Chapter I--Preliminary

PART V.

ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

I. Man A Creation Of God And A Child Of God.

The fact of man's creation is declared in Gen. 1 : 27—" Aud God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him "; 2 : 7—" And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." A consideration of these passages, in the light of modern science, as well as of other Scriptures, enables us to draw the following conclusions:

(a) The Scriptures, on the one hand, negative the idea that man is the mere product of unreasoning natural foroes. They refer his existence to a cause outside of nature, namely, to the creative act of God.

(b) But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not disclose the method of man's creation. Whether man's physical system is or is not derived, by natural descent, from the lower animals, the record of creation does not inform us. As the command "Let the earth bring forth the living creature" (Gen. 1 :24) does not exclude the idea of mediate creation, through natural generation, so the forming of man "of the dust of the ground" (Gen. 2 : 7) does not in itself determine whether the creation of man's body was mediate or immediate.

(c) Psychology, however, comes in to help our interpretation of Scripture. The radical differences between man's soul and the principle of intelligence in the lower animals, especially man's possession of self-consciousness, general ideas, the moral sense, and the power of self-determination, show that that which chiefly constitutes him man could not have been derived, by any natural process of development, from the inferior creatures. We are compelled, then, to believe that God's "breathing into man's nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2 : 7) was an act of immediate creation, like the first introduction of life upon the planet.

Fichte called that the birthday of his child, when the child awoke to self-consciousness and said " I." No brute ever yet said, or thought, "I." With this, then, we may begin a series of simple distinctions between man and the brute, so far as the immaterial prlnciple in each is concerned. These are mainly compiled from writers hereafter mentioned.

1. The brute is conscious, but man Is self-conscious. The brute does not objectify self. "If the plgr could once say,'I am a pig,' it would thereby cease to be a pig."

2. The brute has only percepts; man has also concepts. The brute knows white things, but not whiteness. Man alone has the power of abstraction and of thought.

3. Hence the brute has no language. "Language Is the expression of general notions by symbols" (Harris). Words are the symbols of concepts. Where there are no concepts there can be no words. The parrot utters cries; but " no parrot ever yet spoke a true word." Since language Is a sign, it presupposes the existence of an intellect capable of understanding the sign—in short, language is the effect of mind, not the cause of mind. See Mivart, in Brit. Quar., Oct., 1881 : 154-172.

4. The brute forms no Judgments—e. g. that thi* is like that, accompanied with belief. Hence there is no sense of tbe ridiculous, and no laughter.

5. The brute has no reasoning—no sense that thin follows from that, accompanied by a feeling that the sequence is necessary. Association of ideas is the typical process of the brute mind, though not that of the mind of man. See Mind, 5:403-409; 575-581.

6. The brute has no general ideas or intuitions, as of space, time, substance, cause, right. Hence there is no generalizing, and no proper experience or progress. No hunter's dog ever learned to put wood on a fire, to keep Itself from freezing.

7. The brute has no conscience and no religious nature. No dog ever brought back to the butcher the meat it had stolen. "The aspen trembles without fear, and dogs skulk without guilt."

8. The brute has determination, but not self-determination. There is no conscious forming of a purpose, and no self-movement towards a predetermined end. The donkey Is determined, but not self-determined. Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 537-554—" Man, though implicated in nature through bis bodily organization, is in his personality supernatural; the brute is wholly submerged in nature .... Man is like a ship in the sea—in it, yet above it^guldlng his course, by observing tbe heavens, even against wind and current. A brute has no such power; it is In nature like a balloon, wholly immersed in air, and driven about by its currents, with no power of steering."

By what Mivart calls a process of "Inverse anthropomorphism," we clothe the brute with the attributes of freedom; but it does not really possess them. The brute lives only in the present—lives a sort of dream-life, in which the will acts only as it is acted upon. It has no power to choose between motives; it simply obeys motive. The necessitarian philosophy, therefore, is a correct and excellent philosophy for the brute. But man's power of initiative—in short, man's free will—renders it impossible to explain his higher nature as a mere natural development from the inferior creatures. Even Huxley has said that, taking mind into the account, there is between man and the highest beasts an "enormous gulf," a "divergence immeasurable" and "practically infinite."

Gen. 2: 7—" the Lord God formed man of the dost of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul —appears, says Hovey (State of the Impen. Dead, 14 to distinguish the vital informing principle of human nature from ita material part, pronouncing the former to be more directly from God, and more akin to him, than the latter." So in Zech. 12 :1—"Jehovah, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him "—the soul is recognized as distinct in nature from the body, and of a dignity and value far beyond those of any material organism.

A fuller statement of most of the differences between man and the brute may be found in Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 8 :23; Chadbourue, Instinct, 187-211; Porter, Hum. Intellect, 384, 386, 397; Bascom, Science of Mind, 295-305; Manscl, Metaphysics, 49, 50; Princeton Rev., Jan., 1881:104-128; Henslow, in Nature, May 1,1879 : 21,22; Ferrier, Remains, 2:39; Argyll, Unity of Nature, 117-119; Bib. Sac, 29:275-282; Max MUUer, Lectures on Philos. of Language, no's. 1, 2, 8; F. W. Robertson, Lectures on Genesis, 21; LeConte, In Princeton Rev., May, 1884: 236-261. Per contra, see Lindsay, Mind in Lower Animals; Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals; Fiske, The Destiny of Man,

(d) Comparative physiology, moreover, has, up to the present time, done nothing to forbid the extension of this doctrine to man's body. No single instance has yet been adduced of the transformation of one animal species into another, either by natural or by artificial selection; much less has it been demonstrated that the body of the brute has ever been developed into that of man. Until this shall be done, the view that man's physical system is descended by natural generation from some ancestral simian form oan be regarded only as an unproved hypothesis. Since the soul, then, is an immediate creation of God, and the forming of man's body is mentioned by the Scripture writer in direct connection with this creation of the spirit, we prefer to believe that man's body was an immediate creation also.

For the theory of natural selection, see Darwin, Origin of Species, 398-124, Descent of Man, 2 : 368-387. Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, 241-269, Man's Place in Nature, 71-138, Lay Sermons, 323, and art.: Biology. In Encycl. Britannica, 9th cd.; Romanes, Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution.

The theory holds that, in the struggle for existence, the varieties best adapted to their surroundings succeed in maintaining and reproducing themselves, while the rest die out. Thus, by gradual change and improvement of lower into higher forms of life, man has been evolved. We grant that Darwin has disclosed one of the important features of God's method. We deny that natural selection furnishes a sufficient explanation of the history of life, and that for the following reasons:

1. It gives no account of the origin of substance, nor of the origin of variations. Darwinism simply says that "round stones will roll down hill further than flat ones" (Gray, Natural Science and Religion). It accounts for the selection, not for the creation, of forms. "Natural selection originates nothing. It is a destructive, not a creative, principle. If we must idealize it as a positive force, we must think of it, not as the preserver of the fittest, but as the destroyer, that follows ever in the wake of creation and devours the failures; the scavenger of creation, that takes out of the way forms which are not fit to live and reproduce themselves" (Johnson, on Theistic Evolution, in Andover Review, April, 1884 : 363-381).

2. Some of the most important forms appear suddenly in the geological record, without connecting links to unite them with the past. The first fishes are the Ganoid, large in size and advanced in type. There are no intermediate gradations between the ape and man. Huxley, in Man's Place in Nature, 94, tells us that the lowest gorilla has a skull-capacity of 24 cubic inches, whereas the highest gorilla has 34^. Over against this, the lowest man has a skull-capacity of 62; though men with less than 65 are Invariably idiotic (Wallace); the highest man has 114. Huxley argues that the difference between man and the gorilla is smaller than that between the gorilla and some apes. If the gorilla and the apes constitute one family and have a common origin, may not man and the gorilla have a common ancestry also? We reply that the space between the lowest ape and the highest gorilla is filled in with numberless Intermediate gradations. The space between the lowest man and the highest man is also filled in with many types which shade off one into the other. But the space between the highest gorilla and the lowest man is absolutely vacant; there arc no intermediate types; no connecting links between the ape and man have yet been found. In an address to the students of Edinburgh University, on Darwinism, Professor Virchow recently expressed his belief that no relics of any predecessor of man had yet been discovered. He said: "In my judgment, no skull hitherto discovered can be regarded as that of a predecessor of man. In the course of the last fifteen years we have had opportunities of examining skulls of all the various races of mankind—even of the most savage tribes; and among them all no group has been observed differing in its essential characters from the general human type." In addition to this testimony, It deserves to be noticed that man does not degenerate, as we travel back in time. The Enghls skull, the contemporary of the mammoth and the cave-bear, is as large as the average of to-day, and might have belonged to a philosopher." The monkey nearest to man in physical form is no more Intelligent than the elephant or the bee. Sir John Lubbock, indeed, considers that though anthropoid apes rank next to man in bodily structure, ants hold that plane in the scale of intelligence.

3. There are certain facts which mere heredity cannot explain, such for example as the origin of the working-bee from the queen and the drone, neither of which produces honey. The working-bee, moreover, does not transmit the honey-making instinct to its posterity; for it is sterile and childless. If man had descended from the conscienceless brute, we should expect him, when degraded, to revert to his primitive type. On the contrary, he does not revert to the brute, but dies out instead.

4. The theory can give no explanation of beauty in the lowest forms of life, such as molluscs and diatoms. Darwin grants that this beauty must be of use to its possessor. in order to be consistent with Its origination through natural selection. But no such use has yet been shown; for the creatures which possess the beauty often live in the dark, or have no eyes to see. 80, too, the large brain of the savage Is beyond his needs, and is inconsistent with the principle of natural selection which teaches that no organ can permanently attain a size unrequired by its needs and Its environments. See Wallace, Natural Selection, 338-300.

5. No species is yet known to have been produced either by artificial or by natural selection. Huxley, Lay Sermons, 323—'* It is not absolutely proven that a group of animals having all the characters exhibited by species in naturo has ever been originated by selection, whether artificial or natural"; Man's Place in Nature, 107—" Our acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis must be provisional, so long as one link in the chain of evidence is wanting; and so long as all the animals and plants certainly produced by selective breeding from a common stock are fertile with one another, that link will be wanting." Huxley has more recently declared that the missing proof has been found in the descent of the modern horse with one toe, from Hipparion with two toes, Anchitherlum with three, and Orohippus with four. Even if this were demonstrated, we should still maintain that the only proper analogue was to be found In that artificial selection by which man produces new varieties, and that natural selection can bring about no useful results and show no progress, unless It be the method and revelation of a wise and designing mind. In other words, selection implies Intelligence and will, and therefore cannot be exclusively natural.

While we grant, then, the partial truth of Darwinism, and find it supported by the facts of embryonic development, of rudimentary organs, of structure and constitution, of reversion to former types, we refuse to regard it as a complete explanation of the progress of life. As Darwin himself has acknowledged: "The cause of each slight variation and of each monstrosity lies much more In the nature or constitution of the organism than in the nature of the surrounding conditions "—(quoted by Mivart, Lessons from Nature, 280-301). We must supplement natural selection, therefore, with the doctrine of an originating and superintending God.

Mivart, Man and Apes, 1B2—" If it is inconceivable and impossible for man's body to be developed or to exist without his informing soul, we conclude that as no natural process accounts for the different kind of soul—one capable of articulately expressing general conceptions,—so no merely natural process can account for the origin of the body informed by it—a body to which such an intellectual faculty was so essentially and intimately related." Thus Mivart, who once considered that evolution could account for man's body, now holds with Wallace that It can accouut neither for man's body nor for his soul, and calls natural selection "a puerile hypothesis" (Lessons from Nature, 300).

