Section II



We have already had frequent occasion to remark, how the activity of the Church in connection with Christology abated during the century to which may be given the title of the Trinitarian Century. Indeed, the Christian conception of God was to furnish the groundwork for the construction of a doctrine of the Person of Christ. How this foundation was laid, we have described in the preceding section. We should be very greatly mistaken, however, if we were to suppose that Christological labours had meanwhile been totally suspended: on the contrary, in the case of the thinkers of the Church, Christology was the perennial motive of their trinitarian efforts. These inquiries, however, took precisely the form which they alone could take, and which corresponded to the position held by Christology as the mainspring of the trinitarian movement; they related, to wit, not to the individual momenta of the Person of Christ in their relation to, and movement towards, each other; nor to the question, What are the fundamental elements of this person? but the Person of Christ, in its entirety, was the object of the attention of the Church. What we have in the first instance to recount is not, points which became matter of clear consciousness, in consequence of the solicitations of heretics; not the settlement and defence of a single point, in opposition to single attacks; not the analysis of the momenta of Christology as a whole; but the utterances which proceeded from the Church concerning the Person of Christ, when it gave free and unreserved expression to the impression once and constantly made upon it by this person in its entirety. The grand total image of the living Person of the God-man, who includes heaven and earth in Himself,1 hovered before the eyes of the greatest teachers of the Church, especially in flourishing periods, as, for example, in the time of Irenaeus and Tertullian, or at the epoch now under consideration, when the Christian mind gathered up its powers for a full or new exercise on the work set before it. They were not able, it is true, to set forth the entire fulness of that image in a scientific form; but still we have numerous scattered utterances of theirs, which indicate its nature, and show that the fixed logical forms which they adopted did but faintly reveal the substance that occupied their hearts and minds—a substance which science could only slowly, and perhaps by long roundabout methods, reproduce. As the immediate and original outflow of the Christian mind, this total image of the living Person of Christ deserves special consideration in the present connection; especially as it throws the true light on the attempts made during the following period, to construct the unity of the person on the basis of two distinct natures. For, on the one hand, it will show us clearly that the existence of this mystical intuition of the Person of Christ, in which the conjunction of the divine and human aspects to personal unity is immediately posited and intentionally anticipated by faith, does not render unnecessary, but rather requires, that full justice be done to the distinctions between the two aspects, in order that an unity may be arrived at based on the recognition and conciliation of the distinctions. It further, also, shows us, that even when the work of discrimination was carried too far, or scientific thought remained entangled in the distinctions drawn, the total Christological possession of, at all events, the better teachers of the Church was not absorbed by such imperfect attempts; on the contrary, that unity of the person or conjunction of the widely separated distinctions, which they had not been able scientifically to establish, was certified to them in the sphere of faith by the immediate intuition of the image of Christ in its totality. That immediate intuition accompanied their mind in its dialectic activity; and as it could not be replaced, so neither was it supplanted, by the scientific process.

1 ytQvpol, compare the Homil. on the Theophan. in the Opp. Greg. Thaum.; dvxxtQuhxieivrxi, after Paul.

This primitive Christian intuition of the Person of Christ, of which we discover frequent traces even in the New Testament, and which is of the highest significance relatively to His redemptive work, to baptism, to the Eucharist, and to the right view of the idea of the Christian Church, we have found repeatedly expressed, in the most fully developed form, however, by Ignatius and the Ep. ad Diognet., by Irenaeus and Tertullian. The same remark holds good of the Fathers of the third century also, as we have seen, for example, in the case of Hippolytus, Cyprian, and others.1 Origen especially lived in it, though it took in his mind a distinct and peculiar character.

The First-born of all creation, says he, the noblest nature, is designated King and Son of the King; the man whom He assumed, was formed by Him in righteousness, and so they are one. For the Redeemer made of two one, in that He united the first fruits of both in Himself.2 If God has made Him, who knew no sin, sin for us, we can no longer say that there was no darkness in Him (as there is none in the Father). But He took our weakness upon Himself, our sin did He bear; and the sickness of the soul, the pains of the hidden man of the heart, lay upon Him. On their account, in order to carry them away, He confessed that His soul was troubled and shaken, and, according to Zechariah, put on unclean garments. Because He took upon Himself the sins of the people which believeth in Him, therefore saith He so frequently, as though speaking in our name,—" The account of my sins is far from salvation; Thou knowest my folly, and my sins are not hidden before Thee." No one can suppose that we thus blaspheme against the Anointed of God.

1 See Vol. i. 103 ff., 259 ff., 313, 316 ff.; ii. 65 ff., 96 ff., 101 ff.

2 Ad Bom. i. 5. Origen designates the Logos "promiscue" Only-begotten and First-born. During the Arian controversy (compare Ath. c. Ar. or. 2, 663), these ideas were more precisely denned as follows: " Onlybegotten" refers to the eternity and singularity of His Sonship; whereas "First-born" has reference also to the many brethren, whom He does not lack notwithstanding His own pre-eminence, nay more, whom He gains through it. The designations, therefore, are taken as mutually complementary. The former is the absolute expression for Christ; the latter, the relative, which refers back to the former.

For as the Father alone has immortality, whereas the Lord took our death upon Himself, out of pure love to men, we can only say of the Father, " In Him is no darkness." If God has made Him, who knew no sin, sin for us, we cannot say of Him, " In Him is no darkness." For Christ, in His love for men, took our darknesses upon Himself, in order that by His power He might kill our death, and dissipate the darkness of our soul, as Isaiah saith, "The people which sat in darkness, hath seen a great light (tov Kvpiov rjficov Sia <pCkaOpunriav Bdvarov Tov inrep f)fimv avei\.rj<f>6ro<;,—e'(/>' avrov T^s qfi&v ateorias avaSeBeyfievov, etc. In Joh. T. ii. 21). His flesh also is termed "sin;" for He came in the form of sinful flesh. It is called sin, because it is a sacrifice for sin; through this sacrifice, which is termed sin, He has put sin to flight and destroyed it (ad Rom. iv. 12; T. iv. 589). Life is stronger than death; righteousness is stronger than sin; the grace is greater than the mischief. For the grace of Christ is more richly and widely poured out than the death of Adam; seeing that it has not merely driven away death, but brought life to dominion; nay more, it has even brought us to dominion through Christ (ad Rom. v. 2). He is the tree of life, into whom we must be implanted. His death becomes the tree of life to us. In this way we can imitate Him in holiness. And the Church is His body (in Joh. T. x. 23, 27); so that the resurrection of Christ embraces the mystery of the resurrection of the entire body of Christ (in Joh. T. i. 34, x. 20). This is the deeper reason why, in all the principal momenta of the history of Christ, Origen sees our history, the history of individuals or of the Church. In this aspect, his allegorical interpretation is not a play with coincidences; Christ he viewed, not as a naked symbol, but as the principle of the process through which the Church must pass in imitation of its Head. For this reason, the thought recurs in the greatest variety of expressions,—His history is our history, and our history is His. The anointing of the Son, the union of the Spirit and of man in Him, denotes the marriage, the commingling, of the believing soul with the Holy Ghost (in Joh. T. i. 30). He gives a similar turn to our crucifixion with Christ (in Joh. T. i. 34), and to the sufferings of believers (ibid., and in Jerem. Hom. 14, 7 ; 18,12). In every martyr, Christ is condemned. For if a Christian is condemned, not because of a sin, but because he is a Christian, Christ is coudemned in him. Throughout the whole earth, Christ is constantly suffering from unbelievers and sceptics, who divide Him in sunder. It is foolish to suppose that Christ has been only once scourged, by Pilate. As often as unbelievers persecute Christians, Christ presents His back to the smiters. When Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 28, speaks of the subjection of the Son under the Father, he shows us that all that he means thereby is, the subjection of believers, whom He comprises in Himself.1 Because Christ is the life in each, the life multiplies itself; for Christ is found in every saint, and for the sake of the one Christ there are born many christs, His imitators, formed after Him, who is the image of God (AiA ydp Tov iv licdarcp Xpiarbv ovra £corjv ifXrjOwovrcu al %coalolovel ydp Kaff eiccurrov ayiov Xpurros evpUricerai, Koi yivovrai Sia Tov eva Xpiarov TroXXol Xpurrol, oi eKeivoi fJUfirjral Kul Kavr avrbv, elicova ovra Qeov jiejiop(pcofievoi; in Joh. T. vi. 3). Between this birth of Christians from God, which he conceived to be mediated by Christ, and the birth of the Son from the Father, he finds also a resemblance (in Jerem. Hom. ix. 4). As the Father did not generate the Son once for all, and then send Him forth from Himself, ceasing therewith any longer to generate, but begets Him eternally; so also, if thou hast the spirit of sonship, God begets thee continually in Him, in every work and every thought; and thus begotten, thou becomest a continually begotten son of God in Christ Jesus.

That which gives the humanity of Christ this universal significance, is simply and solely the Logos, who united Himself with it in vital unity. The Logos illuminates everything, even the ideal world, and the logical souls in the real world (in Joh. T. i. 24). As wisdom, He is the beginning and the end; in Him is included the idea of the entire world, so far as He is wisdom in God (i. 22, 34). He is the light for all men and all rational beings, the source of all pure life (i. 28, 29). Christ, the only-begotten One, is all in all, beginning and end.

1 n. dpx- L. iii, 5, 6: Quid non solum regnandi, verum etiam obediendi venerat reparare disciplinam, in semet ipso prius complens, quod ab aliis volebat impleri, iccirco non solum ad mortem crucis Patri obediens factus est, verum etiam in consummatione seculi in semet ipso complectens omnes, quos subjicit Patri, et qui per eum veniunt ad salutem, cum ipsis et in ipsis quoque subjectus dicitur Patri: dum omnia in ipso constant, et ipse est caput omnium, et in ipso est salus et salutem consequentium plenitudo. Compare above, pp. 134-138.

