Note 1, page 26.

We need only mention the investigations recently instituted into the Ignatian Epistles, to which occasion was given by Cureton's discovery of the Syriac Recension, which is the shortest that has hitherto come to light:—specially the labours of Bunsen, Ritschl, and Weiss, on the one hand, and of Baur and Uhlhorn on the other. Much new light is also thrown on the intellectual movements in the Syrian Church during the first centuries, by the recently discovered work, edited by Miller of Oxford under the false title of 'flpvyevoisi <f>i\aao<povfieva. To this treasure, which dates from the commencement of the third century, Bunsen directs attention in his "Hippolytus und seine Zeit" (see vol. i. of German edition), and justly praises it as of great importance, relatively to both criticism and history.—The correctness of the historical and critical point of view from which the subject of Christology was considered in the first volume of this work, has received ample confirmation from this unexpected discovery. Specially, confirmation has been brought of the important thesis, that, in the ancient Christian Church, an Ebionitic Christology was never dominant; although it is undeniable that a doctrine of the deity of Christ, unconnected with the doctrine of the Trinity, existed for a long time, and was widely diffused ;—that is, there existed a species of Monarchianism, which at first bore a resemblance to Patripassianism, and then gradually inclined to Sabellianism (Sec. 3), after it had become plain, in the second century, that the Logos-doctrine, in its development, was unable to offer any lasting resistance thereto.— We may still expect further disclosures in respect to the Syrian Church, if success do but attend the efforts which are being made to reconstruct the history of the ecclesiastical constitution of Syria; materials for which are afforded partly by the Antiocheian text of the "Apostolic Constitutions," and partly by the treasures of ancient Syriac literature contained in the British Museum. New light may be expected to be thus thrown also on the Pseudo-Clementines. Compare Bunsen's Hippolytus, vol. i. 418 ff. (German edition); Bickell's "Geschichte des Kirchenrechts," 1843, pp. 63, 185 f., 215 ff.

Note 2, page 29.

As might be expected from this its tendency, which was stimulated to activity and set into ferment, in innumerable ways, by the religious doctrines and the spirit of the neighbouring peoples, the Church of Eastern Syria manifested a special productivity in connection with hymnology, liturgies, and the construction of ritus and constitutions, for the Church. No wonder, therefore, that the Ignatian Epistles, with whose spirit Ephraem, in particular, was as it were baptized, should have taken specially strong hold on these districts, and, through the medium of an early translation, have there found a second home. The intercourse between the two parts of Syria (as also between the whole of Syria and Egypt) was in other respects also, lively. In both divisions of Syria, the Greek language and literature were current.

Note 3, page 30.

It is deserving of notice, that the anthropology of Apollinaris, which formed also the basis of his Christology, is substantially identical with that of James of Nisibis (compare Jacobi Nisib. vi., Sermo de Devotis, § xiii.; Galland. Bibl., T. v. pp. xlix. l.). The first generation confers merely the "spiritus animalis, qui confirmatur in ventre,"—hence the mortality of man: holy baptism bestows the spirit, which is from the Deity Himself,—that spirit which constitutes the true personality of man, and which, at the proper time, will aid in the resurrection of the body. (See above, i. pp. 992 ff.) The trichotomy of Apollinaris cannot be satisfactorily referred back to Plato. In the Platonic trichotomy Apollinaris could not have found irvevfia or vow; in the Christian sense, that is, in the sense in which those terms are applied, not merely to Christ, but also to Christians, in whom is realized the true idea of the divine image and likeness. It would appear, however, that James of Nisibis did not advance to the point of giving his doctrine a Christological application; otherwise he would have proceeded to a more distinct denial of the existence of a human soul in Christ, as we have found to be the case with Patripassianism and Sabellianism.

Note 4, page 30.

It is still more interesting to look back from the Audianites to earlier parties. From of old, patripassian representations had found a home in Mesopotamia: the Minaeans had directed their steps especially thither. (Vol. i. 305.) Even Manichaeism, which was diffused from the neighbouring country, Persia, designated the good principle "patibile." The Audianites are often represented as occupying the same platform with the Manichaeans. Theodoret informs us that they did not consider fire, water, and darkness to have been included in the divine work of creation; but this in itself is not enough to show that they held an absolute dualism. Baumgarten-Crusius, in his "Compendium der Dogmengeschichte" (1840, p. 117), maintains that the sect bears the stamp of a Judaizing theosophy, with which dualistic elements are frequently found connected. Their asceticism and their usages also have a Judaistic character:—for example, they clung firmly to the Jewish festival of Passover. Neander (see his "Church History"), who also regards them as Judaistic in tone, reminds us that fire is similarly spoken of in the Pseudo-Clementines: it is described, namely, as the element of evil. That there was a very strong Judaizing tendency in Eastern Syria, is further clear from the character of the sects which, in all probability, took their rise in those districts :—for example, the Hypsistarians (whose system Ullmann considers to have been a mixture of Judaism and Parsism); the Abelonii (from Eljon) and the Coelicolac, mentioned by Augustine; the Euphemitae and ©eoae/Sctv, mentioned by Epiphanius and Cyrill of Alexandria. On the basis of these data, the following may be taken as the probable internal and external connections of the matter. Even as early as the time of Christ, Judaism was very powerful in Adiabene, and indeed in Mesopotamia generally, and must have extraordinarily facilitated the speedy spread of Christianity in those parts (compare 1 Pet. v. 13). At the same time, however, owing to this circumstance, the Christianity of Eastern Syria must have had a Judaistic colouring for a considerable period; and that, although the Gospel was probably first proclaimed by preachers from Antioch. This must have been still more the case after intercourse had been broken off with Antioch, or after the clergy had begun to resort to Jerusalem for ordination. Further, what can be more likely, than that after the destruction of Jerusalem, under Hadrian, many Jewish Christians from Palestine would settle down in these same districts, and bring with them the ideas and pretensions they had previously cherished? More at home they could scarcely feel themselves anywhere, than in the land whose inhabitants (according to the traditions of the North) consisted for the most part of Jews of the kingdom of the Ten Tribes. Add to this, that, in the south of Mesopotamia, there were flourishing Jewish colonies, and that the feeling for a hierarchical constitution, and for the elaboration of the cultus, had early worked. It is possible that the Christians of East Syria were acting under the influence of the Pseudo-Clementine literature or thoughts, when, about the middle of the second century, they constituted themselves into an independent National Church (Assem. iii. 2, 612), with an archbishop at its head, the seat of whose see was Seleucia.—But both the Judaism and the Christianity of Eastern Syria were particularly in danger of undergoing disintegration, partly from their action upon each other, and partly from the action upon them of the religious systems prevailing in those districts, which were for the most part somewhat characterized by dualistic and emanatistic elements. Whilst these circumstances rendered an hierarchy the more necessary, they also put it out of the power of any hierarchy to prevent a multitude of sects breaking loose from its authority. All the above-mentioned sects bear a certain family likeness to each other. The older ones—as, for example, the Melchisedekians, the Audianites, and the Messalians—combined Judaistical elements, both of a doctrinal and practical nature, with dualistic, after the manner of the Clementines. The remaining sects went back to a primal revelation; designated Adam, Melchisedek, Moses, Christ, and others, prophets of the Most High God (having in this respect some affinity with the Clementines and the Melchisedekians); and thus developed a kind of religious syncretism, on a groundwork which was gradually more and more purged of dualistic elements. So the Hypsistarians (a name derived from ©eo9 {hfnaros, PyJ? <>K, Gen. xiv. 18), who regarded fire and light as an emanation of the good principle, and kept the Sabbath (Jewish); and the Coelicolae and Oeoaefieh of the fourth and the fifth centuries. That such sects, existing near the confines of Arabia in the fifth century, must have prepared the way for Muhammedanism, with its syncretistic doctrine of a primal revelation, and its acknowledgment of a diversity of prophets, needs no more detailed elucidation. Side by side with these sects, however, there existed in East Syria a powerful and flourishing Church, especially in the fourth century. Although the above-mentioned parties did not fail to act upon this Church, it developed a very distinct character of its own, and through its peculiar character, subsequently to the second half of the fourth century, exercised considerable influence, first over the West Syrian, and afterwards over other portions of the Christian Church. The vehicle of this influence was, in particular, the monastic system and mode of life, which had struck firm roots in Eastern Syria, and diffused itself from thence ever more widely through Western Syria; and the adherents of which devoted their attention very largely to scientific questions. It would probably repay the labour, to renew the inquiry into the origin of the Pseudo-Clementines, on the basis of the data just furnished.

