Note 1, page 4.

EPIPH. 1. c. 1:—Kal oxrrot rh crrepeh. rov Krjpvyfiaros fief/MnjKcujiv. C. 32 :—Ti co(f>eXei rjpJas rj Tov 'latawov 'AiroicdXtryfris; Whether they rejected the doctrine of the Logos altogether, or not, is not quite clear from what Epiphanius reports. It is true he designates them (c. 3), irainairaaiv dWorplovs rod KrjpvyfiarTo<; T?)s akrjOeias; but, from the connection, we should judge him to refer to their rejection of the Gospel of John. Besides, the name Alogi was given to them, not because of their rejection of the doctrine of the Logos, but because they rejected the strongest witness for it in the canon,—a course the more irrational, as, apart from this critical point (c. 4), T^ 7aa fjpltv irurreveiv Bokovai, and as they protested against being at all charged with the Ebionism and Docetism of Cerinthus. They represent Cerinthus as the author of the Gospel which they repudiate. Epiphanius was quite justified in entertaining a low opinion of such criticism. The isolated voices which in recent times have attached importance to this criticism, have given in their adherence, not to its positive, but solely to its negative aspect, that John was not the author of the Gospel which bears his name. But the two things cannot be separated. On the contrary, an attentive reading of Haer. 51 shows that, in their view, the beginning of the Gospel—which passes so rapidly from the o X07o? aap^ iyevero to the calling and witness of the Baptist; contains no reference to a history of the childhood of Christ; at once brings the Incarnate One into connection with the Baptist; in chapter i. 6 (compare i. 11) appears to represent the Baptist as having made his appearance prior to the incarnation, and first mentions the act of baptism supplementary,—was fitted to favour the heresy of Cerinthus. This is the abrupt feature, the feature favourable to Docetism, which they supposed themselves to find in the Gospel of John; and the contradictions which they discover between the fourth and the other three Gospels may be all reduced to this one point. Herein lies the reason of their doctrinal criticism; and it is useless for Heinichen to attempt to show, on a priori grounds, to wit, from the malice of Epiphanius, and so forth (pp. 42 ff.), that the Alogi attributed the Apocalypse alone to Cerinthus. If they followed the example of others in regard to this latter point, it is easy to see that they might the more strongly incline to use similar language relative to the Gospel; nay more, I should be almost surprised if modern critics did not adopt this view of the prologue, and, with the Alogi, find Cerinthianism in it. What they otherwise say,—namely, that according to the first three Gospels, one Passover alone took place during the official life of Christ; according to John, two,—does not give a very favourable idea of their ability for historical criticism. For the first they derived not from the Synoptics, but from a false explanation of the passage relating to the gracious year of the Lord, rather usual at that time; and the second is false, for, according to John, more than two Easter festivals occurred during the interval between the baptism and the death of Christ. Finally, also, their doctrinal acuteness must have been very limited, or else they could never have so completely failed to see the relation of the Gospel and Epistles of John to Docetism and Ebionism. The Alogi appear to have laid chief stress on the practical intelligence, not without a certain degree of superficial illuminism. Compare Neander's "Church History" 2, 908 (Germ. ed.). They cannot be shown to have had Marcionitic tendencies. We may remark by the way, that the Alogi did not venture to describe the Gospel of John as a new work; but completely harmonized with the tradition of the Church in relation to the date of its composition. Indeed, Cerinthus was a contemporary of the Gospel of John. This testimony, given as it was about the year 170 after Christ, deserves notice. Had they had before them a single trace of the recent origin of the Gospel of John, they must certainly have made it the chief basis of their attack.

Note 2, page 6.

It may be justly questioned whether this Theodotus did deny the supernatural birth of Christ. At all events, the words of Tertullian, in "de prsescr. haeret." 53, imply the contrary,— he maintained that Christ was a mere man, and denied that He was God, though he believed Him to be born of the Holy Ghost from the Virgin Mary, "sed hominem solitarium atque nudum, nulla alia prae coeteris nisi sola justitiae auctoritate." Theodoret also says (Haer. fab. 2, 5),—" He taught the like doctrine with Artemon." The testimony of Epiphanius, who attributes to him the words (Hair. 54),—" Christ was born of the seed of a man,"—cannot prove the contrary. For, in the first place, Epiphanius makes the same remark concerning his school, which, so far as we are acquainted with Theodotus the Argentarius, is not correct. In the second place, it does not follow, from the denial of the birth from a virgin, even if it should be attributed to the elder Theodotus, that he therefore denied the supernatural birth of Christ. For Theodotus might still have assumed a divine act in connection with the origin of Jesus; nay more, he did assume this, according to the testimony of Epiphanius himself. He says that Theodotus appealed to the circumstance of its being written, not "the Spirit of the Lord will be in thee" (yevrjaerai eV aol); but, "the Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee" (Luke i. 35): by which he intended, on the one hand, to acknowledge the action of God in connection with the birth of Christ; and, on the other hand, to exclude the incarnation of the Holy Spirit (compare Epiph. 54, 3), or of the Logos, if with Justin Martyr we understand 'nreCyu.a and Swafiis to signify the X070?. He deemed Christ to be the prophet who mediates between God and men; retaining hold, however, solely on the humanity of Christ, and appealing merely to Deut. xviii. 15; Jer. xvii. 9; Isa. liii. 3; Acts ii. 22; 1 Tim. ii. 5. His mediatorship he undoubtedly regarded as grounded in His higher divine gifts, and, above all, in His righteousness. Nay, further, when we consider that, according to Epiphanius, he was a learned man, who stood in connection with many heretics, and when we remember, besides, that his disciple Theodotus the Vol. 11. 2 E

Money-changer evinced an affinity with the Valentinians, and was the founder of the Melchizedekians, we may very fairly raise the question, whether Epiphanius did not misunderstand the position, "Jesus was born of human seed," if he really did lay it down. For, in the Excerptis Theodoti in Clemens Alexandrinus (whose doctrinal principles Neander, for example, in his "Genetische Entwickelung, etc.," p. 189, attributes to the Money-changer, and which certainly belongs to this school), much is said of the <rrrepfjia apprjvucbv (see 2, 21, 39, 40), from which the elect souls are derived, and Christ in particular (17). In this case, however, the cnrepp. a apjyqviicbv is said to denote Christ's origin from the ao<pia.

Note 3, page 7.

Theodoret, Haer. Fab. 2, 6:—Toiis Be MeXyiaeSeiciavovs rfirjfJM fiev elvcu Toutav (the Theodotians) <f>aal, Kaff ev Bk povov Bia(fxovelv, To Tov MekyiaeBeic riva /eal Oelav /cot fieyurrtjv viroXap.{3dveiv icar' elKova avrov rbv Xpunov yeyevfjaOcu. *Hp^e Be r?)? alpecrems rainrjs ciXXo? QeoBoros apyvpofioifios Tijv reyyrjv. Tertull. de praescript. haeret. 53:—Alter post hunc (after the Byzantine Theodotus) Theodotus haereticus erupit, qui et ipse introduxit alteram sectam, et ipsum hominem Christum tantummodo dicit ex spiritu sancto ex Virgine Maria conceptum pariter et natum, sed hunc inferiorem esse, quam Melchisedech.—Nam illum Melchisedech praecipuae gratiae coelestem esse virtutem, eo quod agat Christus pro hominibus, deprecator et advocatus ipsorum factus: Melchisedech facere pro coelestibus angelis atque virtutibus. Nam esse illum usque adeo Christo meliorem, ut airarmp sit, ap.'fyrmp sit, wyeveaXoyrrros sit, cujus neque initium, neque finis comprehensus sit aut comprehendere possit. Christ is, therefore, merely compared with Melchisedek in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Note 4, page 8.

As further disciples of the elder, we find mentioned Asclepiades, Hermophilus, Apollonides, Natalius (Euseb. 1. c.). So completely do these later Ebionites betray their connection with Gnosticism, which had notwithstanding despised the human aspect of the Person of Christ, that the Theodotus mentioned by Clemens Alexandrinus (Exc. 2) gave even to baptism a similar meaning to that given it by older Gnostics, in order to be quite certain of describing the human aspect of Christ as that which presented the ovala. Instructive in relation to the conception of ovala at this period, is the fragment of Clemens Alexandrinus in Fabric. Opp. Hippolvti, T. 2, 74. The fundamental idea is To Kaff eavrov v<f>eoro<;, whether it be inorganic or <f>vrbv, or efiyfrityov alaOryrucov, £a>oi/, or, in addition to the latter, XoyiKov also, like man. Ovala, therefore, is always the essential element of a thing, its substance. Hence we can see how, in certain circumstances, ovala might be used to denote that which we understand by Ego or personality; only that ovala then stands for the completely undefined notion of personality. In the Trinitarian Controversy, during the fourth century, ovala and Viroaraais were separated. Compare also Ang. Mai Collectio nova, T. 7, 52 ff.; Suicer. Thesaur. s. v.

Note 5, page 12.

Baur 1. c. pp. 297 ff. attributes greater importance to the moral perfection of Christ in connection with His glorification, than the authorities warrant him in doing. Nay more, in opposition to his own account (according to which, on the one hand, divine Wisdom exerted a permanent influence on, and heightened the spiritual and moral power of Christ, and on the other hand, there dwelt in the man Jesus a divine principle, developing itself in Him, p. 298), he remarks in conclusion (p. 305),—" The divine Logos works, it is true, upon the man, but the Logos is properly and essentially merely the inner man himself" (nowhere does Paul go so far, but merely compares the Logos in Christ, in so far as He is a mere quality and not hypostatical, with another common personification, the inner man, which also simply signifies a 7tom>tr??); "and man therefore can, by himself, through the progressive development and perfection of his moral power, arrive at divine dignity." Such an universalization of the divine Sonship cannot be historically established; nor can the idea of the man Jesus raising Himself to perfection by moral power. On the other hand, Neander, in avoiding these faults, has wrongly overlooked the moral element in Christ's irpoKvrrrj and waOriai<;.

Note 6, page 12.

In other respects also, Paul evinced little honesty. Eusehius styles him Kpinfrlvovs, a7rarrjXo? (7, 29). In the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity, he endeavoured to accommodate himself to the Church expressions, Holy Ghost and Word. Thus he teaches also a X070v irpo<fyopucos. Anacephal. 2,146:—X070v irpofopiicbv avrbv (tov Xpiarbv) ayrjuaruras (comp. Theodoret. Haer. Fab. 2, 8). Naturally, this X0709 is impersonal; He is merely God conceived in a particular lirivoia or activity. Eusebius tells us (7, 29), that at the Synod of Antioch, held in the year 269 on Paul's account, a learned presbyter, by name Malchion, compelled him to give utterance to his real opinions, after he had for a long time taken refuge behind ambiguities. At this Synod there were present, besides a great number of other teachers, Firmilian from Cappadocia, the brothers Gregory Thaumaturgus and Athenodorus, and so forth (see Eusebius 7, 28, 30). They all agreed in describing Paul's doctrine as an innovation, a revival of the already condemned heresy of Artemon;—indeed, their confession contained already a more fully developed, far higher doctrine of the Son of God and of Christ. Paul, on the contrary, held an isolated position in the discussions of the Synod. In this respect, there was a marked difference between his age and that of Arius. Artemonites there undoubtedly continued to exist, but they did not hold a position within the Church (Euseb. 5, 28; and 7, 30, ed. Heinichen 1. c. p. 404). Still, Paul does not seem to have entirely lacked disciples, although they too were excluded after the Synod of Antioch (compare Athan. de Synod. c. 26). It is simply one of that scholar's daring, but historically unjustifiable propositions, when Baur (1. c. p. 305) maintains that Paul's view, and that too in the form in which he gives it (see Note 5), is to be regarded as a general type of a determinate doctrinal system. It is true, he was Bishop of Antioch, where we shall find kindred views subsequently upheld by Lucian, but still Lucian himself was very different from Paul.

Note 7, page 19.

Compare, besides the above, Melito in Routh 1, 115;—he taught Qebv 6p.ov re ical avOpayrrov riXewv, Bvo ovalas: further— To aki)9e<; ical cupavraarbv Tt)? "tyvyfjs avrov Kcu rov crcofidrOS rfpi Kaff fjfias avOpcoirlvrjs <pvaeco<;. Further, may be compared Socrates, H. E. 3, 7 :—Ovtco yap iravres oi 'rrakcuorepoi irepl Tovtov X6yov yvpvvdaavres eyypcupov rjfilv Karikiirov ical yap Elprjvaios re Kox Kxtj/itj?, ''AiroXivapw<; re o 'IepairoXirtj<; ical Xepairlav efiyfrvyov Tov evavOpwirqaavra iv rols irovrjOeiaiv avrols Xoyoi s d>? ofwKcr/ovfievov avroi<; (pcuTKOvaw ov firjv aXXa Kox t) Sia BijpvWov Tov <£tXa8eX$1'a? 777s ev A pa ft'ia hrUricoirov yevofievrj avvoho<; ypd<povaa BrjpvWqt ra avra irapaBiSaicev. ,Slpir/evrjs Be iravraypv iv rot? (pepofievois avrov ftifiXluK, efiyfrvXpv Tov ivavOpmirrjaavra dlSev. Eusebius and Pamphilos testify that Origen, he goes on to say, was not the first to lay down the principle; aXka rrjv Tt}<; etwcXijatkw pA)<rriicrjP ipfi^vevaai iraparBoaiv. These words, like the commencement of the chapter, in which he believed it necessary as it were to justify Athanasius and the bishops of the Synod of Alexandria who taught that Christ had an human soul against the charge of innovation, sufficiently prove that that doctrine had not, up to this time, been completely adopted by the Church;—neither as to all the momenta thereof, nor with sufficient insight into the full consequences of its denial.

Note 8, page 20.

Adv. Prax. 20, 26. When Baur (1. c. p. 254) maintains that the polemic of these Monarchians (as also of the Alogi) against the Church's doctrine of the hypostatical Logos is incompatible with the supposed fact of the Gospel of John having already long been in existence and operation in Asia, I can only say, that I am surprised, and that it betrays a misapprehension of the course of development run by the doctrine of the Logos.—What was it not possible for heretics to do, who, to use the words of Irenaeus, like bad wrestlers, were accustomed to lay convulsive hold on one member of the truth? Finally, like Theodotus of Byzantium, Praxeas also recognised the Gospel of John, though he at the same time clung to his theory; not to mention other more recent and more pertinent cases (compare adv. Prax. 23-25). As to the Romish Church, that is, the pretendedly Ebionitical Church,—if it had been really Ebionitical, it must plainly have taken the greatest offence at Praxeas. Whereas, on the contrary, we know from Tertullian that at first he found in Rome much sympathy, even with the Bishop himself. How is it possible, then, to regard the favourable reception accorded to Praxeas as a proof of the Ebionism of the Church at Rome in the second century? Supposing the Church did incline to Patripassianism prior to the coming of Praxeas, they must have believed that the Most High God Himself appeared in Christ, though not a particular hypostasis;—for regard to the divine unity prevented them believing the latter. If we take into consideration, that the teachers who at that time taught most definitely that the Son was a distinct hypostasis, did not free themselves from a certain measure of Subordinatianism, which was favourable to Arianism or Ebionism, we are compelled to say,—Patripassianism was really further from Ebionism than these teachers of the Church; and that, what was intended to prove the Ebionism of the Romish Church, is a proof to the contrary. A fresh warning not to treat the ideas, "Judaizing Christianity" and " Ebionism," as interchangeable. Judaizing the Patripassians may be termed, because they clung so rigidly to the unity of God in the Old Testament sense; but they were not therefore Ebionites. For the one God in whom they believe, does not abide shut up in Himself, but manifests His essence in the form of actuality; appears in, nay more, becomes, a man.

Note 9, page 23.

The passage runs as follows (c. 27) :—" Et de hoc quaerendum, quomodo sermo sit caro factus. Utrumne quasi transfiguratus in carne, an indutus carnem? Immo indutus. Ceterum Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut aeternum. Transfiguratio autem interemtio est pristini. Omne enim, quodcunque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse, quod f uerat, et incipit esse, quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse.—Si ex transfiguratione et demutatione substantiae caro factus est, una jam erit substantia Jesus ex duabus, ex carne et spiritu mixtura quaedam, ut electrum ex auro et argento, et incipit nee aurum esse, i. e. spiritus, neque argentum, i. e. caro, dum alterum altera mutatur et tertium quid efficitur. Neque ergo Deus erit Jesus, sermo enim desiit esse, qui caro factus est; neque caro, i. e. homo, caro enim non proprie est, qui sermo fuit. Ita ex utroque neutrum est, aliud longe tertium est, quam utrumque." Hippolytus informs us that this was the view held by Beron. My opinion is not that Praxeas actually taught the view in question; but that it appeared to Tertullian a possible and nearly-lying deduction from his theory—nay more, to constitute a proper termination thereto. We may here beforehand direct attention to the circumstance, that Beron in Hippolytus, and at a later date Apollinaris, arrived at similar conclusions from similar premises. Servetus and Schwenkfeld are examples of the same thing in recent times.

Note 10, page 28.

Epiphan. h«r. 57, 8. Ti ow ipei Norrrbs iv ry avrov avorjala; pJrj iv Toi ovpavm aap^ fy; and so forth :—which words are partially borrowed by Hippolytus (c. Noet.),—Tl ovv ^ryret . . .; /iifrt ipel, cm iv ovpava aap^ ty; C. 17 :—ov yap tearet (f>amaaiav 17 rpo7njv, dXX' akrjO&9 yev6p.evo<; avOpasiros ty. It would seem, therefore, that the theory of Noetus contained, though in vague outlines, the doctrine of the <pvai<; aeaapKcopAvrj advanced at a later period; naturally, with the difference, that he repudiates the Trinity, and consequently refers the incarnation, with the iraOiyrov, etc., not to the Logos, but to the Father Himself. At this point, therefore, it becomes for the first time clear, that even now it was necessary to oppose the arpeirrov avaXKouorov, davyyyrov of the two natures, although not in these precise terms, to those who aimed at constituting the Father and humanity an unity without distinction in Christ. At a higher stage, the very question which now occupied the Church in relation to the Father, was raised again in relation to the Logos. Had this position of the matter been properly understood, the chief objection against the genuineness of Hippolytus' work against Beron must have fallen to the ground of itself.

Note 11, page 29.

Compare "Hippolytus contra Beronem et Helicen" (jcara Brjpavos Ka\"HXuco<;), in Fabric. 1, 225, who conjectures that we ought to read, ical tfkiiccor&v alperiK&v. I consider the work from which these fragments were taken, and which bore the title irepl OeoXoyuis ical aapiccbaem, to be genuine. The eight fragments relating to Beron appear to me to be taken from the larger work of which the treatise against Noetus formed a part: —indeed, the Biblioth. Max. iii. 261 introduces the treatise against Noetus with the similar title, "De Deo trino et uno et de mysterio incarnationis." Its commencement also shows that it formed part of a greater whole. The work appears, too, to have been designated "Memoria Haeresium" and "adversus omnes haereses." The arguments against its genuineness, so far as they deserve consideration, are the following (compare Christ. Aug. Salig's "De Eutychianismo ante Eutychen." 1723, pp. 26 ff.; Hanell's "De Hippolyto Episcopo," 1828, p. 41) :— 1. His style of representation is heavy and obscure; his proofs are philosophical, not exegetical:—both which things are opposed to the manner of Hippolytus. But the work, although requiring thought, is not more difficult to understand than, for example, many passages of the treatise against Noetus. In the latter, in particular, the entire discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity is quite as difficult, and its tone quite as philosophical. Besides, it must be borne in mind, that we only possess fragments of the work against Beron, selected for a particular purpose, and relating to a subject which is comparatively little fitted for an exegetical treatment.—2. The work presupposes a definite heresy, which reminds us of Apollinaris and Eutyches (Hanell, p. 42); nay more, the word ivepyeia, which plays so great a part here, reminds us of the Monotheletic controversies. And we cannot suppose the author to have refuted an heresy which had not yet been devised.—We have already subjected this reason to a preliminary examination in Note 10. Only those can attach importance to it, who fail to perceive how necessary it was in the development of Christology that, prior to the determination of the doctrine of the Trinity, the same synusiastic theories should make their appearance, as were set forth at a higher stage, and in a more fully developed form, subsequently to the Council of Nicaaa. After the Nicene Council, it was regarded as a settled point, that the divine in the Person of Christ was the Logos, who is decidedly distinct from the Father; but there were not a few (as the Monophysitic controversies from the time of Apollinaris onwards show) who knew of but one method of securing the divine-human unity of the Person, to wit, by clinging to the unity of nature; for though, in itself, it consisted of two momenta, they represented these momenta as passing over into each other. "Was it not necessary, then, that prior to the Nicene Council,—at a time when, though the conception of the divine in Christ in its relation to the Father was still a very indeterminate one, the unity of the Person of Christ, the union in Him of the divine and human, was unquestionably recognised,—there should be preludes of the attempt to view the divine and human aspects of the Person of Christ in each other? Is not the history of Christology even during the prse-Nicene period full of such attempts! But a simple reference to what has preceded is enough to show, that Beron by no means stood alone in the first half of the third century. Tertullian, as we have previously shown (p. 23 f.), makes frequent allusions to heretics, who endeavoured to establish the unity of the Person of Christ by representing the one nature as passing into the other (transfiguratio; in Hipp. c. Noet. 17, rpoirrf). The objection which is derived from the word evepyeia scarcely deserves a refutation. If the expression OeavBpucfj evepyeia, or some such other one, had been used, it might be suspicious; but no such expression can be found in the fragments. Indeed, I cannot understand how it is possible to find anything particular in the word, when we know from the writings, for example, of Origen and Paul of Samosata, that it was in common use at that period.—3. The argument drawn from Theodoret's not adducing any testimonies from this work in his refutation of the Apollinarists, is allowed to be feeble even by Iliinell himself; but it completely loses its force when we take into consideration the fragments preserved by others from the work "de Theologia et Verbi incarnatione" (Fabr. 1, 235; 2, 45; A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 7, 14, 68), and which harmonize completely with the otherwise well accredited doctrine of Hippolytus.—4. What does Hanell mean by denying the first of these fragments (Fabr. 2, 45) to be the work of Hippolytus, because the words, To BeXeiv eyei 6 0eo?, ov To firj OeXeiv, do not secm to him to betray the lover of philosophy? Does not the fragment in Fabr. 1, 280, from the "Cantic. trium puerorum," harmonize most fully with this theory of the freedom of the will? Does not the decided protest raised against all rpembv in God, in the first fragment c. Beron, agree perfectly with the procedure of Hippolytus, in attributing merely volition and refusing to attribute non-volition or permission to God, for fear of introducing a rpeirrbv into His essence?—5. That, further, Hippolytus most decidedly opposed the duality of the natures to every species of avy)(yai<; thereof, and that the terms ovyyyai<;, alamos, rpoirfj, ivepyeia (c. Beron, Fragm. 5, 8, 1), were certainly familiar to him, is plain, for example, from c. Noet. 17, and Pfaff s fragment in Fabr. 1, 282. No less is the early character of the work evident from the circumstance, that where later writers say 6fioovaio<;, it uses the terms ofuxpvrfc and 6jm>^>vxo<;; whereas 6fioovaios never occurs at all. See Note 4.

Note 12, page 41.