As the beginning, He is in the man whom He assumed; as the end, in the last of the saints. Or otherwise put,—Even in those who are in the middle (between the beginning and the end of the world) is He: as the beginning in Adam; as the end in the Son of man, the second and last Adam (i. 34). Christ is Alpha and Omega. No one knows the Father save through Him; no one can stand connected with the Father save through Him. And perhaps, as in the temple the steps were many which led to the sanctuary, so is the First-born of God all steps to us; as reckoning downwards, He is the first and the second, so also the last. His humanity is the first and lowest step. Beginning with it, we pass on through the entire series of steps, so that we ascend through Him, who is also angel and the rest of the powers. Above all, however, He must be to us the Lamb, which takes away our sins (in Joh. xix. 1). In a much diviner way than Paul He became all things to all, passing through all stages, from the angels down to the beings in the nether world, in order to win all. To the angels He became an angel, to men a-man. If there exist letters of God, after the reading of which, the saints say that they have read in the tables of heaven, elements through which heavenly things can be read, these are the ideas, which are, as it were, broken into small fragments, to wit, into the Alpha and the following letters to Omega, which is the Son of God. Again, regarded from another point of view, the same Son is as Logos, simultaneously, both beginning and end (in Joh. T. i. 34).

In passages like that just adduced, and in similar ones, the distinction between the first and second creation is not always thoroughly maintained. Sometimes the Logos is represented as the soul of the world, which is broken up into a plurality of beings (Xoyoi). This by itself would not sufficiently explain why the Logos should become man, angel, and so forth; for in a certain sense He became man and angel by the creation of these beings: why, then, was a further special act of union with them necessary? From our previous exposition of Origen's system, however, we know that he considered the participation in the Logos involved in the creation to have been but imperfect, so far as free beings were brought into existence, to whom an abiding and indissoluble connection with the Logos was primarily a task to be accomplished. This is the point at which


his theory, that the Logos must take His place in history, and undergo a regular process of development on behalf of all rational creatures, finds application. He must become all rational beings, in order that, as one of them, He may be near to all, may be laid hold of by them as the atoning principle in its totality, and may lead them to the Father. He is able to assume all, because all are created by Him; and in them all is but one generic substance of different grades, for there is but one Logos. For this reason, He pervades all the genera of beings as different stages of the Xvyiicov. But believing as he did, that all rational beings are, as such, inwardly connected with the Logos, and that He, as their common principle of unity, assumed them all, and exhibited all in Himself in their perfection, the way was paved to his doctrine of the airoicaraaraais of all things (c. Oels. 8, 12). He set forth all in their perfection by becoming all; but He returned out of them to Himself, by deifying them in Himself. As He passed through all stages, even so must we, strengthened by His power, and, in imitation of His example, advance from stage to stage, till we become one spirit with Him.

In this aspect also, therefore, Origen's Christology may be said to have a somewhat Docetical character. Not because of the universality lent to his view of redemption, by his doctrine of the assumption of all classes of beings; for, as we have remarked, he looked upon angels, not as a different genus of beings, but merely as a different grade of one and the same logical genus. Nor because the historical life of the Logos was blended with and dissipated into His life in eternity, by the doctrine of His assumption of all beings; for He was actually of opinion, that the Logos showed Himself to angels as an angel, and as a man to men, and that men, at a higher stage, will become angels, in consequence of the Logos having first become man for them. Finally, the Docetical element does not lie in his notion, that whilst the Logos was man, He was also the light and vital principle of the entire world; for Origen appears to have connected the two things as follows,—the soul of Christ being indissolubly united with, and fired throughout by, the Logos, was one spirit with Him, and the centre whence He, unhindered by body and space, was universally active. We have seen above, that he regarded the sacrifice of Christ on the cross as the sacrifice offered in the centre of the world on behalf of the entire world; and to those who expressed surprise that the Pneuma (that is, the Logos) should be sent into a corner, instead of filling all bodies in the entire world, he replied,—"We have enough with one sun; it is for all. This Anointed One made many anointed; Christ is the head; He and the Church are one body. If thou desirest to see many bodies full of the Divine Spirit, look at the Church (c. Cels. 6, 78, 79)." The Docetical element rather consists in his denying to the humanity of Christ constitutive and permanent significance in itself (for example, ad Kom. i. 6, compare Thomasius, pp. 213, 214), even as he denied it to the other forms which he assumed; attributing to them, on the contrary, a merely paedagogical or anagogical significance, as guides to the pure and naked deity. Our perfection, too, will be the termination of our personal existence; and thus the system which made so strictly ethical a beginning, ends by being physical. The utmost that remains is, that a new world may arise through a new apostasy; which, however, must be represented as running through the same course, unless the ideas, respectively, of God and the world, are stripped of their mutually exclusive character.1

How important was the position held by that image of Christ in His totality, in the system of Athanasius, prior to the Arian controversy, we have seen above (pp. 249 ff.). Arianism necessarily felt inwardly estranged from it; all that it sought in Christ was a teacher and pattern of virtue. Only men like Eusebius of Caesarea endeavoured to retain their hold on it; in the sense, however, that the Logos in and by Himself, and not first the Logos incarnate, or the God-man, was the First-born of creation, the Head of humanity and of the world (see above, pp. 221 ff.).

1 The ideas of Irenaeus and Tertullian, 'which belong to this connection, have been treated above. The important thought, that Christ was the archetype even for the creation of Adam, appears to have been contained also in Methodius' Ivpiroai»v 'jraptiinxiu, where he remarked,—ixofatt» i Ql&( To» A»tpuiro» xxr tlxiv»t ofiolx» riif tixivos xirov, Tovt tari X«t tixo»x Xpitrrov. The word Xpiaros might refer, it is true, merely to the Son of God in Himself, for Methodius goes on to say,—\bris yuf «t/ ri dirxiyxo,fiu xxl o xupuxriip riis iirwrauiius uvrov. Compare Gregory of Nyssa,

'Ktpl xovz*<jx. xvipuirov, C. 16.

When the office of mediator or substitute for humanity is conferred on a creature, such as the one proposed by Arianism, it becomes ethnic and unethical; for only on the ground of an act of deification, and of the curtailment both of our personality and of the task assigned to us, can a mere creature be represented as taking our place, and as holding the position of our representative before God. In the works directed against Arianism, Athanasius constantly recurs to this idea, whenever his object is to confront the entire fulness and weight of true Christianity with the scanty view of it taken by Arianism. It was that intuitional image of the Redeemer in His totality that marked out for Athanasius, during all his controversies, the direction which he ought to pursue; like a never-erring compass, it enabled him to steer safely between heresies wearing the appearance of the full truth, like those of Marcellus and Apollinaris. He employed it against Arianism, not merely when his purpose was to establish the Christian idea of atonement, in opposition to the false deification of man, on the one hand, and his false humiliation and separation from God, on the other; but both he and his friends used the idea principally in order to turn aside Arian objections, which deduced the lowness of Christ's higher nature from the lowness of the declarations concerning Him contained in the New Testament. To a whole series of passages of this nature in the New Testament they applied the canon,—When Christ was troubled unto death, and cried out, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" He spake in our name, because He had put himself into our place, and had taken upon Himself our guilt and abasement.1 Against Sabellianism they argued, on the basis of this intuition of theirs, that Christianity was not a mere transitory theophany, or an ivepyeia of God; but that its aim was the perfection of humanity.

1 Athan. c. Ar. i. 48; Greg. Naz. or. 29, 18: "Count up, unthankful man, the words, <My God and your God,' <greater,' <created,' <made,' <sanctified,' <servant,' <obedience,' <He learned,' <He was commissioned,' < He was sent,' < Of myself I can do, speak, judge, give, will nothing.' Add thereto His ignorance, His subjection, His prayer, His questions, His progress, His being perfected. Add, further, His sleeping, being hungry and weary, His weeping, His trembling and shuddering. Perhaps thou wilt reproach Him also (0 Arian) with His death and His cross." Let the answer serve: 'Evl xtQxhultp rd fit» fyviXartpx irpiaxyt rfi itirvrri xxl Tji xpiirroai Qvaii ir,uiuv Xmi aufixros, rx ie txirtmurtpx Avyihtu, Xxi r£ 8«i « xwutirri Ti Kxl aaptuiii»ri, Kxl dvipuxtaii»ri. Compare 30, 1, 21.

Now the perfection of humanity requires that it be constituted the Church, the body of the Lord, of which He is the Head.1 How, in the last place, Apollinarism was combated by the aid of this image, we shall shortly see.

Let us now specify a few of the more important passages. In becoming a man Himself, says Athanasius repeatedly, the eternal Son constituted mankind sons and gods; for He set forth in Himself, in the first instance, a man who was God, and now He draws us into fellowship with Him (vloiroirjae, ical iOeoiroirjae Tow dvOpa>irov<; yevofievos auros avOpcoiros, c. Ar. or. 1, 38).2 Neither the Logos was exalted by becoming man and displaying virtue, as the Arians suppose, nor was He humbled (rjkarribOri) by the assumption of a body; but deification became the portion of the body which He assumed (c. Ar. 1, 40, 42). As humanity is worshipped in Him, the heavenly powers can no longer wonder when they see us, who wear His nature, entering into heaven (c. 42). His humiliation is a fact; but it produced no change in Him. For not physical defect, but the riches of His love, was the cause of His humiliation, and therefore He remained the same, though we were savingly altered (c. Ar. or. 1, 48). He first sanctified Himself in order that He might sanctify us all. "I, the Logos of the Father, give even the spirit to Myself, the Incarnate One, and thus sanctify Myself, the Incarnate One, in order that all may be at once sanctified in Me, who am the truth." Accordingly, He gives as God; He receives as man; but in His person we have made a beginning of receiving. From Him streams forth the Spirit as a precious ointment over tne whole of humanity (or. c. Ar. 1, 46—48). C. Ar. 4, 33 :—" He wrapped Himself in our first fruits, and married Himself therewith. Taking this perishing man into Himself, He renews him by a stable renewal unto eternal duration."

1 Compare c. Ar. 4,12, 25. The question with which we have to do, is not something epideictical, a iratiid., but the Axbitix, which is contained in Christ for the individual and the Church.

2 Compare 39, 1, 48. 0/ xvipuiroi liaiv Apyn» lytnrtH Tos Xxpfix»ii» ir xirip xxl $i xirrov' Xvtov ydp Vv» hiyoftivov dtifWrlmf xpluixt, ifitis eafiit ol i» xini? xpUfitvoi' e-i/vtj xul iScfsri^ofAiuov xiiroi ilfius iofiw oi h xinp fiximfyfit»oi. 3,34.