Wallace, Natural Selection, 338—" The average cranial capacity of the lowest savage is probably not less than five-sixths of that of the highest civilized races, while the brain of the anthropoid apes scarcely amounts to one-third of that of man, in both cases taking the average; or the proportions may be represented by the following figures: Anthropoid apes, 10; savages, 26; civilized man, 32." Ibid, 380—"The Inference 1 would draw from this class of phenomena is, that a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides

the development of many animal and vegetable forms The controlling action of a

higher Intelligence Is a necessary part of the laws of nature, just as the action of all surrounding organisms is one of the agencies in organic development—else the laws which govern the material universe are insufficient for the production of man." Sir Wm. Thompson: "That man could be evolved out of inferior animals is the wildest dream of materialism, a pure assumption which offends me alike by its folly and by its arrogance." Hartmann, in his Anthropoid Apes, 302-306, while not despairing of "the possibility of discovering the true link between the world of man and mammals," declares that " that purely hypothetical being, the common ancestor of man and apes, is still to be found," and that "man cannot have descended from any of the fossil species which have hitherto come to our notice, nor yet from any of the species of apes now extant."

Darwinism is a reversion to the savage view of animals as brethren, and to the heathen idea of spbynx-man growing out of the brute. However the principle of development may apply to the rise of one species from another in the ordinary course of geological history, we must regard this evolution, so far as it exists, as only the method of the divine Intelligence, and must moreover consider it as preceded by an original creative act Introducing vegetable and animal life, and as supplemented by other creative acts at the introduction of man and at the incarnation of Christ. See Mivart, Genesis of Species, 202-222, 259-307, Man and Apes, 88, 149-192, Lessons from Nature, 128-242, 280-301, The Cat, and Encyclop. Brltannlca, art.: Apes; Quatrefages, Natural History of Man, 64-87; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884 :181-189; Dawson, Story of the Earth and Man, 321-329; Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 38-75; Asa Gray, Natural Scienoe and Religion; Schinid, Theories of Darwin, 115-140; Carpenter. Mental Physiology, 59; Mcllvaine, Wisdom of Holy Scripture, 55-88; Bible Commentary, 1: 43; Martensen, Dogmatics, 136; LeConte. In Princeton Rev., Nov., 1878 : 776-803.

(/) The truth that man is the offspring of God, implies the correlative truth of a common divine Fatherhood. Qod is Father of all men, in that he originates and sustains them as personal beings like in nature to himself. Even toward sinners God holds this natural relation of Father. It is his fatherly love, indeed, which provides the atonement. Thus the demands of holiness are met and the prodigal is restored to the privileges of sonship which have been forfeited by transgression. This natural Fatherhood, therefore, does not exclude, but prepares the way for, God's special Fatherhood toward those who have been regenerated by his Spirit and who have believed on his Son.

Texts referring to God's natural and common Fatherhood are: Mai. 2 :10—"Have we not all cue father [Abraham]: hath not one God created us?" Luke 3 : 38—" Adam, the son of God "; 15 :11-32—the parable of the prodigal son, in which the father is father even before the prodigal returns; John 3 :15—" God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son "; Eeb. 12 : 9—" the Father of

spirits."

Texts referring to the special Fatherhood of grace are: John 1:12,13—" as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, bat of God ;Rom. 8:14—" for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the Sons of God "; 15— " ye received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father "; 2 Cor. 6 :17 —" Gome ye out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch no unclean thing, and I will receive you, and will be to you a Father, and ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord almighty "; Eph. 1 : 5, 6— "having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ onto himself"; 3 :14—"the Father, from whom every family [marg. 'fatherhood' ] in heaven and on earth is named" (— every race among angels or men —so Meyer, Romans, 158, 159); Gal. 3 : 28—"for ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus "; 4:6 —" lnd because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father "; 1 John 3 :1, 2 —" Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the children of God: and Buch we are .... Beloved, now are we children of God."

On the common Fatherhood of God, see Crawford, Fatherhood of God, 9-26,188-159. For denial that God Is Father to any but the regenerate, see Candlish, Fatherhood of God; Wright. Fatherhood of God.

II. Unity Of The Human Race.

(a) The Scriptures teach that the whole human race is descended from a single pair.

Gen. 1: 27, 28—" And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male aid female created he them. And God blessed them: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it"; 2 : 7—" And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul"; 22—" And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man "; 3 : 20—" And the man called his wife's name Eve; because she was the mother of all living "; 9 :19—" These three were the sons of Noah: and of these wss the whole earth overspread."

(o) This truth lies at the foundation of Paul's doctrine of the organic unity of mankind in the flrst transgression, and of the provision of salvation for the race in Christ.

Rom. 5 :12—" Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned "; 19—" for as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous"; 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22—" For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive "; Heb. 2 :16—"For verily not of angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham."

(<") This descent of humanity from a single pair also constitutes the ground of man's obligation of natural brotherhood to every member of the race.

lets 17 : 26—" He made of one every nation of men for to dwell on ail the face of the earth "—here the Hev. Vers, omits the word "Wood" (" made of one blood —Auth. Vers.). ^Tho word to be supplied Is possibly "father," but more probably "body "; cf. Heb. 2 :11—"for both he that sanctileth and the? that are sanctified are all of one [father, or body]: for which cause he ia not ashamed to call them brethren, saying, I will declare thy name unto my brethren, in the midst of the congregation will I sing thy praise."

Wlnchell, in his Preadamltes, has recently revived the theory broached in 1655 by Peyrerius, that there were men before Adam: "Adam is descended from a black racenot the black races from Adam." Adam is simply "the remotest ancestor to whom the

Jews could trace their lineage The derivation of Adam from an older human stock

is essentially the creation of Adam." Wlnchell does not deny the unity of the race, nor the retroactive effect of the atonement upon those who lived before Adam; he simply denies that Adam was the first man. 297: He "regards the Adamic stock as derived from an older and humbler human type," originally as low in the scale as the present Australian savages.

Although this theory furnishes a plausible explanation of certain Biblical facts, such as the marriage of Cain (Gen. 4 :17), Cain's fear that men would slay him (Gen. 4 : 14), and the distinction between "the sons of God " and "daughter? of men" (Gen. 6 :1, 2), It treats the Mosaic narrative as legendary rather than historical. Shem, Ham, and Japheth, it is Intimated, may have lived hundreds of years apart from one another (409). Upon this view. Eve could not be " the mother of all liring" (Gen, 3 : 20), nor could the transgression of Adam be the cause and beginning of condemnation to the whole race (Rom. 5 :12,19). As to Cain's fear of other families who might take vengeance upon him, we must remember that we do not know how many children were born to Adam between Cain and Abe), nor what the age of Cain and Abel was, nor whether Cain feared only those that were then living. As to Cain's marriage, we must remember that even if Cain married into another family, his wife, upon any hypothesis of the unity of the race, must have been descended from some other original Cain that married his sister.

See Keil and Delitzsch, Com. on Pentateuch, 1: lift—"The marriage of brothers and sisters was inevitable in the case of children of the first man, in case the human race was actually to descend from a single pair, and may therefore be Justified, in the face of the Mosaic prohibition of such marriages, on the ground that the sons and daughters of Adam represented not merely the family but the genus, and that it was not till after the rise of several families that the bonds of fraternal and conjugal love became distinct from one another and assumed fixed and mutually exclusive forms, the violation of which is sin." See also Ebrurd, Dogmatik, 1:275. For criticism of the doctrine that there were men before Adam, see Methodist Quar. Rev., April, 1881:205-231; Presb. Rev., 1881 : 440-444.

The Scripture statements are coroborated by considerations drawn from history and science. Three arguments may be briefly mentioned:

1. The argument from history.

So far as the history of nations and tribes in both hemispheres can be traced, the evidence points to a common origin and ancestry in central Asia,

The European nations are acknowledged to have come, In successive waves of migration, from Asia. Modern ethnologists generally agree that the Indian races of America are derived from Mongoloid sources in Eastern Asia, either through Polynesia or by way of the Aleutian Islands. Bunsen, Philos. of Universal History, 2 :112—The Asiatic origin of all the North American Indians "is as fully proved as the unity of family among themselves." Tylor, Primitive Culture, 1:48—"The seml-civillzed nations of Java and Sumatra are found in possession of a civilization which at first glance shows itself to have been borrowed from Hindu and Moslem sources."

See also Sir Henry Rawlinson, quoted in Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of the Race, 166, 157; Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 223-236; Pickering, Races of Man, Introd., synopsis, and page 816; Guyot, Earth and Man, 298-334: Quatrefages, Natural History of Man, and Unite del¹ Espece Humalne; Oodron, Unite del' Espece Humaine, 2:412gq. Per contra, however, see Prof. A. H. Sayce: "The evidence is now all tending to show that the districts in the neighborhood of the Baltic were those from which the Aryan languages first radiated, and where the race or races who spoke them originally dwelt. The Aryan invaders of Northwestern India could only have been a late and distant offshoot of the primitive stock, speedily absorbed into the earlier population of the country as they advanced southward; and to speak of ' our Indian brethren' is as absurd and false as to claim relationship with the negroes of the United States because they now use an Aryan language." Scrlbner, Where Did Life Begin? has lately adduced arguments to prove that life on the earth originated at the north pole, and Prof. Asa Gray favors this view; so also Warren, Paradise Found.

2. The argument from language.

Comparative philology points to a common origin of all the more important languages, and furnishes no evidence that the less important are not also so derived.

On Sanscrit as a connecting link between the Indo-Germanic languages, see Max Milller, Science of Language, 1:146-165, 326-342, who claims that all languages pass through the three stages: monosyllabic, agglutinative, inflectional; and that nothing necessitates the admission of different independent beginnings for either the material or the formal elements of the Turanian, Semitic, and Aryan branches of speech. The changes of language are often rapid. Latin becomes the Romance languages, and Saxon and Norman are united into English, in three centuries. The Chinese may have departed from their primitive abodes while their language was yet monosyllabic.

Ziickler, however, in Jahrbuch fllr deutsche Tbeologle, 8 :68 denies the progress from lower methods of speech to higher, and declares the most highly developed inflectional languages to be the oldest and most widespread. Inferior languages are a degeneration from a higher state of culture. In tbe development of the Indo-Germanic languages (such as the French and the English), we have instances of change from more full and luxuriant expression to that which Is monosyllabic or agglutinative. The theory of Max MUUer is also opposed by Pott, Die Verschiedenheiten der menscblichen Hassen, 202,212. Pott calls attention to the fact that the Australian languages show unmistakable similarity to the languages of Eastern and Southern Asia, although the physical characteristics of these tribes are far different from the Asiatic.

On the Old Egyptian language as a connecting link between the Indo-European and tbe Semitic tongues, see Bunsen, Egypt's Place, 1: preface, 10; also see Farrar, Origin of Language, 213. Like the Old Egyptian, the Berber and the Touareg are Semitic in parts of their vocabulary, while yet they are Aryan in grammar. So the Thibetan and Burmese stand between the Indo-European languages, on the one hand, and the monosyllabic languages, as of China, on the other. A French philologist, Terrien de la Couperie by name, claims now to have interpreted the Yh-King, the oldest and most unintelligible monumental writing of the Chinese, by regarding it as a corruption of tbe old Assyrian or Accadian cuneiform characters, and as resembling the syllabaries, vocabularies, and bilingual tablets In the ruined libraries of Assyria and Babylon; see Sayce, in Contemp. Rev., Jan., 1884 : 934-936.