Note 5, page 32.

How far does Theodore advance in this respect beyond Origen, with whom (as with the anthropological views of the Clementines) he has, in other matters, as much affinity! For if man is higher than pure spirits, the supposition is inevitable, that matter confers upon spirit a further advantage, of which it would be otherwise destitute. The controversy with Dualism and Manichaeism, carried on with such zeal by the school of Antioch, must unquestionably have contributed materially to this result. Diodorus (see Phot. Cod. 83) had written twentyfive books against the Manichaeans; so also against the el/iapuivtj; in which connection he discussed both the Dualists and Bardesanes (Cod. 223). Theodore wrote against the Magism of Persia (Cod. 81); and, at the same time, gave an exposition of the doctrine of Zoroaster, opposing to it the cosmogony of Moses. It was in the course of this struggle that the Antiocheian teachers were driven to emphasize so strongly the unity of the world, and to the rejection of the Origenistic doctrine of matter. This point also determined Theodore's relation to Augustinianism, with which he was acquainted solely through Hieronymus Ara-m (Phot. Cod. 177).

Note 6, page 34.

The descendants of Adam sin, not <f>vae(. but yinofiy (see Phot. Cod. 177, p 121, and my Dissertation, pp. 19 ff.). They still possess freedom, and the knowledge of good and evil (p. 14, Note 17). But the tie between body and soul, which in Adam, though dissoluble, did still really exist, was loosened, and almost completely broken, when they entered on their possession. And the result of this independence of the mortal body, with its desires and its mutability, has been, that the freedom of all alike is exposed to assaults and temptations. Even at this point, Theodore diverges from Pelagius, and allows the existence of an inherited defect in the descendants of Adam, although he acknowledges no sin, save where a free act has really been performed. He further appears to resemble Pelagius in teaching, that Adam was subjected to the necessity of dying; though here again there is the difference, that he traces the necessity of death, to which Adam was subjected from the moment of creation, to the Divine foreknowledge of the fall. Because God foreknew man's career, He did what He otherwise would not have done, to wit, He created man necessarily mortal. Death would in any case, he thinks, have been introduced by sin. Adam is, it is true, thus put on an equality with us; and that not merely in reference to death, but strictly also in reference to sin. If Adam were created with the link connecting body and soul already broken, then that antagonism and indestructible enmity between body and soul, on which he in other respects lays such great stress, must have clung to Adam from the very commencement, and creation itself must have, empirically, necessarily co-operated in the origination of sin:— a yiew which would smack of supralapsarianism. This, however, he did not intend to teach; but he knew no other way of avoiding the conclusion, than by denying that the historical causalities took a natural and normal course, and by treating them docetically: he says, therefore,—It was not the innate actual mortality of Adam that produced his fall, but the freedom with which he was endowed. In like manner, on the other hand, he represents God and His creative act as the real cause of death, and consequently denies actual sin to be the veritable cause of death. That such a view reduces guilt and the real causality of sin to a mere seeming, is evident. On this point, Theodore approximated to the doctrine of an intelligible freedom, which pursues its own course, whilst the real corporeal world is, from the very commencement, bound as by an iron necessity, by the firm chain of cause and effect. (The Praeearistentianism of Origen is not to be found in his system.) We shall find that this played also an important part in connection with his Ohristology. God gave the visible world such a constitution as seemed to Him fit and just, in accordance with His foreknowledge of the use which Adam and his descendants would make of freedom. Theodore thus left the world in partial possession of unity (the mortality of the body befalls the spirit as a punishment); but if he had advanced no further than this scanty commencement, the eternization of sin and unblessedness would have been inevitable.

Note 7, page 35.

In the view of Theodore, salvation consists mainly in the fact of resurrection, and in the gift of eternal life, that is, in the overcoming of death, which is the punishment of sin ;—it is not in the victory over guilt, or over sin itself, that consists salvation. Similarly, also, though not with so conscious an exclusiveness relatively to other aspects, teachers like Athanasius had laid chief stress on the immortality gained for men by the work of Christ. From the victory over mortality, Theodore then proceeds to derive the eradication of the earthly tendency of our nature, of its disorderly and evil desires. Now that humanity has been restored by the Prince of life to a unity like the unity of God, it is possible for the Holy Spirit so to pervade men, that they P. 2.—VOL. I. 2 B

can no more apostatize and sin, but possess true freedom—the freedom of irrestrainable love. It would seem, therefore, that during their earthly life, the only part of redemption which Christians, strictly speaking, experience, is the knowledge of a salvation to come: they do not realize a present salvation, but merely receive the promise of a future salvation,—a view of the matter essentially Old Testament. This account of the office of Christ is the proper counterpart to the Ebionitic eschatological view of the Person of Christ, referred to above (see vol. i. 230 ff.). Holy baptism he regarded as containing the promise of this body of resurrection and of eternal life—hope through the Holy Spirit. For this reason, infant baptism occasioned him no embarrassment: even without recognising original sin, he found a significance in the rite—a significance, indeed, very similar to that attached to it by the disciples of John, when they baptized for a kingdom that was to come. Notwithstanding this, he held that baptism strengthens us in our earthly struggle, as a pledge of the fulfilment of the promise. He who rose again, gives us jn baptism a pledge that we also shall rise again, and that we shall be sinless, without the law, through the Holy Spirit: it is both symbol and pledge of the future regeneration,—a thing of which those who occupied a purely legal, Judaistic point of view, had not even an idea. Although he further denies the inherence of sin in children, and traces no connection between their baptism and the forgiveness of sins, he still assumes the existence of a bias (pornj) to evil in our nature, which is not fully eradicated till the resurrection (compare Phot. Cod. 177; Spicileg. Bom. ed. A. Mai, T. iv. Comment. Ep. ad Kom. p. 502 ff., 510). All that he postulates for the present world, is an imitation (jtifir^ii) of the future life Karet To Bvvarbv, the will to be pure (Comm. ad Rom. 7, 4; 6, 12; cf. Catena in Epp. ad Corinth. ed. Cramer, Ox. 1841; the note on 1 Cor. vi. 15). That a new birth takes place in the present world, he does not hold; but merely that past sins are forgiven, especially through the medium of the holy Eucharist (l. c. in connection with 1 Cor. xi. 34). The promise, however, acquires a fuller significance, because there is so sincere an intention that it shall attain realization in all. Like Origen, he taught that there would be an airoKaTaaraais; but differed from Origen, in believing that it would be a per

manent one (Comm. ad Rom. v. 20, iroXKol is synonymous with irdvres; compare Phot. Cod. 177), not without the just punishment of the wicked (see his remark on 1 Cor. x. 15), who will be saved merely as a brand from the fire. Freedom he treats as, in all cases, mediatively necessary to salvation: grace is imparted to those alone, concerning whom God knows that they will use their freedom well. Even after the bestowal of that pledge of hope, all depends on its being freely and faithfully guarded.

Note 8, page 39.

By Eustathius, for example (see above, vol. i. 965 ff.). The rpemov attributed to the middle being of Arianism, may perhaps have been the expression, under an abnormal and mythological form, of the ethical tendency to assert for Christ a certain independence,—an independence, it is true, such as might pertain to a mere creature. Eustathius and others relieve the confusion by which Arian representations were characterized, in so far as, by asserting for Christ a true human soul, a- fitting place was secured for the rperrrbv, whilst the Logos at the same time continued arpeirrOs. Theodore, however, first traced this Tpeirrbv of the humanity of Christ to its ethical roots, and limited it by his own profounder doctrine of freedom. Diodoms' work against the elfiapfievrj, and Theodore's against the Magusseans, formed the points of transition thereto. We may therefore be allowed to say, that an element of Arianismrnot previously properly appreciated by the teachers of the Church, and badly expounded even by Arians, endeavoured to secure for itself the recognition it deserved, by means of the school of Antioch. With regard to Paul of Samosata, compare i. 510-516.