(Hvarai <ptXavOpamcos fjiuv, Ttjv dirapyrp) I'i/icov irepiOefievos, Kal ravrp dvcucpaOek.El Toivvv (tov uvOpanrov) aaBpmOevra

et? eavrbv Xafiofievos irakiv avaicaivi^ei Bui rfjs fiefiala<; avrov avavecoaew; rrpb<; Biafiovrjv dreXevrrjrov ical But rovff evovrai el<s Oeiorepav airrbv dvdymv Xrj^iv—7rw? olov reroil dirocrr6Xoi<;awapiOfielv rov r&v diroarokcov icvpiov;) "The Word became flesh, in order that, as the Logos is Son, God might be termed our Father for the sake of the Son dwelling in us. Whoso, therefore, has not the Son in his heart, of him God cannot be termed the Father" (Aih rovno yap 6 X6yo<; yeyove aap\, Xv, iireiBtj 6 X07o? eo~riv vlbs, Sia rov ivoucovvra ev r)fiiv vlov Xeyrrrcu K<n I)i,lmv rrarrjp.OiKovv 6 ev fjfilv vibs rov XBiov irarepa hrvKa\ovfievo<; ical r)fi£>v avrcov rroiel rrarepa KaXelaOai. 'AfieKei S>v Ovk eariv et? ra<; KapBlas 6 vlbs, rovrcov ovBe rrarrjp o Qebs av ~Kej(Oehj, 4, 22). "When the Spirit descended on Him in the Jordan, He descended upon us, whose body Christ bore. When He was washed in the Jordan, we were washed in and by Him (EvBrjXov, ori ical r) eis airrbv hi rm 'IopBdvy rov irvevfiaros yevofievtj KaOoBos eh ^uts f)v yivofievrj, Bio. rb fopeiv airrbv To f)fierepov adfia.Tov yap icvpiov &>? dvOpcoirov Xovofievov—J?/i«? rjfiev 0i ev airc o mil irap' avrov Xov6fievot, etc., 1, 47). "God calls men, who are created, sons, as though they had been begotten. As they are created natures, they can only become sons by receiving the Spirit of Him who is by nature and truly Son. He who was our Creator becomes our Father, from which it is clear that we are not by nature sons, but the Son who is in us. Nor is God by nature our Father, but the Father of the Word, which is in us. But the Father designates those sons in whom He sees His Son" (2, 59). "Man united with a mere creature could not have been deified, nor could he have ventured to present himself to the Father, had not Christ been the essential Word of God. As man, He is become the beginning of the new creation (dp%fj Kaivfj'; Krlaecosi); for He is the man created for us. For this reason, this union of the divine and human (awa<prj) took place in Him, in order that, with that which is by nature divine, He might unite that which is by nature human, and the salvation and deification of the human (Oeoiroirjais) might be firmly established" (2, 70). "As a wise builder does not merely think how to build a house, but also arranges it so that it can be restored if it should receive damage, so the basis of our renewal was laid in Christ ere we existed, in order that we might be created again in Him" (2, 77). This passage appears to represent the connection of our nature with Christ as so essential, that it must have subsisted even if sin had not entered the world.1 "We must not be surprised, therefore, to find Christ speaking of His image (two?), which is in us, as of Himself; for when Saul persecuted the Church, in which was His image and likeness, He said, as though He Himself were the object of the persecution,—Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?" Similar also is the import of the passage, Prov. viii. 22 :—He speaks of the creation as of Himself. After explaining in c. Ar. or. 3, 32 f. that the grand thing is, that whatever sufferings are undergone, or works are performed, by a man in Christ, do not concern this man alone, but the Logos also, who makes all things His own (pliceioi, IBumoiel), he goes on to say,—Inasmuch as the flesh was born of the Virgin (Mapla OeoroKos), He Himself was said to have been born, who is the principle of the birth of others, namely, that He might transfer our birth to Himself, and thus obtain the mastery over the principle of death in us.a He regarded the work of redemption, therefore, as already begun with the act of incarnation; the entire finitude to which He subjected Himself, and of which that act formed the beginning, finds its explanation, not in His nature, but in His substitutionary love. (Note 55.) This leads us to notice a particular class of passages which relate to the sufferings of Christ. (Note 56.) C. Ar. 1, 41: "As man He endured death for us, that so He might present Himself to the Father for us. As He died for us, so also has He been exalted on our behalf, in order that, like as we all died in the death of Christ, even so we might all be unutterably exalted in Him."

1 His meaning can, however, also be,—The possibility of the incarnation was grounded in the creation itself, because the Logos or the Wisdom of God was informed in the world (compare c. 79); but still merely typically, in comparison with the archetype, wisdom itself.

2 "I»« rij» iifiuv tis ix c» fitrxtri yi»iai», xxl fwixiri if yjj fiirn Sines els yjj» dxe"htufiit, dMC us r£/ e\ oiipxtov "hltyov avvxQiemts els oipxtovs dvxx^fiit ^ap xirrov. Ovxavt Ovtu xxl td u/.'f.x crxdn mv ouft,xros ovx d^tixirus tls iuvro»'iinxi»' Ivx finxtri us dvipuitoi, oiAX' us f&Io! rav hoyov r)jf xlunlov £uijf fitrxaxufiiu. Tijf yitiaeus iifiuv xxl irxons rijf aapxixiis doie»elxs fttrxreairrua lis To» 'hoyat (cf. 2, 69) eyetpiy-etu diri ytjf, 'hvitians "if oV xfiaprixv xxripxs, etc. Oiixiri us yntvns, dKhd 'hotxot hoyuiuans rijf aapxos 3/x rot rav ©eov Xo'yo», of It %fi&s iyivtro aap%.

"He takes our sufferings upon Himself and presents them to the Father, interceding for us, that they may be destroyed in Him" (4, 6). "Although not weak, He took upon Himself our weakness; although not hungering, He hungered; He sacrifices that which is ours, in order to extinguish it; but instead of weaknesses (which were laid on Him, and through His bearing of them were extinguished), He receives gifts from God, of which those will become partakers who are united with Him" (c. 7). "The death, which is termed His, the death of the Logos, was a ransom for the sins of men, and a death of death" (1, 45). "Laden with guilt, the world lay under the condemnation of the law; but the Logos took the judgment (Kpifia) up into Himself, and suffering in the flesh for all, He bestowed salvation on all" (compare Ar. or. 1, 51, 60; 2, 69).

Similar expressions occur repeatedly in the works of the two Gregories and of Basilius. Gregory Nazianzen, after saying, in Hom. 30,—the ranruvwrepai and avOpwrriicdrrepai (pcoval which are recorded respecting Christ, are to be referred to the veos oY 37/ta? avOpamos; he proceeds (c. 3),—rco 8vri eSovXeiwe aapicl h-al yeveaei teal irdOeai Tok fjpxripoi s Sicb rtjv fjfierepav iXevOeplav, icaj iraxriv dls aeamicev imb Tt)? upaprias Kareypfiivois. Ti Se p.eVjov dvOpdnrov raireivortyri, fi 6em ifKakrjvai Kox yeveaOai Qebv iic Ttj<; fit^eas; The Oela elicav is commingled with the BovXiKt) fu>pcf>r). On 1 Cor. xv. 28 (c. 5), he remarks,—Is He not now subject? Did He need, as God, to be subjected to God, like a rebel 1 'AW? ovrm aKo-rrei, 6Vi &<rrrep icardpa fjKOvae oV ifie, 6 Ttjv ifiijv Xvcov Kardpav, Kal dfiapria 6 aipcov Ttjv afiapriav Tov Koafiov, KaX 'ABafi dvr\ Tov iraXaiov ylverai veo<;' Ovtq> Kcii To efiuv dwrroraicrov eavrov iroieurai d>? Ke<paXrj Tov 7raiT0s cnu/iaro?. "jeo>s fiev ovv awrroraicros eyc o Kox OtoaiG>Zrj<;} awn-oratcro? To Kclt ifih Kox 6 Xpioro? Xeyerar orav Be inrorarffl avrco To. iravra (yrrorarfjaerai Sk Kal rrj emr/vdiaei Kox rrj f&ercnroitfaei), rore Kcu ai/rO<; Tjjv virora/yrjv irerrXrfpaice, irpoadycov ifie Tov aeacoapAvov. The Father subjects all things to the Son, the Son to the Father; the former by His decree, the latter by His deed. Thus, He who subjected it sets forth before God that which belongs to us, as subjected, by appropriating to Himself that which belongs to us (eavrov iroiovfievos To rjp&repov). In like manner, he then further explains the desertion of Christ. He was not left in Himself, either by the Father or by

Specially rich in passages of this kind are the works of Gregory of Nyssa. According to him, God, in uniting Himself with one man, united Himself with the whole of humanity, assumed the entire race, because the one man whom He assumed was the airapyj), in which all men are potentially or principially included. Humanity is, in his view, one living being, h/ £coov; hence the divine power of the Head, which is at the same time an integral member of the great body of humanity, diffused itself through the whole race. And so, in this One all died; and the resurrection and exaltation of this One is the resurrection and exaltation of all. This fact is brought also into the most intimate connection with baptism and the Eucharist. (Note 58.)



Reference has been already made to the Christology of Arius and of the Sabellianism revived by Marcellus; but we have only given closer attention to it, so far as the view to be taken of one aspect of the Person of Christ depended on the form assumed by the doctrine of the Trinity. We have therefore still a word to say regarding their view of the human aspect, and of the unity of the person.

The First-born of creation, whom the Arians say became man, is a being of another genus than man :—still, however, a creature, which, on the ground of its mutability (rpeirrbv), of its, in the first instance, merely growing, unestablished virtue, of its imperfect knowledge, and above all, of the freedom of choice attributed to it in common with all finite rational beings, may be described as possessing all the elements strictly constitutive of the spiritual aspect of the humanity of Christ. Arianism was therefore unable to concede to Christ a human soul: for how could two finite beings, two free wills and so forth, be conceived to be conjoined in one and the same person? It consequently attached equal importance to the two principles;— 1. Whenever the spiritual aspect of Christ is spoken of as having humbled itself, it must be referred to the Logos; 2. Christ had no human soul; but the bright lucific substance assumed a human body, partially in order to veil itself, partially in order to become visible to men.

