baur, on the other hand, following the example of Schleiermacher, is of opinion, that Sabellius distinguished the Monas very clearly from the Father. Sabellius's designating the one God vloirdrcop, Son-Father (Greg. Nyss. Or. c. Ar. et Sabell. in A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 8, Appendix p. 1), does not decide the matter; for we do not know whether to translate,—" The Monas became vioirarcop, that is, both Father and Son;" or, "The Father as unity becomes also Son." The prefixing of vlbs seems to be opposed to the former translation; whereas it is very intelligible if we adopt the latter. This also was the view taken of the matter by Gregory of Nyssa.

Note 28, page 158.

The words of Hilarius in his "de Trin." 7, 39,—"ut in assumto homine se filium Dei nuncupet, in natura vero patrem," etc., might be taken to imply, that as Sabellius designated God in the incarnation Son, so he designated God in nature Father. But "in natura" may also signify "by nature;" for this notice is too isolated, and is too little accredited by Greek Fathers, to permit us to build any argument upon it. Even Athanasius did not know in what relation the irKarvafiol stood to the creation. C. Ar. 4, 14. If, says he, the self-expansion of God did not exist from the very beginning, He must have had a reason for passing over into expansion. What was this reason? After inquiring whether this reason could be that the Father might acquire a Son, or that the incarnation might take place, he says,—el Bl Bia To Kturcu eirKarvvOrj, aroirov. For the Monas cannot have become powerful in consequence of the expansion, but must have been powerful already in itself. Moreover, on that supposition the world would cease to exist when the 7rXarvo~fios was withdrawn. Athanasius quotes elsewhere expressions of Sabellius verbatim (for example, 4, 25). And yet even he was unable to say whether or no Sabellius conceived creation to be one of the purposes of the expansions of God. Against this supposition may be pleaded, too, that he represented God as arriving at a new revelation only after withdrawing from the earlier: this may be carried out to a certain extent in the relation between legislation and Christ, and between Christ and the Holy Ghost; that is, if the significance of Christ is conditioned solely by sin. But how can Sabellius have supposed that the creation would cease, if the revelation begins with the incarnation? (Compare pp. 160 f.)

Note 29, page 159.

Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25:—To the Sabellians the Father must be both Logos and Spirit, in that, irpos T)jv %pelav Ikcujtov apfio^6fievo<;, to the one He is Father, to the other Logos (that is, Son), and so forth. 'A.vdyici) Be Kox iravOfoeaOai To ovo/ia Tov vlov Kox Tov irvevpM.ros, rtjs ypelas irXt)p(oOelarj<;. Basil. Ep. 210,—Tov avrbv Qebv eva ra> inroiceifievip ovra irpbs Ta? «cocrrore 'rrapairnrrova'a<; ypeias fierafiopcpovfievov vvv p.ev <&? irarepa, vvv Be <os vlov, vvv is To ar/wv irvevfia SiaXeyea9ai (a passage without doubt quoted verbatim). Ep. 214,—-'Eva p.ev elvai, rfj viroardxrei Tov Qeov, irpoaairoiroieiaOai Be wo T7?s ypcufxi}<; Bia<popcos, Kara To iBuofin rtjs irrroKeip.evqs iiccurrOre ypela<;, Koj vvv pkv ras irarpucas eavrc o wepiriOivai <po>va<;, Orav Tovtov tempo* Xi Tov irpoacoirov, vvv Be ra? vlq> irpeirovo~a<; vvv Be To Tov irvevfiMro<; inroBveaOcu irpoaayrreiov. Ep. 235,—Tijv avrriv inroaraaiv Trpos Ttjv eKdarOre irapefi-Trnrrovaav ypeiav fieraa^fiarl^eaOcu. August. Tract. in Joann. 53,—"Pro diversitate causarum ipsum dici Filium, ipsum dici Spiritum Sanctum." Of the Son, in particular, Epiph. Haer. 62, 1;—IlefupOevra Tov

vlov Kaipro 7T0r6, u>airep atcriva, Kcii ep^aadfievov To. -rravra ev rco Koafup To. T>j? olKovofuas rr}<; evar/yeTuicrjs Km aanrjpuv; rcov avOpamcov, avaXr)<pOevra Be avOi<; et? ovpavbv, &>? inro rfXlov irefi<f>Oeurav aicrlva, ical irdXiv eh Tov rjkwv avaBpafioucrav.

Note 30, page 160.