On relations between Aryan and Semitic languages, see Renouf, Hibbert Lectures, 5561; Murray, Origin and Growth of the Psalms, 7; Bib. Sac. 1870: 162; 1876 :352-380; 1879: 674-706. See also Pezzi, Aryan Philology, 125; Sayce, Principles of Comp. Philology, 132-174; Whitney, art. on Comp. Philology, in Encyc. Britannlca. also Life and Growth of Language, 269, and Study of Language, 307,308—" Language affords certain indications of doubtful value, which, taken along with certain other ethnological considerations, also of questionable pertinency, furnish ground for suspecting an ultimate relationship.... ... That more thorough comprehension of the history of Semitic speech will enable us to determine this ultimate relationship, may perhaps be looked for with hope, though it is not to be expected with confidence." See also Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 1D9-222; Smith's Bib. Diet., art.: Confusion of Tongues.

3. The argument from psychology.

The existence, among all families of mankind, of common mental and moral characteristics, as evinced in common maxims, tendencies and capacities, in the prevalence of similar traditions, and in the universal applicability of one philosophy and religion, is most easily explained upon the theory of a common origin.

Among the widely prevalent traditions may be mentioned the tradition of the fashioning of the world and man, of a primeval garden, of an original innocence and happiness, of a tree of knowledge, of a serpent, of a temptation and fall, of a division of time into weeks, of a flood, of sacrifice. It is possible, if not probable, that certain myths, common to many nations, may have been handed down from a time when the families of the race had not yet separated. See Zockler, in Jahrbuch fllr deutsche Theologie, 8 : 71-90; Max MUUer, Science of Language, 2 : 444-455: Prichard, Nat. Hist, of Man, 2 : 857-714; Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 236-240; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2 : 77fll; Gladstone, Juventus Mundl.

4. The argument from physiology.

A. It is the common judgment of comparative physiologists that man constitutes but a single species. The differences which exist between the various families of mankind are to be regarded as varieties of this species. In proof of these statements we urge: (a) The numberless intermediate gradations which connect the so-called races with each other. (6) The essential identity of all races in cranial, osteologieal, and dental characteristics, (e) The fertility of unions between individuals of the most diverse types, and the continuous fertility of the offspring of such unions.

Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, 163—" It may be safely affirmed that, even If the differences between men are specific, they are so small that the assumption of more than one primitive stock for all is altogether superfluous. We may admit that Negroes and Australians are distinct species, yet bo the strictest monogenists, and even believe in Adam and Eve as the primeval parents of mankind, (. e., on Darwin's hypothesis"; Origin of Species, 113—"I am one of those who believe that at present there is no evidence whatever for saying that mankind sprang originally from more than a single pair; I must say that I cannot sec any good ground whatever, or any tenable evidence, for believing that there is more than one species of man." Owen, quoted by Burgess, Ant and Unity of Race, 185—" Man forms but one species, and differences are but indicatlonsof varieties. These variations merge into each other by easy gradations." Alex, von Humboldt: "The different races of men are forms of one sole species—they are not different species of a genus."

Quatrefages, in Revue d. deux Mondes, Dec, 1860 : 814—" If one places himself exclusively upon the plane of the natural sciences, it is impossible not to conclude in favor of the monogenlst doctrine." Wagner, quoted in Bib. Sac, 19 : 607—"Species = the collective total of individuals which are capable of producing one with another an uninterruptedly fertile progeny." Pickering, Races of Man, 316—"There is no middle ground between the admission of eleven distinct species in the human family and their reduction to one. The latter opinion implies u central point of origin."

There is an impossibility of deciding how many races there are, if we once allow that there are more than one. While Pickering would say eleven, Agnssiz says eight, Morton twenty-two, and Burke sixty-flve. Modern science all tends t« the derivation of each family from a single germ. Other common characteristics of all races of men, in addition to those mentioned in the text, are the duration of pregnancy, the normal temperature of the body, the mean frequency of the pulse, the liability to the same diseases. Meehan, State Botanist of Pennsylvania, maintains that hybrid vegetable products are no more sterile than ordinary plants (Independent, Aug. 21, 1884).

B. Unity of species is presumptive evidence of unity of origin. Oneness of origin furnishes the simplest explanation of specific uniformity, if indeed the very conception of species does not imply the repetition and reproduction of a primordial type-idea impressed at its creation upon an individual empowered to transmit this type-idea to its successors.

Dana, quoted In Burgess, Antiq. and Unity of Race, 185, 186—" In the ascending scale of animals, the number of species in any genus diminishes as we rise, and should by analogy be smallest at the head of the series. Among mammals, the higher genera have few species, and the highest group next to man, the orang-outang, has only eight, and these constitute but two genera. Analogy requires that man should have prefiminonce and should constitute only one." 1»4—"A species corresponds to a gpeciflc

amount or condition of concentrated force defined In the act or law of creation

The species In any particular case began its existence when the first germ-cell or individual was created. When individuals multiply from (feneration to (feneration, it is but

a repetition of the primordial type-Idea The specific is based on a numerical

unity, the species bein(r nothing else than an enlargement of the individual." For full statement of Dana's view, see Bib. Sac, Oct., 1867 : 862-866.

(a) To this view is opposed the theory propounded by Agassiz, of different centres of creation, and of different types of humanity corresponding to the varying fauna and flora of each. But this theory makes the plural origin of man an exception in creation. Science points rather to a single origin of each species, whether vegetable or animal. If man be, as this theory grants, a single species, he should be, by the same rule, restricted to one continent in his origin. This theory, moreover, applies an unproved hypothesis with regard to the distribution of organized beings in general to the very being whose whole nature and history show conclusively that he is an exception to such a general rule, if one exists. Since man can adapt himself to all climes and conditions, the theory of separate centres of creation is, in his case, gratuitous and unnecessary.

Agasslz's view was first published in an essay on the Provinces of the Animal World. In Nott and Oliddon's Types of Mankind, a book gotten up in the interest of slavery. Agassiz held to eight distinct centres of creation, and to eight corresponding types of humanity—the Arctic, the Mongolian, the European, the American, the Negro, the Hottentot, the Malay, the Australian. Agassiz regarded Adam as the ancestor only of the white race, yet like Peyrerius and Winchell he held that man In all his various race* constitutes but one species.

The whole tendency of recent science, however, has been adverse to the doctrine of separate centres of creation, even in the case of animal and vegetable life. In temperate North America there are two hundred and seven species of quadrupeds, of which only eight, and these polar animals, are found in the north of Europe or Asia. If North America be an Instance of a separate centre of creation for its peculiar species, why should Ood create the same species of man in eight different localities? This would make man an exception in creation. There is, moreover, no need of creating man in many separated localities: for, unlike the polar bears and the Norwegian firs, which cannot live at the equator, man can adapt himself to the most varied climates and conditions. For replies to Agassiz, see Bib. Sac, 19 : 807-632; Princeton Rev., 1862 : 435-464.

(6) It is objected, moreover, that the diversities of size, color, and physical conformation, among the various families of mankind, are inconsistent with the theory of a common origin. But we reply that these diversities are of a superficial character, and can be accounted for by corresponding diversities of condition and environment. Changes which have been observed and recorded within historic times show that the differences alluded to may be the result of slowly accumulated divergences from one and the sameoriginal and ancestral type. The difficulty in the case, moreover, is greatly relieved when we remember (1) that the period during which these divergences have arisen is by no means limited to six thousand years (see note on the antiquity of the race, pages 106, 107); and (2) that, since species in general exhibit their greatest power of divergence into varieties immediately after their first introduction, all the varieties of the human species may have presented themselves in man's earliest history.

Instances of physiological change as the result of new conditions: The Irish, driven by the English two centuries ago from Armagh and the south of Down, have become prognathous like the Australians. The inhabitants of New England have descended from the English, yet they have already a physical type of their own. The Indians of North America, or at least certain tribes of them, have permanently altered the Bhape of the skull by bandaging the head in infancy. The Sikhs of India, since the establishment of Babel Nana's religion (1500 A. D.) and their consequent advance in civilization, have changed to a longer head and more regular features, so that they are now distinguished greatly from their neighbors, the Afghans, Thibetans, Hindus. The Ostiak savages have become the Magyar nobility of Hungary. The Turks in Europe are, in cranial shape, greatly in advance of the Turks in Asia from whom they descended. The Jews are confessedly of one ancestry, yet we have among them the light-haired Jews of Poland, the dark Jews of Spain, and the Ethiopian Jews of the Nile Valley. The Portuguese who settled in the East Indies in the 16th century are now as dark iu complexion as the Hindus themselves. Africans become lighter in complexion as they go up from the alluvial river-banks to higher land, or from the coast; and on the contrary the coast tribes which drive out the negroes of the interior and take their territory end by becoming negroes themselves. See, for many of the above facts, Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of the Race, 195-203.

The law.of originally greater plasticity, mentioned in the text, was first hinted by Hall, the paleontologist of New York. It is accepted and defined by Dawson, Story of the Earth and Man, 360—" A new law is coming into view: that species when first introduced have an innate power of expansion, which enables them rapidly to extend themselves to the limit of their geographical range, and also to reach the limit of their divergence into races. This limit once reached, these races run on in parallel lines until they one by one run out and disappear. According to this law, the most aberrant races of men might be developed in a few centuries, after which divergence would cease, and the several lines of variation would remain permanent, at least so long as the conditions under which they originated remained." See the similar view of Von Baer in Schmid, Theories of Darwin, 55, note. Joseph Cook: Variability is a lessening quantity; the tendency to change is greatest at the first, but, like the rate of motion of a stone thrown upward, it lessens every moment after- Kenouf, Hlbbert Lectures, 54—"The further back we go into antiquity, the more closely does the Egyptian type approach the European." Rawlinson says that negroes are not represented in the Egyptian monuments before 1500 B. C. The Influence of climate is very great, especially in the savage state. See Ziickler, in Jahrbuch ftlr dcutsche Theologie, 8 : 51-71; Prlehard, Researches, 5 : 517-552. Nat. Hist, of Man, 2 : 644-656; Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 96-108; 8myth, Unity of Human Races, 255-283; Morris, Conflict of Science and Religion, 325-385; Rawlinson, in Journ. Christ. Philosophy, April, 1883 : 359.

LTJ. Essential Elements Op Human Nature. 1. The Dichotomoug Theory.

Man has a twofold nature,—on the one hand material, on the other hand immaterial. He consists of body, and of spirit, or soul. That there are two, and only two, elements in man's being, is a fact to which consciousness testifies. This testimony is confirmed by Scripture, in which the prevailing representation of man's constitution is that of dichotomy.

Dichotomous, from {i^a,'in two,' and Te>m,' to cut,' = composed of two parts. Man is as conscious that his immaterial part Is a unity, as that his body is a unity. He knows two, and only two, parts of his being—body and soul. So man Is the true Janus (Martensen), Mr. Faclng-both-ways (Bunyan). That the Scriptures favor dichotomy will appear by considering:

(a) The record of man's creation (Gen. 2:7), in which, as a result of the inbreathing of the divine Spirit, the body becomes possessed and vitalized by a single principle—the living soul.

Den. 2: 7—" and the lord God formed man of tin dost of the ground, Mid breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; ud man became a liying soul"—here it is not said that man was first a living soul, and that then Ood breathed into htm a spirit; but that God inbreathed spirit, and man became a living soul ■= God's life took possession of clay, and as a result, man had a soul. Cf. Job. 27 : 3—" for mj life is jet vhole in me, and the spirit of God is in my nostrils "; 32 : 8—" there is a spirit in matt. And the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding "; 33 : 4—" The spirit of God hath made me. And the breath of the Almighty giveth me life."

(6) Passages in which the human soul, or spirit, is distinguished, both from the divine Spirit from whom it proceeded, and from the body which it inhabits.