Baur's view (1. c. 284 ff.) does not square with the words of Eusebius. For how could Beryll have taught that the "TrarpiKrj Oe6rrj<; (not merely Ovafiis) was in Christ, if his conception of Christ were Ebionitical, essentially the same as Artemon's? We should then have expected a totally different description of Beryll's views, and a totally different polemic against them: moreover, it is scarcely likely that an Ebionite would have so readily yielded ground to Christian truth as Beryll is said to have done. Baur translates as though, according to Eusebius, Beryll denied the Oeorq<; of Christ; but he merely denied the ISia Oeorry; prior to the incarnation, that is, the hypostatical Logos with pre-existence, scarcely, however, His post-existence. For, as Fock justly remarks, the passage in Eusebius constantly uses the present of the Redeemer, and alludes to Him as one still present. Besides, he was not charged with error on this point; and from our statement of his views it will be evident, that he could have had no ground for representing the Person of Christ as transitory, but that, in his case (as already in that of Beron), Patripassianism had taken the forward step of ensuring the eternity of the humanity of Christ. If it could be affirmed, in the manner in which Baur affirms it, that Beryll believed the humanity to be the personific element in Christ, and conceived the divine to be a mere power, he must have laid the greatest stress on the soul of Christ, because, without it, a human personality would be inconceivable. Instead of that, we find that the Synod, which addressed an epistle to Beryll, gave special prominence to the soul of Christ (Socr. H. E. 3, 7). Grammatically, also, this interpretation is inadmissible. 1. The most natural explanation is, that the words, Oeorryra ISiav e^eiv, have the same subject as the preceding words—Tov icvpvov /ii) irpov<pecrravai. Now, in the latter, icvpios evidently stands for the higher nature of Christ; for Beryll would not have merited blame for denying pre-existence to the human nature or to the divine-human unity. Consequently, the higher nature of Christ must also be the subject of the words, Oeorryra ISiav Ovk eyeiv; and the meaning cannot be that which Baur brings out, to wit, "the humanity of Christ had no ISla Oe6rrjs" (where ISla, moreover, would be completely superfluous); but, "the higher nature of Christ had no lSla Oeorrj<;, as had the Logos or Son;" the divine in general, the ^eorijs irarpucrj alone was in Him. Only when we thus take the iBla Oean)<;, in agreement with what precedes, as equivalent to toYa, that is, rod vlov Oeortp'a, does the antithesis irarpucrj Oeorrjs become clear.—2. Baur takes the word ep.iroXtreveaOai in the sense—"to be a citizen alongside of a citizen;" that is, the expression implies that the irarpiKrj Oeonj<; merely dwelt, as it were, side by side with another citizen, to wit, the personal humanity of Jesus; from which he deduces the further conclusion, that Beryll conceived the indwelling of God in Christ, under the category of influence and moral union. But, even supposing the explanation were lexicographically justifiable, the conclusion referred to would be too hasty. For, inasmuch as, on the explanation adopted, two persons must be supposed to have co-existed in Christ; why should this be reduced to a mere influence of the divine power? Baur ought rather to have attributed to Beryll the assumption of a double personality in Christ. Besides, the works of Hippolytus (which Baur, it is true, has left unnoticed) show us, that the word e/«roXireveaOai was used in an entirely different sense. As eViS^/iua was employed even at this time to denote the incarnation, so the Church, which repudiated the notion of a duality of persons, and of the separate personality of the human nature, in Christ, adopted the term ifiiro7ureveaOai, which, with its dative, was used as about an equivalent to ivavOpanrelv (compare, for example, adv. Noet. 12 with 4). So that this word can by no means be regarded as having an Ebionitic stamp.— 3. Finally, as regards the word irepir/pcuprj, a more careful consideration of the writers of this period shows us, that we must be very cautious in transferring our idea of personality, in the sense of the Ego, to them. Our idea of personality, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, presupposes very complicated processes of reflection; and we shall altogether fail to see that the Church's doctrine of the Person of Christ and of the Trinity made real progress, if (as I did myself in the first edition of this work, and as Baur repeatedly does) we start with the presupposition, that our idea of personality was familiar to every period, instead of regarding it as a result of the conflicts of many centuries. Only by keeping these remarks in view can the changes in the use of such terms as ovala, {rn-oaraai?, irpoaayrrov, be understood and followed. For example, " own proper personality," is not a correct rendering of the words, tola over tias irepvypa<prj (although such is Neander's opinion; see his Church History 1. c. 1020, Note 1, German Edition); they signify rather simply, "circumscription," "determination," and contain directly no trace of the "Ego." In the formation of this expression, on the contrary, we find an unmistakeable reflection of the point from which ancient thinkers started in seeking the idea of human personality, to wit, limitation through the body, or individuality. See Note 4; and compare Nagelsbach's "Homerische Theologie," Section Seventh. Of course there is an analogous specific distinction between those who regarded the divine, and those who regarded the human, as the proper substance of the Person of Christ, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between those who represent the divine nature alone, and those who represent the human nature alone, as the personific element; only that, until a determinate idea of personality has been arrived at, he who says merely, "Christ was filled with divine power or Oearrjs" might mean the same as he who says, "God dwelt personally in Christ,"—namely, if the former does not apply the word personality also to the humanity. For the rest, the word irepvypatyrj was applied already at an early period to God, or the pre-existent Logos. Compare above in connection with Theodot. Excerp. 10, 19; Orig. in Joh. 1, 42, Vol. iv. 47. There it is equivalent to inr6aroai<;. On the other hand, in Hippol. c. Ber. Fragm. 1, we read,—'O Xoyo<;<f>vaiKf}<; aapicos irepvypacpfjs avao~y6p.evo< ; iraarj<; efc o irepvypcupr)s fiep.evrjicev. Fragm. 4: 'H Oe6nyro<; ivepyeia Itcurt)< ; iicros Kara <f>vo~iv irepvypacfriy; Siafievovaa SUXapn^e Bid aapicb<; <f>vaei ireirep(wfiivfi<;- ov yhp irtyvice irepiypd<peaOai yev^rrj cpvaei To Kara <f>vaiv ar/evryrov. There, irepiypatyrj is not equivalent to V7roara<w, but signifies "limit."

Note 13, page 43.

The same ambiguity characterizes his doctrine also, according to the account given of it by Eusebius. It contains the contradiction that, on the one hand, in the interest of Monarchianism, the pre-existence of the Logos and His I8la Oeorry; are denied, and no step is taken in advance of the simple divine or ir<irpucrj Oe6rrj<;: on the other hand, the entire mode of expression would lead us to suppose that, precisely like the Beron of Hippolytus, he represented the divine itself as made subject to limitation, through the incarnation. For if, with Baur, we were to take the words iZCa ovo~las "rrepir/pcufiq with irarpiKrj Oeorrj<;, as though Beryll meant to say,—"Christ was a man who was the subject of special divine influence," the expression for this very obvious thought would be too forced and prolix. For that a man is an IZla ovalas irepvypa<prj, and that as a mere man he has no JZla Oeorry;, is self-evident. Neander, therefore, appears to me to have approached in the main nearer the truth, and still more Schleiermacher; though Baur is probably right when, in opposition to them, he urges that Beryll attached greater significance to the humanity of Christ than is commonly supposed. But it seems to me impossible to form a clear conception of this significance, if, as it has almost become customary to do, we make it our aim to strip this line of thought as much as possible of all trace of Patripassianism; for it must have been stirred by both religious and speculative considerations, when it represented God as a suffering God, and asserted His intimate participation in finitude. The defect was simply that Patripassianism unavoidably tended, even against its own will, towards an ethnic mutability of God, because it did not take its stand definitely enough on the ethical idea of unbounded participative love. In one aspect, indeed, the line of thought which we have considered is the proper continuation of that principle of love which Marcion had more energetically brought to light and advocated. But the view taken of these unquestionably difficult questions is still bungling. In consequence of the lack of the intermediate links, the love which they set forth threatens constantly to become a merely physical thing, and the entire tendency acquires a pantheistic character, shared also by Monophysitism, which was the revival thereof at a higher stage. Nay more, the Manichaeism which made its appearance some few decennia after Beryll or Beron, was a degenerate pagan form of this same tendency. For the rest, this age was so stirred by such questions, that theories of this nature were probably developed in much greater variety than has been commonly supposed. Indeed, traces enough of their actual existence are discoverable, though we must not make it our aim, as some do with a confidence that I cannot share, to reduce back all doctrines which bear any resemblance to each other, and are anonymously handed down, to one common source. For example, when Origen (see his Comm. in Joh. T. ii. 2) speaks of those who, out of anxiety for the unity of God, denied to the Son an independent subsistence of His own (tStorryra Tov vlov irepav irapa Ttjv Tov irarpbsi), and distinguished Father and Son merely in name, he is said to refer to the same party with the Patripassians (as in the above-mentioned passage from the Apology of Pamphilus, T. iv. 22; or as in his Comm. in Joh. x. 21, Vol. iv. 199, and c. Cels. 8, 12, Vol. i. 750). But when in the first quoted passage (in Joh. ii. 2) he mentions, as the second class, apvovplvovs Tjjv Oeonp-a Tov vlov, riOivras Be airov Ttjv ISiorrjra ical Ttjv ovalav Kara irepiypa<fn)v rvyydvovaav erepav Tov irarpos; and in the further passage, cited by Pamphilus,—"Sed et eos qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum pracognitum et praedestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem, ne illos quidem sine periculo esse, ecclesiae numero sociari;" or when Greg. Thaum. (A. Mai 1. c. 7, 171) alludes to men who, though they conceived Christ to be filled with deity, really allowed no distinction between Him and the saints and prophets, but approximated to heathenism or Judaism by offering worship to a man endued with divine power; for it is heathenish irXrjpaOevra OeoTqro<; aefieiv, Jewish, to regard Christ as a Kriafia:—there is undoubtedly a relationship between them, but we can scarcely be warranted in identifying them all, either with each other or with Beryll, or with any other teacher. The passage cited from Origen by Pamphilus reminds us of what Eusebius says respecting Beryll, and may very well relate to him; for it does not attribute Ebionism, but rather the contrary, when it speaks of the "deitas Patris:" which is further evident also from the mild and rather warning character of the judgment pronounced by him. Still its identity with Beryll is by no means certain; for we miss an essential feature noticed in the account given by Eusebius, namely, that when it became incarnate, the irarpiKrj Oe<rrq<; took up into, or posited in, itself a limitation, a irepvypa^yq. Through the omission of this feature, the description becomes vague and indefinite enough to suit many others, for example, the Alogi. At the same time, this feature may lie in the first passage (in Joh. ii. 2); for the party there mentioned, posited the IStorry; Tov vlov, and said,—His ovcria is Kara irepvypcufyqv erepa irapa Ttjv rod 7rarpos. But they again denied the Oeorrjs, and not merely the ISia Oeorr)<;, of the Son; they would therefore appear to have been Ebionites, and cannot have been identical with the previous ones. Schleiermacher also (1. c. 532), and with him Fock and Rossel, seems to hint at the same view of the matter. The words of the latter passage can only be referred to Beryll, or better to those who resembled him, if we understand them to deny the Oeorrj<; of the Son not absolutely, but "ad tempus," or on the ground of the Kevaxris, by which God posited Himself as a man. In favour of which meaning might be adduced the consideration, that otherwise in this connection also the following words, from riOevres Bk to irarpos (see above), would have far too wide a scope, if they were merely intended to state that Christ was a man, and indeed a man whose ovcria Kara irepvypaxprjv erepa irapa r. r. ir.; for the latter point would only have been regarded as too selfevident by Ebionites. Whereas, on the contrary, these widereaching words acquire their full and sufficient import if we suppose them to set forth an opinion which, according to the account given in the text, resembled either that of Beron or that of Beryll. They would then refer, namely, to a form of their doctrine, in which fuller development had been given to the very nearly related element, to wit, that by the Kevaais a distinction, a section (airoicoirrj) of the divine essence in general, or a second rrpoaayrrov in addition to that of the Father, was brought to pass (compare Orig. in Job.. T. xx. 16: de princip. 4, 31); a form with which Gregory Thaum. also was acquainted, and which constituted a point of transition to Subordinatianism (see Note 1, page 34). But I should be unwilling to lay any particular stress on this explanation. It must always be a perilous thing, supplementarily to give definite names and shapes to the authors of systems which have been anonymously and vaguely handed down. Nor would Baur have been able so confidently to refer the passage in Joh. T. ii. 2 to Beryll, if he had considered that Origen began his commentary on John as early as A.d. 219, and that, according to in Joh. vi. 1, andEuseb. 6, 24, the first five tomes thereof were ready before A.d. 231; whereas the discussion with Beryll took place far later, to wit, in the year 244; although I, for my part, should by no means decidedly conclude from this circumstance, that Beryll could not be meant. For Origen had been even at an earlier period in Arabia; and in that land, where mystical and theosophic movements were the order of the day (see Ullmann, p. 8), might easily long before have become acquainted with the opinions entertained by Beryll or those related to him, especially as Beryll must have attained to an advanced age about the year 244, and was then designated Bishop. For this reason, also, it is not improbable that Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus Romanus, in Arabia, named Abulides in the East, may have had fruitless discussions with Beryll prior to 244, although we have no information to that effect, unless where Beron is mentioned we ought to understand Beryll. Eusebius also (see his H. E. 6, 20) sets Beryll and Hippolytus together. Completely indefinite is the description given by Gregory of those who worshipped a man filled with deity. It looks like what we know of Paul of Samosata and his followers; but, as we shall soon see, might also have belonged to the school of Sabellius.

Note 14, page 59.

He had this realistic tendency, and therefore also substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity, even prior to his adoption of Montanism. Indeed, he gives utterance to it already in his Apologeticus, c. 21. In the Adv. Prax. he gives the "Regula Fidei," which contains the belief in a real Trinity, and says, —" Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurrisse probabit novellitas Praxeae hesterna." "As always, so now more than ever, instructed by the Paraclete, who leads into all truth, we believe, indeed, in one God, but agreeably to the divine order which we call oeconomia;" c. 2, 13, 30. Tertullian himself, therefore, in a work intended to justify Montanism, and to confute its opponents, confesses that, prior to coming under the influence of Montanism, he held, with the Church, substantially the same doctrine of the Trinity as he now expounds. Indeed, altogether apart from what has been previously advanced, it must in itself be much more likely that the later Montanism was modified and rid of its character of abruptness by the influence of the doctrine of the Trinity settled by the Church, was purified by the principle of gradualness and order defended by Church teachers like the author of the Epistle to Diognetus or Irenaeus, and was brought to the recognition of the divine oeconomia and its orderly course, than that the Church was led to the doctrine of the Trinity through the influence of Montanism.

Note 15, page 83.

Baur also, in his large work on the Trinity, has left him entirely unnoticed; and Hiinell gives an inaccurate and incomplete picture of him (1. c.). Reuter has justly directed attention (see the "Berliner Jahrbiicher," 1843) to the importance of the man, who was not only ranked among the first by his own age, but stood high in the esteem of Eusebius, was much used by Epiphanius (for example, Haer. 31), and on the ground alone of his work, irpbs airdaas ra<; a!peaei<; (Euseb. H. E. 6, 22; Photius Cod. 121), occupies a high position as an Haeresiologer. We know from Photius that the work commenced with Dositheus, ended with Noetus and the Noetians (Phot. 1. c.), and discussed the Nicolaitanes, Montanists, Cainites, Marcion, and Valentine. The Valentinian sect (of which the Beron referred to in the text was an offshoot) appears to have made an effort at the beginning of the third century to enter into closer connection with the doctrine of the Church. We have previously remarked the same course of procedure adopted by the school of Marcion. This is proved, after his fashion, by Apelles, who inclined towards Valentinianism; by Alexander (Tertull. "de Carne Christi" 15, 16), who taught that Christ truly suffered; and by the afore-mentioned Beron. For the rest, in considering VOL. II. 2 F

the question of the genuineness of the writings of Hippolytus, we must take our start from the fragment of his work against the heresies, entitled "Against the Heresy of Noetus." That the haeresiological work with which Eusebius was acquainted, and which Epiphanius used, was identical with that read by Photius, no one will doubt. But as the work seen by Photius concluded with Noetus, and the fragment extant on Noetus, which was invariably attributed to Hippolytus, not only concludes in a manner suitable to the termination of an entire work, but begins also in such a manner as to show that it is a fragment, and not a homily, as the title of the Vatican manuscript represents it; nay more, the fragment of a work in which other heresies had been spoken of, consequently of an haeresiological work,—we have every reason for assuming it to be the last part of the work with which Eusebius and Epiphanius were acquainted. To this must be added, that Gelasius, Bishop of Rome (Fabric. 1, 225) adduces a passage which is identical with c. 18 of our fragment, the commencement being taken from c. 11 and 12 or 17. Still more striking are the inner grounds. For the views of the author are so peculiar, that they could no longer have been put into the mouth of an orthodox teacher of the Church even in the fourth century. They set before us the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity at a stage at which it had not yet been warned by Arianism of the consequences of teaching that the Son first attained an hypostatical existence outside of the divine sphere, at the creation of the world. The author still adhered to that more harmless form of Subordinatianism, the very inner inconsistency of which impelled it to further progress and to the exclusion of all inadequate elements; and there could be no doubt whatever that, when the time arrived for deciding between Athanasius and Arius, he could not possibly feel drawn towards the latter. He had not yet reached the stage at which Origen stood; on the other hand, we find that, as compared with Tertullian, he took up a more decidedly antagonistic position relatively to the continuous patripassian movements. The work, therefore, of which this fragment formed a part, must be concluded, on inner grounds, to have been written between Tertullian and Origen; and this would exactly suit Hippolytus, who is said, by Gelasius, Bishop in Arabia, to have addressed a letter to the wife of Philippus Arabus. This fragment shall furnish us, to use one of his own figures, with the warp into which we shall weave our image of Hippolytus. I further believe myself justified in describing as genuine, among the works bearing upon Christology, that which treats of Antichrist. As he occupied himself greatly with chronological studies, and wrote a commentary on Daniel (compare Fabr. 1, 272); and as the Catenae on the first three Gospels (compare on Matt. xxiv.; Luke xxi.) show that he had bestowed much thought on the subject of Antichrist; and, finally, as the style and thoughts are both archaic (Photius makes the same remark),—there seems to me to be no ground for doubting the genuineness of the work. Further, in it Hades plays a great role (c. 11, 45); hence also the work, Xoyos 7ry>o? "EXXrjvas, of which the treatise entitled Kcna JTXarmva (Fabr. 1, 220 ff.) formed a part, and the fragment in A. Mai's Coll. Nova (7, 12), may very fairly be assigned to him. With the Christological principles of the treatise against Noetus, and of the work on Antichrist, harmonizes also the X0709 el<; rd ar/ia Oeo<f>dveia: compare c. 6 with c. Noet. 18. Chapter Third of these homilies appears indeed to contain the doctrine that Mary remained a virgin even subsequently to the birth of Christ, against which Tertullian strongly protests. But, in the first place, even the discourse at the Feast of Epiphany, attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgusx contains this doctrine; in the second place, perhaps Tertullian's serious defence of the true view may be a sign that an antagonistic view was beginning to be taught; and, in the third place, another explanation of the passage seems to me to be more probable than the one referred to (see Note 3, page 95). This doctrine may have been first taught by Docetists, who were willing to recognise the birth of Christ,—for example, by the Valentinians,—and have then commended itself to the Church of this age on other grounds. Indeed, the history of Montanism shows a similar course of things. The teachers of the second century, and in particular Tertullian, were concerned to assert the complete truth of the incarnation of Christ on quite different principles from Hippolytus, as we shall soon see. As far as concerns the remaining fragments, that of Mai 7, 134, is preserved in Latin by Leontius (Fabr. 1, 266), in greater compass; that of Mai, p. 68, we possessed previously in Greek (c. Beron. Fabr. 1, 227). The fragment (Fabr. 1, 266) from his commentary on Genesis is attested by Jerome; and the fragments, Fabr. 1, 267-269, by Theodoret. The remaining Christological fragments from the commentary on Genesis (Fabr. 2, 22-31), and the "Demonst. c. Jud." (Fabr. 2, 2-5), are as far from causing difficulty as the trinitarian and Christological fragments, 1, 267 to 281. Doubt may be thrown on the fragment 1, 282, because of the superscription taken in conjunction with its doctrine of the Eucharist. On the other hand, the work irepl yapiapArav is above suspicion, with the exception of the uncertain title; though there is nothing in it of importance for our purpose, if we except the confession of faith (246), which is brief, simple, and archaic in its character. Spurious, on the contrary, is that communicated by Joannes Antioch. (Fabr. 2, 32), which is completely Monophysitic in tone, and contradictory of all the accredited Christological views of Hippolytus.

Note 16, page 89.

Herewith Hippolytus aimed at showing that he was justified in giving to the Logos also the name Son. It is very remarkable that the Monarchians, to whom he was opposed, raised no objection to the use of the word Logos, nor even against the position that the Logos became flesh. But they protest, as against an innovation, a l~evov, against identifying the Logos with the uto?, in that they explain the word X070? so that it retains no hypostatical significance, and assert that this was the sense in which it was used by John. 'IcBai/1^7s fiev ycip Xe7et Xcyyov, aW' aXkw; aWr)yopei. Two things herein are remarkable. Firstly, we see again the groundlessness of Baur's argumentation, that Patripassianism furnishes an indirect but powerful testimony against the authority or genuineness of the Gospel of John, seeing that the doctrine of the Logos plays a great role with John, and that it was rejected by the Patripassians. For, inasmuch as both understood how to get over the difficulty, by adopting a peculiar interpretation, John could by no means have brought about a collision. On the contrary, the adherents of this tendency believed the Gospel of John to furnish the strongest scriptural proofs in their favour. In the second place, the assertion of the opponents, that it was something new to identify the Logos with the Son, and thus to ensure to the Son a premundane hypostatical existence, if it deserve credit, introduces us very plainly to an age in which all alike were thoroughly convinced that the higher nature of Christ was of one substance with God; but in which also the inclination to assert for that higher nature an hypostasis of its own, which we found so strong and lively at the commencement of the second century and subsequently, had almost died out in the neighbourhood of Noetus. The reason whereof being, that the Christian mind had laid firm hold on that which it considered preliminarily to be the main point; to wit, that the person of the eternal God Himself had drawn near to men in Christ, which seemed possible, without ascribing to the Son an independent hypostasis of His own. Even the Fatripassians could say, The wisdom, the understanding, the omnipotence of God, became man in Christ; and, in point of fact, they recognised the eternity of the hypostasis which appeared in Him even more fully than the Church teachers whom we have noticed, for they conceived the one hypostasis acknowledged by them—that is, God Himself, the Father—to have personally appeared in Christ. Therein lies also a further evidence of the high antiquity of this work, nay, even of its composition during the first half of the third century. For, as the indifference to the hypostasis of the Logos and of the premundane Son, which was so markedly a characteristic of Tertullian, presupposed the entire course of the doctrine of the Logos depicted above, so, on the other hand, no later writer could have made the concession made by Hippolytus (c. 15 init.), that the identification of the Logos with the Son, who had always been conceived to be hypostatical, was a new thing, although justified by Faul and Apocalypse xix. 11. When we ask historically, what was new and what was old, we must undoubtedly reply,—It was new to employ the word Son, in this distinctly doctrinal sense, to denote the momentum of personality; for at an earlier period the term, Son of God, had been applied, not merely to the pre-existent second hypostasis, but also to the entire earthly personality of Christ—a thing which now, when writers aimed at greater precision, was no longer suffered, or suffered solely out of regard for the higher nature of Christ. This clearly defined use of the word owed its rise to the necessity (a necessity whose grounds we have previously pointed out) of establishing the hypostasis of the Son by other means than by the doctrine of the Word and the Sophia, the union of which in the Logos, after the manner indicated, sufficed solely to establish the divine essence of the Son. The perception of this necessity impelled the Church to endeavour to seek another basis of the hypostasis of the Son; but it was tempted to aim at securing this object, in the first instance, by connecting the genesis of the hypostasis of the Son with the genesis of the world: thus, of course, gliding into thoughts of an Arian tendency,—not, indeed, in relation to the essence, certainly, however, in relation to the personality of the Son. That from the days of Tertullian onwards, stirred especially by the influence of Patripassianism, the Church aimed with renewed energy at asserting for the Son a distinct hypostasis,—this was old; for that the higher nature of Christ was a pre-existent divine hypostasis, had long been allowed to be a fact, although, as we have remarked, less attention had been bestowed on it from the end of the second century onwards. But the mode of establishing that He was or became a person was new; for earlier writers had not gone so far as, out of regard to the divine unity, to remove the hypostatical element in the Son outside of the inner divine sphere. This new feature soon became antiquated, it is true, and passed away; indeed, those who insisted on it could not avoid falling into the Arianism which they did not desire to adopt. To the praise, however, of the Church teachers whom we here have in view, it must be said, that they did their best to oppose that Arian tendency, which threatened to reduce the hypostasis, and not merely the hypostatical element, of the Son to a mere creature. And that not only by always requiring truly divine essence to be attributed to the Son, but also by endeavouring to bring the Son, although outside and alongside of God, yet into the most intimate relation to the inner Logos of the Father. Tertullian, as we have seen, aimed at pointing out the existence of the potence of Sonship and incarnation in the inner, eternal essence of God, the inner Word; Hippolytus appropriated to the X070? aaapico<; in God, also the name of Son, in particular on account of His destiny to incarnation,—a course which he himself, as we have said, allows to be to a certain extent an innovation, but which was at the same time in agreement with Scripture. Its adoption may be taken as an indication that he was unwilling, and very justifiably, to be content with an hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, whose origin and subsistence lay outside of the inner essence of God; and that he felt compelled to give it a seat in the inmost sphere of the divine. This effort, as, on the one hand, it was evidently closely allied to the tendency which prevailed in the earlier days of the Church's existence (a thing to which Patripassianism also, in its peculiar way, testifies), so, on the other hand, it was the forerunner of that doctrine of the Trinity which was laid down by the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea, and which made its appearance in the course of the third century, so soon as the Arian elements contained in the systems of the Church teachers, above referred to, began to be consolidated to an independent and self-consistent whole. The remark just made remains true, although we should have to grant that the attempt to unite the hypostasis of the Son with the inner Logos could not realize its object, so long as no other basis of the doctrine of the Trinity was discovered in God Himself than the illusory one of the multiplicity of the divine attributes (for example, wisdom). That this was insufficient, is clear alone from the consideration, that a Trinity does not result at all, if the divine attributes are to be taken as so many potences of hypostases. In that case, to reply to Hippolytus with Hippolytus himself, God is 71-0X11?, not a Trinity. Furthermore, until the conception formed of God had been transformed, and thus a different foundation laid for the distinctions of the Trinity, that connection of the wisdom and omnipotence of God with the mundane Son involved a partial retrocession to the very ground which had just been quitted, with the design of establishing the hypostasis of the Son on a surer footing than the doctrine of the Logos was able to afford. But although we perceive here a remainder of the obscuration of the insight which we have praised above, this defect is fully counterbalanced by the consideration, that the reduction of the mundane Son back to the inner divine essence, thus commenced, was also the commencement of the rejection of creatural and Arian features from His hypostasis. So that the very same thing which we found accomplished during the second century in relation to the essence of the Son, we now find accomplished in relation to His hypostasis. For, in the second century, the Logos was brought far nearer to the essence of the created world than was the case in the third ;— He was conceived to he immediately (that is, without the mediation of ethical categories) the world itself, in its ideal aspect, the Koafw; vorjros; on which view, justice could not be done to the idea of creation. That was cast aside towards the end of the century through the acquisition of the "stamina" of the Christian idea of God, during the conflict with the many forms of Gnosticism; and although we can trace the influence of the earlier theory in Tertullian, who regarded the inner divine Logos as also the idea of the world; and although the entire distinction between the inner Logos and the mundane Son bore a certain analogy to the doctrine of the Xo'yo? evBtaOero<; and irpo<popircb<; rejected by Irenaeus, we must not forget to notice the step taken in advance, in that the X070s evZtd#6'7-o? and irpotpopucos, in its new, higher potence, was no longer represented as containing the idea of the world, both as resting in God and as actually realized, but was rather taken to denote the inner divine reason on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the reason after it had become hypostatical, or a Son. In other words, the distinction now drawn between Logos and Son, instead of relating as heretofore to the product, in the idea of the world, related to the idea of God Himself; although, in the first instance, a precipitate resort was made to the world, in order to secure the hypostasis—not the divine essence—of the Son.