Note 9, page 40.

In the passage cited from pp. 300 ff., after saying that the evoiKrjais must be something distinctive, he proceeds to say,— ovcla fiev ovv \eyeiv ivoiKeiv rbv Qeov Twv airpeireardrwv icrriv, for then He would be present merely as to His essence in those in whom He dwells, Kal earai Twv aKKov airavTwv e'/cro? oirep a.rOirov elirelv eVl rrj<; direipov </>uae&>?, or we must attribute His ivotKrjais to all beings, even rots 0X070i? Kox a^rv^otf, inasmuch as it would be based on His <f>vais, which is omnipresent and cannot be restricted. Oukovv oiiaia Ttjv ivoiKi)aiv \eytw yiveadai Twv evrjdearara>v av eirj. To b" avro av Ti? eXiroi K<u eVt r7/<? evepyeias, and on the same ground. TV ovv apa mo\eiirerai; rivi %pr)a6p,eda \oytp o? em Tovtojv IBid^ov <f>avurm <f>v\aaaofievos; Brj\ov ovv &•? evBoKiq. \eyeiv yiveadai Tijv evou<tf, acv irpoa/jKei. EvBoKia Be \eyerai»; dpiarrj Kai KaWtaTt) OeXrjci1; Tou Qeov fjv av iroirjaerai apeadels Toi<; dvaKeiadai cunut etnnv' BaKoacv airo Tov ev Kal Ka\d BoKelv avrm irepl airrtov. Wherefore, aireipos pev yap av Kal direplrfpa<po'; rrjv <f>vaiv fraoeari r0t9 irdai, ry Bl evBoKla ruv fiev earl pMKpdv, rStv Be C77119. Compare Col. i. 19.

Note 10, page 44.

A. Mai Coll. N. vi. 304,—tfvayro p^ev yap e£ ap^s To) 8ea 6 j<f>del<; Kara, irpoyvwaiv iK airrfj rf) Bianr\daei Tt)? fujrpa1; rrp Karapyrjv T^? ewuceo)? Bel-dfievos. This reference back to the Divine irpoyva>ai<; is a remnant of the Christology of Origen. But that there ever was a real moment in which Christ had made Himself worthy of union with the Logos by His own virtue, is no longer assumed :—such a purely human life, is merely held to have existed as a thought of the Divine mind. At the same time, the knowledge that Christ, even independently of an original union with the Logos, would have made Himself worthy of the distinction, was the ground of the distinction actually conferred on Him by God, from the very beginning. But the passage cited, xxvi., should also be compared: according to it, irpoyvooaK is not so much "praescientia" as predestination. God would not, says he, merely out of regard for utility (ypnp1,/io? Xoyo?) have assumed a man, and so united him with Himself as that he should become an object of adoration to the whole of creation, had not the work to be accomplished through him been a common benefit to the universe.

Note 11, page 51.

It is not without interest to compare the work erroneously attributed to Justin Martyr, "EKdeai<; T^<? opdrjs iriarew (compare Pseudo-Justini Opp. ed. Otto, T. i. 1-57; and Gass in Illgen's "Hist, theol. Zeitschrift" xii. 4, p. 130 ff.), with the doctrine either of Theodore or of his school. In the matter of .the Trinity, the "Exeais, like Theodore, kept to the doctrine of the Church. In the matter of Christology, there are no traces whatever of that speculative element which laid hold of the idea of the divine image ; on the contrary, the incomprehensibility of the How 1 of the union of the two natures, is emphatically asserted (c. 14). And yet the path into which the writer strikes, despite all his caution, is substantially the same as that pursued by Theodore. Significant especially are such expressions as. the following: vaos (c. 13), evBoKia. (c. 15), etc. (C. 10),—6 Aoyosrtjv (rrjs irapdevov) vijBvv eloSii<; olovei rt<? delo<; cnropos ir\drrei, vabv eavrm Tov Te\eiov avdpamov, /iepos Ti \a/3d>i/ Tt;? iKeiw)s <pvaea>s, Kal ei? Tijv Tov vaov BiMirXaacv ovaubaas. 'EvBiis 8e axrrov Kar aKpav evaxnv, 0eo? of&ov Km avdptairo'; irpoe\dwv ovrw Ttjv Kaff rjfia<; olKovofilav eKjpioaeu. That the avdpanros, the reKeios avdpanros, is not here mentioned by mistake instead of the dvdpa>'rrivr) <f>vai<;} is evident from the circumstance, that he only partially approved of the comparison drawn from the relation of the body to the souk as applied, to Christology', although it was so much in vogue. It is appropriate, he remarks, in so far as man is one, and yet consists of two natures, with one of which he thinks, with the other executes: for Christ also is one; and with one of his natures He performed miracles, in the other He abased Himself;—both which parts of His life are to be carefully discriminated and strictly distributed between the two natures. This principle in itself puts a decided limit on the Kowwvia of the two natures. But then he goes on to say,—In another respect, the comparison halts; for, concerning man, although he has a double nature, we cannot say—he is the two natures; but merely, he has them, he consists of them. Furthermore, man is a third something in addition to the two natures of which he consists, town, the real unity which combines them together; even as a house is not the building material, nor the plan, but is the union of the two. Christ, on the contrary, does not consist of deity and humanity, in the sense of His being a new third something in addition to the two aspects, but He is simply the two, both God and man; that is, He is just their arithmetical sum. Further, the soul is able to suffer along with the body; but it is absurd to affirm such a thing of the deity in Christ. But still the author puts the question exactly as it presented itself to Theodore, namely,—If the entire Logos were in Christ, how

could He at the same time be in the world as to His essence? And if the Logos was omnipresent, in agreement with the nature of God, what remained for the temple of the Logos t He gives the following answer:—As the universal light, which was everywhere diffused, was created in the beginning; and as then the solar body was created, in order that the general light might be concentrated in it without thereby undergoing any change of substance, though destined to be indissolubly united with, and to shine by, it: so likewise the connection between the Logos and human nature was indissoluble after the Unio; the oue Son can now no more be separately termed Divine Logos, and the other Son, Man, but there is one Sonship; even as light and its vehicle constitute one Sun (c. 12). But the question returns again,—How came the temple (Christ's humanity) to such a distinguished, yea, of its kind, unique, participation in the Logos, if the Logos dwell indeed in all things as to His essence? (c. 15 ft). At this point he argues zealously against those who, hr avaipkaei Tu>v Bvo <f>vaea>v, wish to bring about a Kpaais, avy^yais, a /jwaftoj airb awficiTOS els deoTTjra, an ovaiwdrjvai of the <rapi- in the X070?: in the same connection also, he rejects the formula, capita Tw \oyov yeyanjadai (compare Theodore in A. Mai Coll. Nov. vi. l. c. Nro. viii.). In fact, the relative independence of the humanity of Christ is given as the reason why the Logos, who, in respect of His essence, is omnipresent, could dwell in Christ in a peculiar and unique way In this case, the law holds good, that although the sun shines everywhere, and everywhere alike, an impure body cannot receive its rays. Of the rays which this sun sends forth for all alike, he who has strong eyes receives the larger number; not as though the sun diffused its rays more over him than over others, but because of the strength of his own eyes, and because he whose eyes are weak cannot bear the brightness of the light. So also the Sun of Righteousness, in that it is God, is present with all in like measure as to its essence; but we all, through our weakness and impurity, are unable to bear the entrance of the Logos. On the contrary, the temple which the Logos inhabits as His own, is, as it were, the purest possible eye, and can take in the full brightness of His light;—for His temple was formed of the Holy Ghost without sin (c. 17).