Norn. 16 : 22—" 0 God, the God of the spirits of all flesh "; Zech. 12 :1—" the Lord, which ... formeth the spirit of

man within him "; 1 Cor. 2 : 11—" the spirit of the man which is in him the Spirit of God "; Heb. 12 : 9—

"the Father of spirits." The passages just mentioned distinguish the spirit of man from the Spirit of God. The following distinguish the soul, or spirit, of man from the body which it inhabits: Gen. 35 : IB—"it came to pass, as her soul was in departing ( for she died )"; IK. 17 : 21—" 0 Lord my God, I pray thee, let this child's soul come into him again "; Eccl 12 : 7—" the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit return unto God who gave it": Jamas 2 : 26—"the body apart from the spirit is dead." The first class of passages refutes pantheism; the second refutes materialism.

(c) The interchangable use of the terms 'soul' and 'spirit.'

Gen. 41: 8—" his spirit was troubled "; cf. Ps. 42 : 6—" my soul is cast down within me." John 12 : 27—" Now is my soul troubled"; cf. 13 :21—"he was troubled in the spirit." Mat 20 :28—"to give his life (i^vxiji-) a ransom for many"; cf. 27 : 50—" yielded up his spirit (nveiina)." Heb. 12: 23—"spirits of just men made perfect"; cf. Rev. 8 : 9—" I saw underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God." In these passages "spirit" and "soul" seem to be used Interchangeably.

(d) The mention of body and soul (or spirit) as together constituting the whole man.

Mat 10 : 28—"able to destroy both soul and body in hell"; 1 Cor. 5 : 3—"absent in body but present in spirit"; 3 John 2—" I pray that thou mayst prosper and be in health, even as thy soul prospereth." These texts imply that body and soul (or spirit) together constitute the whole man.

For advocacy of the dichotomous theory, see Godet, Bib. Studies of the O. T., 32; Oehler, Theology of the O. T., 1: 219; Hahn, Bib. Thool. N. T., 390 Schmid, Bib. Theology N. T., 503; Weiss, Bib. Theology N. T., 214; Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 112, 113; Hofinann, Sehriftbeweis, 1: 294-298; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 1; 549; 3 : 249; Harlcss, Com. on Eph., 4:23, and Christian Ethics, 22; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1:164-168; Hodge, in Princeton Review, 1865: 116, and Systematic Theol., 2: 47-51; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 261-263.

2. The Trichotomous Theory.

Side by side with this common representation of human nature as consisting of two parts, are found passages which at first sight appear to favor trichotomy. It must be acknowledged that nvev/ia (spirit) and ^vxi (soul), although often used interchangeably, and always designating the same indivisible substance, are sometimes employed as contrasted terms.

In tliis more accurate use, i/ivn denotes man's immaterial part in its inferior powers and activities;—as fvrf, man is a conscious individual, and in common with the brute creation, has an animal life, together with appetite, imagination, memory, understanding, Uvev/ia, on the other hand, denotes man's immaterial part in its higher capacities and faculties ;—as web/m, man is a being related to God, and possessing powers of reason, conscience, and free will, which difference him from the brute creation and constitute him responsible and immortal.

In the following texts, spirit and soul are distinguished from each other: 1 Thess. 5 : 23— "And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ"; Heb. 4 :12—" For the word of God is living, and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart." Compare 1 Cor. 2 :14—" Now the natural [ Gr. ¹ psychical' ] man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God"; 15 : 44—"It is sown a natural [Gr. 'psychical' ] body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural [Gr. 'psychical' ] body, there is also a spiritual body"; Eph. 4 : 23—"that ye be renewed in the spirit of your mind "; Judo 19—" sensual [ Gr. 'psychical' ], having not the Spirit"

For the proper Interpretation of these texts, see note on the next page. Among those who cite them as proofs of the trluhotomous theory (trichotoinous, from rpi^a, "in three parts,' and T<h*«i, 'to cut,' = composed of three parts, (. e. spirit, soul, and body! may be mentioned Olshausen, Opuscula, 134, and Com. on 1 Thess., 5:23; Beck, Bibliscbe Seelenlehre, 31; Delitzsch, Biblical Psychology, 117,118; Giischel, in Herzog, IlealencyclopSdle, art.: Seele; also, art. by Auberlen: Oeist des Menschen; Cremer, N. T. Lexicon, on vvti>na and ^yjci; Usteri, Pauliu. Lehrbegriff, 384 iiq.; Neander. Planting and Training, 394; Van Oostcrzee, Christian Dogmatics, 365, 30ti; Boardinan, in Bap. Quarterly, 1:177, 325, 428; Heard, Tripartite Nature of Man, 62-114; Ellicott, Destiny of the Creature, 106-125.

The element of truth in trichotomy is simply this, that man has a triplicity of endowment, in virtue of which the single soul has relations to matter, to self, and to God. The trichotomous theory, however, as it is ordinarily denned, endangers the unity and immateriality of our higher nature, by holding that man consists of three substances, or three component parts— body, soul, and spirit—and that soul and spirit are as distinct from each other as are soul and body.

The advocates of this view differ among themselves as to the nature of the if*vx>j and Its relation to the other elements of our being; some {as Delitzsch) holding that the t^v^i is an efflux of the ivi/j-a, distinct in substance, but not in essence, even as the divine Word is distinct from God, while yet he is God; others (as Giischel) regarding the ^i, not as a distinct substance, but as a resultant of the union of the nvtvua and the awiua. still others (as Cremer) hold the ipvxri to be the subject of the personal life whose principle is

the irycvjia.

We regard the trichotomous theory as untenable, not only for the reasons already urged in proof of the dichotomous theory, but from the following additional considerations:

(a) livevfia, as well as V'W, is used of the brute creation.

Eccl. 3 : 21—" Who knoweth the spirit of mall whether it goeth [marg. 'that goeth '] upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it goeth [marg.'that goeth'] downward to the earth?" R«t. 16 : 3—" And the second poured out his bowl into the sea; and it became blood, as of a dead man; and every living soul died, even the things that were in the »•»" = the fish.

(6) Vvxy is ascribed to Jehovah.

Amos 6 : 8—" The Lord God hath sworn by himself" (lit. 'by his soul'); Is. 42 :1—" Mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth "; Heb. 10 : 38—" My righteous one shall live by faith: and if he shrink back, my soul hath no pleasure in lim."

(c) The disembodied dead are called 4>vx"i

Rev. 8 : 9—" I saw underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God ": e/. 20 : 4— "souls of them that had been beheaded."

{d) The highest exercises of religion are attributed to the i'vxv.

Mark 12 :30—" Thou shalt love the Lord thy God ... with all thy soul" ; Luke 1: 46-" My soul doth magnify the Lord "; Heb. 6 :18, 19—" the hope Bet before us; which we have as an anchor of the soul " ; James 1 : 21—" the implanted word, which is able to save your souls."

(e) To lose this i'vxv is to lose all.

Mark 8 : 36, 37—" For what doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his life [ or 'soul,' 'lix'xv ]? For what should a man give in exchange for his life [ or 'soul,' ^ujfij J?"

(/) The passages chiefly relied upon as supporting trichotomy may be better explained upon the view already indicated, that soul and spirit are not two distinct substances or parts, but that they designate the immaterial principle from different points of view.

1 Thess. 5 : 23—" may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire" = not a scientific enumeration of the constituent parts of human nature, but a comprehensive sketch of that nature In its chief relations; compare Mark 12 : 30—"thou shalt loie the lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy sod, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength "—where none would think of finding proof of a fourfold division of human nature. On 1 Theea. 5:23. see Riggenbach (In Lance's Com.), and Commentary of Prof. W. A. Stevens. Eeb. 4 :12—" piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit, of both joints and marrow " = not the dividing: of soul from spirit, or of joints from marrow, but rather the piercing: of the soul and of the spirit, even to their very joints and marrow; i. e. to the very depths of the spiritual nature. On Eeb. 4 :12, see Ebrard (in Olshausen's Com.), and LUneinann (In Meyer's Com.); also Tholuck, Coin, in loco. Jude 19—"sensual, having not the Spirit" (i^i»\t*oi, irvtvpa txovres)—even thoug*h nvevna = th|f human spirit, need not mean that there is no spirit existing-, but only that the spirit is torpid and inoperative—as we say of a weak man: 'he has no mind,' or of an unprincipled man: 'he has no conscience'; see Nitzsch, Christian Doctrine, 202. But wrey/xa here probably = the divine nv*vna. The Rev, Vers, therefore capitalizes the word "Spirit."

We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, is called in>x4>viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called wvev/ia. The nvc'vfta, then, is man's nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving and manifesting the Tlvev/ia aywv; the i/'¹'*'/ is man's nature looking earthward, and touching the world of sense. The iwei/ia is man's higher part, as related to spiritual realities or as capable of such relation; the 4>i'x>'/ is man's higher part, as related to the body, or as capable of such relation. Man's being is therefore not trichotomous but dichotomous, and his immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance.

Man's nature is not a three-storied house, but a two-storied house, with windows in the upper story looking in two directions—toward eurth and toward heaven. The lower story is the physical part of us—the body. But man's "upper story" has two aspects; there is an outlook toward things below, and a skylight through which to sec the stars. "Soul," says Hovey, "Is spirit as modified by union with the body." Is man then the same in kind with the brute, but different in degree? No, man is different in kind, though possessed of certain powers which the brute has. The frog is not a magnified sensitive-plant, thougli his nerves automatically respond to irritation. The anlimil Is different in kind from the vegetable, though he has some of the same powers which the vegetable has. God's powers include man's; but man is not of the same substance with God, nor could man be enlarged or developed into God. So man's powers Include those of the brute, but the brute is not of the same substance with man, nor could he be enlarged or developed into man.

Porter, Human Intellect, 39—" The spirit of man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the lower powers which vitalize dead matter Into a human body." It does not follow that the soul of the animal or plant is capable of man's higher functions or developments, or that the subjection of man's spirit to body, in the present life, disproves his immortality. Porter continues: "That the soul begins to exist as a vital force, does not require that It should always exist as such a force, or in connection with a material body. Should it require another such body, it may have the power to create it for itself, as it has formed the one It first Inhabited; or it may have already formpd It, and may hold it ready for occupation and use as soon as it sloughs off the one which connects it with the earth."

Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 547—" Brutes may havo organic life and sensitivity, and yet remain submerged in nature. It Is not life and sensitivity that lift man above nature, but It is the distinctive characteristic of personality." Parkhurst, The Pattern in the Mount, 17-30, on Ptot. 20 : 27—" The spirit of man is the lamp of the lord "—not necessarily lighted, but capable of being lighted, and Intended to be lighted, by the touch of the

divine flame. Cf. Hat. 6 : 22. 23—" The lamp of the body if therefore the light that is in thee be darkness,

how great is the darkness."

This view of the soul and spirit as different aspects of the same spiritual principle furnishes a refutation of four important errors:

(a) That of the Gnostics, who held that the mtv/ia is part of the divine ■essence, and therefore incapable of sin.

(o) That of the Apollinarians, who taught that Christ's humanity embraced only cupa and i"'X'i, while his divine nature furnished the nvevfia.

(c) That of the Semi-pelagians, who excepted the human xvei>fm from the ■dominion of original sin.

(d) That of the Annihilationists, who hold that man at his creation had a divine element breathed into him, which he lost by sin, and which he recovers only in regeneration; so that only when he has this nveifm restored by virtue of his union with Christ does man become immortal, death being to the sinner a complete extinction of being.