Note 17, page 97.

Patripassians of the earlier kind failed also to advance beyond the idea of a theophany. So that the result described above in connection with the Trinity, reappears also in connection with Christology:—the teachers of the Church at this period still stand on the same basis as their opponents. Clinging as they still did to their premises, they were unable to attain the mastery over them. It is instructive to observe how the doctrine of the absolute unchangeableness of God led the teachers of the Church to the like theophanical result, as the doctrine of the immediate passibility of God, held by their opponents of the so-called Patripassian school. Both were necessitated to regard the humanity as impersonal, as a mere husk of God. We have already indicated that the idea of God, which on both sides was still dominated by physical categories, only needed to be taken in an ethical sense, in order to the doing of full justice to the immutability of God on the one hand, which the Patripassians misapprehended, and on the other hand, to open up the prospect of a much more intimate participation of God in the finite, without endangering His divine essence, than Hippolytus judged admissible.

Note 18, page 110.

De princip. 1, 2, 2:—" Quomodo extra hujus sapientiae generationem fuisse aliquando Deum Patrem vel ad punctum momenti alicujus quis potest sentire vel credere—? Aut enim non potuisse Deum dicet generare sapientiam antequam generaret, ut eam, qua? ante non erat, postea genuerit, ut esset; aut, potuisse quidem et, quod dici de Deo nefas est, noluisse generare, quod utrumque et absurdum et impium esse omnibus patet, id est, ut aut ex eo, quod non potuit, Deus proficeret ut posset, aut cum posset, dissimularet ac differret generare sapientiam. Propter quod nos semper Deum Patrem novimus unigeniti Filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis, sine ullo tamen initio, non solum eo, quod aliquibus temporum spatiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem, quod sola apud semetipsam mens intueri solet, et nudo ut ita dixerim intellectu atque animo conspicari. § 4 : Est namque ita aeteraa ac sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatus ex luce. Non enim per adoptionem spiritus Filius fit extrinsecus, sed natura Filius est. § 7: Deus lux est; Splendor hujus lucis est unigenitus Filius ex ipso inseparabiliter velut splendor ex luce procedens. §10: Pater non potest esse quis si filius non sit. The Father is not omnipotent prior to the birth of wisdom; per filium omnipotens est pater. Ever created thing accidentem habet justitiam vel sapientiam, et quod hoc quod accedit, etiam decidere potest, gloria ejus sincera et limpidissima esse non potest. Sapientia vero Dei, quae est unigenitus Filius ejus, quoniam in omnibus inconvertibilis est et incommutabilis et substantiae in eo omne bonum est, quod utique mutari atque converti nunquam potest, idcirco pura ejus ac sincera gloria praedicatur. 4,2, 8: Sicut lux nunquam sine splendore esse potuit, ita nee Filius quidem sine Patre (Pater sine Filio ?) intelligi potest, qui et figura expressa substantiae ejus et Verbum et

Note 21, page 120.

Baur (1. c. 204 ff.) gives it as his opinion, that Origen vacillates between a generation out of God's will, and a generation out of God's essence; and refers to " in Joann." T. xx. 16, as containing the former view. The point, however, is to discover the cause of this vacillation. Had Baur taken this course, he would perhaps have been able to confine the vacillation within very narrow limits. Neander starts with the view—one with which I am unable to agree—that the doctrine of the identity of the essence of the Son with that of the Father was gradually arrived at, and first clearly taught in the West, during the third century; that, on the contrary, Subordinatianism had its home in the East, from the days of Origen onwards; and that, in order to exclude Emanatism, Origen assumed that the Son originated from the will of God. The first-mentioned point is contradicted both by Patripassianism and by a whole series of Church teachers of the second century; and the Subordinatianism of Tertullian and Novatian, so far from being weaker than that of Origen, is, taking all things into consideration, stronger. As far as concerns Emanatism, Origen, it is true, was opposed to it in its coarsely sensuous forms; he could neither allow of a division in God (airoKom-rj), nor of a "fatum" above God, necessitating the Father to the generation of the Son. But he was not therefore obliged to represent the generation of the Son solely as a matter of the "liberum arbitrium" of God. He did not even trace the origin of the world to that "liberum arbitrium." On the contrary, he held that the divine will was the unity of freedom and necessity. If, however, it should be replied,—The existence of the Son is undoubtedly not accidental, in the sense, namely, in which the world's existence is not accidental; but still the Son, no less than the world, owes His existence to that divine will in which freedom and necessity are combined; out of the divine essence, on the contrary, neither the world nor the Son is derived ;—we shall shortly give it closer consideration. Eitter (see his "Geschichte der christlichen Philosophic" i. 493, 501) represents the Son as brought forth by the will of the Father, though out of His essence. He justly recognises that the essential tendency of Origen's teachings was to show that the entire fulness of the Deity dwelt in the Son; and that the Son is not to be regarded as a creature, but as the creative spirit, the true Mediator, of equal perfection with the Father. The subordination of the Son and the appearance of a commixture with creatures did not attach to the doctrine which he really meant to teach, but merely to the imperfect development thereof: they were a remnant of the sensuous ideas, which prevented him from seeing the difference between the dependence of the Son as generated, and the dependence of creatures. The assumption of the imperfection of the creation must also have reacted on the conception he formed of the creative power of God (that is, of the Son, or Word). Possibly, however, a certain degree of subordination may be shown to be grounded in Origen's conception of God; but no less also His equality with the Father.

Note 22, page 129.

The chief passages relating to this personification (Personwerdung) of the divine will in the Son, who proceeded independently eternally forth from the divine "Mens" (Augustine uses the word "memoria"), through the self-duplication of God, are collected in Note 1, page 125. In the "de princ." 1, 2, 6, he teaches, that to describe Him as the image of God, is to affirm "naturse ac substantia: patris et filii unitatem. Si enim omnia, quae facit pater, hsec et filius facit similiter, in eo,— imago patris in filio deformatur, qui utique natus ex eo est velut quaedam voluntas ejus ex mente procedens. Et ideo ego arbitror, quod sufficere debeat voluntas patris ad subsistendum hoc, quod vult pater. Volens enim non alia via utitur, nisi qua consilio voluntatis profertur." It might appear as though, in the last words, he returned completely to the stage at which Tertullian and Hippolytus stood, apportioning all to the will instead of to the essence of God. We must not, however, overlook the "ideo," which refers to what has gone before. God's will being of such a nature that it can personally objectify itself in the duplication of God, therefore, says he, it appears to me unnecessary to resort to anything else than the will; in other words, if the divine will were merely creative, we should have to leave it out of consideration in the present case. If Origen had intended, as Baur maintains (1. c. p. 207), by the mention of the will, to represent the origin of the Son as the work of a kind of divine caprice, he must have contradicted his own position, that for the Father to have a Son, a perfect image, was a good; and that to bring forth the Son belonged as truly to the essence of the Father as brightness belongs to light. Moreover, Origen does not allow the existence of such a thing as caprice in God. But he does not even content himself with a creation of the Son by the will of the Father, grounded-in rational necessity or rational freedom. For, apart from the consideration that the idea of an immediately creative will of the Father was something foreign to his conception of God, he says (see Note 1, page 116, and Note 19, Appendix), He was the divine Will proceeding forth from the divine "Mens;" He was the will as proceeding; how can He have been created by this will? The words "consilio voluntatis profertur" exclude all caprice; though, at the same time, they are an outflow of the defect already mentioned, of conceiving the Father to be self-conscious in and by Himself, and not in and with the Son. But the idea of purpose, of decree, cannot lie in the word "consilio;" for that would involve His being a creature, and contradict Rom. i. 5, according to which the Son cannot be the object of a divine decree. In the original Greek probably stood yvcofiy, which was intended to set forth the divine will, which emanates and becomes a person, as conscious; that is, it was intended to set aside the passivity and unconsciousness which attach to the common Emanatism. With this explanation harmonizes the immediately following polemic against such emanatistic doctrines. "Magis ergo," he concludes, "sicut voluntas procedit e mente (this favourite expression of Origen's shows that he deemed the so-called generation of the Son to be quite as truly His own act as the act of the Father) et neque partem aliquam mentis secat neque ab ea separatur aut dividitur, tali quadam specie putandus est Filium genuisse, imaginem scilicet suam, ut sicut ipse invisibilis est per naturam, ita imaginem quoque invisibilem genuerit.—Imago ergo est invisibilis Dei patris Servator noster; quantum ad ipsurn quidem patrem, Veritas, quantum autem ad nos, quibus revelat patrem, imago est, per quam cognoscimus patrem."

Note 23, page 140.

We can scarcely do otherwise than characterize it as play, when some make the play on words in which Origen indulges the corner-stone of his doctrine, deducing from his derivation of ifrvyrj from yfrvXco, and his supposition that y^vyrj denotes cooled down irvevfia, the conclusion that he conceived Christ's soul also to be not entirely free from impurity. When Baur—not very confidently, it is true—gives utterance to this conjecture, he overlooks the numberless passages in which the perfect sinlessness of the soul of Christ is maintained in the strongest terms (compare ad Rom. 3, 8; 6, 12; in Joann. T. xx. 17; de princ.

2, 6, 3, 4, 5; 4, 31), and has not properly considered Origen's course of thought; otherwise he would have seen that the accessibility of the soul to suffering, and its subjection to finitude, as taught by him, was based, not on the guilt, but on the love of Christ, which condescended to us and became a curse for us. In Paul also was a reflection of this love, which neither vanishes nor cools down, in that it is ready to become a curse for others, but during its humiliation remains what it was as love, though, instead of enjoying the blessedness naturally belonging to it, sympathizingly makes the unhappiness of the brethren its own (compare the passages quoted, page 134 f.). In general, moreover, Origen did not understand yfrvyjj to mean merely something cooled down, but frequently something substantially good; nor did he regard the human soul as a mere cooled down irvevfia. Thus he calls the Logos the soul of God, speaks very frequently of holy souls, and therefore uses tyvxrj in its usual sense of an individual spiritual being, which also, as such, may proceed forth from the hand of God: compare ad Rom. iii. 8. The soul of Christ was foreordained to be a sacrifice; de Martyr. 47; Xoyiiaj i{nryrj. In Joann. T. xiii. 25,yjrt^?) Sucaia; xiii.

3, Oeiorepai yfri^al; T. x. 16, Bvvarai Kox (pvaei lepov elvcu 17 ev<pvrj<; ev X6ycp "tyvxrj Bih rbv crvfnre<f>vKOra Aoyov: 13, 43; 20, 7. The acrrpa also are e/ty|ri^a, and the Logos 1/x.i/rir^o?. In Joann. T. ii. 25, xiii. 25.

Note 24, page 141.

Compare de princ. 2, 1, 2; 3, 3; and the passage quoted above, 2, 6, 3, 5; 3, 5, 7, 8; c. Cels. 8, 72; ad Rom. L. 5, 10. Origen's conception of freedom was by no means so formal as appears commonly to be supposed. His doctrine of a final airoicardarcu7is, after all possible delays, relapses, purifications, shows clearly that he looked upon grace as a power which overarches even freedom, without, however, exercising physical constraint. He regards not merely choice or caprice as freedom, but whatever stress he lays on the middle momentum or stadium of the idea of freedom, represents it as preceded by the essential connection of the spiritual nature with the Logos, or by essential freedom; and, on the other hand, in that perfect love which is the goal, he sees neither the possibility of evil nor unfreedom, but rather the union of freedom and ethical necessity. At all the lower stages, says he, ad Rom. L. v. 10, a relapse is possible; but where there is the love of the whole heart, it preserves from the possibility of a fall. If, as the Apostle says, nothing can separate us from the love of God, the faculty of choice camwt separate us. It remains, it is true; but the power of love is so great, that it draws all powers and all virtues to itself, especially since the love of God manifested itself as prevenient. The free grace which apparently renounces the law, establishes the rule of love in opposition to caprice and to freedom of choice.

Note 25, page 147.

The correctness of the above exposition, which starts with the conviction that Origen is by no means chargeable with vacillation in his teachings regarding God, but, on the contrary, remained in the main self-consistent throughout,—that, in agreement with this his conception of God, he always, and very distinctly, assigned essentially the same position respectively to the Logos, to Christ, and to the world,—and that he by no means at one time conceived the entire divine essence to be present, for example, in Christ, and at another time regarded the Logos as a mere creature,—finds confirmation in the circumstance, that it appears to furnish an explanation of his strange doctrine of several worlds successively following upon each other. As God is the goal of the world, and His inmost essence abstraction from all multiplicity and finitude, the world is threatened, the nearer it approaches perfection, the more with complete absorption into God: nay more, in order to attain perfection, it must be raised above its own nature; in other words, it must really cease to exist. Feeling this, Origen was driven to seek for a counterpoise, especially as he held the existence of the world to be a great good for God Himself. For this reason, he keeps the world as long as possible undergoing processes of purification,—processes which he represents as continuing even after the resurrection. On the same ground, also, he leaves the matter open, and conceives it as a possibility, which may become an actuality, that freedom should, by renewed apostasy, prolong that relative independence of God, which he was able to deem perfect solely outside of God, not in Him. And thus the unreconciled antagonism between finite and infinite in his system assumed the form of a doctrine of objective alternating worlds; and the same thing assumed subjectively the form of an alternation between mystery and revelation (see Martensen's "Meister Eckart"). With this is further intimately connected another point. Corporeality he represents at one time as the product of sin, or at all events as the seal of imperfection, the existence of which is therefore threatened when it approaches perfection: at another time, he deems it to be that through which the ideal world first becomes a reality; and accordingly posited its existence as eternal. That perfection would bring at once the most intimate union with God, and the most complete confirmation of individuality, Origen was as yet unable to see; because he neither viewed individuality as a work of God, nor reckoned it as a part of the divine creation. He regarded it as grounded, not in God's idea of the world, but solely in the freedom of man. Thus viewed, however, it had a very doubtful existence. The eternal and true element in the idea of the world does not extend to the concrete and individual, but is merely the potential creation, the teoa/io? Votjtos. The actual world, on the contrary, in his representation, hovers constantly, so to speak, between existence and non-existence; and accordingly very much that he posits at one time, becomes at another time doubtful. This alternation between position and negation, however, which characterizes his system at so many points, was grounded, not in caprice and unsteadiness, but in his conception of God, which still suffers from the contradiction of constituting the lowest and most abstract determination the inmost essence and highest element of God, though Origen himself elsewhere saw clearly enough that the spiritual determinations are the highest. It was reserved, however, for the teachers of a later period to perceive the erroneousness of Origen's notion, that the divine essence contained within itself a fulness of VOL. II. 2 G

qualities, of which those embodied in the divine volition and knowledge are but a feeble copy; and to acknowledge that spiritual love is itself the inmost essence of God, His uncreated being; and that consequently the Son, if He be actually in relation to will and intelligence of a truly divine nature, may also be of one substance with the Father. The task then becomes to establish the distinction between the Father and the Son in another way; for this distinction could not be established without subordinatian and modalistic vacillations, so long as the Father was identified with the ungenerated divine essence, instead of the same essence being attributed to the Son equally with the Father. If we take for granted at the very outset that the true distinction cannot be established unless we suppose that the Father, for the sake of knowing Himself, objectified His knowledge and will eternally in the Son, we find Origen far removed therefrom; for he believed the Father to know Himself in Himself, and not in the Son, His image. Still we may say,—Origen also represents the Father as becoming objective, and, as issuing forth out of the inner depths of His being, in the Son, who is His evipyeia; but He did not contemplate Himself in the Son as in the mirror of Himself, but merely an imperfect image, not equal to the one only archetype, Himself.

Note 26, page 153.

Baur has rightly directed attention to the fact, that Marcionitism (which even during the fifth century, to judge from Theodoret's letters, had many adherents in the East, and, according to the above exposition, was intimately allied with Patripassianism) subsequently passed over into Manichaeism. The occasion thereof was the rigid antagonism posited between Law and Gospel. But Sabellianism also offered a point of connection for this antagonism, in that it represented the earlier revelations as disappearing when a new one was given; for example, the law disappeared when Christ came. Athanasius also (c. Ar. 4, 23) charges it with dividing the Testaments (Siaipelv T«s BiaOijicas, teal firj rrjv erepav Tt}? erepa<; eyeaOeuMaviyalcovTo iirfn)Sevfia). Manichaeism proper, which arose about the year 260, like Patripassianism, subjected the divine in the world to physical suffering, to wit, through matter; and its doctrine of the "Jesus patibilis omni suspensus ex ligno" (see August. c. Faust. 20, 2; compare Baur's "Das manichaeische Religionssystem," pp. 71 ff.) may be regarded as a cosmological extension, though also a dissipation, of Patripassianism with its more soteriological character. Only in one aspect, it is true; for though both alike attribute suffering in the physical sense to God, Patripassianism represents Him as subjecting Himself thereto by assuming an external, visible shape; whereas Manichaeism teaches that the sufferings of the pure lucific principle arise from an antagonistic primal dark principle. We shall find afterwards that Sabellianism was finally driven to Dualism, and that, with its rigid conception of God, it was unable to allow even of a creation, and was compelled to fall back on an eternal vXrj; but the presages of this course of things are discernible even in the earlier forms of this tendency. For, so far as the one God converts Himself into corporeality, as they in part teach, notwithstanding that they retain their Monism, and only their conception of the one God comprises contradictory elements, the reality of the incarnation and of the birth from Mary was threatened. Now, when the adherents of this system, with a view to escaping the danger of Docetism, represented God as assuming from without that which constituted Him passible, to wit, His body, we have an entrance of God into passible matter, similar to that which Manichaeism sets forth in its "Jesus patibilis," or its Bvvafus iraBrjnKrj. The more, then, all obscuration and darkness are removed outside of the pure divine essence, that is, the more the pure divine essence is fixed in its immutability, the more, as we shall see, does the Sabellian system become affected by Dualism, until at last it is unable to allow the one Divine Being to be even the cause of the world, and is therefore necessitated to represent the world as having its principle in itself, and as a second primal principle standing over against the first. Clearly, however, Sabellianism contained this Dualism merely in the form of a consequence, of which its adherents were partially unconscious, whereas it was the constitutive principle of Manichaeism. Sabellianism differs essentially, not only from Manichaeism, but also from the milder Platonic form of Dualism, in that it scarcely occupied itself at all with the question of the creation of the world, and limited its inquiries entirely to the already existing world; the other two systems were decidedly cosmogonical. The same remark may be made also of the Sabellianism of Schleiermacher. This is not the place to give a more detailed account of the Manichaean Christology. Compare Baur, who says (1. c. p. 407),—" The Christ of Manichaeism has nothing but the name in common with the Christ of Christianity." It is an expression catachrestically, traditionally adopted. The Manichaean Christ is the universal lucific Spirit, enthroned in the sun and moon, the pure efflux of God, represented perhaps as the pure archetypal man, between whom, however, and their "Jesus patibilis," or the seed of light enchained and suffering in every plant, etc., there is a clear difference. The latter is bound and commingled with matter (owa/«? iraQrjrucrj). For whereas the second divine Swafus, the SrjfiiovpyiKrj, the world-forming Svvafus, is only able to set limits to the dominion of matter by bringing the world into order, but was unable to rescue the light-germs confined in it; a third power, Christ, the form which is enthroned on the sun, draws all related elements out of matter upwards to the light of the sun. Baur. 1. c. pp. 205, 291. This Christ, therefore, cannot be born; for birth would bring with it the loss of the purity which gives Him redeeming power. In general, that physical and cosmical process of redemption is by no means connected with the person of the historical Christ, although the Manichaeans frequently use Him as an allegory of the Christ on the sun, to wit, so far as the inmost essence of Jesus, which came to light at His transfiguration on the mount, like the essence of every "Electus," may undoubtedly be designated pure and divine. But quite as truly, and even more fully, is the historical Christ a mere allegory of the "Jesus patibilis," who himself needs redemption in his sufferings. On the Christology of the Priscillianists, who diffused Manichaeism in the East from the fourth century onwards, compare Liibkert's "de Haeresi Priscillianistarum," 1840, pp. 25-29. Similar phaenomena manifest themselves in connection with the Bogomils (compare Gieseler's "de Bogcmilis Comment.") and the Cathari. According to Augustine (ad Oros. c. Priscill. et Orig. C. 4, T. x. 735, ed. Maur. 2 a.), the Priscillianists were Sabellian in their doctrine of the Trinity. It is also allowed that the Sabellians made use of the Gospel of the Egyptians, which contains dualistic elements. Augustine says (1. c.),—" Priscillianus Sabellianum antiquum dogma restituit, ubi ipse pater, qui Filius, qui et Spiritus S. perhibetur." Similarly Orosius, Leo the Great, and others. Leo's terming them, besides, Patripassians, is plainly explicable from the character of their Christology. But when he entitles them also Arians, he is certainly chargeable with inaccuracy, especially in view of the position—" Christum innascibilem esse," which probably related to His divine nature, which it was thus intended to put on a level with the Father (Cone. Tolet. Reg. fid. Anath. 6); though, as Lijbkert justly observes (p. 25), it may undoubtedly be explained from the Emanatism which, according to the same Council, the Priscillianists combined with their Monarchianism, as did also the Arians. "Credimus," says the Council (Anath. 14), "Trinitatem indivisibilem indifferentem; prater hanc nullum credimus divinam esse naturam." The Priscillianists are charged with entertaining the opinion, "esse aliquid, quod so extra divinam Trinitatem possit extendere." It is not likely, however, that they represented these emanations as concrescing into definite hypostases. A cunon of the Synod. Bracarensis says,—" Si quis extra sanctam Trinitatem alia nescio qua divinitatis nomina introducit dicens quod in ipsa divinitate sit Trinitas Trinitatis, sicut Gnostici et Priscilliani dixerunt, anathema sit." How it was possible for Sabellians to arrive at propositions concerning a double or triple Trinity of this nature, which had been already laid down by Neo-Platonists, for an explanation see Note 31. As the Pri£ cillianists looked upon the body as the seat and work of the devil, they could not attribute an earthly body to Christ; hence the charge of Docetism brought against them by Leo. According to the Cone. Tol. Anath. 6, they denied also the human soul of Christ. Had they remained simply content with denying to Christ both human body and human soul, they would not have deserved even the title of heretics, for they would have cast aside the fundamental idea and fundamental fact of Christianity. (See Note U, vol. i., on the true conception of Heresy.) With this, however, it does not harmonize to say that they maintained "Deitatis et carnis unam esse in Christo naturam" (1. c. Anath. 13). These words, namely, imply, that they assumed the existence of something analogous to matter in the divine nature itself, of which they took a physical view. In harmony therewith is also the further charge of teaching "Deitatem Christi convertibilem esse et passibileni" (1. c. Anath. 7), which, with their Monarchianism, caused them to be blamed for Patripassianism. This admission of finitude into the nature of God, indicates undoubtedly that the original Dualism had begun to be conciliated and weakened down; but even the old Manichaiism had done the same with its " Jesus patibilis." For this reason I consider unsatisfactory the view to which Liibkert inclines (1. c. pp. 27, 28), plainly through not paying sufficient attention to the many appearances which speak of a rpoirrj of God, or of an origin of the body of Christ from the essence of God,—to wit, that this conversion was not objective, but merely subjective, symbolical or Docetical; the effect of which would be, contrary to his own intention (p. 28), to reduce the entire historical appearance of Christ to a mere illusion. There is the more reason for accepting this supposition, as, according to Leo, they taught the birth of Christ from the Virgin; not, indeed, as Neander rightly remarks, in the sense of the doctrine of the Church, but still in the sense that He passed through Mary with the glorious body which He brought with Him from above, and which He derived from God. They may indeed have supposed that this heavenly or divine body appeared to be sensuous to the sensuous, to the spiritual, spiritual, according to their different power of apprehension; but still a real and objective union of God with the "caro" took place. How far they admitted suffering also into this divine "caro," is difficult to say; at all events, it contains the element of finitude. As they denied the resurrection of Christ, they must have denied either the susceptibility of His body to injury, or the continuance of His corporeality. Against the latter alternative is the objection, that they can scarcely have been willing to give up a body derived from the divine nature to the kingdom of earthly matter. But in that case, Christ's body, which is supposed not to have needed resurrection, cannot have experienced injury and death; in the place of the resurrection must be substituted the ascension; and, accordingly, His sufferings must undoubtedly be deemed Docetical.

Note 27, page 158.

Decidedly favourable thereto is Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25 (see Note 1, page 153). Contrary thereto appears to be the passage 4, 13, where we read,—El roivw f) /toro? irXarvvOelaa yeyove rpids, fj Be fiovas eariv 6 irarrjp, rpiAs Be irarrjp} vtoy, ayiov irvevfuv ivpSyrov fiev, irXarvvOeiaa 17 p.ovas irdOos vrrefieive, ical yeyovev orrep Ovk fy,—to wit, acofiahrXarvvOtj yap Ovk ovaa irKarela. "Emira, el airri) 17 fiovds eirXarvvOrj els rpidBa,6 avrbs dpa irarrjp yeyove ical vlbs ical wevfia Kara XafieWiov eVro? el fir) 17 XeyopAvrj irap avrc o fiovas dWo Tl ecrrt 'rrapd Tov irarepa. Ovk en ovv irXarvveaBai (sc. airbv) eBei Xeyeiv (al. Xoyov) dX\' rj fiovas rpiStv irovryrwrj, coare elvai fiovdSa, elra ical irarepa ical vlbv ical irvevfia. But even it does not prove, either that Sabellius consistently carried out the distinction between the Monas and the Father, or that he gave distinct utterance to it (for otherwise Athanasius could not have spoken so doubtfully regarding it); the utmost it proves is, that Sabellius sometimes verged towards the distinction (compare Neander's "Church History," ed. 2, vol. ii. pp. 1024 f., German Ed.). Baur, on the other hand, following the example of Schleiermacher, is of opinion, that Sabellius distinguished the Monas very clearly from the Father. Sabellius's designating the one God vloirdrcop, Son-Father (Greg. Nyss. Or. c. Ar. et Sabell. in A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 8, Appendix p. 1), does not decide the matter; for we do not know whether to translate,—" The Monas became vioirarcop, that is, both Father and Son;" or, "The Father as unity becomes also Son." The prefixing of vlbs seems to be opposed to the former translation; whereas it is very intelligible if we adopt the latter. This also was the view taken of the matter by Gregory of Nyssa.