That concentrated revelation or appearance of the Logos, whose end was the salvation and the organic articulation of humanity, did not demand for its accomplishment, therefore, that He should Himself cease to be essentially present in the All;—the Logos remained as He was, both in Himself and in His activity, but had a different existence in Jesus from His existence in the universe, in so far as His light found in Jesus an eye of the purest and most susceptible kind, an eye prepared by the Holy Spirit. This humanity abides; it participates in the divine dignity (a^la), though not in the divine nature, according to the good pleasure of the Logos (evBoKia: c. 15). A comparison somewhat suggestive of the one just adduced, may be found employed by Gregory of Nyssa (Or. Cat. M. c. 10):— The infinite Logos is not imprisoned within Christ's soul and body, any more than light is confined to a torch. The flame, indeed, is indissolubly joined to the inroKel/JAvov, to the substratum of the torch, but the light is not therefore imprisoned.— The difference between this Christology and Theodore's may, on the whole, be said to consist in its laying greater stress on the divine evBoKia, regarded in the light of a decree, than upon the freedom of Christ. Produced within the limits of the Church, this work shows how near theologians who took their stand on the principles of the Council of Chalcedon, might approximate to the school of Antioch, through the very earnestness of their antagonism to Monophysitism.

Note 12, page 66.

T. v. 2, p. 705,—o X070? eveirXdjaj vapid: p. 708,—e« h> af>ufxo avWeywv Kal a>enrep aWifiuus dvaKipvas To>v <pvaewv IBuofiara. 711,—The Logos remained what He was, both in time and in the flesh; as 0eo? Kara <pvaiv evwdeU aapKl Kal ra 777? ISlas <pvaeios dyadd KoivoiroieZv etwde To> IBUp adifiari. 712,—fiovovox/)(i avvayeipeL ra? <f>vaei<i Kal et'9 utaydyKeiav dyet rSsv eKarepa irpeirovra>v IBta>fidrwv rr)v Bvvafiiv. Homil. xvii. pp. 226, 228. Ep. ad Monach. p. 9; avvBeBpaa^Kora els evorryra cpvaiKqv. Ep. ad Acac. p. 115,— Prior to the evioais there were two natures; uerd Be ye rrjv evwaiv a>s dvrjprjaevrjs tfBrj rijs ek Bvo Biarofifjs ulav elvai inarevofiev rrjv Tov vlov <f>vaiv to? evos irKrjp ivapdpayir^aavros. He is not content merely with the recognition of <f>vaea>v To Bidcj>opov, even after the incarnation; he is willing, indeed, still to allow that there are diverse utterances (tf>wvhs), divine and human predicates, but demands for both classes of predicates one common centre of unity (<£wr«r), p. 119. Kpaais, rpoirfj, <f>vp/ib<; he repudiates (p. 718); and yet he frequently employs the simile of wine mixed with water. Homil. xvii. p. 228; Dial. 9, p. 776.

Note 13, page 75.

For details, see Neander's " Church History," vol. 4, 913 ff. 921 (German edition). A common Confession of Faith the Egyptians- at Ephesus refused to agree to, on account of the Orientals who were present at the Synod. And yet Cyrill afterwards entered into negotiations regarding the Confession of Faith of the very same men. The " Confession of Faith of the Orientals," which Cyrill subscribed in the year 432, draws. a sharp distinction between the two natures, teaches no eva>ai s <pvaud), no fila ^wi? after the incarnation, no natural Son of God according to the human aspect; but one Son of God, one Lord and Christ, in agreement with the union of the natures without mixture; and it allows to Mary the title deor6Ko<;. On the other hand, however, in the later negotiations, Cyrill was not compelled to recall his anathemas: the judgment of deposition pronounced at Ephesus against Nestorius was also, at a subsequent period, accepted by the Orientals, with few exceptions. That judgment, it is true, as we learn from Ep. Cyr. 34 ad Acac., charged Nestorius with teaching that there were two Christs;—a doctrine which might, indeed, be deducible from, but was not explicitly set forth in, his writings, as is allowed even by learned Roman Catholics; for example, by Enhuber, in his Dissertation appended to Alcuin's Opp. T. i., Regensb. 1777. This unhistorical representation of Nestorius' teachings was then handed down from century to century through a long period.—From what has been advanced, it is also clear, that the obligation to accept the decrees of the Council of Ephesus, still occasionally enforced by law, related to an object of an extremely uncertain and indefinite character. One thing alone may be confidently affirmed, that the party which conquered at Ephesus in the year 431, stood much nearer to Cyrill, and consequently to the doctrine of fila <f>vais, than to the Antiocheians and to the Chalcedoniah Dyophysitism, with which even a Theodoret might have been content.

Note 14, page 77.

The Nestorians took firmest root in Assyria and Chaldaea; hence also they have been termed Chaldsean, Assyrian, or Oriental Christians. The usages of the Chaldsean Christians contain many ancient elements, which remind us of Jewish Christianity. Their liturgy was celebrated in the evening,—a circumstance which seems to point to the old division of the day; and they reject celibacy. In Chaldsea they still offer sacrifices of thanksgiving or in the fulfilment of vows, offerings of the first fruits; they observe the laws of the Old Testament relating to food and purification; and in their sanctuaries is a recess entitled the Holy of Holies, which is not entered. (Compare Grant's "Nestorians, or the Ten Tribes;" Lechler's " Das apostolische und nachapostolische Zeitalter," 1851, p. 302.) They themselves, and the Jews also, consider themselves to be of Jewish extraction, and style themselves Nazarenes. Nestorianism would thus seem to have been ingrafted, as an homogeneous branch, on an old Judaiaing stem with remarkable results. About the end of the eighth century, according to some, Babseus (Assem. iii. 429), according to others (Assem. ii. 406), Acacius, as Patriarch of Seleucia, passed over to the Nestorians, and brought their ecclesiastical arrangements into order, by means of a Synod in the year 499. From that time onwards Nestorianism attained to supremacy in the interior of Asia, especially under the rule of the Persians. For a long period, however, the Chaldaean Christians declined to acknowledge the name Nestorians,—Acacius, even in his day, objected thereto (see Assem. ii. 407); the Monophysite Xenajas, say they, first gave them the name. They traced their rise to the Apostle Thomas (ib. 388 ff.), and considered themselves (no less the Monophysites of that district) to be the genuine inheritors of the old patriarchate of Seleucia, which was subordinate to Antioch (compare iii. 299, 587). The Chaldaean Christians maintain that no heresy has found its way into their midst, but that they have preserved the apostolic faith in its purity (iii. 298-302): they also complain that the name Nestorians was given them at a later period, and unjustly (iii. 69, 299,355, 383, 587). It appears probable, also, that the name was first introduced into Chaldsea, Persia, and Assyria, at the time of the expulsion of the Nestorians from the school at Edessa by Rabulas and Cyrus: Maanes, Narses, and Barsumas were especially instrumental in its introduction (iii. 303, 381). Justinian endeavoured (see Assem. iii. 632), but in vain, to lead them back into the Church. For the first time, in the seventeenth century a part of the Chaldaean Nestorians passed over to the Romish Church (Ass. iii. 621 ff.). At a later period, the fixed doctrine of the Nestorians regarding the Person of Christ became the following,—that two natures and two "Knumas," or hypostases, were conjoined into one person, "parsupa," irp6aO>irov (for example, Ass. iii. 108, 280, ii. 292, i. 550). Over the two hypostases, therefore, they set the one "parsupa," within which they, as well as the natures, are comprised as momenta. On this ground they believed themselves able, in part, to join the Monophysites in confessing one will of the one "parsupa;" and deemed it as justifiable as to maintain that the three Persons of the Trinity have but one will (Ass. ii. 292, iii. 547). At the same time, they expressly deny any intention of substituting a quaternity for the Trinity. The human hypostasis they assert to be of quite a different kind from the divine hypostases, and therefore not to be reckoned along with them. Similarly, a controversy arose under the Nestorian Catholicos Timotheus, about the year 760, regarding the knowledge of Christ. One party maintained that Christ's humanity had the vision of His deity; consequently, that He had an adequate knowledge of God. Inasmuch as this implied, that the knowledge regarding the Son of God possessed by the Son of man was equal to the Son's own knowledge regarding Himself; it followed that the knowledge of the deity and that of the humanity had been equalized, and that therefore, in this respect, the Unio had been absolutely accomplished (Ass. ii. 287). Another party, on the contrary, maintained that Christ's human knowledge was not adequate to that of the divine nature; and so far coincided with the monophysitic Agnoetes (Ass. 1. c). Ebed Jesus, about 1280, not only assumed, like the rest, that the Unio was indissoluble, but also that it was operative. In consequence of the avvafeia (adhesio), the divine nature illuminated the human, and made it like itself: the human itself, therefore, now shone with a divine brightness, like the most beautiful diamond, and bore the likeness of the nature of the Creator, without having undergone any conversion (iii. 354). Babaeus (Ass. iii. 95) held, that the soul of Christ, whilst separated from the body, ceased to think and act, even as ours ceases to think and act after death.—With the Muhammedans they were able to keep on pretty good terms (Ass. iii. 585), but with the Monophysites they were constantly quarrelling, even in a scientific respect (ii. 543) ; and the churchfellowship which Barhebraeus asserts (ii. 291) to have been mutually cherished, can only have been a transient and local thing, although it must be allowed that the Nestorians appear to have been more inclined to concord than the Monophysites (iii. 514). In accordance with the law, that extremes meet, we find Nestorians frequently becoming Monophysites, and Monophysites Nestorians. Worthy of remark is, further, the Nestorian doctrine of the Eucharist. They celebrated the "Communio" in both kinds, and for the most part confessed that the Eucharist is Christ's body and blood (Ass. iii. 514). But the reproaches brought against the Nestorians by Xenajas (ii. 39), and the express teachings of Babaeus, and George, Metropolitan of Arbela (iii. 95, 534), who rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation, and insisted on distinguishing accurately between sign and substance, would seem to imply that they meant by transubstantiation that, in one respect, to wit, as symbols, the elements are the body and Wood of Christ; that through the medium of the act of consecration, a connection is established between the elements and Christ, either subjectively, by each individual mind, or objectively, in agreement with the will and in virtue of the action of God. Ebed Jesus of Soba (Nisibis), who died in 1318, first taught, exactly after the manner of the Romish Church, that the elements are converted into the body and blood of Christ, by the living word of Christ (the words used at the institution), and by the Holy Ghost (Assem. iii. 358). This latter is the doctrine frequently held in the East, even by Monophysites (Assem. ii. 200).