Trichotomy allies itself readily with materialism. Many trichotomists hold that man ■can exist without a nvevna, but that the a^y.o. and the ipvxT by themselves are mere matter, and are incapable of eternal existence. Trichotomy, however, when it speaks of the nvtifLa. as the divine principle in man, seems to savor of emanation or of pantheism. A modern Euglish poet describes the glad and winsome child as "A sliver stream, Breaking with laughter from the lake divine, Whence all things flow." Another poet, Robert Browning, in his Death in the Desert, 107, describes body, sou], and spirit, as ■"What does, what knows, what is—three souls, one man." On account of its connection with other doctrines, therefore, dichotomy Is a not unimportant part of the Christian scheme.

The Eastern church generally held to trichotomy, and is best represented by John of Damascus (ii: 12) who speaks of the soul as the sensuous life-principle which takes up the spirit—the spirit being- an efflux from God. The Western church, on the other hand, generally held to dichotomy, and is best represented by Anselm: "Constat homo ex duabus naturls, ex natura anima¹ et ex natura carnis."

Luther has been quoted upon both sides of the controversy: by Dclitzsch, Bib. Psych., -480-482, as trichotomous, and as making the Mosaic tabernacle with Its three divisions an image of the tripartite man. "The first division," he says, "was called the holy of holies, since God dwelt there, and there was no light therein. The next was denominated the holy place, for within it stood a candlestick with seven branches and lamps. The third was called the atrium or court; this was under the broad heaven, and was open to the light of the sun. A regenerate man is depicted In this figure. His spirit is the holy ■of holies, God's dwelling-place, in the darkness of faith, without a light, for he believes what he neither sees, nor feels, nor comprehends. The of that man is the holy

place, whose seven lights represent the variouB powers of understanding, the perception and knowledge of material and visible things. His body is the atrium or court, which is open to everybody, so that all can see how he acts and lives." •i Thomasius, however, in his Christi Person und Werk, 1 :184-168, quotes from Luther the following statement, which is clearly dichotomous: "The first part, the spirit, is the highest, deepest, noblest part of man. By it he is fitted to comprehend eternal things, and it is, in short, the house in which dwell faith and the word of God. The other, the soul, is this same spirit, according to nature, but yet in another sort of activity, namely, in this, that It animates the body and works through it; and it is its method not to grasp things incomprehensible, but only what reason can search out, know, and measure." Thomasius himself says: "Trichotomy, I hold with Meyer, is not Scripturally sustained."

Neander, sometimes spoken of as a trichotomist, says that spirit is soul in its elevated and normal relation to God and divine things; •pvx'i is that same soul In its relation to the sensuous and perhaps sinful things of this world. Godet, Bib. Studies of O. T., 3Sr "Spirit — the breath of God, considered as independent of the body; soul — that same breath in so far as it gives life to the body. Hence, notwithstanding the essential duality of man's nature, the soul is often in Scripture distinguished from the spirit. It Is the soul to which the feeling of personal identity attaches."

The doctrine we have advocated, moreover, in contrast with the heathen view, puts honor upon man's body, as proceeding from the hand of God and as therefore originally pure (Gen. 1: 31—" lad God saw every thing that he had made, and. behold, it was very good "); as intended

to be the dwelling place of the divine Spirit (1 Cor. 6: w-'-knew ye not that your body ii a temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which jo hsve from God?"); and as containing: the germ of the heavenly body (1 Cor. 15 : 44—" it is sown > natural body; it is raised a spiritual body "; Rom. 8 :11—"shell Quicken also your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwelleth in yon"—here many ancient authorities read "because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you"—5id To <voiicoin> avrov nvtvun ). Birks, in his Difficulties of Belief, suggests that man, unlike angels, may have been provided with a fleshly body, (1) to objectify sin, and (2) to enable Christ to unite himself to the race, in order to save it.

IV. Origin Of The Soul.

Three theories with regard to this subject have divided opinion: 1. The Theory of Preexistence.

This view was held by Plato, Philo, and Origen; by the first, in order to explain the soul's possession of ideas not derived from sense; by the second, to account for its imprisonment in the body; by the third, to justify the disparity of conditions in which men enter the world. We concern ourselves, however, only with the forms which the view has assumed in modern times. Kant and Julius Muller in Germany, and Edward Beecher in America, have advocated it, upon the ground that the inborn depravity of the human will can be explained only by supposing a personal act of self-determination in a previous, or timeless, state of being.

The truth at the basis of the theory of prel'xistence is simply the ideal existence of the sovil, tiefore birth, in the mind of God—that Is, God's foreknowledge of it. The Intuitive Ideas of which the soul finds itself in possession, such as space, time, cause, substance, right, God, are evolved from itself: in other words, man is so constituted that he perceives these truths upon proper occasions or conditions. The apparent recollection that we have seen at some past time a landscape which we know to be now for the first time before ug, is an illusory putting together of fragmentary concepts, or a mistaking of a part for the whole: we have seen something like a part of the landscape— we fancy that we have seen this landscape, and the whole of It. Plato held, however, that Intuitive ideas are reminiscences of things learned in a previous state of being; he regarded the body as the grave of the soul; and urged the fact that the soul had knowledge before it entered the body, as proof that the soul would have knowledge after it left the body, that is. would be immortal. See Plato, Meno, 83-85, Phfedo, 72-75, Phmdrus, 245-250, Republic, x: 614; also Introductions to each of these works, in Jowott's translation.

Philo held that all souls are emanations from God, and that those who allowed themselves, unlike the angels, to be attracted by matter, are punished for this fall by imprisonment in the body, which corrupts them, and from which they must break loose. See Philo, Do-Gigantibus, Pfelffer's ed., 2 : 380-364. Origen accounted for disparity of conditions at birth by the differences In the conduct of these same souls in a previous state. God's justice at the first made all souls equal; condition here corresponds to the degree of previous guilt: Mat. 20 : 3—"others standing idle in the market-place" = souls not yet brought Into the world. The Talmudists regarded all souls as created at once in the beginning, and as kept like grains of corn in God's granary, until the time should come for Joining each to Its appointed body. See Origen, De Aiiimn, 7; fepi ipx^v, ii: D: 8; cf. 1:1: 2, *» 18; 4:38. Origen's view was condemned at the Synod of Constantinople, 538.

For modern advocates of the theory, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, sec. 15; Religion in. d. Grenzen d. bl. Vernunft, 26, 27; Julius MUller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:357-401; Edward Beecher, Conflict of Ages. The idea of pretlxistence has appeared to a notable extent in modern poetry. See Vaughan, The Retreate (1621); Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality in Early Childhood: Tennyson, Two Voices, stanzas 105-119. Many of the preceding facts and references are taken from Bruch, Lehre der Priiexistenz, translated in Bib. Sac, 20: 681-733.

To the theory of preexistence we urge the following objections:

(a) It is not only wholly without support from Scripture, but it directly contradicts the Mosaic account of man's creation in the image of God, and Paul's description of all evil and death in the human race as the result of Adam's sin.

Gen. 1: 27—" and God created nan in his own image, in the image of God created he him ": 31—" And God saw e?erj thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." Rom. 5 :12—" Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men. for that all sinned." The theory of preBxlstence would still leave It doubtful whether all inen are sinners, or whether God assembles only sinners upon the earth.

(6) If the soul in this preexistent state was conscious and personal, it is inexplicable that we should have no remembrance of such preexistence, and of so important a decision in that previous condition of being ; —if the soul was yet unconscious and impersonal, the theory fails to show how a moral act involving consequences so vast could have been performed at all.

Christ remeinl>ered his preBxistent state; why should not we? There is every reason to believe that in the future state we shall remember our present existence; why should we not now remember the past state from which we came? It may be objected that Augustinians hold to a sin of the race in Adam—a sin which none of Adam's descendants can remember. But we reply that no Augustinian holds to a personal existence of each member of the race in Adam, and therefore no Augustinian needs to account for lack of memory of Adam's sin. The advocate of preBxistence, however, does hold to a personal existence of each soul in a previous state, and therefore needs to account for our lack of memory of it.

(c) The view sheds no light either upon the origin of sin, or upon God's justice in dealing with it, since it throws back the first transgression to a state of being in which there was no flesh to tempt, and then represents God as putting the fallen into sensuous conditions in the highest degree unfavorable to their restoration.

This theory only increases the difficulty of explaining the origin of sin, by pushing back its beginning to a state of which we know less than we do of the present. To say that the soul in that previous state was only potentially conscious and personal, is to deny any real probation, and to throw the blame of sin on God the Creator.

(d) While this theory accounts for inborn spiritual sin, such as pride and enmity to God, it gives no explanation of inherited sensual sin, which it holds to have come from Adam, and the guilt of which must logically be denied.

While certain forms of the preBxistence theory are exposed to the last objection indicated in the text, Julius MUller claims that his own view escapes it; see Doctrine of Sin. 2: 3SK1. His theory, he says, " would contradict holy Scripture if it derived inborn sinfulness unlelu from this extra-temporal act of the individual, without recognizing in this sinfulness the element of hereditary depravity in the sphere of the natural life, and its connection with the sin of our first parents." MUller, whose trichotomy here determines his whole subsequent scheme, holds only the nvtiiia to have thus fallen in a preBxistent state. The i(iux>i comes, with the body, from Adam. The tempter only brought man's latent perversity of will into open transgression. Sinfulness, as hereditary, does not involve guilt, but the hereditary principle Is the " medium through which the transcendent self-perversion of the spiritual nature of man is transmitted to his whole temporal mode of being." While man is born guilty as to his nvtv>i.a, for the reason that this win* sinned in a preBxistent state, he is also born guilty as to his Uvuxij, because this was one with the first man in his transgression.

Even upon the most favorable statement of Mllller's view, we fall to see how it can consist with the organic unity of the race; for in that which chiefly constitutes us men —the irviDfia—we are as distinct and separate creations as are the angels. We also fail to see how, upon this view, Christ can t>c said to take our nature; or, if he takes it, how it can be without sin. See Ernesti, IJrsprung der Stlnde, 2 : 1-247; Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele. 11-17; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3: 93-122; Bruch, Lehrc der PrHexlstenz, translated In Bib. Sac, 20 : 681-733. Also, Bib Sao., 11: 186-191; 12:150; 17:419-427; 20 : 447; Kuhnls, Dogmatlk, 3: 250—" This doctrine is inconsistent with the indisputable fact that the souls of children are like those of the parents; and It ignores the connection of the individual with the race."

2. The Creatian Theory.

This view was held by Aristotle, Jerome, and Felagius, and in modern times has been advocated by most of the Roman Catholic and Reformed theologians. It regards the soul of each human being as immediately created by God and joined to the body either at conception, at birth, or at some time l}etween these two. The advocates of the theory urge in its favor certain texts of Scripture, referring to God as the Creator of the human spirit, together with the fact that there is a marked individuality in the child, which cannot be explained as a mere reproduction of the qualities existing in the parents.

Creatianisin, as ordinarily held, regards only the body as propagated from past generations. Crcatlanists who hold to trichotomy would say, however, that the animal soul, the ifrvjpf, is propagated with the body, while the highest part of man, the ni'tvua, is in each ease a direct creation of God—the *vti)ia not being created, as the advocates of preilxistenee believe, ages before the body, but rather at the time that the body assumes its distinct individuality.

Aristotle (De Anima) first gives definite expression to this view. Jerome speaks of God as " making souls daily." The scholastics followed Aristotle, and through the influence of the Reformed church, creatianism has been the prevailing opinion for the last two hundred years. Among its best representatives are Turretin, Inst., 5 :13 (vol. 1: 425); Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 65-78; Martensen, Dogmatics, 141-148; Liddon, Elements of Religion, 99-108. Certain Reformed theologians have defined very exactly God's method of creation: Polanus (5 : 31:1) says that God breaths the soul into boys, forty days, and into girls, eighty days, after conception. Giischel (in Herzog, Encyclop., art.: Seele) holds that while dichotomy leads to traducianism, trichotomy allies itself to that form of creatianism which regards the nvtvucL as a direct creation of God, but the *pv%rj as propagated with the body. To the latter answers the family name; to the former the Christian name.