Note 28, page 158.

The words of Hilarius in his "de Trin." 7, 39,—"ut in assumto homine se filium Dei nuncupet, in natura vero patrem," etc., might be taken to imply, that as Sabellius designated God in the incarnation Son, so he designated God in nature Father. But "in natura" may also signify "by nature;" for this notice is too isolated, and is too little accredited by Greek Fathers, to permit us to build any argument upon it. Even Athanasius did not know in what relation the irKarvafiol stood to the creation. C. Ar. 4, 14. If, says he, the self-expansion of God did not exist from the very beginning, He must have had a reason for passing over into expansion. What was this reason? After inquiring whether this reason could be that the Father might acquire a Son, or that the incarnation might take place, he says,—el Bl Bia To Kturcu eirKarvvOrj, aroirov. For the Monas cannot have become powerful in consequence of the expansion, but must have been powerful already in itself. Moreover, on that supposition the world would cease to exist when the 7rXarvo~fios was withdrawn. Athanasius quotes elsewhere expressions of Sabellius verbatim (for example, 4, 25). And yet even he was unable to say whether or no Sabellius conceived creation to be one of the purposes of the expansions of God. Against this supposition may be pleaded, too, that he represented God as arriving at a new revelation only after withdrawing from the earlier: this may be carried out to a certain extent in the relation between legislation and Christ, and between Christ and the Holy Ghost; that is, if the significance of Christ is conditioned solely by sin. But how can Sabellius have supposed that the creation would cease, if the revelation begins with the incarnation? (Compare pp. 160 f.)

Note 29, page 159.

Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25:—To the Sabellians the Father must be both Logos and Spirit, in that, irpos T)jv %pelav Ikcujtov apfio^6fievo<;, to the one He is Father, to the other Logos (that is, Son), and so forth. 'A.vdyici) Be Kox iravOfoeaOai To ovo/ia Tov vlov Kox Tov irvevpM.ros, rtjs ypelas irXt)p(oOelarj<;. Basil. Ep. 210,—Tov avrbv Qebv eva ra> inroiceifievip ovra irpbs Ta? «cocrrore 'rrapairnrrova'a<; ypeias fierafiopcpovfievov vvv p.ev <&? irarepa, vvv Be <os vlov, vvv is To ar/wv irvevfia SiaXeyea9ai (a passage without doubt quoted verbatim). Ep. 214,—-'Eva p.ev elvai, rfj viroardxrei Tov Qeov, irpoaairoiroieiaOai Be wo T7?s ypcufxi}<; Bia<popcos, Kara To iBuofin rtjs irrroKeip.evqs iiccurrOre ypela<;, Koj vvv pkv ras irarpucas eavrc o wepiriOivai <po>va<;, Orav Tovtov tempo* Xi Tov irpoacoirov, vvv Be ra? vlq> irpeirovo~a<; vvv Be To Tov irvevfiMro<; inroBveaOcu irpoaayrreiov. Ep. 235,—Tijv avrriv inroaraaiv Trpos Ttjv eKdarOre irapefi-Trnrrovaav ypeiav fieraa^fiarl^eaOcu. August. Tract. in Joann. 53,—"Pro diversitate causarum ipsum dici Filium, ipsum dici Spiritum Sanctum." Of the Son, in particular, Epiph. Haer. 62, 1;—IlefupOevra Tov

vlov Kaipro 7T0r6, u>airep atcriva, Kcii ep^aadfievov To. -rravra ev rco Koafup To. T>j? olKovofuas rr}<; evar/yeTuicrjs Km aanrjpuv; rcov avOpamcov, avaXr)<pOevra Be avOi<; et? ovpavbv, &>? inro rfXlov irefi<f>Oeurav aicrlva, ical irdXiv eh Tov rjkwv avaBpafioucrav.

Note 30, page 160.

Whether the speaking of God, through which the world was brought into existence and still exists, is conceived as an actual creation, and the trinitarian self-evolution of God as therefore taking place on the basis of a world distinct from God; or whether God Himself is the plurality which attaches to His works (for Athanasius repeatedly asserts that God Himself is, that to which He expands Himself); or whether the creation also was represented as a self-evolution of the Monas (a view which Athanasius frequently attempts to fasten upon him; see c. Ar. 4, c. 11-14), is not quite clear. As he certainly held the trinitarian revelation to be a self-continuation of the speaking Monas or Logos—which is very clearly evident in connection, at all events, with the incarnation; and as the standing designation of the incarnation is self-evolution; we might refer the same expression to the creation also. The views of Sabellius would thus acquire a certain unity, in that all the relations of God to the world would be classed under the one type of selfexpansion. It is possible, however, that Sabellius may have shrunk from the pantheistic consequences contained in the term "self-expansion," have limited it to the sphere of spirit, and have conceived it as a gradually intensified informing, by God, of a world which already existed in distinction from Himself. And, indeed, this charge of Pantheism was not brought against him; a circumstance which ought to be noted. The charge of Dualism lay much nearer. For he represents the impulse to the divine movements within the world, as arising solely from that which for God already had existence; and conceived that God needed a given material, an eternal v\.rj, for His work of creation. His view may have resembled that of Hermogenes. (Compare Leopold's "Hermogenis de origine mundi sententia," 1844, pp. 8-22; especially note 9.) Dionysius of Alexandria also demonstrated the impossibility of an eternal vXrj, in opposition to Sabellius (Euseb. Praep. Evang. 7, 19). Further, if Sabellius had held that God Himself became the world, he could not have retained the unity of God, which it was his purpose to retain; the distinctions would then have existed in the divine life itself, and not have first owed their rise to the world. Creation, redemption, and sanctification would then be three momenta or stadia of the development of His life: and Sabellius would thus have given up the efforts ,he had been making to combine the objectivity of revelation with the unity of God and the indivisibility of His essence. Instead of saying,—For the sake of the ISlafia, of the peculiarity of the need of the world, He purposed to assume the mode of existence of the Son, although it stood in no essential and necessary relation to His own inner being; he was now compelled to say,—The vital evolution of God took the course of evolving itself into a world, and so forth. And if, in the view of Sabellius, it was essential to the idea of God, that He should be not merely a silent, but also a creative or a world-forming God, even so essential must also have been the other revelations. The correct view to take of the matter is, probably, that Sabellius accepted and presupposed the doctrine of the Logos traditionally; though neither in the strictly hypostatical form given it by Origen, nor in the sense that the world is clearly and purely distinguished from the Logos. But just as some of the older writers,—for example, several of the Apologists, Clemens Alex. and Tertullian,—held that the world was immediately contained in God, and conceived the distinction between the Logos and God as He is in Himself to have been first fully accomplished at the creation of the world, without therefore intending to be pantheistic; so may it have been with Sabellius, with the difference, that inasmuch as he assumed an eternal vXrj, he identified merely the idea or the forms of the real world with the Logos, and more distinctly than Clemens let fall the hypostasis of the Logos:—indeed, strictly viewed, to represent the world as immediately contained in the Logos, is to exclude His hypostasis. It is also deserving of remark, that in combating (c. Ar. 4, 11) the Sabellian doctrine of the Logos, Athanasius really combated all those older teachers of 'the Church who conceded to the Logos, prior to the creation of the world, at the utmost a latent and inactive existence in God (compare Note 1, page 154), and an actual existence merely subsequently to the creation.

Note 31, page 161.

The Fathers of the Church adduce no evidence to show that he believed that the world would one day perish. It is in itself improbable that he held such an opinion, and is very likely a mere conclusion drawn from the transitoriness of the members of the Sabellian Trinity. It would undoubtedly be correct if the Father, as the fjrst member of the Trinity, were the Creator. In that case, however, creation must have disappeared with the appearance of the Son in the incarnation, even as the law also was then done away with; which may again be an indication, that Sabellius did not attribute creation to the first member of the Trinity. As concerns the Spirit, Sabellius neither demonstrated nor proclaimed a new revelation after Him; nay more, he did not even teach that He would some time cease to confer His gifts: indeed, this would have been far from harmonizing with the continuance of the world, which he undoubtedly assumed. Nor did he maintain that the irpoaairov of the Spirit would cease to exist, unless we accept the words of Gregory, quoted in Note 32, as true. He might, accordingly, have held that history terminates with the age of the Spirit. If he held that God began to create as the speaking God, we might suppose that creation would attain its perfection in the age of the Spirit (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 11,—auoir&v fiev [0eos] Ovk Tjzvvclto iroieiv, XaXmv Be icri^eiv tfp^aro). The intervening sin would then be set aside by the revelation in the law and the incarnation (Xeiirorafjia; see the passage from Gregory of Nyssa, quoted on page 712); humanity would be led back to the beginning, to the rafts in the Holy Ghost, in a higher way; thus the Holy Spirit would have brought in a new and permanent element. It is more probable, however, that he believed the Holy Ghost to lead men back merely to a perfection which they had at the beginning. At all events, Epiphanius says,—The Holy Ghost is sent into the world to every one who is counted worthy of receiving again life and warmth (avafy&yovelv Be Tov Toiovtov teal ava^eeiv); with which agrees also the passage above quoted from Gregory of Nyssa. Accordingly, he was able to represent the irpoacoirov of the Holy Spirit, so far as it was directed against sin, as ceasing to exist, whereas the positive element in His gifts remains, to wit, the life in God, which is represented as the life in Paradise. The period of perfection would then no longer stand under the special irpoaanrov of the Holy Spirit, but would be the return to the undivided life in God, without its being necessary that the world, or even the gifts of the individual revelations, should cease to exist; the work of the Holy Spirit would then be to lead back out of division, and out of the individual revelations, to the undivided God. Man is then again what he was, and God also is again what He was (compare Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12, 22, 25), prior to the entrance of sin, and to the Trinity, which it had rendered necessary.

Note 32, page 162.

In relation to the Father, notice is further deserved by the following passage from the Expos. Fidei, which may indeed have been in great measure wrongly attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, but still does not need to be placed below the fourth century (compare Neander 2, 1243). It was first edited in Greek by A. Mai (Nov. Coll. 7, 170 ff.). After saying that Sabellius refused to allow that the three persons were real, and rather introduced an avviroararov irpoawrrov, that is, masks instead of hypostases, he goes on to say,— a"rro(f>evyofiev Tov SafieWiov Xeyovra Tov avrbv irarepa, Tov Clvtov vlbv irarepa fitv yctp Xeyet eivai Tov XaXovvra, vlov oe Tov \6yov ev T& irarpi fievovra Km. Kara Kaipbv Tt}<; Srjp.iovpjla<; (f>aiv6fievov erreura pxra Ttjv airavrav ivXrjp(iso~iv Tcov irpwyfiaro>v eh 0ebv avarpey0vra' To avrb Be Koi irepl Tov 'n-vevfiMros Xeyei. This hitherto unnoticed passage is plainly very favourable to Neander's view of the relation between Monas and Father. For the Monas, as speaking, is decidedly designated Father. Now, this is not merely more closely in accordance with the mode of thought common at that time, which regarded the Father as the supreme Unity, as the speaker in relation to the spoken Logos, as the Father in relation to the Son; but it furnishes also an explanation of the circumstance, that many of the Church teachers represent Sabellius as holding the Father and the Monas to be one. According to this passage, the silent God would be the Monas in itself; the speaking God, or the speaking Monas, would be the Father; the spoken word (naturally conceived to be impersonal), or the discourse of God, would, as thought, be primarily in God, manifesting itself, however, in its effects in the creation of the world: it might also figuratively be termed Son; indeed, we find even Celsus giving this name to the world. From this we see that Sabellius did not regard the already created world as the first basis and occasion of the Trinity; but, though he described Father and Son as one hypostasis, considered them to be two eternal and essential aspects of the divine nature, to which the Spirit was added as a third. There thus remained a place for the historical Trinity, which Sabellius is well known to have taught, and on which doubt cannot be cast, though the passage in question gives but a superficial and imperfect hint of it. If, namely, the speaking God be the Father, and that which He speaks (that to which, according to another image, the Monas expands Himself) be the Logos, or figuratively the Son, this relation might be conceived as recurring twice (or more frequently); first, in the external creation, and then in the spiritual world. As the Father, indeed, thinks in Himself, though first through the spoken word, the if>aiv6fievo<; X6yos, the creation of the world, is a reality (the Srjfiiovpyia); so also in the domain of spirit the ideal exists, it is true, in the law, but God is therein merely as speaking, and that in such a manner, that the spoken word of the law still yearns after or proclaims the reality, is consequently conceived as Father; whereas the law acquires reality in the incarnation, first in Christ, and then through the Holy Spirit in the Church.1 The God-man is the spoken God, or God in the form of actuality. It would then be the Holy Ghost who raises the first creation to the rank of the second, by means of the tendency towards God which dwelt in it from the beginning; which tendency in the first creation might be termed the work of the Holy Spirit. So far, then, we should have to maintain that it is essential to God to be, (1) not merely silent, but also to speak; (2) not merely an idea, but also an objectifying real principle; (3) the One who leads back the objectivity into Himself: we should have three principles in God, which, though relating essentially to the world of revelation, are objectively distinct and eternalprinciples which were gradually set forth in history, an eternal Trinity of revelation, as some recent writers have termed it.

1 "Wie der Vater zwar in sich denkt, aber erst durch das gesprochene Wort, den Qxi»iy.mos Xoyos, die Weltechopfung dasteht (die Infiiovpyix), Bo ist auch auf dem geistigen Gebiete, etc."

But as this passage is not particularly marked by accuracy, and stands very isolated, much stress cannot be laid on it. The sense may also be,—Sabellius reduces our Father, who begets the Son, to the merely speaking God, and out of our Son he makes a thought or a word. But still it is remarkable, that here the distinction between Father and Son is reduced back altogether, and consequently also for the entire revelation, to that between the God who speaks and that which He speaks; which, be it remarked, must not be confounded with the distinction between the silent and the speaking God; for the latter Dyad is the necessary presupposition to every species of Sabellian Trias. (Compare Neander's " Church History" in loc.)

Note 33, page 167.

Athanasius also saw clearly (1. c. c. 21) that Sabellianism could not permanently occupy the point of view at which it then stood. He argues against it as follows,—If the man Jesus by Himself cannot be designated Son and Only-begotten One, but, as they urge, both united, the Logos and the man; the question arises—Which of the two is the cause of the other, and constituted Him Son? Did the man constitute the Logos Son? . If so, the man would be the Only-begotten One, the Creator, the Kedeemer; for all these things are attributed to the Son in the Scriptures, identifying Him as they do with the Logos (cf. c. 20), and we should be baptized into the name of a man. But if the man Jesus is called Son because of the Logos, the Logos must have been Son apart from the incarnation, as the Church maintains. And because He was the true Son, He was able to make other sons (c. 22). If, finally, we say that the Son became Son neither through the one nor through the other separately, but through the union of the two, we must assume a cause of the union of these two; this cause was above and prior to both; consequently the principle of Sonship must have preceded, and this precedent cause ought to be termed Son. Hence, in whatever aspect we consider the matter, Sabellius had no alternative but either to go over to the doctrine of the Church, or to allow a false predominance to the human aspect. He himself also failed not to see that, in such a case, the Son would be derived from the world, that consistency would require His being conceived ebionitically, and that He could not redeem the world (c. 20).

Note 34, page 167.

We have already conceded above, that Sabellius, strictly speaking, believed the entire God to be present in the revelation of Christ, under a particular mode of existence. But although this revelation of the Son may be something objective and new in relation to the previous and to the succeeding revelation, that which characterizes it is not, in the strict sense, the entire God, but merely a momentum in Him, which He set forth specially to view for the sake of men; and the means for leading souls to the Monas in His entirety. A part of God therefore remains outside of Christ, be it the resting, or even the active Monas. Indeed, the creative and sustaining activity of God existed outside of the revelation in the law, as Sabellius will not have denied. Nowhere do we find him representing the entire Monas (totam totaliter) as absorbed in a single revelation; indeed, to have done so, would have necessitated a denial of objective distinction to the revelations. He must then have made all progress purely subjective, and therefore have regarded the history of religion merely as the progressive knowledge of God who, in Himself, remains ever the same and unmoved, and not as a course of divine deeds, which, though without the inherent significance involved in having their end in themselves, were still necessary as the means whereby that knowledge should be conducted to its eternal goal. But as he does not do so, and on the contrary (not very consistently, it must be allowed) believes God Himself, the movements of the divine life, to be in that which he represents as mere means, we are compelled to conclude, that he conceived the differences in the revelations to arise from the entire God not being present in each one of them. Sabellianism, therefore, was necessarily driven on to say, that in each of the three revelations, merely some portion of God was manifested. This now is the point from which Sabellianism, if it refused to accept the Nicene doctrine of simultaneous distinctions in God, might pass over to the notion of the gradual emanation of powers out of God—a notion which must have commended itself, specially on account of the Person of Christ, in which was contained a constant and fixed circumscription of a portion of the divine essence. At the same time, even as Tertullian held that the entire sun meets the eye in a single ray, so might Sabellius have conceived the entire God to be present in the ray which was in Christ. The idea of emanation was not strange to Sabellianism, but it manifests itself frequently in the History of Dogmas, as the middle link between Sabellianism and Arianism or Ebionism. So, for example, in the fourth and the sixteenth centuries. For this reason, it was not unjust to direct attention to the danger of a false separation from, and a false division of God, to which Sabellius was exposed. Not to mention Athanasius (1. c. c. 12, ell. Expos. Fid. init.), who remarks concerning the position assigned by Sabellius to the Logos, relatively to the Monas,—that if the Logos was in God prior to His generation, He must be outside of God, that is, a mundane being, subsequently thereto; the Arians, in particular, frequently drew attention thereto. See Theodoret. H. E. i. 3, T. ii., P. 2, p. 743, ed. Schulze :—Kal et<r eva vlov Qeov fiovoyevfj yewrjOevra oil icarh ra<; T&v amfiarcov op.oiorrjras, rats To/«us, Tj rats ite Siaipeaeav airoppolais, coairep Xaj3eWicp tcat BaXevrivfp Bokei. Compare also Note 1, page 156, and Note 38 in the Appendix.

Note 35, page 173.

Later ages appear to have added new portions to the work fj Karh pApa irlans, as often as circumstances appeared to them to require it (in the Greek in A. Mai Coll. Nov. 7, 170-176). Whether any portion is genuine or not, is hard to make out. Individual parts—as, for example, those which betray antagonism to Paul of Samosata, to patripassian and Sabellian principles— might be genuine, but Gregoiy's doctrine cannot with certainty be deduced from these fragments. Otherwise we should have, at the very commencement (1. c. p. 170), express proof that, like Origen, in whose writings also the terms icrlafia, iroirjfia occur, he held the doctrine of eternal generation. There is some resemblance between the commencement and what we read of Theognostus in Athan. de deer. Nic. 25. The discourse for the Feast of Epiphany is spurious (ed. Paris, pp. 30—37); besides also the 12 Ke<paXcua irepl ir{oreco<;. The Ep. Canonica and the Metaphr. ad Eccles. are genuine, but contain nothing Christological. On the other hand, however, A. Mai (Spicil. Rom. 3, 696-698) has published a fragment of Gregory's from an Arabian Codex in the Vatican Library, which is remarkable, because it designates the divine persons "nomina." Different beings bear different names, even when they have the same substance and belong to the same class of natures: so is it with Father, Son, and Spirit. These names, it is true, are not something superadded,as in the case of men, but realities (subsistentiae). Even in the case of men, however, the distinction arises not from the humanity, but from the name; for example, Adam, Abraham, and so forth, are names. "Sed divinae personae sunt quidem nomina, nomina tamen sunt personae." The persons first designate that which is, and subsists; and that is the "essentia Dei." According to this, he would appear to have conceived the divine essence to have first become a reality, in the three "nomina;" even as man first becomes a concrete man, when he receives his name. This does not necessarily contain a Sabellian element; for, on the contrary, he says afterwards,— The Logos is neither a merely cogitated word (/ear' ewoiav), nor merely a word spoken by God (like the X0709 7r/3o<^opitco?, which was spoken to the prophets), nor merely an apOpiicbs, an articulate human word, but " substantiale Verbum, etc." Still, if the fragment is genuine, the designation of the person of the Logos by the totally unusual term "nomen" may have given rise to the appearance of Sabellianism, of which Basilius (1. c.) speaks. Much more probable, however, is the following. According to the letter of Basilius, the new Sabellians appealed in Neo-Caesarea to the words of the baptismal formula, "in this," urging that they denote that we ought to read, "baptize unto the name," not " unto the names." Consequently, it is one person unto whom we are baptized. Basilius, therefore, endeavours to show that baptism unto three names is required; and uses in this connection the unusual designation "three names" for the "three persons." As those Sabellians appealed to the eicOeai<; iri<rreco<; of Gregory Thaumaturgus, which for the rest appears to have been a disputation, and therefore certainly comprised passages which sounded rather Sabellian than Arian; and this may have been the occasion of ascribing the above fragments which treat of the names to Gregory, with the idea of securing Vol. 11. 2 H irarrjp 6 vow Tov Xoyov, cov icf> iavrov, o Be KaOairep vlbs 6 X<yyo<j Tov vov' irpo eiceivov fiev aSvvarov, aX)C ovBe e^coOev iroOev crvv eiceivm yev6fievo<;, /3xoot^«70s Be air avrov' Ovtcos 6 rrartjp 6 p.eyicrro<; Kal KaOoXov vow irpcorov Tov viov Xoyov ipfirjvea Ktil ayyeXov iavrov eyet- This exposition reminds us of Origen and Hippolytus; but it bears a still closer resemblance to the Logology of the Apologists. Still the step taken in advance since Tertullian's time, which consisted in discriminating the Son from the Xoyos — voxk, is not given up. It is true, the Son is spoken of as vow here also; not, however, as such, but as the voij<; which had assumed another mode of being (jieOlarcn,ai 6 vow et? Tov Xoyov). Thus through this /ieroorewi? of the Kclooxov Vov<; into the hypostatized Word he arrives at an objectified vow, or a duplication of God; for in speaking of a /leraaraat?, he by no means intends to teach a conversion in which God the Father should cease to be what He was.

Note 38, page 183.

De Synodis 16 ;—S'ajSeWto? Ttjv fiovada viorrrarepa efovev. Compare Hilar. de Trin. 4, 12; 6, 5, 11. Hilarius adds in the latter passage,—"Divisa s a Sabellio unionis (that is, of the Monas) crimen exprobrant, cujus unionis divisio non nativitatem intulit, sed eundem divisit in virgine." Schleiermacher finds these words obscure; but the meaning probably is,— There would be no objection to be made against a distinction, still less against the division of the Monas, if it preceded and were the principle of the birth of Christ; but they rather divide God in the Virgin; that is, the birth and humanity of Christ are the principle of a division in God, and since the incarnation the person of the Son stands over against that of the Father. We find exactly the same thought also in the work adv. Sab. Gregal. c. 3. When the objection was brought against the Sabellians, that the Scriptures so frequently distinguish Christ and the Father as two persons, they replied,— We also recognise two hypostases; the one is God the Father, the other is the Son, who is a man (teal ovrm Bvo viroardaeis fyalvecrOai, eva Tov irarepa Qeov, erepov Be Tov vlbv avOpanrov); to which it was again answered,—In that sense Paul of Samosata also recognised two hypostases. Here is, at the same time, the weak point of the Sabellian system, at which Patripassianism might again be resuscitated; even as, through the incarnation, an airoicoiri) might be introduced into God. The same thing is clear also from c. 6 and 12, where Sabellians, in order apparently to meet the demand for a Trinity, are said to have resorted to the evasion,—when they conceded distinctions, they wished at all events that God (so far as He reveals Himself in the world) should be compounded of three things (avvOeros e'/c rpicov irpar/fidr<ov).

Note 39, page 183.

Some difference remains here between the two Dionysiuses. The Roman Dionysius develops nothing that resembles a duplication, a self-objectification of the vovs, and must therefore either have conceived the Father in Himself, apart from the Son, as without power and wisdom, or have regarded the Son in the light of an attribute: and it is not probable that he intended to do either. Whereas the Alexandrian Dionysius reckoned, even at a later period, power and wisdom to the essence of the Father; for he held the Father Himself to be the X070? as eyKeifiuevo<; (see page 180). This was more correct in itself, and was also accepted by later teachers of the Church, in order that the Son might not be reduced to a mere attribute of the Father, and that there might not be attributes of which the Father was destitute. The Alexandrian Dionysius probably intended thus to characterize the Father as perfect in Himself, even apart from the Son; whereas the Roman Dionysius, with his doctrinal form, intended to say, that apart from the Son only an imperfect conception could be formed of the Father. His aim, therefore, was to connect the Son more distinctly with the divine essence itself. Still this formula always threatens the hypostasis of the Son, in the manner of Sabellianism. And, in point of fact, the Roman Dionysius does not appear to have expressed himself so strongly against Sabellianism as against the Tritheites and Subordinatianists of the above kind.

Note 40, page 196.