Note 15, page 77.

Leporius attributed to Christ, labour, piety, faith, and merit (Leporii presbyteri libellus emendationis, cap. viii.; bibl. patrum Gallandii, Tom. ix.). To this assumption he adds the further one, that Christ, the perfect man, successfully underwent His sufferings without receiving any kind of help from His deity (cap. ix.). His notion was, that the perfection of the man in Christ consisted, firstly, in His having undergone all His sufferings without any participation whatever on the part of the Word of the Father; and secondly, in the human nature of Christ possessing the power to accomplish everything by itself. In this connection, he appealed especially to the words of Christ on the cross,—" My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" These words indicate, says he, that the sufferings of Christ were completely and exclusively human. Pelagian principles evidently here lay in the background. Augustine was successful in his discussions with him. The chief argument with which Augustine met him was, that such an idea would lead to the assumption of a human personality alongside of the divine; consequently, of two Christs: and as the humanity remains eternally united with the Logos, a fourth person would thus be introduced into the Deity. It is, therefore, not allowable to teach, that the man was born with God in such a sense, that what belongs to God must be attributed to Ilim alone, and what belongs to the man must be attributed to him alone. The argument thus drawn from the danger of introducing a quaternity of persons, evidently implied that in idea the Persons of the Trinity were put on the same level as the human personality Leporius, however, yielded; and taught (c. 3), that the Word of God, having taken upon Himself all that pertained to man, was man, and that the man assumed by Him, in that he participated in all that belongs to God, was nothing else than God: out of compassion, God commingled Himself with human nature, but human nature was never commingled with the divine nature (c. 4). The relation between them was not that of two visible created things or substances which permeate each other, so that the two natures were, as it were, chemically converted into one substance (conflatili quodam genere). "Caro proficit in Verbum, non Verbum proficit in carnem," and yet the Word really became flesh, but "preprie solumpersonaliter, non naturaliter" because otherwise the "Pater cum Spiritu Sancto" would have become His flesh. "Verbum caro factum evacuat inpersona quodpossidet in natura," so that the " persona" alone, without the " natura," became man. Augustine did not always express himself in the same terms regarding the human nature of Christ. In some instances he designated Christ "homo dominicus:" a designation which, at a later period, he repudiated. As Ambrose, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, remarks on the words, " Servus Jesu Christi" (cap. i. 1),—"Utrumque posuit, ut dei et hominis personam significaret, quia in utroque et dominus (est)— Quoties scriptura aut Jesum dicit, aut Christum, aliquando personam dei, aliquando personam hominis indicat;" so also says Augustine,—" Christ was an object of predestination as to His humanity." In Joh. xvii. Tract. 105. Contra Manichseos, lib. ii. 24,—" Reliquit patrem, cum dixit, 'ego a patre exivi,' etc., apparendo hominibus in homine, cum Verbum caro factum est, —quod non commutationem naturae dei significat, sed susceptionem inferiorispersona, i.e. humanae. (The reading "naturae" is spurious.) Similarly in his de Trinit. lib. i. 7, § 15. But Augustine's standing doctrine was,—"Two natures, one person." He allowed that the Logos assumed a "perfectum plenum hominem," but held that the existence of this humanity commenced with the act of assumption, creando, and that it belonged to the person of the Only-begotten One, not by nature, nor by merit, but by grace. Similar also is the view expressed by Fulgentius of Ruspe, in his " de Fide ad Petr." c. 17,—"Verbum personam non accepit hominis, sed naturam, duarum naturarum Veritas manet in Christo secundum. unam tamen personam." Compare, in libro sententiarum Prosperi,—"persona Christi constat et conficitur deo et homine." August. Epist. 3 ad Volusian. ed. Venet. 1756, T. 2, Ep. 137, p. 529,—" Ita mediator—apparuit, ut in unitate personne copulans utramque naturam et solita sublimaret insolitis et insolita solitis temperaret.—Persona Christi mixture est Dei et hominis." The nature of the Verbum est sine mole ubique tota (for not mole sed virtute magnus est Deus); but "longe alio modo quodam quam eo quo ceteris creaturis adest, suscepit hominem, seque et illo (—um) fecit unum Jesum Christum."