Creatianism is untenable for the following reasons:

(a) The passages adduced in its support may with equal propriety be regarded as expressing God's mediate agency in the origination of human souls; while the general tenor of Scripture, as well as its representations of God as the author of man's body, favor this latter interpretation.

Passages commonly relied upon by creatianists are the following: Eccl. 12: 7—" the spirit

return unto God who gave it"; Is. 57 :16—"the souls which I hare made"; Zech. 12 :1—"the Lord which

formeth the spirit of man within him "; Heb. 12 : 9—" the Father of spirits." But God is with equal clearness declared to be the former of man's body: see Ps. 139:13,14—"thou hast possessed [marg. 'formed' ] my rains: Thou hast covered me [ marg.'knit me together' ] in my mother's womb. I will give thanks unto thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made: Wonderful are thy works" ; Jer. 1 : 5—" I formed thee in the belly." Yet we do not hesitate to interpret these latter passages as expressive of mediate, not immediate, creatorshtp—God works through natural laws of generation and development so far as the production of man's body Is concerned. None of the passages first mentioned forbid us to suppose that he works through these same natural laws in the production of the soul.

(b) Creatianism regards the earthly father as begetting only the body

of his child—certainly as not the father of the child's highest part. This

makes the benst to possess nobler powers of propagation than man; for the

beast multiplies himself after his own image.

The new physiology properly views soul, not as something added from without, but as the animating principle of the body from the beginning, and as having a determining Influence upon its whole development. That children are like their parents, in intellectual and spiritual H9 well as in physical respects. Is a fact of which the creation theory gives no proper explanation.

(c) The individuality of the child, even in the most extreme cases, as in the sudden rise from obscure families and surroundings of marked men like Iiuther, may be better explained by supposing a law of variation impressed upon the species at its beginning—a law whose operation is foreseen and supervised by God.

The differences of the child from the parent are often exaggerated; men are generally more the product of their ancestry and of their time than we are accustomed to think. Dickens made angelic children to be born of depraved parents, and to grow up in the slums. But this writing belougs to a past generation, when the facts of heredity were unrecognized. George Eliot's school is nearer the truth; although she exaggerates the doctrine of heredity in turn, until all Idea of free will and all hope of escaping our fate vanish.

Sometimes, in spite of George Eliot, a lily grows out of a stagnant pool—how shall we explain the fact? We must remember that the paternal and the maternal elements are themselves unlike; the union of the two may well produce a third in some respects unlike either; as, when two chemical elements unite, the product differs from either of the constituents. We must remember also that nature is one factor; nurture is another; and that the latter is often as potent as the former (see Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty, 77-81). Environment determines to a large extent both the fact and the degree of development. Genius Is often another name for Providence. Yet before all and beyond all we must recognize a manifold wisdom of God, which in the very organization of species impresses upon it a law of variation, so that at proper times and under proper conditions the old is modilied in the line of progress and advance to something higher

(d) This theory, if it allows that the soul is originally possessed of depraved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil; if it holds the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of moral evil, by teaching that he puts this pure soul into a body which will inevitably corrupt it.

The decisive argument against creatianisin is this one, that it makes God the author of moral evil. See Kahnls, Dogmatik, 3 : 250—" Creatianlsm rests upon a justly antiquated dualism between soul and body, and is irreconcilable with the sinful condition of the human soul. The truth in the doctrine is just this only, that generation can bring forth an immortal human life only according to the power imparted by God's word, and with the special cooperation of God himself." The difficulty of supposing that God immediately creates a pure soul, only to put it into a body that will infallibly corrupt it —sicut vinum in vase acetoso—has led many of the most thoughtful Reformed theologians to modify the Croatian doctrine by combining it with traduetunism.

Rothe, Dogmatik, 1: 249-251, holds to a creation in a wider sense—a union of the paternal and maternal elements under the express and determining elliciency of God. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 327-332. regards the soul as now-created, yet by a process of mediate creation according to law, which he calls 'metaphysical generation.' Dorner, System of Doctrine, 3 : 58, says that the individual is not simply a manifestation of the species; God applies to the origination of every single man a special creative thought and act of will; yet he does this through the species, so that it Is creation by law—else the child would be, not a continuation of the old species, but the establishment of a new one. So in speaking of the human soul of Christ, Dorner says (3: 340-349) that the soul itself does not owe its origin to Mary nor to the species, but to the creative act of God. This soul appropriates to itself from Mary's body the elements of a human form, purifying them in the process so far as is consistent with the beginning of a life yet subject to development and human weakness.

Bowne, Metaphysics, 500—"The laws of heredity must be viewed simply as descriptions of a fact and never as its explanation. Not as if ancestors passed on something to posterity, but solely because of the inner consistency of the divine action " are children like their parents. We cannot regard either of these mediating views as self-consistent or intelligible. We pass on therefore to consider the traducian theory which we believe more fully to meet the requirements of Scripture and of reason. For further discussion of crcatianism, see Froheohammer, Ursprung der Seele, 18-58; Alger, Doctrine of a Future Life, 1-17.

3. The Traducian Theory.

This view was propounded by Tertullian, and was implicitly held by Augustine. In modern times it has been the prevailing opinion of the Lutheran Church. It holds that the human race was immediately created in Adam, and, as respects both body and soul, was propagated from him by natural generation—all souls since Adam being only mediately created by God, as the upholder of the laws of propagation which were originally established by him.

Tertullian, De Anima: Tradux pcecati, tradux animi. Gregory of Nyssa: "Man beingone, consisting of soul and body, the common beginning of his constitution must be supposed also one; so that he may not be both older and younger than himself—that in him which is bodily being first, and the other coming after" (quoted in Crlppen, Hist, of Christ. Doct., 80). Augustine. He Pec. Mer. ct Kern., 3 : 7—" In Adam all sinned, at the time when in his nature all were still that one man "; De Civ. Dei, 13 : 14—" For we all

were in that one man, when we all were that one man The form in which we each

should live was not as yet individually created and distributed to us, but there already existed the seminal nature from which we were propagated."

Augustine, indeed, wavered in his statements with regard to the origin of the soul, apparently fearing that an explicit nnd pronounced traduclantsin might involve materialistic consequences: yet, as logically lying at the basis of his doctrine of original sin, tradueianlsm came to be the ruling view of the Lutheran reformers. In his Table Talk, Luther says: "The reproduction of mankind Is a great marvel and mystery. Had God consulted lne in the matter, I should have advised him to continue the generation of the species by fashioning them out of clny, in the way Adam was fashioned; ns I should have counselled him also to let the sun remain always suspended over the earth, like a great lamp, maintaining perpetual light and heat."

Traducianism holds that man, as a species, was created in Adam. In Adam, the substance of humanity was yet undistributed We derive our immaterial as well as our material being, by natural laws of propagation, from Adam—each individual man after Adam possessing a part of the substance that was originated In him. See Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2 : 1-26, Discourses and Essays, 259; Baird, Elohlm Itevealed, 137-Si, 335-384; Edwards, Works, 2:483; Hopkins, Works, 1:289; Itirks, DilHculties of Belief, 161; Delltzsch, Bib. Psych., 128-142; Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele, 59-224.

With regard to this view we remark:

(a) It seems best to accord with Scripture, which represents God as creating the species in Adam (Gen. 1 : 27), and as increasing and perpetuating it through secondary agencies (1 : 28; <■/. 22). Only once is breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life (2:7; (/. 22; 1 Cor. 11 :8. Gen. 4 : 1; 5 : 3; 46 : 26; </. Acts 17 : 24-26; Heb. 7 : 10), and after man's formation God ceases from his work of creation (Gen. 2:2).

Gen. 1: 27—" And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them ": 28—" And God blessed them; and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiplj, and replenish the earth "; c/. 22—of the brute creation: "And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth." Gen. 2 : 7—"And the lord God formed man of the dust of tbe ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul"; cf. 22—" And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man "; 1 Cor. 11 : 8—" For the man is

not of the woman; but the woman of the man" (e'f dp6>df ). Gen. 4 : 1—" Eve bare Cain "; 5 : 3—" Adam

. .. begat a son . . . Seth "; 46 : 26—" He made of one [ ' father' or ' body ' ] every nation of men "; Heb. 7 :10 —Levi "was jet in the loins of his father, when Melchisedek met him." Gen. 2 : 2—"And on the seventh day God finished his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made."

(I>) It is favored by the analogy of vegetable and animal life, in which increase of numbers is secured, not by a multiplicity of immediate creations, but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. A derivation of the human soul from its parents no more implies a materialistic view of the soul and its endless division and subdivision, than the similar derivation of the brute proves the principle of intelligence in the lower animals to be wholly material.

God's method Is not the method of endless miracle. God works in nature through second causes. God does not create a new vital principle at the beginning of existence of each separate apple, and of each separate dog. Each of these is the result of a selfmultiplying force, implanted once for all in the first of its race. To say, with Moxoin (Baptist Review, 1881: 278), that God is the immediate author of each new individual, is to deny second causes, and to merge nature in God. The whole tendency of modern science is in the opposite direction. Nor is there any good reason for making the origin of the individual human soul an exception to the general rule. Augustine wavered in his traducianism because he feared the inference that the soul is divided and subdivided—that is, that it is composed of parts, and is therefore material in its nature. But it does uot follow that all separation is material separation. We do not, indeed, know how the soul Is propagated. But we know that animal life is propagated, and still that it is not material, nor composed of parte. The fact that the soul is not material, nor composed of parts, is no reason why it may not be propagated also.

(c) The observed transmission not merely of physical, but of mental and spiritual, characteristics in families and races, and especially the uniformly evil moral tendencies and dispositions which all men possess from their birth, are proof that in soul, as well as in body, we derive our being from our human ancestry.

Galton, in his Hereditary Genius, and Inquiries into Human Faculty, furnishes abundant proof of the transmission of mental and spiritual characteristics from father to son. Illustrations, in the case of families, are the American Adamses, the English Georges, the French Bourbons, the German Baehs. Illustrations, in the case of races, are the Indians, the Negroes, the Chinese, the Jews. Hawthorne represented the introspection and the conscience of Puritan New England. Emerson had a minister among his ancestry, either on the paternal or the maternal side, for eight generations back. Every man is "a chip of the old block." "A man Is an omnibus, in which all his ancestors are seated " (O. W. Holmes). Variation is one of the properties of living things —the other is transmission. "On a dissecting table, in the membranes of a new-born infant's body, can be seen 'the drunkard's tinge." The blotches on his grand-child's cheeks furnish a mirror to the old debauchee. Heredity Is God's visiting of sin to the third and fourth generations." On heredity and depravity, see Phelps in Bib. Sac., Apr., 1884 : 254—" When every molecule in the paternal brain bears tho shape of a point of interrogation, It would border on the miraculous if we should find the exclamationsign of faith in the brain-cells of the child."

(d) The traducian doctrine embraces and acknowledges the element of truth which gives plausibility to the creation view. Traducianism, properly denned, admits a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of the human species, and allows, under the guidance of a superintending Providence, special improvements in type at the birth of marked men, similar to those which we may suppose to have occurred in the introduction of new varieties in the animal creation.