For the sake of completeness, we will here devote a word to Victorinus, who, as a Greek by birth and yet a Latin Bishop, occupies a middle position between the East and the West. We have a tolerably long fragment of his, entitled "de Fabrica Mundi" and " Scholia in Apocalypsin" (compare "Victorini Petavionensis in Pannonia superiore episcopi opera" in Gallandii Bibliotheca Vett. PP. T. 4, pp. 49-64). The genuineness of the fragment is unquestionable; but it is in part scarcely intelligible, owing to its bad Latin and the writer's awkwardness in the use of language, with which even Jerome also seems to have been struck. These faults are somewhat less glaring in the other work, which may possibly be due to the copyist. In the fragment we not merely read,—"Verbo dominicoeli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum; —sic dicit Pater ejus; eructavit cor meum verbum bonum: and John,—in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Dcus erat Verbum—omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine eo factum est nihil,"—but he also assigns to the incarnation so high a place, in virtue of mystical numbers (in use also by earlier writers), that he regards it and the history of Christ as the idea that dominates the universe. The Son with the Father, he holds to be the unity of the seven spirits of Isaiah; in the six days of creation these spirits successively revealed themselves. He completes the number seven by representing the Son as revealing Himself to the human race in two principal forms:—firstly, as the principle of the fear of God; secondly, as the principle of blessing and sanctification. Further on, however, the six days' work is typically employed for the parallel with the history of Christ, and particularly with the week of the Passion (c. 2, 6). For example:—As Christ came (in carnem couversus) that Adam might be created anew, He assumed human nature on the same day of the week on which Adam was created, He suffered on the same day on which he fell, and so forth. At the basis hereof lies the idea of a full "recapitulatio,"—an idea which we have already found set forth by Irenaeus. With this fragment, whose conclusion also treats of the Apocalypse, the other work has the most unmistakeable affinity, both in style and thought. For example, the "septem spiritus" are very frequently employed for the explanation of apocalyptic passages; the mystic numbers of the fragment occur also in the Scholia, especially the construction of the history of the world according to the number seven, —a procedure which has drawn upon its author the unjust charge of Chiliasm (for example, from Cave); whereas the conclusion of the Scholia expressly protests against the supposition that the completed kingdom of Christ will endure only 1000 years, and not for ever. Both monuments undoubtedly lay very great stress on eschatology, on the judgment through Christ, and on the perfection at the last day. These scholia supply far fuller Christological data; but as the work has probably suffered from interpolations, doubt is thrown on the elements just referred to. So, for example, the number 666, Apocalypse xiii. 18, alongside of earlier and more absurd explanations (reirav, Diclux), is referred also to a "verbum gothicum revarjpiKos." The words, "He who is, and who was, and who is to come" (Apocalypse i. 4), he explains as follows,— "Est, quia permanet, erat, quia cum Patre omnia fecit, et nunc ex virgine initium sumsit, venturus est, utique ad judicandum." He redeemed humanity by His sufferings (1,5; 5, 4; 12, 1—4). Death is the "debitum" of every descendant of Adam; not, however, of Christ (qui de semine natus non erat, nihil morti debebat, propter quod eum devorare non potuit, id est in morte detinere). He became "agnus;" but "tanquam leo confregit mortem" (5, 5). Thus was he made heir (" hasres Domini," not "Diaboli"), "ut possideret substantiam morientis, i.e., membra humana (5, 4, 5). Ut sicut per unum corpus omnes homines debito mortis suae ceciderant, per unum etiam corpus universi credentes renati in vitam resurgerent." The higher nature of Christ is here also described as the unity of the seven spirits (Apol. 1, 4; 5, 6); but on c. xi. 1 he remarks,— "Patrem esse dicimus et hujus Filium Christum ante originem seculi apud Patrem genitum, hominem factum in anima vera (? ) et came,—morte devicta et in coelos cum corpore a Patre receptum effudisse Spiritum Sanctum.—Hunc per prophetas praedicatum, hunc per legem conscriptum, hunc esse manum Dei et Verbum Patris ex Deo, per omnia Dominum et conditorem Orbis." The author is specially zealous in his attacks on Dualism, because it aims at rending asunder the Old and New Testaments. The Word was the founder of both Testaments. Everything in the Old Testament is treated by him as a type of Christ. But the type still resembles an unbroken seal, a shut temple; nay more, one seal has been added to the other in the Old Covenant. The opening of the seals (Apocalypse v.), which no one could accomplish save the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of the stem of Jesse, is the opening of the Old Testament (v. 8, 9); by Christ all the seven seals are broken at once. He is the opened temple of God (compare Apoc. v.). The new song which is sung after the breaking of the seals by His death, is the confession of the new element in Christianity. New is it, that the Son of God should become man (whose Head is God, Apocalypse i. 14); that He should ascend up to heaven in the body (which He united with the spirit of His glory, Apocalypse i. 12); new, that He forgives our sins, and so forth (Apoc. v. 8, 9). In accordance herewith, he explains the woman, which is adorned with the sun and travails in birth, to be the old Church of the fathers and prophets, of the saints and apostles (prior to its union with Christ). This old Church "genitus et tormenta desiderii sui habuit, usquequo fructum ex plebe sua secundum carnem oliin promissum sibi videret Christum ex ipsa gente carnem sumsisse." He deemed the incarnation, therefore, to be the uncovering of the divine mystery, on which the noblest minds of the old period had toiled with earnest longings. He then naturally conceives this humanity to be permanently united with the Word. Because of His incarnation, says the Scholium to Ap. i. 16, is He appointed judge of the world. The Father intended to show, "quoniam verbo praadicationis judicabuntur homines" (compare on Apocalypse vi. 1, 2, 5), that only the highest revelation of God can judge men.

Note 41, page 196.

The unity of Christ, el ical To. fuiXiara iroWals emvoiais eirivoeircu, is expressly defended. Pamphilus, however, found it necessary to answer the charge of teaching two Christs, which was the fifth brought against Origen (Apol. c. 5). Now, as Paul of Samosata did not teach two Christs, but a Logos and a man, representing the latter, however, as becoming Christ, through His union with the former, the words of the Confession of Faith (Hahn's "Bibliothek," etc., p. 96) will not refer to him; unless we suppose that here also Paul had spoken dishonestly of the generation of the Logos, in order to make it appear as though he attributed an hypostasis to the Logos (even as to the man Jesus), either prior to the creation of the world, as the spurious letter of Dionysius of Alexandria maintains; or at the incarnation, as Ehrlich thinks, when the ivepyeia, which had hitherto been impersonal, became a person. This view bears some analogy to that of Tertullian and others, according to whom the Logos became a person at the creation, but it was not Paul's; compare Schwab's "de Pauli Samos. vita atque doctrina dissert. inaug.," 1839, § 12, pp. 64 f.

Note 42, page 197.

Eusebius, who gives us long fragments of the discussions of this Synod (II. E. 7, 27-30), says also, that a doctrinal portion was recorded in writing; but he has not preserved it. The Confession of Faith directed against Nestorius, discovered amongst the Acts of the Synod of Ephesus, is spurious (see Ilahn 1. c. p. 129); for it contains the word ofioovaux;, whereas we know that the Synod of Antioch avoided it, because of the abuse made of it by Paul. On the other hand, with Hahn and Walch, I consider that recorded in Mansi 1, 1035, Hahn, pp. 91 ff., to be genuine. It neither contains the term 6fioovaios, nor any other determination which does not completely suit the period to which it is attributed. The vagueness which characterizes it in important points, and of which the Arians took advantage, would be inexplicable if it had been framed subsequently to the Council of Nicaea. But precisely because of this remnant of vagueness, that other Confession of Faith appears to be a spurious changeling.

Note 43, page 226.

More particular mention is here deserved by a man who exerted a great influence on many Orientals of the Nicene generation, to wit, Lucian of Antioch, the martyr. That he was like-minded with Paul of Samosata, is an unfounded suspicion cast upon him by the heresy-hunters, with which it is inconsistent that the Arians appealed to him as a witness in favour of their views (Epiph. Haer. 48). But quite as far am I also from believing that Lucian's affinity to the Arians is the result of a falsification of his writings by that party, as Athanasius surmises. On the contrary, there is no reason for throwing doubt on the declaration of the Semi-Arian Synod of Antioch, held in the year 341, that the Confession of Faith which they adopted as their own (the so-called Second Antiocheian Formula) was that of Lucian the Martyr (see Sozomen. H. E. 3, 5, ell. 6, 12). It runs as follows (according to Athanas. de Syn. Arim. et Seleuc. § 23, T. i. p. 2, 735),—"We believe in one God, the Almighty Father, the Former and Creator of the universe, and the Provider; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, His only-begotten Son, the God through whom are all things (St' ov), who was begotten of the Father before all iEons, God of God, a whole of the whole (e'f oXov), an only one of the only one (jjlovov), a perfect one of the Perfect, a King of the King, a Lord of the Lord, who is living Word (X0709), living Wisdom, true Light, the Way, the Truth, the Resurrection, the Shepherd, the Door, immutable and unalterable (arpeirrov re teal avaWoiforov); the unchangeable image (airapaKkcucrov eucova) of the deity, of the essence (ouaiW), of the will, of the power and glory of the Father, the First-born of all creation, who was in the beginning with God, as God the Word, according to the Gospel;—who in these latter days came down from above, and was born of a virgin, according to the Scriptures, and became man, Mediator between God and men, the Apostle of our Faith, the Captain of our salvation, as He saith, 'I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me;'— who suffered for us and rose again the third day, ascended up to heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of the Father, from whence He will come again, with power and glory, to judge the quick and the dead;—and in the Holy Ghost, who is given for the comfort, sanctification, and perfection of believers; as the Lord commanded to baptize into the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matthew xxviii.). Since the Father is truly Father, the Son truly Son, and so also the Spirit truly Spirit, and the names are not empty and idle, but for each of the afore-mentioned exactly denote the hypostasis, the order and the glory (rd^iv Km So^av), so that there are three as to hypostasis, but one in harmony (rfj avfupcovla Be ev). In this faith, which we hold from the beginning and to the end, we condemn all heretical false faith; and if any teach in opposition to the sound true faith of the Scripture, saying, There was an interval, a time, or an JEon, before the Son was generated, let him be anathema. And if any call the Son a creature, like one of the other creatures, or a production or work, like one of the other productions or works, and refuses to teach each one of the afore-mentioned points, one after the other, as the Holy Scriptures have handed them down, and teaches other than as we have received, let him be anathema," etc. This Confession of Faith, with the exception perhaps of the close, which does not really belong to it, accords exactly with the Prse-Nicene period, and is marked by the following noteworthy features: 1. The Father is identical with the one God (eh 0eo?); He represents the fiovapyla. The Son, therefore, is termed, not coeternal with the Father, but the image of His essence and of His attributes; He is not equal to the Father, but stands in ra^is and So^a under Him. We can, accordingly, understand why Athanasius was not quite satisfied with the Confession, and why Arian falsifications were surmised. 2. On the other hand, however, the Son is designated God of God; His perfection, singularity, immutability, and exaltedness above time, are asserted with a decision which proves how offensive Arianism must have been to those whose doctrinal convictions were firmly established, and tolerably developed. Lucian therefore (he died A.d. 311) occupies substantially the same point of view as Eusebius. Measured by a strictly scientific standard alone, both of them are more closely related to Arius than to Athanasius. For, without question, if the Father is the one God by Himself alone, nothing remains for the Son but to be a creature, and there is no place for a Trinity. To posit a middle thing between God and a creature, is unquestionably a contradictory procedure, and an expedient of the resort to which Eusebius and his adherents had already anticipatorily deprived themselves, by representing God as too exalted to enter into any immediate connection whatever with the world, and therefore with that which resembled the world. But to do this, would be to measure them by a scientific standard foreign to them. For such a middle being, which is for us an incogitable thing, seemed to them not only cogitable, but even the solution of the difficulty. They are consequently not to be measured by the more perfect scientific standard; for, according to it, they ought, without doubt, consistently to have gone on to Arianism. But precisely because their theory was in itself so far from meeting the requirements of science, it is necessary to refer back to their Christian consciousness, as the second factor, which alone furnishes an explanation of their procedure. Indeed, with men like Eusebius, this second factor was so decidedly the earlier and more powerful of the two, that if they had become aware of the results to which their theory, scientifically considered, must lead, or if they had been compelled to choose between the doctrine of Arius and that of Athanasius, they would not merely have declared themselves against Arius, as in fact, at a subsequent period, they constantly did, but would have given up their own views, and endeavoured to reconcile themselves to the formula of Athanasius. This also was the exact position taken up by Eusebius relatively to the Nicene Council. That Arianism ought to be repudiated, he felt sure; but he was by no means so sure that his theory must scientifically end in Arianism. Now, so far as he feared that Sabellianism would be favoured by the term Ofioovaiov, and supposed either the hypostasis of the Son or the unity of God not to be sufficiently ensured, he shrunk from adopting it; but he consented thereto as soon as he had convinced himself, that the Synod had no intention of rejecting Arianism in a sense that would involve giving in its adhesion to Sabellianism or Polytheism, and that his own view might possibly coexist along with the formulas of the Synod. It is true, the points of difference between him and Athanasius, and to which he also subsequently clung, did not attain recognition at the Council of Nicaea; but he had a presentiment that a path was thus struck into, which must lead away therefrom, namely, the path towards a lessening of the hypostatical distinctions. Hence the zeal with which he subsequently battled for them in opposition to Marcellus. The momentum about which he was chiefly concerned he saw defended by the Arians, though, it is true, under an exaggerated form. Herein appeared to him to lie the justification of Arianism; and therefore he was never able to take so decided a part against Arius as others, although he by no means intended to rank himself amongst his followers, least of all in a religious point of view. So much the more gratifying is it to find, that Athanasius (de syn. Ar. et Sel. c. 41 f.) did not confound men of Eusebius' mode of thought with Arius, as did later inquisitors, but regarded them as brethren, because they accepted the entire substance of the Nicene Creed, and did not stumble even at the term ofioovawv, in the sense of wishing to represent the Son as a creature. On the contrary, they derived Him from the substance of the Father and no other, and believed Him to be the true Son of the nature of the Father, who, as Logos and Wisdom, was eternally with the Father. That Eusebius, with Origen and Pamphilus, could well accept the latter determination, we have shown above. Athanasius, with the equitable judgment he pronounced on the matter, was right in taking into consideration the religious convictions which alone could have produced formulas attributing such lofty attributes to Christ. But he must be pronounced to have been in the wrong, if we regard their doctrine merely in a scientific point of view, and not in the light of the opinion and tendency they really entertained in their inmost heart. Fixing our eye solely on the former, we must allow that they were constantly liable to fall into Arianism; it was, therefore, "both necessary and highly advantageous for the doctrinal progress of the Church, that Arius should make his appearance: for in him, those who had hitherto held an indeterminate position saw, embodied in a distinct and repellent form, principles which they had no intention of avowing as their own, but the possibility of which they had not consciously and thoroughly enough excluded, and were thus led to a decision.

Note 44, page 231.

Ta re arjfieia irdma, oaa brol/qaev, Kcu al Bvvdp£i<; Beiicvvaiv ainbv Qebv ivavOpmirijaavrcr To awafi<f>orepa roivvv BeiKvvrai on &eos rjv <f>vaei, ical iyevero avOpcoiros <f>vo~ei. In Galland. Bibl. Vet. PP. T. iv. 112, another passage is communicated from the Chron. Pasch., which runs as follows:—'O 77-00-17? dopdrov Kcu doparfjs tcrure&i? Brjfuovpyb<; ical Seairorry; 6 fiovoyevrjs mo? ical X07o?, o T^5 IIarpl ical rc o dylcp irvevfuvri crwatBios, Kol ofioovaios Kara Tt)v Oeorrjra, 6 Kvpto? fjfuav ical 0eo?, 'Irjaovs Xpicrrbs) errl rf} avvreXeia T&v aiuivcov Kara adpica rebels Ek 777? ayla<; ivSo^ov Seo-rroivrjs Tjimov Oeoroicov ical deiirapOevov, ical Kara aXrjOeiav OeoroKOv Mapias, ical iifl Tt}? yfjs 6<f>Oel<;, ical rot? ofioovcrlois Kara Ttjv dvOpwrroTryra dvOparrroi<; &>s dvOpcoiro<; aXii^oi? crvvavaarpacpefc, etc. This passage, however, with its formulas, betrays too clearly a postNestorian, Eutychian period, to permit of its being taken into consideration in this connection (compare the Prolegg. Hierakas held the Spirit to be as nearly like as possible to the Son, but at the same time subordinated the former to the latter.

Note 45, page 232.

This is implied also by the oldest document we have of Arius, to wit, his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, written prior to his stay with him, during which he appears to have written his Thalia. Alexander has driven us away, says he, because we do not agree with him in the doctrine which he publicly teaches :—" Always was God, always the Son; at the same time is the Father, at the same time the Son; the Son exists at one and the same time with tbe unbegotten God, for He is ever begotten, unbegotten begotten, ar/iwrjroyemnjrbs (this is naturally one of the specious conclusions drawn by Arius); in no respect is God before the Son, for the Son is derived from God Himself." And then, after appealing to Eusebius of Caesarea, Theodosius, Paulinus, Athanasius in Nazarbe, Gregorius and Aetius, and in general to the teachers of the Oriental Church, who all, with the exception of Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius (in Jerusalem), say, that God avdpyw; precedes the Son; whilst the three exceptions term the Son an epevyij, irpo/SoX^ dr/ewtyro<;, he proceeds to give his own doctrine.

Note 46, page 233.

Compare Arius' "Ep. ad Alex." in Epiph. and Athan. 1. c. In this latter he gives the following further remarkable testimony to Alexander:—That he had frequently, in the Church and in assemblies, refuted those who taught such doctrines. Preceding are the words,—" To be rejected is rov ovra irporepov, varepov yewrjOevra rj hriKrriaOivra eh vlov;" that testimony, therefore, refers perhaps merely to the fact that Alexander had frequently controverted those who supposed that the Son had being prior to His generation or to His suppletory creation. What else can this refer to, than to the circumstance that Alexander rejected also the view entertained by many older writers, who conceived indeed that the Son had a certain potential and eternal being in the Father, but still represented Him as first proceeding forth from God for the creation of the world? Without doubt, therefore, Alexander was unwilling to separate the genesis of the hypostasis of the Son from His deity, which o~wn\pla<; l-cnrevSe TeXei&acu. Ov rbv eavrov Bdvarov, aXkd rbv rS>v dvOpdnrcov rjkBe reXei&aai 6 acorrip' oOev Ovk ISup>' Ovk ei%e yap, tyorj cov direriOero To a&fia, aXka rbv irapa r&v avvpamaov eSej^ero, iva Kox rovrov ev rep eavrov acofiari rrpoaeXO6vra reXeov e^cupavlcrr). Compare 21, 37. Similarly also c. 20:—The main cause of His appearance was the common guilt of humanity, which demanded payment. Wherefore xnrep rrdvrcov rijv Ovalav dve<pepev awl rrdvra>v rbv eavrov vabv eh Bdvarov "rrapaSiBov<;) "va rov<; fiev rrdvras dwrrevOvvow ical eXevOepovs 'nj? apyaias irapa(3da6(o<; iroiijay Bel^y Be eavrov ical Oavdrov Kpeirrova, dirapyrpi T?)? rS>v oXcov dvaardaew; rb tBiov cro>fia cuf>Oaprov eiriSeucvvfievos. And afterwards, ibid.:—Through the union with the Logos (rr) eirifidaei rov ~Koyov et? airo) two wonderful things met in the same being; on re 6 irdvrcov Bdvaro< ; ev Ta> icvpiaicw acofutri eirX^povro, ical 6 Odvaros ical ri cpOopd Bid rbv o~vvovra X6yov e^rj(pavl^ero.

Note 50, page 270.

It is interesting to see how, under the hands of these Arians, who fought in so abstract a manner for the infinitude, the absoluteness of God, God was reduced to an individual shut up in Himself, that is, substantially to a single finite being. In this is rooted the, not "bold," but cool (nicht kiihne, aber kiihle) and irreligious assertion of Eunomius, that he knew God even as God knew Himself. If the divine essence is nothing more than the abstractly simple independence of the primitive, fixed, ungenerated Monad; and if, by applying this meagre category to the idea of God, all higher categories are anticipatorily excluded, it is a small or even a trivial thing thoroughly to know such a God. And the teachers of the Church had a thorough right to maintain, in opposition to him, the incomprehensibleness of God. In addition to this, Baur ought, for the sake of historical completeness, to have added, that they defended the cognizableness of God in the Son, in opposition to Arius:—it is clear, therefore, that they aimed at taking a middle course between the timidity of the one and the defiance of the other class of heretics; both which lead to the same result, to wit, to the denial to man of any actual knowledge of God.—Still more mistaken is it to reduce the teachers of the Church back to Platonism, the Arians to the philosophy of Aristotte; for, amongst the'tte*£he*s of the Church also/\i^ some who had received an Aristotelian-training. TheTquestSons considered'were, on the contrary, newVand neither <'EttnoteSus' doctrine of the creation, nor that of the "Son/nor that of God, cah'-be saidtb; Be Aristotelian. And these are the doefrines in question. These hrispeculative men, who employed the simple dialectic 6f the understanding, were entirely destitute of;the Aristotelian irp&fbv-itiVovv, which IfBOves ' itself. Their loflneeption'of;God was that ;6f> the abstractly' simple'Ov, which -wo 'find<hi Neo-PIatonism;,the Church, On the contrary, which demands that roOmfce;Jeff for motion and distinctions, opposed that conception, andeter'more completely freed itself from-its influence. Bat at ,Shis *Ov an empty abstract idea ofGod SrriVes)mevery"age;-and hi the "&re supreW'-'ef M&e last century no one will fail to discern the 'Same fundamental thought. Although, therefore,-I grant that' the -Arians were trained in the Aristotelian dialectic, and, on the ground of the empirical feature common to both, recognise a relationship between -then*; I consider Stf ra&er adapted to, promote confusion than an: understanding of the matter, more to resemble play than sober mqtfiry, to seek, asBaur does, to class the Arians and their opponents in the 0h*reb;as Aristotelians and Platonists.

Note 51, page 270.

Oatech. Il,'l2. His designating the Logos eternal High Priest, the Father the apyr) of the entire deity, which is the head also of the Logos, and his esteeming the unity of God to be preserved by the'Father, from whom alone divinity proceeds, are slight further traces of his Semi-Arianism. On the other hand, he confesses that the Son was Son of God, not by adoption, but by nature,—the Only-begotten One, because; He has no brother, no one equal to Himself. For, on the contrary, all others becdme sons through Him, by means of adoption. "He did Hot'rise from the-condition Of a servant to sbnship; but was brought forth by an unsearchable act of generation; He was: not first another, who then became other than He had been." On the question of the mode of this generation he lays down'merely negative determinations: that it'took place and is to be believed, he will endeavour to show, not how. -It1 is interesting to observe, in-his case, how Semi-Arianism was led Qp tp, the recognition of the coeternality of the Son with the Fatheiy by following outthe idea—In the Deduction; of the Son, who was not out of nothing, but out of His essence, God is not to be supposed) subjected to the-,hjni|s.of; time. If time is absolutely to be denied of the Father, and the Son be of the essence of the Father, no interval can be conceived to have existed between the being of the Father andi that of the Son, but the latter: must proceed- eternahy,forth,from theiessence of. God. From which it follows, strictly speaking, that tllis generation cannot have been the work off one moment, which neveri happened again, but. must he eternally going on, even as light constantly proceeds from light. Athanasius gives distinct expression thereto; Cyrill also approximates to this ide$iof( Origen, when he asserts that the words, "This day have. I begotten thee,',, must be.understood of the eternal to-day. At the same time, w.e find; also,expressions of an opposite tendency; for example., whan he says, "Far more rapidly than we produce words, and thoughts, did He generate the Sou." In this case, the generation is again represented as a single act. He describes the act of'generation more precisely as follows:,.—'< The Father did notj generate the Son, as a master begets his pupil by his teachings, or as we Christians are made His children by enlightenment. Nor, again, as the spirit of man begets wordsi;. for, whereas sounds are. scattered, Christ is a. consistent and living word; not spoken by the lips and then again dissolved, but continually born of the Father in an unutterable manner and with an independent being. Whilst generating, the Father is neither. unconscious, nor does He proceed by choipe and reflection; for, to say. that H|e does not know and love Him whom He begets, would be godless; and no less godless, toi represent Him as first, considering a long time and then generating, seeing that He never was without Son. Wo have not two unbegotten beings, nor again two only-begotten ones; but one is the unbegotten Father, who has no Father; the, other is the eternal Sou, born of the Father. The Begetter neither robs Himself nor converts Himself into the Begotten; and the Begotten lacks nothing. Not the Father became man, nor did Ho suffer for us.;, bujt the Son, whom the Father sent to suffer,for us. Let us. then neither, estrange Father and Son from each other, nor combine the two to a Sonfutherhood (Sohnvatorschaft); let us rather walk in the, royal road, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left. We will not call the Son Father, in order thus to honour Him the more; nor, with the notion of doing honour to the Father, will we regard the Son as a creature; but let the one Father be worshipped through the one Son, and the worship not be divided." This, therefore, is all that he demands,—that the unity be not reduced to uniformity, and the distinction be not converted into separation; for the rest, he refrains from more precise determinations, and declares, if not a progressive knowledge of, yet a full and satisfactory insight into, the nature of this generation, to be impossible. (Catech. 11.)

This eternal Word now, begotten before all JEons without mother, took upon Himself in these last days a body from the Virgin, without father. To worship a mere man would be idolatry; but quite as perverse would it be to designate Christ simply God. If Christ, who is God, did not assume humanity, we are far from redemption. The causes of the incarnation were the following:—Man was the noblest creature, having been made, not by the mere command, but by the hands of God. In six days was the world created—the world for the sake of man, who is in the image and likeness of God. But, moved by envy, the devil cast this noblest of all creatures out of paradise; the human race became constantly more wicked. Deep were the wounds of humanity; from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, there was no soundness in it; its wounds were not attended to; they were not anointed nor dressed. Then God, hearkening unto the prayer of the prophets, sent His Son, the Lord and Physician, from heaven. To every one of My warriors, saith He, I will give the royal seal which I won by My wrestlings on the cross, that he may bear it on his forehead. Where sin abounded, there did grace much more abound. Our Lord must needs suffer, but without the devil recognising Him; for had he recognised Him, he would not have approached Him. His body thus became a bait of death; so that when the dragon expected to swallow up it, he was rather compelled to give up those whom he had swallowed. Again, men had heathenishly worshipped God in human forms; God now became truly a man, in order that the imagination (the self-made service of God) might cease. It was further necessary for Him to be with us, to become like us, in order that we might be able to lay hold on, to enjoy, to trust Him. Daniel could not be quickened till a human hand touched him: so did it behove the Physician to be present, the Lord to eat with us as He ate with Abraham; for we could not have borne His naked deity (Cat. 12).