The latter principle evidently renders it impossible that Christ should have been the subject of an actual development from youth upwards. The higher, premundane, lucific spirit must have attained to a high degree of virtue, of ripeness in general, ere He became man. Accordingly, it was impossible that He should learn and grow after a human fashion, beginning at the lowest stage; and the entire process through which Christ is said to have passed, becomes Docetical, unless we resort to the monstrous supposition, that this highest creature reduced itself again to the level of a potence, plunged into Lethe after the manner of the Platonic souls, and metamorphosed itself to an earlier stage of its existence, in order to be able to become man. But if Christ's growth were a mere appearance, His conflicts, His temptations also, were an appearance; and one cannot understand why He should be rewarded for them. Moreover, what reward could be conferred on Him? All that Arians could do at this point, was to represent that higher spirit, whom even prior to His incarnation they designate Creator and First-born, as returning to the position He occupied before; for, as He had no human soul, they could not fairly speak of His humanity being exalted and becoming eternal. But the body by itself could only, strictly speaking, be the instrument of a momentary theophany; it could not have an eternal significance. We see, therefore, that the Christ of Arianism, who is a higher spirit, walking upon earth, and apparently undergoing a development in a human body, was really a completely mythical shape. At this point, Arianism, which commenced with being jejune and coldly logical, assumes a fantastical character, and reveals an affinity with Gnosticism; which also we have found to combine within itself the opposite elements of Ebionism and Docetism. In order to reduce the miracle of the incarnation to as low a level as possible, Arianism began with referring all the defects that are attributed to the human nature of Christ to His higher nature; and now, as though by way of punishment, instead of a miraculous person, it was compelled to adopt a monstrosity, and the veritable humanity, for which it apparently took up arms, was dissipated into a Docetical seeming. In one word, as frequently occurs elsewhere, Arianism preferred the marvellous to the miraculous, taught by the Church.

This aspect of the Arian system did not remain entirely unnoticed even at an earlier period; but all eyes were at first so completely occupied with its trinitarian aspect, that neither Arians themselves further developed the Christological principles of their system, nor did the Church teachers recognise the real significance of this point. In Antioch alone, soon after the close of the Nicene Council, was a protesting voice raised against the Arian principle, that Christ assumed a body without soul, by the Bishop Eusebius. It would appeal', however, that the Arians themselves, in laying down and frequently referring to the principle, were led, not so much by a conviction of its indispensableness to the complete construction of their Christology, as by a feeling that it was a convenient and near-lying middle idea. For, had it once been decided that Christ assumed, not a human soul, but merely a human body, then the conclusion was inevitable, that the lower utterances regarding Christ contained in the Scriptures, referring, as they unquestionably do, to a spiritual, and not to a merely corporeal element, must hold good of His higher nature, which was in reality the only spiritual element in Him. (Note 59.)

"We should have expected that, in order to refute this line of argumentation, the Church would have at once fallen back on the ancient doctrine of the soul of Christ, which had never been retracted. So far as we know, however, the only teacher in the East who did so prior to Apollinaris, was Eustathius in Antioch. According to Epiphanius (de Ancorat. c. 33), the doctrine, that the Son of God assumed, not a human soul, but merely a human body, had long been held by the school of Lucian. Although Lucian's motive in laying down the principle was probably different from that which influenced his followers,1—for neither he, nor, at first, Arius, had been specially concerned to represent the Logos as mutable,—still, we must conclude it to have been ventilated for the first time in Antioch, especially as the Arians appealed very readily to Lucian, and applied to the purposes of their doctrine of the Trinity that which in his hands had probably related solely to Christology.

1 Without distinguishing between Lucian and the Arians, between Lucian and Lucianists, Epiphanius (1. c.) attributes the Arian motive to both the latter.

We know not merely that Eustathius disapproved of the Arian denial of the human soul of Christ, but also how far he succeeded in securing to the doctrine thereof a positive and independent significance. (Note 60.)

Marcellus, as we know, conceived the divine in Christ to be the active principle, the human the passive: the human by itself he represented as completely will-less, as a mere organ of the divine evepyeia, as passive in the manner in which the prophets were held to have been passive during their ecstasies. He was unable to conceive the human consciousness as awake and alive; indeed, he scarcely conceded it an existence, and therefore stood in the same relation to the question of the human soul of Christ as did the Arians.

Now, the Church teachers refused to content themselves with the doctrine of a divine ray, or of an operation of the Logos from the distance, in the man Jesus (see Note 58; Basilius, Hom. 25), whether supposed to constitute Christ a theophany, or to produce a holy man whom it unites with God. If it were not the Logos Himself who became man; if the incarnation were not that of the Logos; if the doings and sufferings of Christ did not in some way pertain to the Logos as His own; they saw clearly that they were deprived of that which they believed highest and best. Theophanies belong to the Old Testament; under the New, they are Docetical: but if Christ is a mere man, who, although He already existed apart from, was assumed by, the Logos, the saying holds true,—" Cursed is he who putteth his trust in men." On innumerable occasions, therefore, does Athanasius say,—Our redemption consists in His making His own that which belongs to us. He not merely had, but was, man. Even the Jews would allow us a theophany; that would be no stumblingblock to them; even to an indwelling little objection would be raised, for the Logos came in former days to the saints who received Him worthily. But concerning none of them was it said, when they were born,— The Logos Himself is born; or, when they suffered,—The Logos Himself suffered. Precisely this, however, must be said of Christ. That He made His own that which was low,—this, the point of the whole matter, without which the very soul of Christianity is lost—this offends them. Only on that supposition, however, can humanity be said to have been exalted to God in Christ. (Note 61.) Had not the opinion of Athanasius been, that humanity was completely assumed, and that what the Logos assumed He constituted part of Himself, how could he have taught that our entire nature, of which the soul surely forms an essential feature, was redeemed and established in the divine by the Logos?1

More indefinite descriptions of the mode of being of God in Christ are the following:—The ahp^ was His olicos, vaos (c. Ar. 3, 52, 53); which passage, however, is to be supplemented by 3, 30 (see Note 61). So also the expression,—Humanity was the organ of the Logos, by which He revealed Himself ever more completely,—is merely a relative description. It expresses the relation of the God-man to His work, and the fact that the impulse proceeded from the Logos. This comparison, by itself, however, would reduce the humanity of Christ to a passive, lifeless accident. Hence, the most perfect expression attained by Athanasius is,—The Word did not progress; and, on the other hand, the humanity (aap^) was not Wisdom (to the dvOpdrmvov pertains dyvoelv); but it was made the body of Wisdom; that is, it set forth Wisdom in the sphere of actuality (c. Ar. 3, 53. T?}? Hollas cr&fia yeyovev rj aap^ = avOpcoiro<; in 3;~"30). The aap^ was not Wisdom; so far as it was Wisdom, Wisdom did not progress in wisdom; it did not suffer, and so forth, in itself.

1 We might arrive at a different conclusion if we assumed that Athanasius recognised no other evil than corporeal death, from which men needed deliverance. But, however important the r61e played in his system by such ideas as i£vxros, tHu»owlu, etc., he does not limit redemption solely to them; for he knows something also of guilt and sin. How could he further say, C. Ar. 3, 53:—'E» uvrtji ydp iv Si oxp% i irpoxonrowx, xau uirrov \iytrxi, xxl roiiff hx iri.hir r) Tu» dtipuiru» irpoxojrii Utttutcs Oix To» ovtiinu >.iyan liufitirii? Indeed, it is altogether very clear that Athanasius cannot have referred Christ's progress in wisdom to His body (c. Ar. 3, 52, 63), any more than in our case; but it is quite as impossible that he should have referred it to the Logos (c. 51). There is, therefore, no alternative but to say that he presupposed the existence of a soul in the <rxp £, in the i.»ipuirifn Q!>ai(, etc (c. Ar. 3, 30): without, however, giving special prominence to it as a constituent element of the complete human nature.

But it was so one with humanity, that we may fairly say, it progressed aapKl; for the human in it (rb avOparmvov iv ry Soipt'a) advanced, gradually transcended human nature, and was deified (inrepavafiaivov Kwr oklrjov Ttjv avOpcoirivrpi <pvaiv ical Oeorroiovfievov Kcll opyavov avrrjs irp6<; Ttjv ivepyeiav r17s Oeorrjros ical Ttjv eKkaptyi v avrr)s yivopxvov ical (paiv6fievov iraai (compare c. 52). Ibid.: Av^o.vovto<; iv fjXucia rov au>tiaros oweireDiSorO iv avrm ical rj T^s Oeort)rO<; (pavepa<«?, ical eZeikwrO irapa iraaiv, Oti vab<; Oeov icrri, ical Oefa r)v iv Tg3 acopan). The true sense of the words, "He grew in grace and wisdom," is consequently this,—He progressed in and through Himself (ovtb<; iv iavrat irpoeKonrrev, c. 52), for rj Xocpia <pKoS6firjaev eavrfj Oikov, ical iv eavrfj Tov Olkov irpoKoirreiv liroUi. Athanasius can scarcely have meant that the body of Christ grew in wisdom; he must therefore have included the soul of Christ in the avOpaymvov.

But, however many hints of the doctrine of a human soul of Christ may be found in the works of Athanasius, one thing is lacking—freedom of choice. He lays great stress on it for men, but he never attributes it to Christ. This is perhaps the reason why he, whose system, as a whole, insists on the full and entire humanity of Christ in general, and on a human soul in particular, who, as it would at first sight appear, must have been driven, even by his opponents, to set that forth which would have disarmed them, yet hesitated to give special prominence to freedom of choice. Freedom of choice and mutability occupied so large a place in the system of Arius, that the appearance of Christ bore rather the character of the deed of a finite spirit than of a deed of God. The rpemov ascribed to even this person made the decree of redemption and the certainty of its accomplishment doubtful; nay more, it reduced the divine redemption to a self-redemption. Athanasius feared, and not without reason, being compelled to admit of freedom of choice in this sense, if he should give special prominence to the full human soul. In one word, the entire danger to which the stability of the faith and the divine-human Unio were exposed by the Arian rpeirrov, threatened to break forth from the system of the Church itself at another point, if the doctrine of the human soul of Christ were allowed that integral significance which it had in the form in which it last appeared, to wit, in the systems of Origen and Paul of Samosata; unless, indeed, such a conception was formed of it, as should prevent its freedom of choice from undermining the certainty of the divine decrees and of their accomplishment. (Note 62.)