Page-Roberts, Oxford University Sermons: "It is no more unjust that man should inherit evil tendencies, than that he should inherit good. To make the former impossible is to make the latter impossible. To object to the law of heredity. Is to object to God's ordinance of society, and to say that God should have made men, like the angels, a company, and not a race." Tho common moral characteristics of the race can only be accounted for upon the Scriptural view that "that which is born of the flesh is flash" (John 3 ; 6). Since propagation is a propagation of soul, as well as body, we see that to beget children under improper conditions is a crime, and that foeticide is murder. On organic unity in connection with realism, see Hodge, in Princeton Rev., Jan., 1865:135-135. See also

Dabney, Theolog-y, 317-32]: Kibot, Heredity; W. K. Brooks, Heredity (the male element repreflentlntf the law of variation; the female the conservative principle).

V. Thk Moral Nature Of Man.

By the moral nature of man we mean those powers which fit him for right or wrong action. These powers are intellect, sensibility, and will, together with that peculiar power of discrimination and impulsion, which we call conscience. In order to moral action, man has intellect or reason, to discern the difference between right and wrong; sensibility, to be moved by each of these; free will, to do the one or the other. Intellect, sensibility, and will are man's three faculties. But in connection with these faculties there is a sort of activity which involves them all, and without which there can be no moral action, namely, the activity of conscience. Conscience applies the moral law to particular cases in our personal experience, and proclaims that law as binding upon us. Only a rational and sentient being can be truly moral ; yet it does not come within our province to treat of man's intellect or sensibility in general. We speak here only of Conscience and of Will.

1. Conscience.

As already intimated, conscience is not a separate faculty, like intellect, sensibility, and will, but rather a mode in which these faculties act. Like consciousness, conscience is an accompanying knowledge. Conscience is a knowing of self (including our acts and states) in connection with a moral standard, or law. Adding now the element of feeling, we may say that conscience is man's consciousness of his own moral relations, together with a peculiar feeling in view of them. It thus involves the combined action of the intellect and of the sensibility, and that, in view of a certain class of objects, viz.: right and wrong.

But we need to define more narrowly both the intellectual and the emotional elements in conscience. As respects the intellectual element, we may say that conscience is a power of judgment—it declares our acts or states to conform, or not to conform, to law; it declares the acts or states which conform to be obligatory — those which do not conform, to be forbidden. In other words, conscience judges: (1) This is right (or wrong); (2) I ought (or I ought not). In connection with this latter judgment, there comes into view the emotional element of conscience—we feel the claim of duty; there is an inner sense that the wrong must not be done. Thus conscience is (1) discriminative, and (2) impulsive.

The nature and office of conscience will be still more clearly perceived if we distinguish it from other processes and operations with which it is too often confounded. The term conscience has been used by various writers to designate either one or all of the following: 1. Moral intuition—the intuitive perception of the difference between right and wrong, as opposite moral categories. 2. Accepted law—the application of the intuitive idea to general classes of actions, and the declaration that these classes of actions are right or wrong, apart from our individual relation to them. This accepted law is the complex product of (a) the intuitive idea, (6) the logical intelligence, (c) experiences of utility, (d) influences of society and education, and (e) positive divine revelation. 3. Judgment—applying this accepted law to individual and concrete cases in our own experience, and pronouncing our own acts or states either past, present, or prospective, to be right or wrong. 4. Command—authoritative declaration of obligation to do the right, or forbear the wrong, together with an impulse of the sensibility away from the one, and toward the other. 5. Remorse or approval —moral sentiments either of approbation or disapprobation, in view of past acts or states, regarded as wrong or right. 6. Fear or hope—instinctive disposition of disobedience to expect punishment, and of obedience to expect reward.

From what has been previously said, it is evident that only 3. and 4. are properly included under the term conscience. Conscience is the moral judiciary of the soul—the power within of judgment and command. Conscience must judge according to the law given to it, and therefore, since the moral standard accepted by the reason may be imperfect, its decisions, while relatively just, may be absolutely unjust.—1. and 2. belong to the moral reason, but not to conscience proper. Hence the duty of enlightening and cultivating the moral reason, so that conscience may have a proper standard of judgment.—5. and 6. belong to the sphere of moral sentiment, and not to conscience proper. Since conscience, in the proper sense, gives uniform and infallible judgment that the right is supremely obligatory, and that the wrong must be forborne at every cost, it can be called an echo of God's voice, and an indication in man of that which is supreme in the nature of God. Its office is to "bear witness" (Rom. 2 :15).

In Rom. 2 :15—" thej shew the work of the lav written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them"—we have conscience clearly distinguished both from the law and the perception of law on the one hand, and from the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation on the other. Conscience dors not furnish the law, but it bears witness with the law which Is furnished by other sources. It Is not "that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each Individual " (Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 77) nor can we speak of " Conscience, the Law" (as Whewell does in his Elements of Morality, 1:269-268). Conscience Is not the lawbook, in the court room, but it is the judge—whose business is, not to make law, but to decide cases according to the law given to him.

As conscience Is not legislative, so It is not retributive; as It Is not the law-book, so It is not the sheriff. We say, indeed, in popular language, that conscience scourges or chastises, but it is only in the sense in which we say that the judge punishes—i. e. through the sheriff. The moral sentiments are the sheriff—they carry out the decisions of conscience, the judge; but they are not themselves conscience, any more than the sheriff is the Judge.

Only this doctrine, that conscience does not discover law, can explain on the one hand the fact that men are bound to follow their consciences, and on the other hand the fact that their consciences so greatly differ as to what is right or wrong in particular cases. The truth Is, that conscience is uniform and infallible, In the sense that it always decides rightly according to the law given it. Men's decisions vary, only because the moral reason has presented to the conscience different standards by which to Judge.

Conscience can be educated only In the sense of acquiring greater facility and quickness In making Its decisions. Education has its chief effect, not upon the conscience, but upon the moral reason, in rectifying its erroneous or imperfect standards of judgment. Give conscience a right law by which to Judge, and its decisions will be uniform, and absolutely as well as relatively Just. We are bound, not only to "follow our conscience," but to have a right conscience to follow—and to follow It, not as one follows the beast he drives, but as the soldier follows bis commander.

Conscience Is the con-knowing of a particular act or state, as coming under the law accepted by the reason as to right and wrong; and the judgment of conscience subsumes this act or state under that general standard. Conscleuee cannot include the law—cannot itself lie the law—because reason only knows, never co»-knows. Keason says scio; only judgment says atnscio.

This view enables us to reconcile the intuitional and the empirical theories of morals. Each has its element of truth. The original sense of right and wrong Is intuitive—no education could ever impart the idea of the difference between right and wrong to one who had it not. Hut what classes of things arc right or wrong, we learn by the exercise of our logical intelligent*;, in connection with experiences of utility, Influences of society and tradition, and positive divine revelation. Thus our moral reason, through a combination of intuition and education, of internal and external information as to general principles of right and wrong, furnishes the standard according to which conscience may Judge the particular cases which come before it.

This moral reason may become depraved by sin, so that the light becomes darkness ( Bit. 6 : 22, 23) and conscience has only a perverse standard by which to judge. The "weak" conscience (1 Cor. 8 : 12) is one whose standard of judgment is yet imperfect; the conscience "branded" (Rev. Vers.) or "seared" ( A. V.) "as with a hot iron" (I Tim. 4 : 2) is one whose standard has been wholly perverted by practical disobedience. The word and the Spirit of God are the chief agencies in rectifying our standards of judgment, andso of enabling conscience to make absolutely right decisions. God can so unite the soul to Christ, that it becomes partaker on the one hand of his satisfaction to justice and is thus "sprinkled from an enl conscience" (Heh. 10 : 22), and on the other hand of his sanctifying power and is thus enabled in certain respects to obey God's command and to speak of a "good conscience" (1 Pet. 3 :16—of single act; 3 : 21- of state) insteud of an "cTil conscience" (Heb. 10 : 22) or a conscience "denied" (Tit. 1:15) by sin. Here the "good conscience" is the conscience which has been obeyed by the will, and the "eril conscience" the conscience which has been disobeyed; with the result. In the first case, of approval from the moral sentiment*, and, in the second case, of disapproval.

The conscience of the regenerate man may have such right standards, and its decisions may be followed by such uniformly right action, that its voice, though it is not Itself God's voice, is yet the very echo of God's voice. The renewed conscience may take up unto itself, and may express, tho witness of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 9:1—"1 say the truth in Christ, I lie not, mj conscience bearing witness with me in the Holy Ghost"; cf. 8 : 16—" the Spirit himself beareth witness with oar spirit, that we are children of God " ).

But even when conscience judges according to imperfect standards, and is imperfectly obeyed by the will, there is a spontaneity in its utterances and a sovereignty In its commands. It declares that whatev er is right must be done. The imperative of conscience Is a " categorical imperative " (Kant). It is independentof the human will. Even when disobeyed, it still asserts its authority. Before conscience, ever}' other impulse and affection of man's nature is called to bow.

Yet conscience is not an original authoritj-. "The authority of conscience" is an abbreviated form of expression for the authority of the moral law, or rather, the authority of the personal God, of whose nature the law is but a transcript. Conscience, therefore, with its continual and supreme demand that that which is right should be done, furnishes the best witness to man of the existence of a personal God, and of the supremacy of holiness in him in whose image we are made.

On the New Testament passages with regard to conscience, see Hofmann, Lehre von <3em Gewissen, 30-38; KBhler, Das Gewissen, 225-293. For the view that conscience is primarily the cognitive or intuitional power of the soul, see Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, "7; Alexander, Moral Science, 20; McCosh, Dlv. Gov't, 297-312; Talbot, Ethical Prolegomena, in Bap. Quar., July, 1877 : 257-274; Park, Discourses, 280-296; Whowell, Elements of Morality, 1: 259-266. On the whole subject of conscience, see Mansel, Metaphysics, 158-170; Martlneau, Religion and Materialism, 45—"The discovery of duty is as distinctly relative to an objective Righteousness as the perception of form to an external space."

Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 283-885, Moral Science, 49, Law of Love, 41—" Conscience is the moral consciousness of man in view of his own actions as related to moral law. It is a double knowledge of self and of the law. Conscience is not the whole of the moral nature. It r/resupposes the moral reason, which recognizes the moral law and affirms its universal obligation for all moral beings. It is the office of conscience to bring man into personal relation to this law. It sets up a tribunal within him by which his own actions are judged. Not conscience, but the moral reason, judges of the conductor others. This last is science, but not cnnncience." Wayland, Moral Science, ■49; Harless, Christian Ethics, 45, 60; H. N. Day, Science of Ethics, 17; Janet, Theory of Morals, 264, 348; Kant, Metaphyslc of Ethics, 62; cf. Schwogler, Hist. Philosophy, 233; Haven, Mor. Pbilos., 41; Fairchild, Mor. Phil., 75; Gregory, Christian Ethics, 71.

Peabody, Moral Philos., 41-60—" Conscience not a source, but a means, of knowledge. Analogous to consciousness. A judicial faculty. Judges according to the law before It. Verdict (varum dictum) always relatively right, although, by the absolute standard of right, it may be wrong. Like all perceptive faculties, educated by use (not by increase of knowledge only, for man may act worse, the more knowledge he has). For absolutely right decisions, conscience is dependent upon knowledge. To recognize conscience as J*ffisIa(or (as well as Judge), is to fail to recognize any objective standard of right." The Two Consciences, 46, 47—" Conscience the Law, and Conscience the Witness. The latter is the true and proper Conscience."