Note 52, page 271.

Compare Klose's "Geschichte und Lehre des Marcellus und Photinus," Hamburg 1837. The fragments of Marcellus are collected in the Marcelliana, etc. of Rettberg, Gottingen 1794. Compare Epiphan. haer. 72; Theodor. haer. fab. 2, 10; Basilii M. Ep. 52 (Ed. Paris 1638, T. iii. 80); Hilarius, fragm. 1-3. Above all, Eusebius' "Libri duo adv. Marc.," of which the "Libri tres de ecclesiast. theol." are a continuation, belong to this connection. The Eastern Church held him for heterodox, especially since the appearance of Photius; even Athanasius denied him fellowship. See EHose 1. c. pp. 17 ff. Hilarius and Epiphanius hesitate, but still incline to condemn him. The charge of Samosatenism brought by Arians and semi-Arians was unjust, as fairer thinkers have allowed. After his resignation at Constantinople, in the year 336, he betook himself with a Confession of Faith to Julius in Rome: it was so framed that Marcellus could continue to hold his own view, and yet deceive others. He does not say that he believes in the eternal Son, but refers the being always with God to the Logos. At the close, he speaks of the eternal duration of the kingdom, but in such a manner that the words may be referred to the Father or the Son; indeed, the Father is mentioned immediately before these words. The Confession of Faith is given by Epiphanius.

Note 53, page 286.

His doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have differed from that of Marcellus; indeed, there was no reason why it should. The Dyad, with which Marcellus really contented himself, between the silent and speaking God, he did not need to let drop. For the Holy Spirit he might have found a similar place to that assigned Him by Marcellus, who designates Him a secondary expansion (Theodor. Haer. fab. 2, 10, 'Trapeicrcwt? rrjs iicrdaeco<;, a branch) of that expansion which was contained in the Son. Only the latter, Photinus was compelled to describe rather as an influence on; than a dwelling in, Christ. As to the mode in which Photihus passes over to the humanity of Christ, from' a.passage inEpiph. haer: 71,. we:might surmise that he represented it as being brought to pass by means of a' conversion of God into man (compare Hilarius, desyn. 38,.xi.). This information, which is indirectly sustained by the circumstance, that he is so frequently styled a Sabellian, might in itself, according, to what has been set< forth above, be correct, and wduld only presuppose that' Photinusj with the view, on the one: hand;(of instating the humanity of Christ in its rights (which he declares to have been his intention), and, on the other hand (in agreement with' the influence still exerted on him by Marcellus), of drawing in the-divine 8w«/*«, represented this SvvafiR as converting itself^. that is, as reducing itself to the potenoe which became the man Jesus-. By his virtue, this man raised himself up to deity; and thus the deity,.or divine power, which had lowered itself to a potence in the complete humanity of Christ,. attained again to its original actuality. But although Photinus, was by no means alone in. entertaining such a theory, it is scarcely reconcilable therewith, that others should speak of him as rejecting all conversion and change on the part of Godi Compare especially VigiL Taps. Dial: adv. Arianos, Sabell. et Fhotun. 1,.4;—"Geterum Deus inviolabilis et immensus non ex se alium genuit^ nee ipse unquam genitus fuit ut merito de se filium habere aut ipse sibi filius esse credatur. (He rather designated the one God! X070irdrcop in imitation of the Sabellian woirdnop,. avoiding, however, the hypostasis which might lie in the word Som) Sed est nnicus et singularis nee generando passioni obnoxiuSj nee se ipsum protendendo cumulatus, nee suam in virgine portionem derivando divisioni subjectus" Independently of this passage in Vigilius, his opposition to Sabellius, against whom he advances it as a reproach, that he represents the essence of God as expanding itself,. is scarcely reconcilable with a conversion or division of Godi. With Marcellus, he restricts this expansion to the divine activity. Opposed thereto is also the assumption of a true birth from Mary, and of the eternal duration of the humanity. For this reason I coincide witk Klose, who characterizes the above statement of Epiphanius- as erroneous (p. 79); Epiphanius was, perhaps, led astray by Anathemat. xL of the Synod of Sirmiumt(6f the year-351^ in Hilar, de syn. 1" &)j which he may have referred to Photinus, us others did' wbereaBj according to Kloae's, probable view,.it.may have been, a.justification, as far as Photinus was concerned.—This Synod anathematized also both the. application ofr the idea of the X»7o?. irpo<f>opnco<; and ivSiaOerbs to the Son, and the doctrine of; a "dilatatia" and "contraction" of God.

Note 54, page. 330.

Bam* indeed: assigns them, an entirely different task from that to which they actually did; and were compelled, to devote themselves* In his opinion^ they ought to have described the world as- the Son. of God; and finding that* instead of doing,so, they repudiated tlie notion as heathenish, he has no alternative, but1 to look upon the second, and third centuries as further advanced than the fourth. For the fbrmerhadi not yet attained a. clear perception of the distinction between^God and the world; in the Son,, many regarded the world; as still immediately or physically one with God. And the heathen philosopher Celsus had formed a- still more complete, conception of tMs unity of God and the world already; in the second century. Now, aa the aim' of the Church, during the history of its doctrine of the Trinity, was to overcome both the Jewish and heathenish' conception. of God, and above, all; to render it complete in itself, and then: to derive the world (because it. is not to be reckoned to the essence of God in.Himself) from the ,wilVoi the essentially perfect God.; the entire doctrine, in its further phases, is for Dr Baur one mass of confusion. The Nicene Council having excluded the Hellenic conceptioni of Gbdj the Ghnrch from this time onwards is^ in hia view;. on a false track. A few heretics alone can be said to have seeni the truth from afar, and some of. the teachers of the Church to' have given utterance, at all events in the form of suggestive questions, to sentiments more desirable to hear;. That a historian thus. at the very outset takes up a polemical position towards the central-point of the efforts of the teachers of the Church, scarcely needs mentioning; we can,well understand, also, that such a position must bring with it a perennial feeling of discontent with the entire work of the teachers of the Church (that is, in reality with the entire course of the history of the doctrine), which is not likely to further the true understanding of the matter. Our great aim ought to be, to penetrate to the very centre of the efforts of the Church Fathers, and thus historically to comprehend why the heathenish conception of God neither did nor could satisfy them; further, to consider the endless contradictions which marked the conception of God laid down by heathenish philosophers; and therefore, not to cease criticism here, but to do honour to that criticism which was pronounced in so grand a manner by history. If, on the contrary, we treat that heathenish idea of God, without further inquiry, without even giving it an essentially new turn, as the self-evidently true one, we take up a point of view which, though clearly too self-contradictory to allow of our feeling contented with it, leads to our examining the history of the doctrine of the Trinity in the light of principles foreign to itself. The natural consequence whereof is, that our criticism of the individual phenomena of the History of Dogmas, instead of coinciding, as it should, with the criticism pronounced by the history itself, and with the positive advances made by the dogma, is in conflict with the judgment of history at all the points at which the Church gives judgment, and therefore remains alien from the heart of the matter itself. Regarding the subject from the centre of the movement, the sole strength of that method of precedure appears to consist in looking at things separately which are really connected with each other, and in then taking advantage of the isolation to strike each down in succession. A notable illustration thereof is furnished by Dr Baur, 1. c. pp. 443-470, where, by bringing to view now solely this, and then solely that aspect, he makes Basilius, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, first Tritheites, then Monarchians or Sabellians, and finally appears to rest in the conclusion that they were Subordinatianists. We have already referred to the charge of Subordinatianism (p. 326). As to the two other charges, one would suppose that, at all events, if the first were brought against these men, they would escape the second and opposite one, especially, when we find Dr Baur himself, in several passages; expressing his respect for the greatness of their mind. In the case of heretics, he frequently succeeds in happily pointing out a connection between things apparently contradictory: we are therefore justified in asking,— firstly, whether the position taken up beforehand towards the doctrinal development of the Church, or the nature of that development itself, furnishes an explanation of the constant charge of inconsistency 1 and secondly, why, in the case of the teachers of the Church, no attempt whatever is made to reconcile apparently contradictory elements, to distinguish the fixed goal and the immoveable kernel of their doctrine, from its moveable and, in part, still fluctuating elements, and thus to view their efforts in their very centre and motive principle? In the main, then, it is not at all the fault of these men, if they appear to be Tritheites and Sabellians at one and the same time; especially as it is only through making an inadmissible use of passages which speak of the difference of the hypostases, and of the divine unity, that Dr Baur has succeeded in setting them forth in the light in which they appear. If we allow ourselves to translate the important term Isiottjs (distinctive characteristic), as applied to the hypostases, by "quality" or attribute," whereas these men call the divine attributes iroi6rr)res, and unweariedly repeat that all the iroi6rrjre<; belong to each of the hypostases— not, however, the Ibiorryrrjs; it cannot be difficult to show them to be Sabellians. And so, if from the simile of the rainbow employed by Basilius (see Baur 1. c. p. 469), we draw the conclusion, that as the one light appears in the rainbow in different colours, even so God " appears" differently in the three persons; whilst at the same time there is nothing to prevent us supposing that Basilius regarded the different colours of the rainbow as objectively different modes of existence of the one light; forgetting, at the same time, that Gregory of Nyssa also uses the simile, and further, how strongly, for example, Basilius (Ep. 52) requires not merely that the sword be drawn against Arians, but also that Sabellians be formally rejected. Precisely the same course must be adopted by Dr Baur in order to make them out Tritheites; both in regard to the image of the three suns, and the comparison with the plurality in the one humanity. For in this case also, all that is needed is to stretch the simile far enough, and to take little notice enough of the annexed limitation of the resemblance,—indeed, in general, of that of which the simile is meant to be a simile; by such means, Tritheism may without difficulty be deduced therefrom,—only that it does not harmonize with that which all these teachers of the Church intended, not figuratively, but logically, to convey when they employed the term t'&wjv. Qf Gregory of Nyssar'A use of.the last-mentioned comparison, we.haveaiteady spoken (pp. 313ff.)i If we. take the various iUttprances of Gregory Nazianzen together). noti even in his case can we finally deduce Tritheism from his employment: of the; image^of the. three 'suns.. For the meaning of his. words. is npt» that the three hypostases a*e. three suns, existing in: independence of, and isolation- from, each other: on the contrary, the very discourse in which he employs this simile contains: a protest against TJrjtheism: (p*>.«y.,,Msi "*/?* TfW/taTos a7WM, ed. Bas.. p. 322).. The.stre^s.isim^ to,be laid on the isolation; for immediately before,.ha says,^'* What have we to do with Tritbeism ox Dithei$m.?: We have one Gpd, forw© have one divinity;; arid that which, proceeds therefrom^ haft its relation to the unity (prpbs £« T<v e^airroQ. Ttju avafiopav. ej^ei, KJpt/Tpiar 'n,urjewyrtu). For the one is not less Godj. and'; the other* not more; neithertis-pripr tpj.Qr; lateiMhan^the. other 3;tbeyt arenotspht up in. the will, not divided. in. power; nor do we-findhere any of the characteristics which; peritoilte to divided things (qub4ti T&v Qfr&Tpfc f/£&f&f$pvTrapyei «p* TuyO* Xa@eit* eartp); but, in one word, the deity is undivided, in those which are,distinct from each other'(«^ep«yT«s.ej» Tok p^fiepw/WKOts rj OsoTfis)' :"-<-affoer; which fpUpw, the. words^oftw ei^^Xfois rpurlv ep£0/+ew»s d}Ovfa*v t*fa rod faros avyicpuvis, This image, therefore, as he himself says,. was not intended: to denpte a diyisioUiof the one deity: but his meaning was,—One light is. in.tjie three suns (thp 06o.t7?s) ; and besides,. the three are mpsti intimately united witheach ethprj for they adhere, to, or rather, according to what has preceded, depend oil each. Othpr,.arid dart their cays into each other. The import of the image then is, as follows,—The three are different points of unity, different centoes. for all that which pertains to the divine essence in general, that-is, for the divine attributes; the divine essence, hpwever,. ajtjipugh present in each of tjie hypostases in a different manner, is entirely and updividgdly present in each: so that,. considered! hi their connection, the words, denote precisely the same thing as the usual comparison,—the Son is the Father's perfect. image, or stands over against Him as a. living mirror. That this is the right view to take of the matter,. is put; beypnd. ajl doubt by &«. following chapter (c 15).. He represents some one as objecting, Have not the heathen also, at all* events the more intelligent, one deity And yet many gods,.'even to there is one humanity arid yet many m*n ?—in other words,'the unity and sameness of the essence, of'the 0eoT>7?, does not .preserve you Christians

'from'Polytheism. He answers,—'JS/rei fih> 17 teoivonf; rb h> Zyei fiavov hrivota OecoprjrSv ra oe '/edf? Sicaotov irXetarov dX\.^\cov real Tw jfpov((r teal rots ire&eai seal rfj'Bwdfiei fiep.epicrfieva. tHfieT<;~re''ya.p 'ov ativQeroi fiovov, d\\a ical icmlSeroi Ka\ aXki')

''"koi? teat rjfuv Clvtois, OvZe eirl ftias! ?)fj.epa<; Ka6apas /nevovrc? oi avroli^^dXka Ka\ (rdbfuurt xal 'x/ri^ow del faiovrd1; re teal ftera7rtVToi»rE?. And the like remark may be made concerning the heathenish gods: they are in conflict with each other and with the'first causes. But not'so we. Bach of the hypostases: has

: unity (to ev $yet)>no ^Ss ""^hen we look to that which is together with it (ro ovyKelfievdv, namely, the 6ther hypostases), than When we have regard to itself: and that, indeed, through the identity of essence and power (c. 16). We must further consider what he: says regarding the use of comparisons in general (for example,' c. 11). When, on the contrary, Athanasins (or. c. Ar. 3, 15) says,—We'have not treed Ihe image of three suns, bat that of the sun, its brightness arid so forth; he rejects, not that which: Gregory meant to teach m using the image, but merely

'one1 explanation' thereof, namely, that which represents it as denoting the isolation of the three,—an explanation which Gregory ' would have "repudiated, seeing that he intended in the passage to speak 6f'tmity (compare c. Ar. 3,;4); precisely as the same Gregory repudiates the similes of the sun, of the ray arid the light, of the primal source, of the babbling fountain, of the flowing stream, n6t absolutely, but merely so far as they could be Used'to obliterate the hypostatioal distinction. On this ground, he elsewhere unhesitatingly avails himself of these images; finding them sufficient, indeed,'to mark the unity of essence, but not sufficient to define the toiorip-e? of the different hypostases. Gass also has justly directed attention to the fact, that the two Gregories (Naz. or. 35; Nyss. c. Eun. 2, 6; compare T. iii. p. 22; like Athanasius'T. i. 530, ii. 5), understand by " God^" nbt merely the essence common to the hypostases,

'but'also the "collective divine image" (theA70os of the essence), which embraces essence and hypostasis, in a word, the Trinitarian God. They best succeeded in doing this in relation to the divine activity; which they persistently regard as a one, undivided, collective activity of God. God, therefore, is in their view an acting personality; though, leaving Athanasius out of sight (see above, pp. 301 f.), they do not enter on the questions, whether this one personality is constituted by the hypostases; and whether the divine Ego has its seat in the essence, apart from the hypostases, or in the essence, so far as it unfolds itself into hypostases. To such questions as,—Is the common essence, the basis of the hypostases, self-conscious spirit or Ego? or, does each of the hypostases form a distinct Ego? or finally, whether the absolute self-consciousness of the deity results eternally from its hypostases, being as it were the collective consciousness of the distinctions ?—these Fathers would supply us with no answers. Indeed, we have frequently had occasion to remark that the idea of the "Ego" belongs rather to modern times, and that inrocrracn<;, or even irpoaanrov is by no means to be identified with our conception of personality. The utmost that can be done, is to divine from the principles laid down by these Fathers what side they would have taken had such questions come within their range of vision. We unhesitatingly aver our conviction, that Athanasius and Hilarius would have decided for the last-mentioned view; for they were furthest of all from regarding the hypostases as avfifiefirjKora; indeed, on the contrary, they incorporated them, as mediatory causes of the divine self-consciousness, that is, as essential, with the idea of God. Basilius the Great, however, and Gregory of Nyssa, would probably have maintained that the one, common, divine essence knows itself in a different manner in the three hypostases, and would therefore have taken the first-mentioned view of the matter, though without intending to adopt Sabellianism. "Whilst, finally, Gregory Nazianzen, without any thought of being a Tritheite, would probably, with greater determinateness than the rest, have ascribed a distinct and independent existence to the hypostases. Compare Or. 31, 31-33.

Note 55, page 343.

Baur (pp. 573 f.) misunderstands the doctrine of Athanasius, —" that the Logos, in the very act of being born as a man, iOeoiroiei the humanity, in the first instance naturally His own," —so far as he affirms that the Logos did not really become man, but that man was at once "deified and raised above his natural attributes." Of such an elevation of man there is not a trace in the works of Athanasius, but the contrary (for example, c. Arian. 3, 37 f. 42-48). The deification may, however, be a growing one; and, indeed, was so in the view of Athanasius; for he believed that the human nature of Christ attained perfection with the resurrection and ascension. Nowhere does he say that the body of Christ did not in itself, and by its nature, suffer hunger, but merely that the Logos did not; in that He subjected Himself to the body and the laws of finitude merely out of substitutionary love. Baur has neglected to take into consideration that passages of this nature were directed against Arianism, which attributed to the Logos immediately and physically, what Athanasius attributed to Him merely ethically and through the medium of the humanity, which love had moved Him to constitute His own. Compare, for example, ad Serap. 4, 14.

Note 56, page 343.

Psalm xv. p. 1024 :—To Koivov &<rrrep rrpoaanrov T>}? dvOpcoirorrjios dvaXaficov roii<; rrpbs Qebv Kol rrarepa rroielrai X6yov<;; Ovk inrep ye fiaWov eavrov, oV 17/ia? Be Kal inrep rjpMv a>? el? ef f)p.cov Bia rrjv OtKovojjblavfj Bia Tt)v iiacXrjaiav,fj o~apij ydp avrov rj eKKkrjala. Many other passages of this kind may be found in other works of Athanasius; for example, in the Epistle to Epictetus, in the two books against Apollinaris. Compare the "de Incarn. c. Ar." c. 20. On the words, "When we shall be subjected" (1 Cor. xv. 28), he remarks,—" When we are found as His members, and have become sons of God to Him. T/tet? 7"/'> <prjaiv, eh iore ev Xpiarm 'Irjaov. Tore Be avrbs inrorayrjaerai dvff rjfiuiv rco irarpl, ay; tee<pa\i) inrep rSsv IBuov p^eXcov. T&v yap fieXcov avrov p/qBeirui inrorayevrcov irdvrcov, avrbs, 17 ice<paXrj aircov, Ovirco inroreraKrai rqj irarpl, dvafievcw To. tSia p-eXrj. (Here, therefore, he represents Him as identifying Himself with those who do not yet believe, but are first to become believers; compare c. Ar. 2, 80.) 'Hfieis eafiev 01 ev airrip inrorao~o~6p£voi rco irarpl, Kal rjpxis eafiev oi ev avrai J3aaiXevovre<;, &a? dv reO&aiv 0i i%8pol rjp.u>v irrro rovs iroBa<; rjpm>. Compare c. Ar. 1, 43:—AiA rrp) irpb<; rb acopM. avrov avyyeveiav vao<; 8eov yeyovaftev Kal rjfJ.el<;, Kal viol Qeov Xoiirbv TeiroirjfieOa, coare Kal ev rjpHv 17817 irpoaKwelaOai rbv Kvpiov. 3,.U8; on baptism, which he'views; in accordance, with this idea, Bee icAr.* Or. 1, 48; compare 3, .22::—'je/o»t«u, Xva ical avrol yevwvrai h> Kuta To ev euol acofia Kal Kara ri)v avrov reKeicocru; 'iva Kal abrol *yevi0mai reX£toi, e^oire? vrpb<; revro rrjv evorrfra, real efcavToht yevifitvof ivaayfAvirdvrs^^>opeOevre<; imp ifiov '/rdvre) &<riv h> ir&fia Kol h> irvevfia^xal efc avZpa riXeu>v4cavav


Note. 57, page 345.

'The; passage concerning His'ignorance of the day of judgment he refers, with Athanasius (c. Ar. 3,, 37.f.:42—48), to the human nature of Christ; it, therefore, he held to be actually ignorant in some respects (Or. 30, 15). 'It is not sail, "The Son of! God knew it not," but u the,Son," which in this case is equivalent to the Son of man. Athanasius says,—av&partrou tSiov To ayvoeiv, as rh ireivav. Nor does he afterwards recede from this position, as Baur's account makes it to appear (pp. 576 f.), but abides by the principle,—u As man He was able to say, I know it not; for as man He did not, although the Word knew it." It is a misrepresentation of the opinion of Athanasius, when ^Baur argues as follows,—According to Athanasius, Christ had)merely a body,.not a human soul; for him, therefore, there was no.other subject to*which knowledge or ignorance could be attributed save thetLogos; bat if the Logos was the speaker,; the subject, His .attribution of ignorance to;Himself must necessarily appear to Athanasius as a false accommodation.—Bamf has overlooked, that though Athanasius, prior to the appearance of Apollinaris, never gave special prominence to the human soul of Christ, he never denied it. lOn the i contrary, the entire view he took of the incarnation and redemption as something affecting the totality of man, rests on the presupposition that Christ had a human soul. This presupposition shows itself still more clearly in passages like the present, which without it would be destitute of meaning. For, that ignorance cannot be ascribed to the body, Athanasius was surely well aware; and in this passage he uses the term atSpcoiro<; as a substitute for o~ap^. For the rest, we find similar tllings elsewhere also during the period. before Apollinaris; for example, he frequently says, the Logos .assumed a man (c. Ar. 4, 35), the anointed element in Christ was the man out of Mary;