On the other hand, however, it is quite as evident that the incarnation must remain Docetical as to its main feature, so long as Sabellianism and Arianism had not been confuted in this point also. The great progress made in the doctrine of the divine aspect, or in that of the Trinity, must remain completely without that influence on Christology which it ought to have, if a representation were adopted of human nature, such as rendered it impossible that the hypostasis of the Son, which is of like substance with God, should be conjoined in vital unity with a complete humanity; or, otherwise expressed, Christology would derive no advantage from the labours of the Trinitarian Period, notwithstanding that it gave them their impulse, if decided progress were not made, above all, in relation to the human aspect. To the required advance, the Church was, as it were, driven by Apollinarism.



Amongst the most interesting systems occurring in the History of Dogmas, is undoubtedly that of the younger Apollinaris of Laodicea, a man who was distinguished for comprehensive culture, intellectual power and depth, and who enjoyed the reputation of devotedness to the Church and sincere piety. Not only did Athanasius therefore hold him in high esteem, but even Epiphanius treated him with respect and consideration.

He was a remarkable man, if only on one account, namely, that he himself was the turning-point at which the Church ceased to devote that exclusive attention to the doctrine of the Trinity which it had for a considerable time devoted, and began those Christological investigations which engaged its powers unremittedly, especially in the East, during centuries to come. He was, in particular, the occasion of the Church's decidedly affirming the existence of that feature of the humanity of Christ which had hitherto held a precarious position, to wit, His true human soul. But the question regarding the human soul of Christ at once gives rise to a new problem, that of the unity of the two natures; indeed, the theory of Apollinaris may be regarded as a premature attempt at the solution of the problem. This is, at the same time, the point which gradually compelled the Church to investigate the question,—whether the human nature of Christ is to be conceived as impersonal or personal. In denying the existence of a human soul of Christ, Apollinaris meant to represent His human nature as impersonal; and in this respect, we may fairly assert that the Church, in its later doctrinal inquiries, arrived at the very goal towards which Apollinaris, actuated by regard for the unity of the divinehuman person, believed it necessary to strive; with the difference, however, that the coarser form of a denial of the human soul of Christ adopted by the latter, in order to avoid the assumption of a double personality, was exchanged by the former, for the finer form of teaching, that Christ had a human soul, but an impersonal human nature.

The sources of information respecting Apollinarism are pretty copious (Note 63); but it has been hitherto impossible to make clearly out what Apollinaris' own opinions were, in several important respects. That the school of Apollinaris fell into inconsistency with themselves, and became untrue to their master, in some points, is certain. But it is less certain whether Apollinaris was always self-consistent in his teachings. There will be no reason, however, for doubting the matter, if it can be shown, that those who charge him with changing his views, as, for example, Theodoret, were unable to perceive that opinions which seemed self-contradictory, and to belong to different stages in his intellectual history, are really very compatible with each other. Confusion seems to have been introduced into the view taken of the principles of Apollinaris, specially through the unhesitating ascription to him of ideas, which bore a distant or closer family resemblance to his system, notwithstanding they made their appearance prior to, and in total independence of him. By Apollinaris himself they were probably never adopted; but first by a portion of his school, which appears unquestionably to have identified itself with these earlier tendencies, in consequence of a certain affinity with them. These tendencies were in part of a patripassian character; though the doctrine VOL. II. Z

of a suffering or a change, undergone by God, had been meanwhile modified by the doctrine of the Trinity, and had been restricted in its application to the Son: connected therewith, however, was a partial revival of Gnostic elements, such as the doctrines of a heavenly humanity of Christ, of a merely apparent birth, and so forth. These reviving tendencies might derive a certain support from the great stress laid by Apollinaris on the unity of Christ, and his decided antagonism to the duality of the natures: and so, vice versa, they afforded a certain support to the idea of Apollinaris. For both the one and the other of these suppositions—both the supposition that the divine nature became human, and consequently underwent conversion; and the supposition that the human nature was derived from the divine, and the humanity was a heavenly one—appeared favourable to the doctrine of the unity of the two natures. Our object, however, must be to separate Apollinaris from those tendencies, and to view him simply as he was in himself. For, in the nature of the case, greater weight must be laid on the distinct hints given by ancient writers, that Apollinaris taught an actual birth from Mary, and repudiated the notion of a conversion of God into humanity,—hints which Epiphanius in particular repeats (1. a),—than upon the confusion of the view really entertained by Apollinaris with theorems set forth by his school, and by men who were totally independent of him—a confusion so very possible, where the acquaintance with his system was but superficial. (Note 64.)

Athanasius (Ep. ad Epict. 2) gives the following account of the views pertinent to this matter, which were at that time entertained in Corinth, and which he drew from a work written by a member of the party, apparently under the title of xmofirrjfiara. In order to retain the unity of the Person of Christ (this question was really the motive principle of their inquiries), whilst conceding to Him a specific dignity, they derived His humanity from the essence of the Logos; and in so far entertained the notion of a heavenly humanity. The body born of Mary was ofioovaiov rfj Tov X6yov Oeorqri; consequently, in their view, there was no duality of natures in Christ. The body, say they, is not younger than the deity of the Logos, but coeternal with it (owatSwv avr£> Bui iravros yeyevrjaOai, erreiBrj !/ c Tt}? ovaias rrjs Ho<pla.s <nwe<rrq). If the humanity of Christ be regarded as an independent whole, instead of being derived from the Logos, His exaltation would be the introduction of a Tetrad, instead of a Trinity, into God; inasmuch as the human also is represented as raised to God in Him. But, however decidedly they asserted that the humanity of Christ was derived from the essence of the Logos, they could not immediately identify it with His deity; for then the humanity would have had no existence at all, and the Docetism to which they in other respects tended would have gained the upper hand. For this reason, by way of more carefully defining the notion of the heavenly humanity, which is derived from the Logos, they supplemented it as follows,—The Logos formed a body capable of suffering, out of His own substance, by conversion (p£r<nroirjae); as to one aspect of His essence, He renounced His immutability, fell away from His own nature (fiWarp<j T?)? ISlas ^vaeca?), and thus converted Himself into flesh, bones, and an entire body. In this way, the deity of the Son, which is of the same substance with the Father, curtailed itself and reduced itself from perfection to imperfection (areX^? yeyovev etc reXelov).1 Accordingly, they were able to say both, that which was nailed to the cross was not so much a body like ours, as the Sr)fuovf>yb<; ovala of Wisdom itself, that is, the nature in God the Logos, by which He also created the world: and, that Christ who suffered in the flesh, and was crucified, was not the Lord and God, not the Son of God; for that in Him which, in the stricter sense, was divine and unchangeable, could not become man and suffer, but merely that which, in one aspect of His being, He became and set forth, to which He humbled Himself, into which He converted Himself. It cannot be denied, that, on this supposition, apart from all other considerations, precisely that which was, in the strict sense, divine in the Logos did not become man: or, to use the words of the teachers of the Church, such a view would throw us back on the Gnostic duality of Christ.

1 Besides the forerunners of Apollinaris, with whose names we are not acquainted, mention should here be made of a part of his school, which Theodoret (haer. fab. 4, 9, ell. 8) is candid enough to distinguish from the master himself. 4, 9 :—Tlohifuos (elsewhere also called Polemo) xxl arwov

aiwim "hiy%t yeytviiadut xul xpAoiv rri$ dtvrirrros xcil Tow auficttof. (Hence the name Synousiasts given them by Diodorus and Theodoret.) K«J SXhoi U rivtf ix riis 'Airohmuplov ov»uyuyris ix ruv oipxvuv 'i^xatv xx.riihvihxi Tow xvplov To aup.u. Ai&Qopx oe iipoPrts "-'-' rtii( ixeltov ovyypxy.fJ.xai ioyfiu.rx ol fih Tovto/j, o/ it ixttvois npltsdwuv.

Inconsistent with the theory just set forth seems the last feature thereof, as reported by Athanasius:—The Word entered into a holy man, as into one of the prophets; He Himself, however, did not become man when He assumed the body from Mary, but Christ was one; another, the Logos of God, who existed before Mary and before the .35ons, and who was the Son of the Father. For whence the holy man, into whom the Word entered, if the said man was nothing more than the Logos, who had converted Himself into a man, as to the one aspect of Hia being? The explanation of the discrepancy appears to be the following:—That that which we may designate nature in the Logos is first distinguished from, and then again combined with, that in Him which, in the strict sense, was deity and spirit. In the view of the advocates of this theory, the fact of its derivation from the Logos seemed to secure the unity of the entire Person of Christ; but it is derived from Him in different ways. Its physical aspect was the nature of the Logos, converted, transformed into a man; the proper deity of the Logos did not become man. On the other hand, it gave this man a share in itself, in that it animated him spiritually after the manner of the prophets. Thus the elements contained in the Logos may, in a certain sense, be said to have been in the man Jesus, though in a reverse order;—namely, on the one hand, that which in the Logos was merely a potence, to wit, the capability of converting Himself into a man, had become in Jesus an actuality, and formed the basis of further developments; and, on the other hand, that in the Son of God which was an actuality, to wit, the deity, was in Jesus a mere potence or power. In a word, the poles in the conception of the Son changed places, as it were, and the result of this change was the incarnation.