Along with the expressions just qiioted, which appear to teach the personality of the humanity of Christ, he employs also the old images of "vestis, templum, vehiculum, instrumentum." Sympathizing with the opposition raised against Apollinarism, he strongly objected to every species of transubstantiation or commixture, and gives careful prominence to the "gemina substantia." The only way in which it seemed to him possible (de Trin. i.) really to meet Arianism, was by referring the "inferiora" exclusively to the humanity, and not directly to the one person in its totality. Not even in the state of exaltation does he allow that the humanity is converted into deity. On the other hand, he attributes to the Soul of Christ perfect knowledge from the very beginning. It was merely for His disciples, that He did not know this and that (for example, de Trin. i. 23). As far as the individual elements of His humanity were concerned, Augustine attributes to it soul and body, but no freedom of choice. The body was a part of the Adamitic mass, which was constituted a body by the act of assumption; Mary conceived Him, " non carnaliter concupiscendo, sed spiritaliter credendo;" she gave birth to Him also in unviolated virginity. It was necessary that He should take upon Him flesh, in order that our souls might become His members, and that the devil might be vanquished by the same nature which he had seduced. Hence also Christ must needs purchase us by His own death. Along with the body, He took upon Himself all human " affectus et infirmitates, non conditionis necessitate, sed miserationis voluntate et potentia." He appears, however, to conceive of the purpose of incarnation as involving the subjection of His nature to the law of mortality, to the necessity of death: consequently, the body He assumed was not like that of Adam prior to the fall, but one bound by the necessity of death. In his "De peccati meritis et remissione," L. ii. c. 29, he says, "Quia in eo erat similitudo carnis peccati, mutationes aetatum perpeti voluit—ut ad mortem videatur etiam senescendo illa caro pervenire potuisse, nisi juvenis fuisset occisus." Wherefore also he remarks, that Christ assumed, with the " caro," the " poena (mortem)," even if not the " culpa," of sin. At the same time, he naturally does not agree with the Pelagians, in their opinion, that other men are by nature "aequali puritate" with Christ (c. Julian, v. 15). Other men, born of "concupiscentia," inherit "concupiscentia." Hence also the Pelagian objection has no force, that, if "peccatum" is "naturale," as the Traducians believe, it is "irrefutabiliter necesse, dici etiam Christum reatum de Mariae carne traxisse." Whether the inherited " tabes" is propagated through the body and the soul, or through the body which affects the soul—that, indeed, he does not undertake to decide (c. Julian, v. c. 4, § 17); but he maintains, that a body not formed in "concupiscentia" cannot have attracted to itself this "tabes" (c. 15, § 54). The soul of Christ, however, he thinks, is not in any case "ex traduce animus illius primae praevaricatricis (de Genesi ad Literam, L. x. 22 f., about 393). On the other hand, in the letter to Euodius, written about the year 415 (ep. 164, ed. Venet. T. ii. 754), he lays it down as possible, that if all souls are derived from the fallen soul of Adam, He "eam suscipiendo mundavit." But when this humanity was assumed by the Son of God, it became, at the same time, God—"homo deus. Sic homo susceptus est a Verbo ut simul cum eo Deus fieret." Vice versa, also, he says in Serm. 187, in nat. Dom. 3, c. 3,— through the assumption, not merely did the Son of man become the Son of God, but the Son of God also the Son of man. "Homo factus est, ut nos Deus faceret." He is the Head of the Church, and we are His members: see, for example, his Enarr. 2, in Ps. 29; De Trinitate iv. 2-7; "De Agone Christiano," c. 20. Yet the Son of God remained what He was, and did not renounce the " forma dei," as Hilary supposed: He continued with the Father in heaven, at the very time when Jesus was sojourning on earth; but still He was in Jesus. "Forma servi accessit, non forma Dei discessit." Sermo 183, de 1 Joh. iv., Tract. 28 in Evang. Joh. De Verbis Evang. Joh. i. Sermo 122,—" Accessit ad nos, sed a se non multum recessit, immo a se quod Deus est, nunquam recessit, sed addidit quod erat, naturae nostrae. Accessit enim ad id quod non erat, non amisit quod erat." Sermo 123, He is "Deus manendo et hominis carnem assumendo, addendo quod non erat, non perdendo quod erat." But if the Word, as " Deus, ubique totum est" (see above), in Christ it would appear to have no distinctive mode of existence: the only difference between Christ and others would then apparently be, that He possessed a degree of susceptibility to God which no one else possessed;—an idea which might lead to a Nestorian view, especially as he says,—His " exinanitio" was merely an "occultatio" of that which He was, and a " demonstratio" of that which Pie had become. It would then be a mere abuse of language to apply to Him the words, " He became flesh ;" and, in fact, he says, that because of the union of the Word with humanity, their respective predicates are spoken of as interchanged. But he again eases his mind with the affirmation,— the human nature is to be distinguished, indeed, but not to be separated, from the personality of the Word, nor to be placed in a distinct and separate person. Sermo 47, de'ovibus in Ez. 34, -—" Distinguenda erat forma servi (Joh. xiv. 9, 10) non separanda et alienanda et in aliam personam constituenda." But although Christ consists of the two natures, or is a " totum" made up of Word, soul and body, God did not therefore become a mere part in Christ (c. Maximin. Arian. L. ii. 10). The three Persons of the Trinity are not each a "pars dei." And quite as inadmissible is it to call Christ " una persona gemina? substantiae, pars hujus personae." For, before the assumption of the form of a servant, the Son of God was "totus," and underwent no increase when the humanity was superadded. This wholeness, this totality of the person, evidently relates in the first instance to the Ego, to the constitutive principle of personality, and not to the result, the collective person. And yet he also makes the general observation,—" Pars rei ullius esse non potest Deus." Even so, God does not increase through those who, by cleaving to Him, become one spirit with Him. The category of Part and Whole are, he thinks, inapplicable to God. Now, if we pass by the circumstance that he elsewhere, notwithstanding, designates Christ a composite person (see Abaelard's detailed discussion in his " Sic et Non") ; if, further, we allow that, considering the matter from the lower side, from the side of the man Jesus, he says,—This is not a mere man, but a person compounded of body, soul, and divine nature; and that, considering the matter from the higher side, from the side of the Logos, he denies that the Son of God became a part of the Person of Christ; still we are forced to confess that Augustine did scarcely anything in the way of showing that the incarnation was more than a closer relation, " relatio," a^eaK, of the "Verbum quod ubique totum est," to that particular point of humanity, which became Jesus in consequence of its special and unquestionably God-created susceptibility to God. In that case the difference between Christ and others is merely a quantitative one, especially as they also, like His humanity, become sons of God by grace, though they are not such from the very beginning. And Augustine's view contains traces not only of Ebionitical, but also of Docetical elements. For, not to mention other matters, what reality can be attached to the expression, "factus est, quod non erat," or even to that other expression, * ao cessit, quod non erat," if attention be directed merely to the

unchangeableness and omnipresence of the "Verbum," who notwithstanding His union with Christ, was "ubique totum?" How can Christ be seriously regarded as an incarnation of the Son, if He did not actually come into the possession, not even by love, of something which He had not possessed before? According to Augustine, the world of revelation, that is, the Church, presents to view, in general, nothing more than the hinder part of God (de Trin. ii. 30); God can reveal Himself solely through the creature. Even the Son is essentially invisible in the revelation; and therefore, the inmost essence of God does not become manifest (iii. 7, 21). On the other hand, however, the warmth of his Christian feelings drove him out beyond a position like this, and prevented him being satisfied with the idea that the eternal Son of God existed merely theophanically or symbolically in Jesus, or stood merely in an external relation to Him: he pressed directly on towards the position, that we have in Christ, Him who "personam Sapientiae Dei sustinuit," with whom God was personally united, so as in no other theophany. His best utterances on the subject of Christology lie in the sphere of the mystical, especially in his Tractat. on the Gospel of John; for example, Tract. 21, 28, 52, 61, 67, 80, 81; in Ep. Job. c. i. Tract. 1, 3, 9; in Joh. Tract. 28,—" Non enim Christus in capite et non in corpore, sed Christus totus in capite et in corpore. Quod ergo membra ejus, Ipse; quod autem Ipse, non continuo membra ejus, nam si non Ipse essent membra ejus, non diceret, Saule, quid me persequeris 1 Non enim Saulus Ipsum, sed membra ejus persequebatur. Noluit tamen dicere, sanctos meos, servos meos, postremo honorabilius fratres meos, sed, Me, h. e. membra mea, quibus ego sum caput." In 1 Joh. v. Tract. 10,—" Extende caritatem per totum orbem si vis Christum amare, quia membra Christi per orbem jacent. Si amas patrem, divisus es; si divisus es, in corpore non es; si in corpore non es, sub capite non es." Compare Chrysostom, ed. Montfaucon, T. iv. 678, Homil. in Genes. 7, where he carries out the idea, that Christ has won more treasure than Adam ever lost. In Theodoret's writings, also, there are many passages which point to a mystical Christology, as the background and basis of his system of ideas, although the system itself is otherwise fabricated of very different material. Theodor. Opp. ed. Schulz, T. iv. pp. 27.5, 278 ff., P. 2.—VOL. I. 2 C

"de haeret. fab." L. iv. 13, pp. 373 f.; Ep. viii. ad Eugraphiam, p. 1066; Ep. cU. p. 1291.

Note 16, page 78.