substance of humanity shall thus have been penetrated by the divine nature, that irrrorayrj will take place which is designated a subjection of the Son, because it is His body in which He brings it to pass. The image of the <pvpafia is physical; but that the "tertium comparationis" was not a physical process, is clear, in part, even from the circumstance that He is represented as the soul of the humanity, His body (c. 16). To Sih Tov ad>fiaro<; rjp.S>v yivofievov icaret awfiBeiAv riva 177 tyvyr) Xoyi%ofieOa.H&fia Be avrov iraaa fj dvOpwrrlvrj <pvais, fj KarefiiyOrj, and, as far as men are concerned, Gregory lays special stress on human freedom (Or. Cat. c. 7, 31). Indeed, Rupp justly remarks (1. c. p. 262), that in contrast to the physical point of view of Eunomius, a strictly ethical estimate of Christianity was characteristic of Gregory of Nyssa. But Gregory's notion of the ethical was certainly not of so meagre a nature, that he deemed it feebler and less sure of attaining a result than physical power; nor did he regard the unity founded by it as less intimate and firm than a physical unity. For this reason, he might very well apply the above images, in order to mark the final certainty of redemption, and the uniting power of love:—this all the more, as he did not rend the ethical from religion, and recognised no freedom which needs to cast a jealous eye on grace.—Or. Cat. 16,—"As that which had been dissolved by death was again united, to wit, in the resurrection; even so, the union of that which is dissolved passes over, as from one principle, to the whole of humanity" (plov airo Twos ap')(fj<; eh iraaav rt)v avOp(oirlvrjv <pvaiv rrj Bwdfiei Kara To Lctov 17 Tov BiaKpi£evro<; evaais Biafialvei). In C. 32 he expressly describes the same idea as something h eh i?/«i? ite 'rrapaZoaew; ijKei (p. 93). The entire Gospel contains a /lifts of the divine and human; everywhere are both conjoined; and so also on the cross. Its very figure sets forth four lines, which radiate in all directions from one centre. That is the symbol of the God-man. He who was nailed to the cross was To irav wpo? eavro) owBecov re Kox awapp.6fy>v, ra<f Suufwpovs T&v Smrmv <f>vo~ei s 7T/30? fuav o~vfnrvoidv r6 Kcu apfioviav Bi eavrov crwdymv. As, when one of our sensuous organs is active, everything united with the part is drawn into sympathy and participation, so, inasmuch as the God-bearing flesh (o~hp^ OeoS&yps?) was taken from our mass, the resurrection of one part passes over to the whole, as though the entire nature (humanity) were one living being (jcaBdirep Th/o? 8vto<; %(oov Tracnj? rrj<; (pvcrecos). For, agreeably to the continuity and unity of nature, it communicates itself from one part to the whole. C. 37. As a little leaven leavens the whole lump, so does His slain body, having passed into ours (in the holy Eucharist), convert it entirely into itself. Our body also thus becomes acofia OeoS6yov, and by this fierovala in dtpOapaia we also become immortal.—As the soul is united with the Logos by faith, so also through the Eucharist is the body, or its (pvais, united with the body of Christ, which has life in itself. Concerning baptism, he says, —Its true idea is the full and entire extinction of death and sin, and the complete resurrection to a new immortal life, in the imitation of Christ. Because, however, of the weakness of our nature, that which really forms one connected whole was separated into its parts, and the entire force of the baptism unto Christ is not concentrated in the one ritual act. But believers are not therefore less sure and certain of becoming, in the future, complete copies of Him into whose death and life they are baptized.—Compare Basilius, de Bapt. L. 1, c. 1, 2; T. 1. 551, 553, 561, 565, 568, 574; Lib. 2, Q. 1, pp. 582 f. Specially worthy of comparison, also, is the homil. 25, T. 1, pp. 504 ff. of Basilius. God is amongst us in the flesh: not as in the prophets, working from afar, dWa avfupvi) eavru) Ttjv avOpcoirorrjra ical rjvcop£vrjv icaraKrrjadp.evos, Kal Bid. Tt}? avyyevow ' crapicbs alrrov irpo<; eavrbv eiravwycov T2jv avOpvmlnrfra. Hco? ovv 6V evos, <fyrjaiv, et ? iravrcis ffXOe To Xafirrrtfpiov; Tivo. rporrov ev aapicj 17 Oeortjs; &>? To irvp ev aiSrfpip- ov fierafiariKw; (that is, so that the Logos would have changed His place), but fiera&orticGjyi. He lost nothing; He underwent no conversion. Aia Tovto Oeos ev aapicj, iva evairoicreivrj Tov ifupajXevoma Odvarov. '/2? yelp T&v <pappA.Kcov To aXe^rjrrjpia KaraKparel T&v {pOapriic&v olicetcoOevra T<* amfian,ovrax; 6 ivSwaarevcov dvOpcoirivrj (ifyvaei) Odvar0<; 777 irapovala Ttjs Oe6rrjro<; rj$aviaOrj. (The genuineness of this homily is established; not so that of the Libri de Baptismo.) Ephraem (Phot. cod. 229) designates Christ Tov Oxikov, not Tov Tivo. avOpcoirov, that is, an "homo universalis," and not merely "singularis." "I will," says Christ, "that they all become one body in Me,"—in Him who carries all in Himself, through the one temple assumed bytical treatment, with reference to Eph. ii. 6. One might suppose that when He is said to have become man, or even a curse, for us, we ought to understand it subjectively,—namely, that so it appears to us, without objective reality. This is the one extreme. The other extreme is that of Apollinaris, who taught that Christ, in becoming man, converted, transubstantiated us into Himself. This is refuted by 2 Cor. v. 21; for we cannot say that Christ substantially became sin. The substitution, however, he is determined to retain. In pp. 424-426, he shows, from Rom. v. 12 ff., 1 Cor. xv. 21 ff., that the unity of all in Christ was the purpose of the incarnation. As the Apollinarists exaggerated, so the Arians fell short, of the idea. They acknowledge that Christ had a body, in order that it might be possible for us to see Him, in order to reveal the brightness of His divine essence in such a manner that it might be endurable; in other words, they limit the significance of Christ to His prophetic office. But for this purpose, an incarnation was not needed: did not the Son appear to Abraham without becoming a man? What was necessary was, that the same nature which had been conquered should gain the victory; in this the Arian theory fails. On its basis, namely, we do not know ourselves as victors in Christ, through the victory gained by our nature in Him. Even Theodore of Mopsuestia (A. Mai, Spicileg. Eom. T. 4), in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (c. vi. 6, p. 508), says,—rco Xpurra, (frqaiv (Paul) earavpaufihnp coairep airaaa rjficov rj inrb Ttjv Ovtyrorr)ra iceifievrj <f>vai<; awearavpaBrj hrei&fi ical iraxra avrq> avvaviarrj, irdvrcov dvOpclnrow avrp o~vpyp.eracryeiv eXirityvrcov Tt)? dvaardaew <&? evrevOev avvavatparviaOrjvai fiev rrjv irepl To dfutprdveiv rjfiSiv evicoXlav, Sid r?}? hit rrv dOavao~lav Tov aaywiro? ytiera<rraaea>?. Compare my Christmas Programme for 1844, "Theodori Mopsv. de imagine Dei doctrina," pp. 23, 24. In Christ the likeness to God borne by man is brought to perfection; He is the fixed, the indissoluble bond of unity for the entire world, which Adam was not completely: Adam, on the contrary, rent the bond. Of later writers, we may further mention John of Damascus, "de orthod. fide" 3, 12, 4, 4; Theodorus Abukara, Opusc. ed. Gretser, 6, p. 453. This latter tries to make clear by images how it was possible for sin and salvation to pass through the whole of humanity; and how the first and the second Adam might have the signifi

Note 60, page 349.

The fragments of Eustathius in A. Mai, T. 7, of the Coll. Nov., contain scarcely anything bearing on this subject. Only the words contained on page 85, which are taken from the work to which the above passage belonged, might possibly, inasmuch as they are directed against the idea broached by certain philosophers, that the soul in its wanderings drinks the cup of forgetfulness prior to each new birth, have a reference to the Arians, who may have made use of the philosopheme for the purpose of demonstrating the reality of the human development. The work of Eustathius was entitled irepl ,<^v^s Kara (pCkoao<pcov; and the peculiar circumstances of Antioch (see the text) probably gave occasion to these investigations, which initiated a new series of works on the soul (compare Gregory of Nyssa, "de Anima;" Augustine, "de Anima;" Nemesius, "de natura hominis "). More to the purpose is offered by the fragments in Theodoret, Dial. 1,3; Galland. 1. c. pp. 578 ff. The passage cited above, in Note 59, page 518, proves that Eustathius not merely understood and remarked the Arian artifice of teaching that Christ had a aajia dyfrvypv, in order to be able to transfer the emotions and so forth to the Logos; but also saw that the Church must of necessity either accept the Arian, subordinatian consequence, or teach a human soul. Eustathius, however, was led to the same result by other considerations,—to wit, by the consideration of His descent into Hades. In death, the soul of Christ was separated from His body; but rrjs crapicbs e'*ro? r/evofievrj 55 teal v<piarrjKe, nay more, yeyove Kox iv rc o ympUo r&v avOpmirivav yfrirycov. It thus had experience of both the things which befall us (eKarepcov iretpav eaye); Xoyuc?j dpa ical rals yfrvyals rcov avOpunrcov aapicj nrp(avei, iic rrjs Mapla<; irpoeXOovaa. He therefore attached great importance to the truth of the human development of Christ. In his view, it was by no means deified or in possession of divine prerogatives from the very commencement (Gall. pp. 577 f.). The exaltation (6ofa en-ttcrijro?) did not concern the Father, who is reXetos, a-rreipos, airepiv6rjro<;, airpoaBerjs Kowovs; nor the Son, to whom Eustathius gives the same predicates; aXX ' o avOpcoiros rov Xpiarov ete veicpav eyeipopkevos vyfrovrai ical So]jd£erai. P. 578 :—airros dp Ovto? icrriv 6 /xera ras vfipeis, aetS^?, apj)pcf>o<; 6paOeU, etra irdXw eK /Aera/9oX^? einrphreiav evBvadfievos' oiBk yap 6 Karroucmv eV avrqj 0eo? dfivov SUrjv et? Odvarov rj7ero, etc. Pp. 580, 581 (from Facundus Herm. 11, 1):—"Dicamus, inquit (Eustathius) cujus rei gratia filius hominis diem proprii adventus ignoret (Matt. xxiv. 36). For our good, He was ignorant of the day of judgment. Sicut enim hominem—Verbo coaptavit et Deo (salutis hominum causa); sic et insignem judicii diem caussa divini beneficii homini competenter abscondit, ne forte ineffabilia mysteria similis generis hominibus indicans et diem secundi adventus ostenderet." But unquestionably for the sake of His voluntary sufferings on our behalf, He is crowned with honour and glory. He sits also as to His humanity on the holy throne, avv&povo<; diroSeBeucrcu Tj> Oeiorarip irvevfiari, Buj Tov oucovvra Bebv iv ai>r$ Smjw-kco? (Theod. Dial. 2, Gall. 577). Page 581: —The words of Ps. ix. 8, "Dominus in coelo praeparavit sedem suam," refer neither to the Father nor to the Word, who both already have the kingdom, but to Christ. "Nam omnium simul creaturarum dominator (sc. Christus est) propter Verbi divini commixtionem." Similarly the fragment in Gelasius' "de duabns naturis in Christo" (Gall. 581):—Homo Deum ferens, qui mortis passionem sponte censuit sustinere,—honorem et potestatem percepit. Et ubi (ibi) recipitur gloria, quam nequaquam prius Jtabuerat." Eustathius, therefore, conceived the communication of the divine attributes, not as complete from the very beginning, but as first fully accomplished at the ascension. Indeed, he was in general concerned to allow the humanity of Christ free and full play; thus showing himself to be a true Antiocheian. According to a passage in Gelasius (Gall. 581), he taught that Christ had an human soul, expressly because he could not otherwise deem the incarnation complete. Sadness, emotions, hunger, and the like, could not affect the fulness of the deity. "Homini vero haec adplicanda sunt proprie, qui ex anima constat et corpore; congruit enim, ex ipsis humanis et innoxiis motibus demonstrare quia non phantastice et putative, sed ipsa veritate totum hominem indutus est Deus perfecte adsumens." At the same time, we must not omit to notice that, after the manner of the later Antiocheians, the deity and the humanity remain separate and distinct, and do not constitute a living unity. He describes the incarnation most frequently under the image of the indwelling of the Logos in the temple of humanity; the unity of the Logos with the humanity he reduces to the anointing of the humanity with the Holy Ghost by the Logos, who, at the same time, remained by Himself. According to A. Mai, 1. c. p. 203, in his homilies on the Gospel of John, he remarked on the passage, "I do not Mine own will,"—In Christ there was no will which stood in need of negation (" Negation," KardXvaeco<;), neither the divine (Oelicov), nor that which sprang from the incarnation (to Ttj? dvOpayrrrjaeas):—which latter will, according to another fragment, superadded dperds hriKrrjrovs. From this it would seem that Eustathius assumed the existence of two wills in Christ, which, however, will the same thing. The same conclusion may be drawn from a fragment in Theodor. Dial. 3, Gall. 576:—Birth did not lessen His i^ovala; the cross did not wound His irvedfia. To fiev yap acofia fierdpaiov earavpovrO, To Se Oelov rrjs So<pta^ rrveZfia /eal Tov atbfiarOS etac o Bitjt&to, Ku\ rots ovpaviois iirefidreve, Kal irdaav we/wet^e rfjv yfjv, Kal T&v dftvaawv eicpdrei, ical To? eKdarav ^ru^a? dviyyevcov Siiicpive, Kal irdvra 6fiov <ruvijOco<s o'ia 0eo? eirparrev. Oil yap etam rmv acofiariK&v oyKow rj dvcordrco 'Xo<pla KaOeipyfiivrj 'rrepdyerai, KaOdirep ai T&v vyp&v Kal ^rjpav vXat T&v fikv dyyelcov etaa KaraKXeiovrai, irepieyovrai Be fwXXov fj irepiiypvai ras OrjKas. 'AKXa Oela Tis oiaa Kal dveK<f>paaro<; Svvafifi rd T evBordrao Kal i^andrco Tov vem rrepiXafifSdvovaa Kparaior KavrevOev iireKeiva SirjKovaa irdvra< ; 6fiov Tov? SyKovs KpareX irepieyovaa. Page 582 :—God (and the Logos is God) fills the universe; for Him, therefore, there can be no such thing as movement from one place to another (ovSafiu><; i^ eripcov ets erepov<; fieOiararai Tovous, rd irdvra irXrjpmv); for if He were outside of a place, the place which He failed to fill, would bound Him (el yap e^o> Xeyoiro Toirov Tivos, dvayicrj 7repiopi^eaOai axnbv inr eKelvov, oinrep areplaKerai). This now must be applied to the incarnation also:—and, at a later period, we find Theodore of Mopsuestia taking it as his point of departure. But if no advance were made beyond the position thus described, the Logos must be judged to have had His own independent consciousness and sway (at all events, during the earthly life of Christ), and the man Jesus also his; and it is not clear how Eustathius could avoid assuming a double personality, at all events during the time referred to. It will therefore not be accidental, that, besides Theodoret, Facundus of Hermione, an Xoyov a&fia \ap.fidvovre<; (in the Holy Eucharist) Oe<rrioiovfieOa.

Note 62, page 352.

The question appears to me to have taken in the mind of Athanasius the form which I have indicated in the text; not, however, that a human soul alongside of the Logos would threaten the unity of the person, as Baur supposes (p. 579). The soul by itself would scarcely have occasioned him difficulty; for he did not conceive it as a particular substance, or as a subject, which, as such, would exclude another subject from itself (in the present case, therefore, the hypostasis of the Son), or would at all events come into conflict therewith; but rather as a multiplicity of powers, or as a movement of thoughts and volitions, which have an individual limitation in and through the body. On such a view of the soul, the union of the hypostasis of the Logos with a human individuality might be accomplished without much difficulty, because two subjects would not then be supposed to meet in the one Christ. The divine hypostasis alone (as it were the universal element) in Christ receives human individuality. At this time, not a single word can as yet be spoken regarding an human Ego. Athanasius felt that, in order for Christ's soul to be of like nature with us, it must be free; and on other grounds, this seemed to him a doubtful opinion. We see, as often as he approaches this question, that he feared it would be necessary to exchange the theological point of view of the Church with the anthropological one of Ebionism, if a free human soul were posited. For he constantly warns against forming such a conception of the full humanity of Christ as leads to Samosatenism, and against seeing in Christ merely an independent man apart from the Logos. Compare the passages c. Ar. 4, 35; 3, 30; Ep. ad Max. Philos. 2,3.

Note 63, page 353.

The main sources are the very numerous fragments in Gregor. Nyss. Antirrheticus adv. Apollinarem, ed. Zacagni, p. 123-287; A. Mai, Coll. Nov. T. 7; Gregor. Naz. Ep. i. ii. ad Cledon. and ad Nectar.; Athanasius c. Apollinaristas, L. 1, 2 (compare below, Note 65); Epiphanius, Hser. 62; Theodoret.

haer. fab. 4, and Dialog. 3. Many fragments of ApolHnaris are contained in the Catenae; compare especially the Catena to the Gospel of John, ed. Corderius, 1630. He forms the strongest antagonism to the school of Antioch, which even in his lifetime had already acquired, under Diodorus of Tarsus and Carterius, the features which were distinctively characteristic of it; and from it, for a considerable period, proceeded many attacks on ApolHnaris and his school (so, for example, from Diodorus in his work against the Synusiasts, from Theodorus of Mopsuestia xv. LL. adv. Apollinarist. et Eunom., and from Theodoret). That even as early as the year 360, it was usual for some in Antioch to draw a distinction between the divine and human aspects of Christ (see Note 60), which, in the apprehension of many, threatened the introduction of a double personality, is evident from Athanasius, c. Apoll., and from the Alexandrian Synodal Epistle, entitled Tomus ad Antiochenos a. 562. ApolHnaris himself perhaps wrote to Diodorus (Mai 1. c. 7, 17); at all events, he wrote about and against him. If we consider, on the one hand, that ApolHnaris deduced the description of the person, the dissolution of the incarnation, relapse into the heathenish error of denying the incarnation of Christ, and into the Jewish error of viewing it ebionitically, from the doctrine of a particular human soul, to which his opponents gave such prominence; and on the other hand, that which we know of Eustathius of Antioch; this doctrine would undoubtedly appear to have found a seat in Antioch from the year 330 onwards, and to have been vigorously represented by Diodorus and his school, though at the same time to have been strongly opposed both by ApolHnaris and others.

Note 64, page 354.

Many polemical arguments of the Church Fathers have been prematurely referred to ApolHnaris, which did not relate to him at all. For example, what has Athanasius' Ep. ad Epictetum Corinth. Episc. (Opp. 1, 901 ff.) to do with Apollinaris? The "tessera" of ApolHnaris is not mentioned amongst the views there controverted, namely, the denial of the human soul of Christ. The only allusion is to a heavenly humanity and a conversion of God; just as in the Ep. Basilii M. to the Sozopolitans (1. c. Ep. 65, T. 3, 103). Still less can the words of Hilarius (de Trin. 10, 15 ff.) be referred to Apollinaris. For that work was composed before the doctrine of Apollinaris had attracted the attention it subsequently did. Besides, the views there controverted are totally different: they combine three momenta in themselves :—1. The Logos emptied Himself, fell away from Himself in the incarnation (defecit a se Deo), and was present in the man Jesus merely as a passible potence or power. 2. In this form He animated the man Jesus, even as the Spirit of prophecy stirred in the prophets. 3. Hence Jesus was so perfectly a man, that He had not merely a body, but also a soul from Adam. They reproached the teachers of the Church with not bringing out the full equality of the essence of Christ with us, in relation to body and soul; which is necessary, seeing that the body and soul of Adam lay in sin. We have here, therefore, another illustration of the truth of the assertion, that the doctrine of a conversion of the Logos may pass into Ebionism. How widely diffused such views were, we see from the circumstance, that Athanasius controverts them in his Ep. ad Epictetum 2,11,12. They did not deny the birth from a virgin; nor the Trinity; but from Apollinaris they were so far removed, that in point of result, they might be more justly classed with the Antiocheians of the fifth century. Nor is it allowable to distribute the above views between different parties; they stood all together, for example, in one work, Athan. ad Epictetum, cap. 3. Further, even in Cau. 11,12 of the Synod of Sirmium of the year 351, we read,—" Si quis Verbum caro factum est, audiens Verbum in carnem translatum putet, vel demutationem sustinentem accepisse carnem dicit, anathema sit.—Si quis unicum Dei filium crucifixum audiens dealitatem (Oeortfrd) ejus corruptionem vel passibilitatem aut demutationem, aut deminutionem vel interfectionem sustinuisse dicat, anathema sit."

Note 65, page 359.

These views are partially controverted also in the three books of Athanasius, which usually bear the title, "Adv. Apollinaristas;" in which, however, neither Apollinaris nor any other name is distinctly mentioned. Still, the form of the refutation is such as to betray that its author had gone through the Apollinaristic phase of doctrine. It is a mistake to suppose that these books contain, strictly speaking, an account of the theory of Apollinaris himself; but it would be equally erroneous to suppose that Athanasius did not think he was really combating the view propounded by Apollinaris. The true state of the case is rather the following:—These books, according to Proclus, written after the death of Apollinaris, are taken up with his school in general, which, in consequence of coalescing with theories such as those above described, had separated into different parties, pursuing different tendencies. Many of the opinions controverted by Athanasius in these books, must therefore not be laid to the account of Apollinaris; although they may be fairly counted part of Apollinarism, as a phagnomenon of the Church. The three positions—the conversion of the Logos (aXXoiWt? Tov X6yov); that the passion of Christ was mere seeming; that the flesh of Christ was heavenly and uncreated (aap^ Xpurrov atmaro?, errovpavios)—in particular, were laid down as we have seen by writers prior to Apollinaris:— whether by himself also, we shall soon see. The existence of these parties prior to Apollinaris throws also a clearer light on the Synodal Epistle of the Alexandrian Synod, which was written about 362 (Athan. Opp. 1, 770 ff.; entitled Tomus ad Antioch.). This Synod, namely, lays down the principle,— 'SlfioXoyow yap ical Tovto, Oti Ov a&fia dyfri^ov ovB' avaurOryrov, o£S' dvorjrov elyev 6 crcorrjp; whereby the opinion of Apollinaris is substantially excluded. Moreover, it is scarcely to be doubted that Paulinus, who shortly after handed over to Epiphanius a copy of this Synodal Epistle, which he had subscribed (Epiph. 1. c.), referred these words of the Council, either to Apollinaris or to his faithful pupil Vitalis. At the same time, we have no right to conclude that the Council attributed to Apollinaris or to Vitalis all the opinions which it condemns, and that it consequently had had to do with Apollinaris alone. Neither the opinion, that the Word did not become flesh, but that it "happened to Christ," or that it came upon Him, as upon the prophets; nor that of a duplicity of Christ, in the sense, that the Son of God before Abraham was one, the Son of God after Abraham another (ere/io?); He who raised Lazarus from the dead one, another He who inquired after him, fits Apollinaris. But by these are meant such as Hilarius describes (de Trin. 10,21), who represented the man Jesus as influenced after the manner of the prophets, and brought against the teachers of the Church the charge, "quod Christum dicamus esse natum non nostri corporis atque animae hominem." Indeed, from the latter one might venture to surmise, that when the Synod of Alexandria maintained that all the orthodox with them, agreed <m ov a5>fia dyfrvyov ov& avaicrBryrov ovtf avsytfrov elyev 6 aayrrjp, it merely meant in the first instance to say,—In rejecting that Ebionitical view, the Church teachers have no intention either of leaving the charge brought by Ebionites unnoticed, or of detracting from the completeness of the humanity of Christ; on the contrary, if there are any who posit, for example, no human soul, this also is to be blamed. Looking at the matter in this light, Apollinaris and his followers can by no means be said to have been arraigned before the bar of the Synod, although they were eventually condemned. What was in the first instance arraigned, was a Christology which substantially led back to Ebionism, which no longer took up an unitarian position relatively to the doctrine of the Trinity, but merely, out of regard to the unity of the Person of Jesus, represented the Logos as a mere power in the human personality, either on the basis of a conversion of the Logos into a mere potence (see Note 64),—a view which was certainly taken by some; or without such a conversion. In the latter case, even on the supposition of a partial conversion, we should arrive at a double Christ, and at an Ebionism engrafted on the doctrine of the Trinity,—a phaenomenon which we shall shortly find in the school of Antioch. Deputies from Apollinaris attended the Synod and subscribed its decrees; so that it is doubtful whether the Fathers always had Apollinaris in view, or whether his position was not at that date a more favourable one:—namely, whether he and his adherents were not at that time the strongest defenders of the view of the Church, in opposition to those who arrived at a double Christ, and approximated to Ebionism as regards the human aspect of the Redeemer. But, however it may stand with the persons and with the judgment of the Synod as to the views entertained by the persons, it is substantially clear that the Fathers rejected, not only a double Christ, but also such an unity of His person as involved the mutilation of His human nature, or as was in any way effected by a conversion of the divine into the human. Compare also, Mansi Concil. T. 3, 355. other, we may see from the circumstance that he applied it to the Trinity also, in order to set forth the relation between the unity and the distinctions. As he endeavoured to point out the man in the Logos, and the Logos in the man, in the sense, namely, of each being a determination of the other; even so did he conceive the Father and Son to be related to each other. The Son has the Father as a determination of Himself; He is accordingly irarrjp though vUco<;, etc. He lays it down as a canon,—JJavrayfj awe£evyfia>aj)<;} fiaXXov Be rjvaspAvces rfj ereporryri voelv avar/Katov rrjv 'Kpcorrqv ravrortyra, etc. Basil. M. Ep. 129, 1. This has been interpreted as Sabellianism (Theodoret, Haer. Fab. 4, 8); but may also be interpreted in agreement with the Nicene Creed, and serve to introduce the doctrine of the 'rrepv)((bfn)ai<; of the hypostases.

Note 71, page 386.

Such I believe to be the true sense of the difficult passage, Ep. ad Oledon. 1, 15. It is true, if Apollinaris, like Origen, had held that the inequality of Christ with Himself, as also the inequality of the regenerated with themselves, would constantly recur; and that thus there would be an eternal alternation between the Biat'peais (Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. c. 29) and the ijjurow; he must also have assumed that the same history would be constantly repeated, that the incarnation would be again and again accomplished, metempsychosis, etc. We have, however, no sufficient ground for such a supposition. The necessary basis of such an alternation in the endless progress, would be a dualistic view of the two connected aspects, God and man; for then they would constantly be as strongly repelled from as they are drawn towards each other. Apollinaris undoubtedly appears sometimes to regard human nature, the free will, as sinful in itself (see ad Cledon. 1, 10; Note 68 and Note 2, page 387). This, however, he scarcely deemed a principal point, but employed it rather as a proof. In order to show that the divine irvevp/t must be the vow in the perfect man, he assigns to the human vow as low a position as possible. For the rest, he everywhere aims, not at dualism, but at unity, and tries to grasp the Logos as the truth of the human vow, as the vow of the completed, second creation, which notwithstanding he conceived to be eternal.

aWd Kara Bvvafuv fyvancrjv. Ov yap irurrei rrj eh IIarepa rd
Oavfidaia Xpiaros epyd^erai, iriarei Be rfj eh vlov hrireXovaiv
airoaroXoi rd vlov ra Bia rovrmv irparrofieva. Aid. Kcu ae/3a<;
fiev Tu> vi0} irpoadyerai, cre/9a? Be ovBafioOev diroo~rokoi<; o(pel-
Xerai, ovBe av p.ei&va rod Kvpiov iroirfacoo~iv. On John xiv.
13 :—Ta fiev o<pelXerai ra Kvpia irap fjfi€>v irepl cov ical irapay-
yeWei' ra Be auro? irapeyei, irepl &v eiray/eWerai. (Compare
Augustine's words,—" Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.) Our
obedience is a sign of our love to the Lord (a7ro8etfi? dydirrfi),
irap avrov Be rjfuv rj rrjs Oela<; ^>vo~eco<; yoprjyla KOivcovevrai.
On xiii. 16:—Not men lay hold o"f the good, but the good con-
fers on men communion (ot/ee/oxri?) with itself. Ov yap dpe-
aames i^eXkyOrjfiev, aX\' "va dpeacofiev. Aib icai <frrjaiv e/eXe-
t;afievo<; avrovs eirl Kapiro<popia re9eiicev, "va el K<u fit) Bid ra
'rrporepa rifuov Qeo) KaOearrjiceifiev, aWd Bta ra reXevraia yevd>-
fieOa. Th Be 6 T(ov ''airootoxcov KapTrbs cuf>OaprO<; Ovtos, ical eh
al&va fievav; r) 'EKKXrjaia.

Note 74, page 404.