With this theory the assumption of an actual body derived from Mary would seem to be incompatible. And, in point of fact, the heretics whom Athanasius had in view, notwithstanding the stress they laid on the concrete humanity of Christ, probably did not themselves teach that Jesus had a body derived from the substance of Mary.1

1 Ad Episfc. 2 :—Ovx ix M«o/«,-, dM? I* rns ixvrov ovalxs fiirtiroiriat»

The same remark may, in all probability, be made regarding the heretics whom Basilius attacks.1 But that such a view must necessarily lead back to the long-repudiated Docetism is so very self-evident,2 that ,we can understand how efforts might, nay more, must be made, to combine the theory referred to with the idea of Christ's deriving His humanity from the substance of Mary. And this we find in some of the heretics mentioned by Hilary (see Note 64). According to the eleventh canon of the Synod of Sirmium, besides the form referred to above, according to which, the Word converted Himself into flesh, and set forth this flesh out of Himself, there existed another, according to which, already existing flesh was received or assumed by the Word, in the sense, namely, that He converted Himself into the material which He found already existing (the Son "demutationem sustinentem camera accepisse"). In a similar manner, Tertullian speaks of a twofold possibility in relation to the bodies of the angels who appeared in Old Testament times, to wit, that they either gave themselves bodies out of themselves, or took them from the aether. The latter also may be termed a conversion, in so far as the angels constituted the, in itself, foreign material, a form of manifestation of themselves, and thus a mode of their own existence. Such a doctrine of conversion, however, necessitated the giving up of the notion of a humanity whose substance was heavenly. This latter theory approached considerably nearer the doctrine of the Church; for the Church also held that the Logos appropriated from Mary a substance essentially foreign to Him, and constituted it a form of His self-manifestation. Its advocates, however, probably meant to go further; at all events, if their prime aim was to preserve the unity of Christ. That they should consent to representing the material taken from Mary a.s something foreign to the Logos, was impossible; their only course, therefore, was to lessen the distance between the Logos and the humanity, into which He converted Himself, either by the enhancement of the human, on the ground of the divinity of human nature in general, and consequently of the nature of Mary and the material taken from her; or by the depreciation of the Logos.

1 Oipxviov aufiu ixfimu To» Kvpiov iru.pxytytnfltiu. Further, they Bay:— It' xiiTrfj rrit itornrx rx oLvipuirxv iixfixtvtiv irciin. Basil. Ep. 65, T. 3, 104 f.

* As is remarked by Athanasius in the Epistle above referred to, and by Basilins.

As they do not appear to have adopted the former plan, like some later writers, for example, in the period of the Reformation, nor to have derived the material in Mary, along with the whole of external nature, from the nature of the creative Logos, there only remained to them the latter alternative—the alternative of approximating the Logos to the flesh, on whose full humanity, derived from Mary, they were resolved to insist. And accordingly they said, —The Logos converted Himself into a form which rendered it possible for the growth and sufferings of humanity to pass over and pertain to Him without hindrance; and thus what belonged to the flesh was able to become in a fuller sense His. When He abased Himself, and renounced divine glory and immutability, He acquired the capability of taking up humanity with its affections into Himself, and constituting it a part of His own being. On this view of the matter, the body must evidently be regarded as the main feature of the humanity of Christ; and the divine Logos alone is the soul or centre; as Apollinaris taught afterwards. Another vie.w of the matter of a more Ebionitical character we have already noticed above (see Note G4; Hilarius, de Trin. 10, 18, 20, 21). It also takes its start with the idea of the conversion of the Logos, in its endeavours to diminish the distance between the divine and human natures; but succeeds better in showing that Christ's body and soul were of like substance with us, than in demonstrating the unity of the two natures. The reason whereof was, that they derived the body and soul of Christ from the Adamitic humanity, and reduced the Logos to the rank of a potence animating the man Jesus. But, as Athanasius frequently remarked, every theory of conversion must end in Ebionism, if it follow out its principles to their legitimate results, and say,—The Logos who converted Himself into man ceased thereby to be Logos, ceased to be what He was. For then, in fact, nothing remains but the holy man Jesus; and instead of an union of the divine and human natures in the incarnation, we have the absorption of the former in the latter. The Ebionism thus arrived at is different indeed from the old, rigid, dialectical form thereof; it brings the divine and human aspects into flux, but without being able to combine their unity with their distinction. The man who was brought into existence by the conversion of the Logos into a man, may be converted again into God; in such a manner, however, that the humanity then ceases to exist. In each we discover the presentiment of its union with the other, but not of that unity which, by preserving the distinctive characteristics of each aspect, does equal justice to both. On the contrary, it is such, that now the one and then the other aspect suffers. When it was the turn of the humanity, the deity was excluded; and when it was the turn of the deity, the humanity was excluded. The aspect which at one time excludes, is afterwards punished by being itself excluded; but this punishment of error is not identical with the truth. A system which does nothing but alternate between two extremes, inclining first to Ebionism, and then to Docetism, cannot lay claim to being the truth, which is fixed and abiding; for truth, instead of substituting the one error for the other, must exclude hoth, and this is only possible if the truth contained in the two extremes is combined to form a higher unity. It is this higher unity which minds that had arrived at the stage of vacillation just mentioned were already seeking; and this is the explanation of the frequent occurrence at this time of theories which had had a partial existence before; for now the day was approaching when the intellect of the Church must apply itself to the task of combining in unity the two aspects of the Person of Christ. (Note 65.)

The theories just considered, which, as in the third century, were only set forth in rough outline, and which inclined backwards, now to Ebionism, and then to Gnosticism, acquired in the hands of Apollinaris a new form, characterized by greater refinement and greater freedom from the old heretical excrescences.

To take our start with the antagonistic element which determined the form of his system :—it was not the doctrine of the Church with which he felt himself in conflict; but, from the state of the Church's Christology in his day, there is every reason for judging that he believed himself to be in harmony with its spirit and meaning, and desired to express himself as it required. The element to which he felt himself in antagonism was rather, in the first instance, Arianism; and Arianism conditioned the form assumed by his ideas and expressions. We know what a high significance Arianism attached to the position,—The Son of God is mutable, is a rpeirrov, which was able to be either good or evil, and which decided for the good by a free act of will. This position, ascribing as it did freedom of choice to the Logos also, and thus subjecting Him to the laws of a finite development, set the seal to His finitude, and gave such predominance to the moral over the religious point of view, that we may fairly regard it as the central feature of the Arian polemic against the doctrine of the Church. We can, therefore, easily understand that the speculative mind and religious soul of a man like Apolliuaris, must feel itself intensely revolted thereby.

Still, the objection felt to the position by ApoUinaris must have been of quite a different character from that felt by those Church teachers who devoted almost exclusive attention to the doctrine of the Trinity, and little or none to Christology. Not that the principle was more objectionable in his eyes than in the eyes of the other teachers of the Church, because it endangered the doctrine of the Trinity, which he also entertained; but he saw more clearly than the rest its Christological consequences. If in Christ everything depended on the free will of a finite being, redemption is not a divine work at all, but a finite being made himself redeemer by his own free act. On this supposition, He who is termed Redeemer rather shows us how it is possible for a finite being to redeem himself than redeems us; the redemption of Christ Himself becomes vacillating and uncertain; nay more, no such thing as a Christology can exist, for a Christology necessarily presupposes the presence and action of God in Christ.

Hence the point against which Apollinaris directed his chief arguments was the rpeirrov, or the idea of freedom of choice in Christology. One might readily suppose that he must exclude freedom of choice from the higher nature of Christ; but why did he not concede it to His humanity? The other teachers of the Church, also, were reserved in relation to this, as yet little considered, point (see above, pages 350 f.); the more naturally, therefore, could Apollinaris follow out the inclination he felt, to exclude every trace of the rpeirrbv from this person. He had, moreover, really the strongest occasion for doing so in the circumstance, that his aim was to construct a Christology on the basis of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. He was the first who endeavoured to turn to account for Christology the results attained in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity.

With the greatest decision he takes his start from the principle, that the higher element in Christ must be conceived, not as a mere power, but as an hypostasis, as an independent vrroKelpevov. An incarnation has not taken place at all, if the Logos was present in Jesus merely in the form of an animating power, as in the prophets, or if He merely joined Himself on to a perfect and personal man. For, on the former supposition, He merely worked, He did not personally dwell, in the man Jesus; on the second supposition, the Logos can, it is true, be more correctly said to have been present in Jesus. At the same time, inasmuch as He is omnipresent, and we live and move in Him, nothing specific is left for Christ; and we can no more speak of an incarnation in this case, than we can describe His omnipresence as an incarnation. (Note 66.)

Christ must be one person; He cannot have merely assumed, He must have become, man. If the divine, the Logos, dwelt personally in Him, there cannot have been a second human person in Him; for in that case Christ must have been a monstrosity, rather than an unity.1 If the humanity of Christ also possessed its own living, spiritual centre, we should have to attribute to Him two wills; and as freedom of choice pertains essentially to the human centre, we should be driven to assume the existence of an immutable will (that of the Logos) and a mutable will (that of the man Jesus), in one and the same subject. Such a result can only be avoided by denying to Christ the human i/o£>? or the human irvevfia, in which freedom of choice has its seat; not, however, as though this person had no vow whatever, but the Logos constituted Himself the human vow in Him. By thus excluding vow and the rpe-rrrov, he supposed that he had not merely laid a firm basis for the unity of Christ's person, but also that the way was cleared for a specific and personal indwelling of the Logos, and, as a natural consequence, for the acknowledgment of the full reality of the incarnation.

The principle that, on the assumption of an usual human vow, the incarnation would be an impossibility; and that, on the other hand, if we deny a human vow to Christ, the Logos

1 L. c. c. 49, p. 257: E/ le nutis fih U rpiu» (compare c. 35, 46, p. 248; c. 48, pp. 254 f.) xvros Ie tx ruraipuv, ot>x A»tlpuiros tlKh xvipxiroitof. Unless, says he, this person is half man and half God, which would be no unity, but a monster, like a r^«yeA«ipof, fimxruvpos, xivrxvpos, liriri>.u(pos.