Opus imperfectum iv. § 92 f.,—" Quidquid naturale est, voluntarium esse non potest. Si ergo est naturale peccatum, non est voluntarium; si est voluntarium, non est ingenitum." § 47,—" Hie ut adsit toto animo lector, admoneo; videbit enim Apollinaristarum haeresim, sed cum Manichaei per te adjectione reparari." Apollinaris denied Christ's having a human soul; Augustine now teaches that He had a soul, but denies the existence of "sensus corporis" in Christ, and affirms Him to have been incapable of sinning, as though He "non virtute judicii delicta vitasset, sed—felicitate carnis a nostris sensibns sequestrates cupiditatem vitiorum sentire nequivisset." Such a Christological adulation (adulatio) is in reality a profanity: § 49,—" Si vel carnem sine annua, vel hominem sine sensibns quibus nos imbuit natura gestavit, exempli formam et legis non docetur implesse. Quid enim fuit laude dignum, contemnere illecebras sensuum, quarum incapax erat beneficio natura? § 50,—" Qu33 postremo palma tolerantiae, si dolor vulnerum et verberum, intercepto itinere sensuum, pertingere ad animum non valebat? Quo ergo profecit Apollinaris adulatio? Videlicet ut omnis virtutum pulchritudo, quam in se Christum expresserat, indebitis naturae ejus laudibus vacuata flaccesceret, cunctoque veritatis suae splendore nudata sacrum magisterium mediatoris offerret irrisui T" § 53,—He was rich in all virtues, non carnis infirmitate (incapability of sinning), sed virtute mentis; and not even the supernatural character of His birth might at all alter the state of the case. § 54,—"Praedico omnem in eo sanctitatem beneficio animi, non carnis stetitisse praejudicio. Sic enim et natura tam conditione ejus quam susceptione defenditur et vita hominum virtutis illins imitatione dirigitur." He then further proceeds to say (§ 56 ff.),— Augustine does not agree with the Manichaeans in teaching that there is a natural evil in natural beings; what right has he then to designate the same natural element, evil in man," the will of man has no share in it? If Christ did not assume these "sensus" which pertain to our nature, and the "possibilitas," He did not really take upon Himself our nature.

§ 84,—" Proinde incarnatio Christi opus suae divinitatis tuetur, qui afferens ad me naturam meam et voluntatem suam, cujus mihi speculum afferebat et regulam—ostendit, culpam non de carnis conditu, sed de sola suscipi voluntate ;—etiam illucl claro testimonio perdocetur, quod suscepti hominis justitia non de natura diversitate sed de voluntaria actione substiterit."

Note 17, page 78.

Opus imperfectum 1. c. § 84. "Itane vero ne hoc quidem Christus diversum habuit in natura, quod ita ex virgine natus est, ut jam esset non solum hominis, sed et Dei filius? Ergone ista susceptio—nihil illi homini valuit ad excellentiam justitia3 ?—Siccine vos contra Dei gratiam defensio liberi arbitrii pnecipites agit, ut etiam ipsum Mediatorem, ut esset Dei filius unicus, voluntate sua meruisse dicatis—? Secundum vos-—non a Verbo Dei homo susceptus est ut ex virgine nasceretur; sed natus ex virgine suae postea voluntatis virtute profecit, et fecit ut a Verbo Dei susciperetur; non talem ac tantam voluntatem illa susceptione habens, sed ad illam susceptionem tali et tanta voluntate perveniens; nee Verbum caro factum est,—sed postea, merito ipsius hominis et ejus humanse voluntariaeque virtutis." From which it follows, that it is possible for others to be like Christ.

Note 18, page 79.

Even as early as the year 435 he began to utter threats against the Antiocheians, who accepted the deoroKos, saying,— "For the destruction of the virus of Nestorianism, that is not enough; whoso appeals to Diodorus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, still cherishes the error of Nestorius." And, accordingly, even at that time he aimed at compassing the condemnation of these teachers, notwithstanding the reverence with which they were regarded in the East, and that they were dead. (Ep. 179 to Aristolaus, and Ep. 167 to Johannes.) "Theodore," says he, "taught the same, yea, even a stronger, degree of Godlessness; under his name, the Nestorian heresy is being revived." But it was in vain that he applied to the Emperor and to the successor of Nestorius, the Patriarch Proclus. This latter, indeed, his opinion having been asked by the Armenian Church, in the course of his discussion of the point in dispute with Nestorius, in his "Tomus ad Armenos," adduces, with expressions of disapprobation, statements from the works of Theodore, without mentioning his name ; but entirely disavowed any intention of thus condemning a teacher who had died at peace with the Church. The Emperor further commanded peace to be kept. Consequently Cyrill complied, but wrote a work against Theodore—the work already mentioned, "That there is but one Christ." Theodoret felt himself, therefore, called upon to write a defence of his teacher.

Note 19, page 84.

This would be equivalent to the "conflatile genus" of Leporius, and the <nn>ovalwai<; of Theodoret. The union of the divine and the human issues in a new third product; but in the new product, the divine is not merely one of the factors, but also the conjunctive, and therefore the completely predominant, constituent. Whether the conversion, in consequence of which the human element derived from Mary ceased to be of the same substance with us, related to the human form or the human essence, he does not state;—probably, to the latter, on account of the term ovala. To such an humanity, which would be neither like us nor merely divine, but through the divine would have become a new third something, the simile of rj\eKrpov might be applied. Electron, a chemical mixture of gold and silver, was a substance of the highest value; and the image drawn from it was not seldom, without any particular name, attributed by the Fathers to a monopbysitic heresy. Eutyches regarded Christ as reXeto? avdpamos,—the holy Virgin as of like nature with us,—and acknowledged that ef avrfjs eaapKoidrj o ©eo? i)fiwv (Mansi vi. 700, 741). But the body of our Lord and God was not O/aoowtio? r)p!iv. Further, says Flavian (see Mansi v. pp. 1328 ff., Ep. ad Leon, i.),—Eutyches rejects the Council of NicEea, Cyrill's letter to Nestorius, and (which was probably the main thing in Flavian's eyes) his letter to the Orientals, and renews the errors of Valentin and Apollinaris. The following are said to have been the words spoken by him before the Synod,—Tov Kvpiov r)fiS)v 'Irjaovv Xpurrbv p.rj %eh> (ofioKoyelv) iK Bvo <pvaea>v fiera rrjv hiavdp&nrqaiv, ev fiia vxoardaei, Kal iv ivl irpoadnrip irap r)fiS)p yvwpi&fiei'ov, /iijtc pyv rhv adoKa T. K. ofioovaiov rjfilv virdpyetv, ola Brj ef r)fi5>v irpoaj$deiaav, kal eva>delcav Tio 6ea> \6y(p Kad' inroaraciv aXX' tcpacKe, rrjv fiev reKovcav avrov irapdevov, Kara capita ofioovciov fifilv elvai, avrov Be Tov Kvpiov firj etj<f>evai e^ avrr)<; Capua fjfiiv ofxoovcwv, dWa To Tov Kvplov cwfia /jutj elvaL fiev cdfia dvdpanrov, avdpwmivov Be cwfia To eti Ttjs irapdevov.

Note 20, page 84.

The appeal of Eutyches to Leo, gave promise at first of the most favourable results. Leo expressed himself to Flavian as hurt at not having been at once put into possession of the facts of the controversy. He remarks, that he had been first informed of the matter by the Emperor (who was favourable to Eutyches), and by a memorial addressed to himself by Eutyches; that he did not know what just ground there was for excommunicating Eutyches, but that he will postpone his decision until he had received more accurate information. He expresses his wish to know what new dogma, contrary to the old faith, has been taught by Eutyches, and recommends moderation, as Eutyches declares himself ready to give way if he be proved to have acted wrongly. In conclusion, he repeats that it is his intention to abide immoveably by the divine tenets of the Fathers (among whom, however, Coelestin also must be included). Besides this, Leo wrote to the Emperor to the following effect,—" The memorial of Eusebius, which has come to me through Eutyches, does not clearly state what is the ground of the complaint of heresy raised against him: Flavian's silence is blameworthy; but I trust he will speak out, so that I may be able to pronounce a judgment." Probably not entirely without Leo's connivance and approval, Petrus Chrysologus, Bishop of Ravenna, wrote to Eutyches, who had been excommunicated in Constantinople, addressing him as "his brother." In this letter, as it were with the design of inspiring him with confidence, he gives prominence to the divine majesty of Jesus, saying, "Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we Him no longer." In conclusion, he admonishes him to submit himself to the Romish See and its decisions; for the same Peter, who still lives and presides on his own throne, gives the true faith to all those who yeam for it.

Note 21, page 85.

Dioscurus had not suffered Leo's circular letter of June 449, addressed to the Synod of Ephesus, to be read at all (Mansi v. 1409); nay more, Leo's legate had been compelled to take to flight. This was a treatment, indeed, which little accorded with the expectations expressed by Leo (Ep. ad Dioscurum, in the year 445, Mansi v. 1239), and which were intended to point out his proper position to him, the successor of an Athanasius and a Cyrill, and the inheritor of a see which had gained so perceptible a predominance in the Church. Leo's first greeting to the new bishop, Dioscurus, had been, namely, an admonition to the effect, that an Alexandrine bishop is ns inferior to the Romish, as the founder of the Alexandrian Church was inferior to Peter;—a clear evidence of the importance attached by Leo to the humiliation of the Alexandrian Patriarchate, and of his opinion that, to be well timed, the step must be taken prior to the Council of Ephesus. Between that see and Leo's predecessors, in the time of Cyrill, there had been no dissension on the doctrine of the one nature of Christ.