The soul of Adam and the soul of Christ was created, not
formed out of already existing material. This opus non habet
in se assumtse aliunde alterius naturae originem. The forma-
tion of the body, on the contrary, was a "sumere, accipere
materiam," in order to give it a form; it was not a creation;
it was, therefore, a receiving of an external, foreign material.
That Hilarius entertained a similar conception of the incarna-
tion also, is clear from de Trin. 2,26, where we read,—" Spiritus
sanctus desuper veniens virginis interiora sanctificavit, et in his
spirans naturae se humanae carnis immiscuit, et id, quod alienwm
a se erat, vi su& et potestate praesumsit. 10, 15:—Quod si
asmmta sibi per se ex virgine carne, ipse sibi et ex se animam
conceptiper se corporis coaptavit, secundum animae corporisque
naturam, necesse est et passionum fuisse naturam." When
Hilarius aims at precision, he says, as here,—animam ex se,
corpus per se, habuit; ex virgine corpus conceptum;" but "non
per humanae conceptionis coaluit naturam, anima ex Deo." C.
15, 22. So, for example, c. 22 :—ut per se sibi assumsit ex
virgine corpus, ita ex se sibi animam assumsit quae utique nun-
qnam ab homine gignentium originibus praebetur. C. 10, 16,
17 :—Mary contributed ad incrementa partumque corporis omne,

quod sexus sui est naturale. The nativitas ex virgine officio usa materno, sexus sui naturam in conceptu et partu exsecuta est.—Conceptus est ex Spiritu Sancto et ex Maria.

Note 75, page 409.

That the "forma servilis" was not the immediate, as it were physical, consequence of the "evacuatio," but that between the two intervened an ethical act, performed by the "evacuatus" Son, that is, by the Son who willed to become man, Hilarius maintained with just emphasis; thus excluding, in the most distinct manner, the opinion attributed to him by Baur. Compare on Psalm lxviii. c. 25 :—"Ipse enim est, et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam hominis assumens; quia neque evacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturae coelestis interitus est, neque formao servilis assumtio tamquam genuinae originis conditionisque natura est; cum id, quod assumtum est, non proprietas interior sit, sed exterior accessio, quod ipsum consequentibus docet (v. 30). Pauper est, qui cum esset omnium dives, se ipsum, ut nos ditesceremus, paupertavit: dolens est, qui secundum prophetam pro nobis dolet.—Hunc pauperem in salutem vultus Dei (i.e., filius) qui forma Dei est, in aeternitatis suae vita —collocavit." De Trin. 9, 14 (compare Note 2, page 408): —" Itaque evacuatio eo proficit, ut proficiat forma servi non ut Christus, qui in forma Dei erat, Christus esse non maneat, cum formam servi nonnisi Christus acceperit. Qui cum se evacuaverit, ut manens Spiritus Christus idem Christus homo esset, in corpore demutatio habitus et assumtio naturae naturam manentis divinitatis non peremit, quia unus atque idem Christus sit, et demutans habitum et assumens. C. 51 :—Manens sibi Dei natura in se humilitatem terrenae nativitatis susceperat, generis sui potestatem in habitu assumtae humilitatis exercens."

Note 76, page 410.

11, 48:—Quod autem se ipsum intra se vacuefaciens continuit, detrimentum non attulit potestati cum intra hanc exinanientis se humilitatem virtute tamen omnis exinanitaB intra se usus sit potestatis (compare the fragment cited in Note 2, page 408). According to 9, 51, ell. 68, c. 25, one might suppose Hilarius to have conceived the "evacuatio" of the Son, whom the Father eternally generates, to have consisted in His returning out of the existence which He had independently of the Father, into the "natura Dei," to the potential existence of the "facies," or of the "vultus," or of the "imago Dei;" and that, during the state of humiliation, His actual personality (facies, vultus) was limited entirely to the "forma servilis." The passage 9, 51, runs as follows :—" Nos enim unigenitum Deum in natura Dei mansisse profitemur, neque unitatem f ormae servilis (that is, the personality in the form of a servant, which alone remained after the accomplishment of the ' exinanitio') in naturam divinae unitatis statim refundimus, neque rursum corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo ejusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem se habuisse naturam; quae in forma naturae se gignentis manens formam naturae atque infirmitatis corporalis acceperit."

Note 77, page 411.

Tract. in Psalm lxviii., Lit. x. c. 6-9. De Trim 11, 49 :— Nostra haec itaque lucra sunt et nostri profectus, nos scilicet conformes efficiendi gloriae corporis Dei. Ceterum unigenitus Deus, licet et homo natus sit, non tamen aliud quam Deus omnia in omnibus est. Subjectio enim illa corporis, per quam, quod carnale ei est, in naturam Spiritus devoratur, esse Deum omnia in omnibus eum, qui praeter Deum et homo est, constituet: noster autem ille homo in id proficit. Ceterum nos in hominis nostri conformem gloriam proficiemus, et in agnitionem Dei renovati ad Creatoris imaginem reformabimur (Col. iii. 9, 10). Consummatur itaque homo imago Dei. Namque conformis effectus gloriaa corporis Dei in imaginem Creatoris excedit, secundum dispositam primi hominis jigurationem. Et post peccatum veteremque hominem, in agnitionem Dei novus homo factus, constitutionis suae obtinet perfectionem, agnoscens Deum suum, et per id imago ejus; et per religionem proficiens ad aeternitatem, et per aeternitatem Creatoris sui imago mansurus."

Note 78, page 411.

On Psalm liii. 12 :—Unigenitum Dei filium frequenter imo semper praedicamus non ex naturae necessitate potius, quam ex sacramento humanac salutis passioni fuisse subditum, et voluisse se magis passioni subjici, quam coactum. Et quanquam passio illa non fuerit conditionis et generis (that is, physically necessary), quia indemutabilem dei naturam nulla vis injuriosaB perturbationis offenderet, tamen suscepta voluntarie est, officio quidem ipsa satisfactura poenali, non tamen poenal sensu laesura patientem; non quod illa laedendi non habuerit pro ipsa passionis qualitate naturam, sed quod dolorem divinitatis natura non sentit. Passus ergo est Deus, quia se subjecit voluntarius passioni; sed suscipiens naturales ingruentium in se passionum (quibus dolorem patientibus necesse est inferri) virtutes, ipse tamen a naturae suae virtute non excidit, ut doleret. 10, 47 :— Passus igitur unigenitus Deus /est omnes incurrentes in se passionum nostrarum infirmitates, sed passus virtute naturae suae, ut et virtute naturae suae natus est: neque enim, cum natus sit, non tenuit omnipotentiae suae in nativitate naturam. 10, 23:— Caro illa, i.e., panis ille de coelis est, et homo ille de Deo est. Habens ad patiendum quidem corpus, et passus est; sed naturam (that is, neither physical necessity nor susceptibility in itself, apart from a particular act of will) non habens ad dolendum. Naturae enim propriae et suae corpus illud est, quod in coelestem gloriam conformatur in monte, quod attactu suo fugat febres, quod de sputo suo format oculos. C. 24:—Cum potum et cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis sed consuetudini tribuit. C. 37 :—Non sibi tristis est: neque sibi orat, sed illis quos monet, orare pervigiles. C. 55 ff.:—There was no "necessitas flendi" in Him; non sibi flevit, sed nobis. And yet His weeping was not a mere seeming; for the needs of men are not mere seeming, nor anything of that to which He subjected Himself, moved not by necessity, but by self-emptying love. Specially important, however, are the passages, 10, 23, 48; de Synod. c. 49; in Psalm Ixviii. c. 4,10,23 :—" Hominem verum secundum similitudinem nostri hominis, non deficiens a se Deo sumsit: in quo, quamvis aut ictus incideret, aut vulnus descenderet, aut nodi concurrerent, aut suspensio elevaret, afferrent quidem haec impetum passionis, non tamen dolorem passionis inferrent: ut telum aliquod aut aquam perforans, aut ignem compungens, aut aera vulnerans omnes quidem has passiones naturae suae infert, ut foret, ut compungat, ut vulneret; sed naturam suam in haec passio illata non retinet, dum in natura non est, vel aquam forari, vel pungi ignem, vel aerem vulnerari, quamvis naturae teli sit, et vulnerare et compungere et forare. Passus quidem est dominus Jesus Christus, dum cgeditur, dum suspenditur, dum crucifigltur, dum moritur, sed in corpus Domini irruens passio nee non fuit passio, nee tamen naturam (that is, physical necessity) passionis exseruit: dum et poenali ministerio dessevit, et Virtus corporis sine sensu poenae vim poenae in se desaevientis excepit. Habuerit sane illud Domini corpus doloris nostri naturam, si corpus nostrum id naturae habet, ut calcet undas et super fluctus eat—penetret etiam solida. At vero si dominici corporis sola ista natura sit, ut sua virtute, sua anima feratur in humidis, insistat in liquidis, et exstructa transcurrat, quid per naturam humani corporis conceptam ex Spiritu carnem judicamus? To the right understanding of this passage, the following further citations are necessary (10, 48) :—" Succumbere ergo tibi videtur Virtus ista vulneris clavo et ad ietum compungentis exterrita, demutasse se in naturam dolendi?—Si in passione sua necessitas est et non salutis tuae donum est, si in cence dolor compungendi est, et non decreti, quod in te mors est scripta confixio est; si in morte vis mortis est, et non per potestatem Dei carnis exuviae sunt; si denique mors ipsa aliud est, quam potentum dehonestatio, quam fiducia quam triumphus: adscribe infirm itatem, si ibi necessitas est et natura, si ibi vis est, et diffidentia et dedecus." This, therefore, is, in his view, the "punctum saliens," that in Christ there was no "infirmitas naturae," no "necessitas." For this reason he says (10, 23),—if the "natura" of the God-man and the hostile powers are confronted with each other in and by themselves, the latter cannot cause the former pain, any more than the air can be harmed by a dart. The pain felt by Christ, therefore, was due to an act of love, which emptied itself on our account, and which not merely coerced the hostile forces by its "potestas," but also discharged the "ministerium poenae" (compare Psalm lxviii. c. 8);—and Christ bore punishment, not as an evil or a pain, but "sine sensu poenae;" for it was rooted, not in guilt of His own, but in a love which forgot itself, and forgot all suffering. We see, accordingly, that he can say of Christ, "dolet et non dolet." The laitter, so far as He took delight in suffering; and as the pain which He endured never, as in our case, got the master of His body, nor was able to change or destroy Him by its power (compare de Synod. c. 49), although His "passio" was a reality. Thus we read in 10, 47:—Fallitur ergo humanae aestimationis opinion, putans hunc (al. hinc) dolere, quod patitur. Pro nobis dolet, non et doloris nostri dolet sensn, quia et habitu ut homo repertus habens in se doloris corpus (that is, a body which is capable of suffering), sed non habens naturam dolendi, dum et ut hominis habitus est, et origo non hominis est, nato eo de conceptione Spiritus S. Tract. in Psalm cxxxix. c. 11:—Permissuin enim corpus passioni est, sed permissa sibi dominata mors non fuit. De Trin. 10, 27 :—Quam infirmitatem dominatam hujus corpori credis, cujus tantam habuit natura virtutem? C. 32 :—Extra carnalem naturam dolendi vulneris reperitur. 9, 7 :—Tametsi in partu et passione et morte naturae nostrae res peregerit: res tamen ipsas omnes virtute natures suae gessit, dum sibi ipse origo nascendi est, dum pati vult, quod eum pati non licet, dum moritur, qui vivit. By thus setting forth the sufferings of Christ in the light of deeds, he deprives Arians of their proofs of tlje lowness and physical passibility of the Logos, in a more striking manner than if he had apportioned them to His humanity. But when he represents Christ's suffering as a deed, as a display of power, it is of course implied that he did not consider Him incapable of suffering, that he did not deny Him the power of making Himself passible. Undoubtedly he frequently repeats, the "Verbum Dei" as such cannot suffer; but the body taken up into union with Him, is the "materia" in which sufferings might be undergone. Tract. in Psalm Ixviii. c. 4:—" Non enim incidere in Deum hie infirmitatem nostrarum terror valebat, aut exserere se nisi in carne corporis nostri, tanquam in subjacente materia, potuerant passiones. . . . Cum se contra naturae coelestis terrenaeque diversitatem, in hunc limum potestatis suae virtute definit: quia ea, quae natura dissident, ad quandam connexionis suae soliditatem non generis ipsius propinquitate conveniunt, sed potiore vi tanquam confixa sociantur, tunc et pati coepit et mori posse." In accordance herewith, therefore, is also "impassibilitas" to be judged, on the ground of which Hilarius has been partially charged with Docetism, in that it is supposed to signify that He neither could nor did suffer. A passage, however, has been overlooked, which clearly explains the bearing of the term, de Synod. 49:—" Pati potuit, et passibile esse non potuit (Verbum caro factum), quia passibilitas naturae infirmis significatio est, passio autem est eorum, quae sunt illata, perpessio: quae quia indemutabilis Deus est, cum tamen Verbum caro factum sit, habuerunt in eo passionis materiam sine passibilitatis infirmitate (that is, without the weakness which is unable to do otherwise). Manet itaque indemutabilis etiam in passione natura, quia auctori suo indifferens ex impassibilis essentiae nata substantia est." Psalm lxviii. 18; x. 15.

Note 79, page 416.

De Trin. 9, 38:—Dispensatione assumtae carnis et per exinanientis se ex Dei forma obedientiam, naturae sibi novitatem Christus homo natus intulerat, non virtutis naturaeque damno, sed habitus demutatione. Exinaniens se igitur ex Dei forma, servi formam natus acceperat, sed hanc carnis assumtionem ea, cum qua sibi naturalis unitas erat, Patris natura non senserat; et novitas temporalis (that is, the new condition of the entire person) licet maneret in virtute naturae, amiserat tamen, cum forma Dei, natura Dei secundum assumtum hominem unitatem. Sed summa dispensations haec erat, ut totus nunc filius, homo scilicet et Deus, per indulgentiam paternae voluntatis unitati paternae naturae inesset, et qui manebat in virtute naturae, maneret quoque in genere naturae. It enim homini acquirebatur, ut Deus esset. Sed manere in Dei unitate assumtus homo nullo modo poterat, nisi per unitatem Dei in unitatem Dei naturalis evaderet, ut per hoc quod in natura Dei erat Deus verbum, Verbum quoque caro factum rursum in natura Dei inesset, atque ita homo Jesus Christus maneret in gloria Dei Patris, si in Verbi gloriam caro esset unita; rediretque tunc in naturae paternae etiam secundum hominem unitatem Verbum caro factum, cum gloriam Verbi caro assumta tenuisset. Reddendo. igitur apud se ipsum Patri erat unitas sua (i.e., a Patre filio), ut naturae suae nativitas in se rursum glorificanda resideret: quia dispensationis novitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, ut perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisset carnis assumtio.

Note 80, page 417.

De Trin. 9, 54:—Major Pater Filio est, et plane major, cui tantum donat esse, quantus ipse est; cui innascibilitatis (ar/yevnaUui) esse imaginem Sacramento nativitas impertit, quem ex se in formam suam generat (to wit, in the eternal generation), quem rursum de forma servi in formam Dei renovat, etc. Tract. in Ps. ii. c. 27-30; c. 27 :—Christ begged that id, quod tum filius hominis est, ad perfectum Dei fjlium, i.e., ad resumendam indulgendamque corpori aeternitatis suae gloriam, per resurrectionis potentiam gigneretur; quam gloriam a Patre corporeus reposcebat.—Non nova quaerit, non aliena desiderat; esse talis qualis fuerat, postulat, sed precatur: id se, quod antea erat, esse, gigni scilicet ad id quod suum fuit. Non erat autem idipsum tunc totus, quod fieri precabatur: fieri autem totus non aliud, quam quod fuerat, postulabat. Sed cum fit (i.e., gloriosus) quod fuit, et quod non erat, est futurus (on account of the humanity, which is to participate in the glory), ad id quod fuerat, id quod totum non erat, quodam novi ortus nascebatur exordio. Ergo hie resurrectionis suae ad assumendam gloriam dies est, per quam ad id nascitur, quod ante tempora erat. C. 30:—The words, "To-day have I begotten Thee," refer, not to the birth from the Virgin, not to the baptism of Christ, but, according to the Apostle, to the first-born from the dead (Acts xiii. 32). According to Baur (pp. 690 ff.), with this glorification at the end, the Docetism, which does away with the human, shows itself quite plainly. He adduces in evidence, de Trin. 9, 38 38 (see Note 79), and c. 41; these passages, however, are not at all pertinent to the matter (see Note 79). He might have adduced other passages with a far greater show of reason; especially de Trin. 11, 40:—"Quibus subjectis subjicitur subjicienti sibi omnia, Dominus scilicet, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor. xv. 28) natural assumti corporis nostri naturae paternae divinitatis invectiL Per id enim erit omnia in omnibus Deus, quia Mediator, habens in se ex dispensatione, quod carnis est, adepturus (est) in omnibus ex subjectione, quod Dei est, ne ex parte Deus sit, sed Deus totus. Non alia itaque subjectionis causa est, quam ut omnia in omnibus Deus sit, nulla ex parte terreni in eo corporis residente natura, ut, ante in se duos continens, nunc Deus tantum sit." Compare c. 41, 42, 49. But, on the other hand, Hilarius says, that we are to become like the glorified body of Christ (11, 19; Ps. ii. 41, lv. 12, Ixviii. 35; compare Note 82). Further: Christ presented the expected gift, the man He had assumed, to the Father (Comm. in Matt. c. 3, 2); "He brought into heaven materiem assumti corporis consociatam Spiritus et substantiae suae aeternitati" (ib. c. 4, 14). Indeed, his fundamental view of the work of redemption required that there should be no necessity for the humanity to be annihilated, in order that the man Jesus might attain to perfection; but that the humanity should really be exalted to God in Christ. Not merely for Thomas had the Risen One a body, but eternally; and at the day of judgment, they will know Him whom they have pierced (de Trin. 3, 16, 20). We shall therefore have to consent to take note of passages of this second kind, in order that we may not form a false representation of Hilarius, and the many Fathers who use similar language to him on this point. But how are the two things to be united? In fact, the contradiction would be unreconcilable if the words, "nulla ex parte terreni in eo corporis residente natura," taught the complete annihilation or swallowing up of the body by the deity. This, however, cannot be the opinion of Hilarius. For he adds, immediately after (11, 40),—the perfection is accomplished non abjecto corpore, sed ex subjectione translato, neque per defectionem abolito sed ex clarificatione mutato, acquirens sibi Deo potius hominem, quam Deum per hominem amittens. Subjectus vero ob id, non ut non sit, sed ut omnia in omnibus Deus sit, habens in sacramento subjectionis esse ac manere quod non est, non habens in defectione ita se carere, ne non sit. That which is swallowed up by the divine "Gloria," is not the "materies" of the humanity, but the "corruptio," the "infirmitas," which is an "accidens" of it, but not its essence (compare Ps. lv. 12). This is also clearly declared, Ps. cxliii. 7. Who was it that was thus exalted? (Phil. ii. 7, 9). "Non ei utique, qui in forma Dei erat, donatur, ut Dei forma sit." For although "cohibens in se fonnam Dei," the Son of God remains in Himself "Dei virtus," and can restore Himself to the "forma Dei" when He will. It is given to Him, as the One who took upon Himself the form of a servant, "ipsi habitui servili id donatur, ut quod erat, esset in forma scilicet Dei esset.— Et haee quidem evangelici sacramenti et humanaa spei Veritas est, humanam naturam corruptibilemque carnem per hujus gloriae demutationem in aeternam transformatam esse substantiam." What, then, is the perfection of the God-man, save that by it humanity is brought to its true state, to God; is stripped of all false independence; is deprived of that existence outside of God which characterizes the "servilis forma," with its "infirmitas" and "corruptio:" and, on the other hand, that the creature is taken into the divine sphere and glory, in which it is a never-disappearing, eternal momentum of the divine life itself.

Note 81, page 419.

Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis assumens. Ps. liv., c. 9:—" Universitatis nostrae caro est factus." In Matt. iv., c. 12 :—" The city on the hill is the humanity assumed by Christ, quia, at civitas ex varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium ita in eo, per naturam suscepti corporis, quaedam universi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit civitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus civitatis habitatio." Ps. cxxiv., c. 4,143, c. 18. De Trin. 2, 24:— (ut) homo factus ex virgine naturam in se carnis acciperit, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo universi generis humani corpus exsisteret, ut quemadmodum omnes in se per id, quo corporeum se esse voluit, conderentur, ita rursum in omnes ipse per id, quod ejus est invisibile, referretur. C. 25:—Non ille eguit homo effici, per quem homo factus est, sed nos eguimus, ut Deus caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis, i.e., assumtione carnis unius interna universae carnis incoleret. In Matt. 2, c. 5:—Erat in Jesu Ohristo homo totus. Ps. xiii. 4.

Note 82, page 420.

Tract. in Ps. xiii. 4, 56, c. 7, 8:—" Compatiendi et commoriendi fides nos glorificat in Christo." Hence David calls the sufferings and glory of Christ His own, quia se per assumtionem carnis in coelestibus collocandum Propheta non nescit, quippe cum concorporales et comparticipes effecti simus in Christo Jesu. Ps. cxxiv., c. 3:—Christus est mons superimminens et excelsus, in quo ipsi nosmet ipsos per assumtionem carnis nostrae corporisque speculamur. C. 4:—In eo enim sumus resurrectionem nostram in resurrectione nostri in eo corporis contemplantes. It is true, Hilarius says also concerning others besides Christ, that all are in them; and from this the Benedictine draws the conclusion, 1. c. p. xxv. § 81:—"Eos omnes qui humanae naturae consortes sunt, Hilarii aliorumque Patrum sententia naturali imitate esse conjunctos. Et uniuntur quidem in illa massa, ex qua omnes originem habent et ex qua Christus ipse carnis suae substantiam sumere non recusavit;" in support whereof might further have been adduced, that, according to Hilarius (compare Ps. li. c. 21), all men are "generalis animae et corporis." But even this does not furnish an explanation of the phraseology in question. If all are one in virtue of their common origin, it may justly be said,—All individuals subsist, have their roots therein, as in the universal, but not in each other, or all in one, unless indeed this one can in some aspect or other be regarded as the vehicle and representative of the whole and the universal. In point of fact, Hilarius does not use the terms in question relatively to every man; but only relatively to Adam, on the ground of his being the universal father as to the body, with which also is connected the spread of sin over the entire race. Hence he frequently says,—" We all fell in him" (in Matt. c. 8, 5; Ps. cxliv. c. 4, 136; c. 5, 7). In his remarks on Matthew xviii. c. 6, he uses Abraham with Sarah as a symbol of the whole of humanity; but merely allegorically. Hence the application to the fjrst Adam along with the Second proves all the more clearly that, like the other Fathers, Hilarius regarded Christ also as the representative of the race. As all men were potentially in the first Adam, so in a spiritual sense are all men potentially in the Second Adam; so, namely, that as the Logos, the Second Adam is the final cause of the origin of the first Adam and all his descendants. On the other hand, the Maurinist is right when he denies that Hilarius held Christ to have assumed merely the general nature of the human race, and not an individual human nature. This is evident from the passage de Tiin. 2, 25, quoted above. See Note 81.

Note 83, page 429.

Even at an earlier period, the opinion entertained in the Church respecting Apollinaris was pretty unanimous, as is clear from what has been advanced above (see page 424). For, independently of the Synod of Alexandria, held in the year 362 (see Note 65), through the influence of Vitalis, Apollinarism was condemned by several Roman Councils under Damasus. Compare Dozom. 6, 25; Theodoret. H. E. 5, 10; Mansi Cone. Coll. T. iii. 461, 447-482, 486, and the epistle of Damasus to Paulinus in Antioch. In this letter we find the following words (1. c. p. 426) :—" Confitendus ipsa sapientia sermo, filius Dei humanum suscepisse corpus, animam, sensum, i.e., integrum Adam, et ut expressius dicam, totum veterem nostrum sine peccato hominem. Sicuti enim confitcntes eum humanum corpus suscepisse, non statim ei et humanas vitiorum adjungimus passiones: ita et dicentes eum suscepisse et hominis animam et sensum non statim dicimus et cogitationum cum humanarum subjacuisse peccato." According to Theodoret, the Romish Council (Mansi 488) said,—'' AvaOepuritpfiev Kaiceivovs ot rives dvrl \oyiKrj<; ifayry; Zda)(vpi^ovrai on o Tov &eov Xo7o? iorpd<prj iv Tj) dvOpcoirivr) aapKb avrb<; yap ovros 0 Tov Geov X070s oir^j dvrl Tt)s" ~KoyiKrjs ical voepd<; Tfrvxfjs eu To eavrov amfiart yeyovev, «\«i rrjv rjfierepav, Tovt eari Xoyucrjv Kcii voepav avev Tt}s dfiaprla<; yfrvX')v dviXaj3e Km eacoaev. Another Roman Council under Damasus says (p. 461) :—Adserunt (the Apollinarists) dicere, dominum ac salvatorcm nostrum ex Maria virgine imperfectum, i.e., sine sensu (vow) hominem suscepisse. Heu quanta erit Arianorum in tali sensu vicinitas! I Hi imperfectam divinitatem in Deijilio dicunt, isti imperfectam humanitatem in hominis filio mentiuntur. Quod si utique imperfectus homo susceptus est, imperfectuln.Dei munus est, imperfecta nostra salus, quia non est totus homo salvatus.—Nos autem, qui integros ac perfectos salvatos nos scimus, secundum catholicae ecclesiae professionem, perfectum Deum perfectum suscepisse hominem profitemur. This was constituted an oecumenical decree in the year 381, when the Council of Constance in Can. i. said,—avaOejianaOfjvai (sc. Set) irdaav a"peo~iv, Km Isucco? . . . Ttjv Twv 'AiroWivapiarmv (1. c. p. 560). With this oecumenical decree were soon associated imperial edicts, forbidding Apollinarism. We cannot, therefore, understand how Baur can assert it to be inaccurate (1. c. 647), to say that the doctrine of the complete humanity of Christ received the official sanction of the Church at the Synod held in the year 381.