God into himself is very God, there must be many Gods, for many receive God into themselves;" consequently, no specific dignity can be assigned to Christ. If the perfect God was united with a perfect man, there must have been two. Wherefore, the human race could not be saved by the assumption of the vork and of the whole man, but solely by the assumption of the aap^ (ovk apa ado^erai ro avOpdmivov yevos 6V awzXif<Jrea>? vov Kal oXov avOpumov, dXXa Bia irpo&Xrfi^,ew; aapicos. Kal yap el avOpdnrc o reXeia> avvi)<pOrj Qeb<; reXeios, &vo av Tjaav. Compare c. 34, 35). Gregory of Nyssa replied, indeed (c. 39), How can the imperfect, the aapt;, combine with its antithesis (the Logos) to form an unity? For the perfect in union with the imperfect rather forms a Dyad, a Dualism. Why does the divine vov? shut out the human? But Apollinaris had already given a reply (c. 40). Because the human is a vow rpeirr6s, mutable in virtue of its freedom of choice; whereas the divine is immutable. But the work of redemption demanded for its accomplishment an immutable spirit, which would not succumb to the flesh, by reason of the weakness of its knowledge; but which would be able harmoniously to accommodate and annex the flesh to itself without violence. He cannot save the world who is himself subject to the universal corruption of men; no one can break the curse of sin who is not essentially a sinless man (c. 51). Now, men generally, and angels, are free to choose; and for beings endowed with freedom of choice to be no longer free to choose, is destruction. The Redeemer, therefore, could not share freedom of choice, accessible as it is to evil; nay more, this freedom of choice must not be supposed to have existed, and to have then been annihilated by the Logos, for no nature is destroyed by Him who created it. This man was rather destitute of freedom of choice from the very beginning. And, notwithstanding this lack, He was man. Man consists of three elements,—flesh, soul, and spirit (vow, c. 8, p. 141; c. 46, p. 248); in proof of which, he appeals to 1 Thess. v. 23. But Christ also consisted of three elements,—irvevfia, yfruyrj, and a&fia (Note 67). He did not, of course, derive His 'nvevfia from men; nor was it fitting that He should do so; for then He would not have been the second Adam from heaven, but like the earthly Adam. If the man from heaven had been in all things like us who arc earthly, even to the possession of the same irvtvfia as we the yaiicol, He would not have been the heavenly man, but rather the mere lodging-place, the receptacle (Boyefov) of the heavenly God. Of the Church teachers, some supposed the souls of men to be a direct creation, and not to be derived from the race (compare Hilarius, de Trin. 10, 20). Were this to be accepted as true, connection of blood with the race must be concluded to be unnecessary to the truth of the humanity of the soul; all that is necessary is, that it should proceed from God. Taking his stand on this principle, Apollinaris might have argued,—Christ cannot be fairly said to belong to a different genus from other men, because the Logos became His vow; for all souls proceed directly forth from God, and are not derived from the race. He does not appear, however, to have adopted this course (compare Hilar. ed. Maurin. p. 1047, Not. e). According to Nemesius, he held that souls are generated by souls, as bodies are generated by bodies. But this idea also presented to him a new outlet, nay more, a new argument for his theory. That which arises in the way of propagation, is not in the full sense irvevfia, but merely soul; Adam became a living soul, but he lacked irvevfia, which was first brought to him by Christ, the Man from heaven. What Adam did not possess, he was naturally unable to propagate. Now, although the creation of man did not attain completion till the divine irvevfia assumed the highest place, the hegemony in him,—for the first time in Christ, through the incarnation, when the Logos became the vovs or wevfia of the individual man Jesus; afterwards in believers, who become by grace what He was by birth;—Jesus, possessed as He was of body and soul, was a man, even apart from the irveufjM.; for no one hesitates to call Adam a man, notwithstanding he was not yet endowed with spirit, but was merely a living soul i^vyrj tyaa, c. 12). Apollinaris appears to have thought that, with the incarnation and regeneration, a new third element was superadded, without which man is not quite complete; for, to the full idea of man belong three elements, although it is right to term him man even before the addition of the third element. According to this theory, therefore, those who lived prior to Christ, or who now live out of Him, are not yet actual persons, but mere generic beings, individuals who stand in the relation of accidents to the genus that produces them. First, when a higher element than that which the kind can bestow unites itself with them, and constitutes itself the central-point of their essence, do they become persons; and then every other part of their being stands in the relation to the higher element (the eaa avOpcoiros) of the subject to the ruler. The inner* man becomes the kernel of the essence; the outward man, on the contrary, is something almost accidental, merely determined by the inner man. In Christ, the Logos assumed the place of the inner man.1 Whereas in Adam there was at the very utmost a vov<;, which was the servant of the aap^, and was compelled to make the flesh its content, but never passed out of its potential and impotent existence to actuality and dominion; in Christ, on the contrary, because the Logos was His vovs, there came an all-prevailing holy principle. No evil thought could arise in the inner being of Christ; however seductive the flesh might be, it found a ruler instead of a response, in the vov<; of Christ. But if Christ never had even an evil thought, and if His spirit never carried an evil thought into execution by means of the body, sin found no place in Him, however strongly the flesh, with its i^vyi?, may have been opposed to the vovs. For only that can be called evil in which the vow takes part (Athan. c. Ap. 1, 2).2

From what has been advanced, we may see that Apollinaris might without hesitation have designated Christ a composite person (avvOerov), after the example of the Church ;8 save that he most decidedly protested against representing the factors as anything else but elements of the one, indivisible person: a composition of the person out of two persons, to which the opinion of many of the teachers of the Church seemed to lead, he felt compelled entirely to repudiate. To his mind also, the duality of the (pvaeis,—if the <f>vaeis are to be conceived as complete,— was equivalent to a duality of irpoaayira. For if Christ's human nature had a vow and an avre^ovaiov like other men from Adam, according to Apollinaris, it was an independent irpo aomov.

1 At,li. C. A poll. 1, 2: 'Avtj Tos iaudt» it iifilr Anipuirov »ovs tirovpi»ios i» Xpurrji' us yup ipyxmxiji xiyptmci axifixr i rip irtpii^flvri' oil yoip oiivri %» -xiKii<yj dvipxiro» Xvrov yi»taim. Alio Ti' h yivtodxi oil bimxrxi.

2 Compare Gregor. 1. c. p. 273, c. 55; Athan. c. Ap. 1, 2.

3 But still he only believed in fiiu Qiais vi»ttras. Compare A. Mai 7,

For this reason, he deemed it necessary to refuse conceding even a duality of <pvael<;. We see, therefore, that the favourite phrase of the later Synousiasts, fua (pvaa Qeov X6yov aeaapKcofievrj, belonged to him also as to its sense. On the other 'hand, the preceding exposition shows that it could occasion him no difficulty to represent the humanity of Christ (acofia and yfn^rj without vow) as something appropriated from Mary, to designate it errUrrjrov.1 To teach a conversion of the deity into humanity and its rpeirrov, could by no means be his intention ; for the very obvious reason, that in order to avoid the rpenrbv, and to secure unalterable virtue and wisdom ($>vauirj) for this man, he represented the Logos as his vow. By doing so, he would unnecessarily have posited the very thing which he had made every effort to avoid. Without giving up His being and undergoing conversion, God cannot become man, says he, save in the sense of His taking the place of the vov<; in the man (Jesus).2

The features hitherto mentioned, give us, however, but a superficial view of the theory of Apollinaris. Were that all, the charge of teaching a Christ who does not at all belong to our genus or class of beings, repeatedly brought against him by Gregory of Nyssa, would be, without any restriction, well founded. For in the case of men, the new divine principle connects itself with a vovs which is human, although it may be merely an impotent or subject potence until the irvevfia comes, which proceeds from Christ: in the case of Christ, on the contrary, no trace whatever of vovs would appear to have been derived from the humanity. On this supposition, the charge of positing as one, things which are two and cannot be one, brought by Apollinaris against the doctrine of the Church, would recoil upon himself; for the humanity which he attributes to Christ is something external to the personal centre therein, like a garment, or like the house in which any one dwells.

1 Compare Gregor. 1. c. p. 230; p. 222, c. 29; p. 207, c. 34; p. 240, c. 44.

2 IlSf, Qrrni, ®eos clvipuiros yfatrui, fivj firruiihnttis diri Tow thxt Qtis, tl fiil »ovs i» Attfitxf xxrirrn, 1. c. c. 56, p. 277. Both Theodoret (see above, page 355, note) and Epiphanius discharge him of intending to teach such a conversion, as also of the doctrine of a heavenly <nxa J. Athanasius also (c. Apol. 1, 2) speaks of the different theories which had been worked out relatively to this point.

In point of fact, although he saw that to represent the human as the mere oV^ewv of the Logos did not exhaust the idea of the incarnation; notwithstanding, further, that he frequently condemns the avOpairo<; evOeos as a meagre representation, the propositions adduced above do not give us anything more than the notion of a God present in a human shell, unquestionably impersonal; which is very far from an incarnation, and is rather a mere theophany. We must, however, at the same time, not forget to mention that the Church teachers of his day had not really advanced any further.1 They were even undecided whether the man Jesus, so far as a human soul is to be attributed to Him, ought not to be conceived as personal by Himself; in which case, seeing that the Logos could only influence Jesus from without, either Christ must have been a double person (whose unity falls more into the subject and its presuppositions than into the object),2 or God was not present in Him in any specific sense; and consistently they ought to have gone back from the idea of a theophany as far as Ebionism (compare A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 20 a).

But what makes the theory of Apollinaris specially interesting, is the mode in which he overcomes this difficulty, in which he represents the composite person as an indivisible unity, and in which he aims at assigning to the Logos, as the substitute for the human vovs, not an external and foreign position, but one which constitutes Him the truth of the humanity, and gives His incarnation its reality.

"The humanity of Christ," says he, " is that which is moved, the deity is the mover; the former, which was not a perfect living being by itself, in order that it might be a complete being, was compounded to an unity, was conjoined with its hegemonical principle. It was united with, and made part of, the hegemonical principle from heaven, as to lis passivity; and it in turn received the divine, which was constituted its own, as to its

1 The less can we be surprised to find Apollinaris sometimes using also the simile—Humanity was tie temple of the Logos. A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 203. John does not say that the Logos became <n*o£ and ipvxti, xiitxroo yxp ivo votpx, xxl iihnrlxd it rip xpcx Kxtoikiin, hx pt.rj To tripw xxrx Tow irtpov dtnicnpxreiifirxi iix rijf olxtixf iO^notxf xxl ieepytlxs. The Logos, therefore, assumed, not a human soul, but merely Abraham's seed, To» yxp roy aufixras 'Irpov vxo» irpohiypxi^m 6 dij/vxos, xxl Atovf, xxl Hihfa Tov "2o"Kofiuvros vxo$.