H. B. 8mith, System of Christ. Theology, 178-191—"The unity of conscience Is not in Its being one faculty or in its performing one function, but in its having one object, its

relation to one idea, viz. right The term 'conscience' no more designates a special

faculty than the term ' religion' does (or than the 'aesthetic sense').... The existence of conscience proves a moral law above us; it leads logically to a Moral Governor;.... it implies an essential distinction between right and wrong, an Immutable morality;.... yet needs to be enlightened;.... men may be conscientious in Iniquity;.... conscience

is not righteousness; this may only show the greatness of the depravity, having

conscience, and yet ever disobeying it."

2. Will.

A. Will defined.—Will is the soul's power to choose between motives and to direct its subsequent activity according to the motive thus chosen— in other words, the soul's power to choose both an end and the means to attain it. The choice of an ultimate end we call immanent preference; the choice of means we call executive volition.

B. Will and other faculties.—(a) We accept the threefold division of human faculties into intellect, sensibility, and will, (b) Intellect is the soul knowing; sensibility is the soul feeling (desires, affections); will is the soul choosing (end or means), (c) In every act of the soul, all the faculties act. Knowing involves feeling and willing; feeling involves knowing and willing; willing involves knowing and feeling, (d) Logically, each latter faculty involves the preceding action of the former: the soul must know before feeling; must know and feel before willing, (e) Yet since knowing and feeling are activities, neither of these is possible without willing.

C. Will and permanent states.—(a) Though every act of the soul involves the action of all the faculties, yet in any particular action one faculty may be more prominent than the others. So we speak of acts of intellect, of affection, of will. (6) This predominant action of any single faculty produces effects upon the other faculties associated with it. The action of will gives a direction to the intellect and to the affections, as well as a permanent bent to the will itself, (c) Each faculty, therefore, has its permanent states as well as its transient acts, and the will may originate these states. Hence we speak of voluntary affections, and may with equal propriety speak of voluntary opinions. These permanent voluntary states we denominate character.

D. Will and motives.—(a) The permanent states just mentioned, when they have been once determined, also influence the will. Internal views and dispositions, and not simply external presentations, constitute the strength of motives. (6) These motives often conflict, and though the soul never acts without motive, it does notwithstanding choose between motives, and so determines the end toward which it will direct ite activities, (e) Motives are not causes, which compel the will, but influences, which persuade it. The power of these motives, however, is proportioned to the strength of will which has entered into them and has made them what they are.

E. Will and contrary choice.—(a) Though no act of pure will is possible, the soul may put forth single volitions in a direction opposed to its previous ruling purpose, and thus far man has the power of a contrary choice (Rom. 7 : 18—"to will is present with me"). (6) But in so far as will has entered into and revealed itself in permanent states of intellect and sensibility and in a settled bent of the will itself, man cannot by a single act reverse his moral state, and in this respect lias not the power of a contrary choice, (c) In this latter case he can change his character only indirectly, by turning his attention to considerations fitted to awaken opposite dispositions, and by thus summoning up motives to an opposite course.

F. Will and responsibility.—(a) By repeated acts of will put forth in a given moral direction, the affections may become so confirmed in evil or in good as to make previously certain, though not necessary, the future good or evil action of the man. Thus, while the will is free, the man may be the "bondservant of sin" (John 8 : 31-36) or the "servant of righteousness" (Rom. 6 : 15-23; c/. Heb. 12 : 23—"spirits of just men made perfect"). (6) Man is responsible for all effects of will, as well as for will itself; for voluntary affections, as well as for voluntary acts; for the intellectual views into which will has entered, as well as for the acts of will by which these views have been formed in the past or are maintained in the present (2 Pet. 3 : 5—" wilfully forget").

G. Inferences from this view of the will.—(a) We can be responsible for the voluntary evil affections with which we are born, and for the will's inherited preference of selfishness, only upon the hypothesis that we originated these states of the affections and will, or had a part in originating them. Scripture furnishes this explanation, in its doctrine of Original Sin, or the doctrine of a common apostasy of the race in its first father, and our derivation of a corrupted nature by natural generation from him. (ft) While there remains to man, even in his present condition, a natural power of will by which he may put forth transient volitions externally conformed to the divine law and so may to a limited extent modify his character, it still remains true that the sinful bent of his affections is not directly under his control; and this bent constitutes a motive to evil so constant, inveterate, and powerful, that it actually influences every member of the race to reaffirm his evil choice, and renders necessary a special working of God's Spirit upon his heart to ensure his salvation. Hence the Scripture doctrine of Regeneration.

For references, and additional statements with regard to the will and its freedom, see chapter on Decrees, pages 177, 178, and article by A. H. Strong in Ilaptlst Review, 1883: 219-242, on Modified Calvinism, or Remainders of Freedom In Man. In the remarks upon the Decrees, we have intimated our rejection of the Arminlan liberty of indifference, or the doctrine that the will can act without motive. Sec this doctrine advocated In Pea body, Moral Philosophy, 1-9. But we also reject the theory of determinism propounded by Jonathan Edwards (Freedom of the Will, in Works, vol. 2), which, as we have before remarked, Identifies sensibility with the will, regards affections as the efficient causes of volitions, and speaks of the connection between motive and action as a necessary one. Hazard, Man a Creative First Cause, and The Will, 407—" Edwards (fives to the controlling cause of volition in the past the name of motive. He treats the Inclination as a motive, but he also makes inclination synonymous with choice and will, which would make will to be only the soul willing -and therefore the cause of Its own act." For objections to the Arminlan theory, see H. B. Smith, Review of Whedon, in Faith and Philosophy, SW-399: MeCosh, Divine Government, 283-318, esp. 312.

We subjoin quotations from writers with whom, upon the subject of the will, we substantially agree. Julius Mtlller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:54—"A being is free, in so far as the inner centre of its life, from which it acts, is conditioned by self-determination. It is not enough that the deciding agent in an act be the man himself, his own nature, his distinctive character. In order to accountability, we must have more than this: we must prove that this, his distinctive nature and character, springs from his own volition, and that it Is itself the product of freedom in moral development. M»t 12 : 33—"m«ie the tree good, and its fruit good "—combines both. Acts depend upon nature: but nature again depends upon the primary decisions of the will ( " m«ko tie tree good "). Some determinism is not denied; but It Is partly limited [ by the will's remaining power of choice ] and partly traced back to a former self-determining." Ibid, 67—"If freedom be the selfdetermining of the will from that which is undetermined, Determinism is found wanting,—because in Its most spiritual form, though it grants a self-determination of the will, it is only such a one as springs from a determinatencss already present; and Indifferentlsm is found wanting too, because while it maintains indeterminateness as presupposed In every act of will, it does not recognize an actual self-determining on the part of the will, which, though It be a self-determining, yet begets determlnnteness

of character We must therefore hold the doctrine of a contlltUmal and limitetl

freedom."

Fisher, chapter on the Personality of God, in Grounds of Theistlc and Christian llellef —" Self-determination, as the very term signifies, is attended with an irresistible conviction that the direction of the will Is self-imparted .... That the will Is free, that is, not constrained by causes exterior, which is fatalism—and not a mere spontaneity, confined to one path by a force acting from within, which is f/ctermf litem—is immediately evident to every unsophisticated mind. Wo can Initiate action by an efficiency which is neither Irresistibly controlled by motives, nor determined, without any capacity of alternative action, by a proneness inherent in its nature Motives have an influence, bu^ influence Is not to be confounded with causal efficiency."

Talbot, on Will and Free Will, Bap. Rev., July, 1882—" Will is neither a power of unconditioned self-determination—which is not freedom, but an aimless, irrational, fatalistic power: nor pure spontaneity—which excludes from will all law but Its own; but it is rather a power of originating action—a power which is limited however by inborn dispositions, by acquired habits and convictions, by feelings and social relations." Ernest Naville, in Rev. Chretienne, Jan., 1878 : 7—" Our liberty does not consist in producing an action of which it is the only source. In consist* in choosing between two pretfxistent impulses. It is choice, not creation, that is our destiny—a drop of water that can choose whether it will go into the Rhine or the Rhone. Gravity carries it down—it chooses only its direction. Impulses do not come from the will, but from the sensibility; but free will chooses between these impulses." Bowne, Metaphysics, 169—" Freedom is not a power of acting without, or apart from, motives, but simply a power of choosing an end or law, and of governing one's self accordingly."

Porter, Moral Science, 77-111: Will Is "not a power to choose without motive." It "does not exclude motives to the contrary." Volition "supposes two or more objects between which election Is made. It is an act of preference, and to prefer implies that

one motive Is chosen to the exclusion of another To the conception and the act two

motives at least are required." Lyall, Intellect, Emotions, and Moral Nature, 581, 592— "The will follows reasons, inducements—but it is not cawietl. It obeys or acts under Inducement, but It does so sovereignly. It exhibits the phenomena of activity, in relation to the very motive it obeys. It obeys it, rather than another. It determines, In reference to it, that this is the very motive it will obey. There Is undoubtedly this phenomenon exhibited: the will obeying—but elective, active, in its obedience. If it be asked how this is possible—how the will can be under the influence of motive, and yet possess an intellectual activity—we reply that this is one of those ultimate phenomena which must be admitted, while they cannot be explained."

Mind, Oct., 1882: 567- " Kant seems to be In quest of the phantasmal freedom which is supposed to consist in the absence of determination by motives. The error of the determinists from which this idea is the recoil, Involves an equal abstraction of the man from his thoughts, and interprets the relation between the two as an instance of the mechanical causality which exists between two things in nature. The point to be grasped in the controversy is that a man and bis motives are one, and that consequently

he is in every Instance self-determined Indeterministn is tenable only If an ego

can be found which is not an ego already determinate; but such an ego, though it may be logically distinguished and verbally expressed, is not a factor in psychology." Morell, Mental Philosophy, 390—" Motives determine the will, and so far the will is not free; but the man governs the motives, allowing them a less or a greater power of influencing his life, and no far the man is a free agent."

Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 349-107—" Action without motives, or contrary to all motives, would be irrational action. Instead of being free, it would be like the convulsions of epilepsy. Motives = sensibilities. Motive is not came; does not determine; is only influence. Yet determination is always made under the influence of motives. Uniformity of action is not to be explained by any law of uniform Influence of motives, but by character in the will. By Its choice, will forms in itself a character; by action in accordance with this choice, it confirms and develops the character. Choice modifies sensibilities, and so modifies motives. Volitional action expresses character, but also forms and modifies it. Man may change his choice; yet intellect, Bensibility, motive, habit, remain. Evil choice, having formed Intellect and sensibility into accord with itself, must be a powerful hindrance to fundamental change by new and contrary choice; and gives small ground to expect that man left to himself ever will make the change. After will has acquired character by choices. Its determinations are not transitions from complete indctermlnateness or Indifference, but are more or less expressions of character already formed. The theory that indifference is essential to freedom implies that will never acquires character; that voluntary action Is atomistic; that every act is disintegrated from every other; that character, if acquired, would be Incompatible with freedom. Character is a choioe, yet a choice which persists, which modifies sensibility and intellect, and which influences subsequent determinations."

See also H. B. Smith, System of Christ. Theol., 238-261; Mansel, Proleg. Log., 113-155, 270-278, and Metaphysics, 366; Gregory, Christian Ethics, 80: Abp. Manning, in Contemp. Rev., Jan., 1871 : 468; Ward, Philos. of Theism, 1 : 287-352; 2: 1-79, 274-349; chapter in Lotze's Outlines of Philosophy, vol. 3; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884 : 69-96; Row, Man ngt a Machine, in Present Day Tracts, 5: no. 30; Santayuna: "A free man, because he is free, may make himself a slave; but onoe a slave, because he Is a slave, he cannot make himself free." Richards, Lectures on Theology, 97-153; Solly, The Will, 167-203; William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, in Unitarian Review, Sept., 1884; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 90-159.