2 Deren Einheit schon mehr in das Subject und seine Voraussetzungen, als in das Object fallt.

position, with which the incarnation is as good as incompatible, are chargeable with entertaining ante-Christian views, either of an heathanish or of a Jewish kind. But such a position is taken up by those who teach two self-moving (<xi/rota'i/7rra) beings, a twofold vow, a twofold will; for these can never be made one. (Note 68.) The human aspect of Christ must rather be so conceived, that it shall of itself point to the divine as its complement, and not be represented as a perfect thing, standing side by side with another perfect thing. Consequently, the only satisfactory course is to represent the divine as the active element, the human as that which is moved by the hegemonic divine principle, not as moving itself. In this way, he considered, we can understand that the two together first constituted the one person. For that which is moved presupposes, and of itself suggests, that which moves; and, on the other hand, the divine that moves would continue shut up in itself, a lifeless principle, if it did not display its motive power on something that is moved; indeed, without an object moved, the Logos would have no organ by which to manifest Himself.1 Mover and moved are correlative ideas: a mover is inconceivable without a moved; and vice versa, a moved is inconceivable without a mover; and so, deity and humanity, as belonging in this respect inwardly to each other, combined to constitute one actual, indivisible divine-human life.

Apollinaris, however, endeavoured to gain a still more complete conception of this personal unity. It is true, he represented the humanity of Christ, considered by itself and apart from the Unio, as an imperfect being; but the deity which took the place of the soul and of the human vows, was not something alien to the human essence; but the human essence, which tends, as it were, towards the perfection of itself in the form of a person, acquired it for its own: and, in like manner, the Logos made the human His own, constituted it a determination of Himself. As it is an imperfect description to say,—I have, or am the vehicle and bearer of a body or a soul, seeing that the connection of the two with my essence is not accurately expressed till having is supplanted by being; Apollinaris felt that merely to speak of God bearing a man in Himself, or of God having a man as His organ or husk, was not to do justice to the idea of the incarnation.

1 He designates humanity an organ, A. Mai 1. c. 302, and p. 20 b. :

'Opyuno» xxl To xoitovr (1. xiijov») y.ix» mfvxet Knftiij Tij» hipyiixn u oi fitu 7\ iAfytix, fiix Kui .i oialef fJ,lu Apu ylyoviv twin rov '/.iyov xxl rns

oxpxis. (From his work against Diodorus.)

Accordingly, his aim was to show that each of the two, humanity and deity, stood in the position of a determination of the being of the other, both belonging together. In these genuinely speculative efforts, he was guided by the most important practical and religious interests. "If there was in Christ one being and another being, unity and sameness of worship must be condemned; for the Creator and the creature, God and man, may not be worshipped after the like fashion. But the worship paid to Christ is one, and therefore God and man are included under one and the same name. Consequently, we must not say that in Christ there were two essences, God and man; but one undivided being, constituted by God's conjunction of Himself with an human body.1 And as it would involve the division and destruction of the object of Christianity, the Person of Christ, to maintain that He ought to be worshipped as to one aspect of His being, and not as to the other (which we certainly must maintain, if the humanity were not in some way or other a momentum of the deity); so also would it involve the breaking up of the unity of His own consciousness (A. Mai 7, 301). 'ABvvarov, rbv avrbv Kal rrpoaKwryrbv eavrbv elBivai Kal Fu). 'ABvvarov apa rbv avrbv elvai Qeov re teal avOparrov ef 6\oKXrjpov, aXfC iv fiovornn avyicpdrov <pvo~e(os Oeikfis aeo~apiccoiJLevn<;. Further, the idea of the incarnation is weakened, and we fall back into long-repudiated heresies, if we teach merely an activity (evepyeia) of the Logos in a complete man, instead of teaching that an human element formed part of the Logos Himself.2

1 A. Mar. 1. C. 16:—*ATiA»f *«i uM.n; ovatu.s ."/«» ihxi xxi rp uvri» tpt>axv»YKriu uilfiirov, rovriartv iroitrrov xxl 'a,orjifiuros, &eov xxl xtipuirw. Mix oe i) lrpooxiutnais rtiv Xpiarci xxl xxru Tovto i» To hi ovofixri votirxi Qtis xxl xvvpuiros. Ovx dpu x?iX*i xul x>.?.,/7 owriu 0eof xxl Avfipxxos' «AAc2 fitx xxrx av»itait ®iov irpis uufiu xvtpu—ita,/. Compare ibid. the fragment from the letter to Jovian.

2 A. Mai 1. c. p. 20 :—Tol auQus i\*ihtyfilvx xxl ir,uyxoafitus ixxtxnpvyfiivx uVn iruhin dtx»eovaixi ritis inxixiipiixxti, xxl Tov e£ ovpxyov itirtpo» dtipuirat irupxb'eo'oftivou v~o T«» u-mar&bMv ex yiis Avipuvov thxi oiot Tok irpinpa» fi>.CtaQrifiovai, To i»ipuirivo» rov "h6y<>v tls itipytiu.n rij» iu d»ipuiru y.trufixKhoin<if. (From the work of Apollinaris entitled, irtpl Txh htus aup xuaius, c. 12.)

Finally—and this he deemed of chief importance—a perfect union of the divine and human appeared to him indispensably necessary to the accomplishment of the redemptive work of Christ.1 Against the doctrine of the Church he brought the charge of having merely human sufferings in the sufferings of Christ; remarking, that the death of a man could not be the death of death (Greg. Antirrhet. c. 51, pp. 263 ff.). Gregory saw clearly enough the importance of the objection, and sought to show that the Logos was truly humbled and truly took part in sufferings; but all he really succeeded in doing, was to represent Christ as reckoning to Himself the sufferings which, strictly speaking, belonged solely to His humanity, on the ground of the humanity belonging to His person. Apollinaris, on the contrary, maintained that the unity of the Person of Christ was not secured, unless we can say,—Our God was crucified, and man is exalted to the right hand of God: the Son of Man was from heaven, and the Son of God was born of a woman (Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. c. 6; A. Mai 7, p. 73 :—'IovSaioi To acofia aravpcoOevres (leg. o~ravpfixTcunes) ©ebv iaravpcoaav). And the work of uniting God and man is first accomplished when God puts Himself completely in the place of humanity, and man is exalted to God. But how does he bring the two together? We have already remarked, that whilst representing the humanity of Christ as imperfect apart from the incarnation, he refuses to allow that, on this ground, the humanity contained in the Person of Christ was imperfect; for the Logos, so far from being foreign to, constitutes rather the proper perfection of, the humanity. This he expresses as follows,—The rrvevpu in Christ was human irvevfia, although divine (c. 27). Nay more, he says also, the divine irveDfia or the Logos, which in Christ was human irvevfia, was eternal, and existed before the incarnation. The Logos must therefore have existed as man also, prior to the incarnation, and His deity was in itself man from the very beginning.

1 Greg. Nyss. Antirrhet. p. 131 ff., c. 5. His entire aim in the Aoyoypcfptx on the incarnation is to show,—To ivrrrip Tos fio»oyivovs vlov «)» h&rrrrx, Km oi^' r$ Aviptnrlttp To iniios hi%xatui, i&KXcl rrj» d—ui>r, xa\ x.vuKXoiWav Qiam fpos irxiovs fitrovalun ctKhomtii»tu.—C. 27: The doctrine of the Church allows Him who was crucified nothing divine in His own nature, not even the beat, that is, imtvfiu. C. 26, p. 185; c. 54, p. 271.

Gregory took the words to mean, that Apollinaris held the flesh of Christ to be eternal; and inasmuch as he, notwithstanding, represented Mary as the mother of Christ, therefore, concludes Gregory, he must have conceived Mary also to be eternal. He posits coarse composite matter as eternal. But Apollinaris never taught this; nowhere did he assume an heavenly humanity in this sense. But he viewed the irvevfia or the Logos in Christ as the eternal humanity j1 probably on the ground of His being the archetype of universal humanity. To him the Logos was both God and archetypal man; and that in the sense of His having been eternally destined to become man, in an historical form. The Logos thus revealed that which had been latent in His nature from the very beginning.2 It is possible that, in his mind, he connected therewith the Platonic doctrine of a icoafios vorjros, in which the archetypes (etS\j) of all things are ideally or potentially contained, though as yet by no means possessed of phaenomenal, external actuality; hence also the incarnation of the Logos. Of this tendency are undoubtedly the words attributed to him by Gregory, ovpdvtov Tl aapKos etSo? avaifko.rrei irepl To Oelov (c. 42, p. 234, compare c. 6); which, however, cannot by any means have been already the principle of the material element of the humanity of Christ, but merely the form or plastic power. At all events, regarding the Logos as he did, not as something foreign to, but as the truth of, the humanity itself, he was able to say,—The primal grounds of the incarnation lay, not in the Virgin,8 but in the eternal Logos Himself, who, by His essential nature, is the eternal archetype of humanity, and bears within Himself the potence of a real incarnation.

1 P. 149, c. 13 :—Upovircipxti, Qwh, 6 Avfyxiros Xpttrro;, oix us Mpov ovros irxp uvrov rov irvtvfixros, Towv tart Tow 0*ov, Xaa us rov Kvptov ev Tn rov iix»ipuirov Qiati iiiov iwevfotros avros- He existed as a man irpo rajf (Dxvtpuaius, to wit, xjnif rov viov itirnrx i£ eLpyihs avipuiro» thxi, that is, in Himself, in essence, but not in appearance.

2 C. 14 :—"Oirep tjv rvi (fvati, Tovth iQxvipuir i vv». C. 15, p. 164: To ha.viu»ov Qiiov xxru Qvuiv ot, rovro -a rris hxvipuirnotus iQxvtpuin xx,ipi. Compare below, page 372, and notes.

3 'H ttlu ai.pxxais ov riv Apxil» xxo rijf irxpiitov eaxw, C. 15, p. 153. But he cannot have added,—the humanity of Christ, which existed from the beginning, before Abraham and the creation roixvrn ^xrrus i», o?« rols fixirrrxis iupuro orttftk. However strongly Apollinaris may have expressed the identity of the eternal ethos of Christ, in the central-point of the xoo/tof »oiiro'f, he cannot have transferred the earthly corporeality of Christ to heaven; for otherwise the xoo-fios Voiitov would have been x,iainros and not tonrof. That he did not hold the humanity out of Mary to be eternal, we shall show hereafter (see page 373 ff.).