Note 22, page 86.

Even in his second letter to Leo, written in March 449, Flavian adopted more the tone of willingness to be accountable to Leo, to whom he forwarded the entire Acts of the Council of Constantinople. He there (p. 1352) reproached Eutyches with commingling (avyyeei) the attributes of the natures united in Christ, and the natures themselves, after the Unio; and with thus contradicting the letter addressed to Nestorius by the Synod of Ephesus, in which it was taught,—8uitf>opoi fiev ai wpo? evorrjra rrjv dj&ivrjv cvvevej^deurai <pvaei<;- el? Be e'f a/uJMM ^piCTTo? Kat n(09, oiry &>? rfjs r&v <f>vaea)p 8ia<popa.; avyprffievifi Bia Ttjv evw&iv, airore\eaaaa>v Be fiSXKov i)fiu> Tov eva Kvpiov 'Irjcovv Xpurrov deoTrjTO<; re Km dvOpwirorrjrOS, Bui Tj}? afypaarov Kal airepworjTov "irpbs evorrjra avvBpofifjs. Relatively to Eutyches, therefore, he takes up the position of a defender of the first Council of Ephesus. He further gives Leo to understand that the Emperor ranges himself on the side of Eutyches; denies that Eutyches at the Synod appealed to Leo; and begs him to make common cause with the rest, to agree to his depositlon, and to establish the faith of the Emperor: for, he urges, it is in Leo's power to turn the scale (poirrj); and if he give his help, peace will return, and the Synod, of which much is spoken, and which threatens to throw all the churches into confusion, will be able to be avoided, and will be dispensable. Such was Flavian's language to Leo, even prior to the Synod of Ephesus held in the year 449. That Flavian had made important concessions to Leo, in regard to the precedence of the latter, ere Leo decidedly took his part, is evident from Leo's letter to the Emperor and to the Synod of Ephesus (Tom. v. 1411, 1359). But towards the end of the year 449 (Mansi vi. 36 ff.), Theodoret said to Leo, after the second Council of Ephesus had terminated, and he himself had been deposed, that as Paul, on the occasion of the dispute concerning circumcision at Antioch, hastened to the great Peter, in order to beg him to solve his doubts, even so he hastens with his difficulties—in fact, with even more justice, considering his own insignificance—to the apostolic throne, Bia irdvra yap vfiwv To irparrevuv dp/Morrei. Especially, he adds, is Leo clothed with an apostolic character; as is evident from other things, but particularly from his work on " The Incarnation of God," and from the admirable acuteness and spiritual wisdom it evinces. He refers to the letter addressed by Leo to Flavian in June 449, which had attained great note (Mansi v. 1365-1389). After reading it, he had praised the grace of the Holy Spirit, which had spoken through Leo, and now entreats him to deliver the Church of God from the storms which are raging around it.

Note 23, page 93.

lb. ep. ad Anatolium 91, p. 129,—" Mirati sumus congregandi synodo tam augustum tempus adpositum; cum, etsi nulla necessitas hostilitatis existeret, ipsa interjectorum dierum paucitas necessarios sacerdotes nos evocare non sineret. Quando enim per diversas longinquasque provincias mitteremus, ut fere possit fieri universale concilium." There were therefore many absent, whose presence was required to constitute an Oecumenical Council. But, on the other hand, that the participation of so many bishops in the so-called Fourth Oecumenical Council, who at Ephesus had subscribed, under constraint, a different creed from that of Chalcedon, as did the Orientals; and of those who at Chalcedon, after the deposition of Dioscurus, had ranged themselves under a confession of faith other than that which they really acknowledged, as did the Egyptian and Palestinian bishops and others, must detract from the authority of the Council of Chalcedon, no unprejudiced historian can well doubt; especially as the passage above quoted makes it very questionable whether it was truly oecumenical. This is true, apart from the fact of its not having been recognised as authoritative by great churches. Some Romish theologians also are of the same opinion (compare Bailer, not. iii. on the above Ep. 91, p. 129). Indeed, to Romish theologians this defect is rather welcome than otherwise; for they resort at once to the expedient of saying, that it first acquired oecumenical character through the approbation bestowed on it by the Romish See.

Note 24, page 99.

Anatolius asked the Synod, whether the formula met with their approbation; whereupon all the bishops, with the exception of the Roman and some Orientals, answered in the affirmative,—" That is the faith of the Fathers; whoso thinketh otherwise is an heretic, and let him be cursed; out with the Nestorians. The whole world holds the true faith; yesterday, the formula pleased all, and one can scarcely discover who they are (that do not consent)." Others, however, exclaimed,— "The faith should not be handled deceitfully (rj Tti<ttk Bo\ai firj irady)." The former then cried out again,—" The formula has pleased God; yesterday, it pleased all; the Emperor is orthodox, the Empress also; Nestorius is deposed. The State authorities are orthodox; we beg that the formula may be subscribed on the Holy Gospels; it has pleased all; command its subscription. Whoso subscribeth it not, is a heretic; the Holy Ghost has inspired it; cast out the heretics. Out with the Nestorians." The State authorities said,—" Dioscurus deposed Flavian because he taught the two natures; but the formula contains the words, e'/e Bv&v <f>vaea>v" (that is, the doctrine of Dioscurus is not favoured; the party of Flavian ought to be content; Dioscurus is and will remain deposed). Anatolius, in order to prevent it being thought that the Synod, in confirming the deposition of Dioscurus, had also condemned his doctrine, reminded the assembly, that Dioscurus had not been deposed on account of his faith, and that, consequently, the point of faith is still a "res integra:" by way of conciliating the Romans, he added,—" He is deposed because he excommunicated Leo, and, although three times summoned, refused to appear." The imperial authorities endeavoured to put an end to the disputes, by proposing that from Leo's letter such things as affected the point in question should be added to the formula. But the bishops, and, among them, now also Eusebius of Dorylaeum, exclaimed,—"We will construct no other formula; nothing fails the formula; the formula recognises Leo's letter; let it be subscribed; it contains everything! Leo has said that which Cyrill said; Coelestin has confirmed it, Sixtus has confirmed it!" But the cry was again raised,—"Put away the deceit of the formula!" Then the authorities declared, that these cries should be brought to the notice of the Emperor.

Note 25, page 100

After the proceedings described in Note 24, the authorities appeared again, with the command from the Emperor, either, as had been already previously proposed to them, to form a Commission, consisting of six Oriental, three Pontic, three Thracian, three Illyrian bishops, and three from Asia Minor, under the presidency of Anatolius, whose business shall be to frame another formula, with which no fault can be found, in order that nothing amphibolical may remain: or, if that course did not please them, that each member of the Synod should declare his faith through the medium of his Metropolitan, in such a manner, however, that there shall remain no ambiguity or discordancy. But if they refuse to adopt either the one or the other course, they are informed, that the Synod will be convened in the West. One party now again called out,—" The formula must continue, or we will depart." Cecropius of Sebastopolis demanded that the formula should be read aloud to the Synod, and that those who neither accept, nor subscribe it, shall quit the assembly: The formula is good, and he and his party accepted it. The Illyrian bishops cried out,—" Let the opponents of the formula show themselves; they are Nestorians; its opponents may go to Bome." The opponents appear, at this point, to have maintained silence. From all this we may see how great must have been the number of those who, at the outset, expressed their approval of the first formula, which was favourable to Dioscurus, and the renunciation of which can scarcely have been due solely to accident. We see, also, what opinion is to be formed of the majority of the Synod, who afterwards again took an opposite, course, and only consented to allow the first formula to be dropped after they had heard the Emperor's threat, which indicated in a sufficiently clear manner the dogmatic conclusions he expected to be arrived at. The threat to bring the matter to a decision in the West took the greater effect, as there were probably few in the- Greek Church who would not have esteemed the transference of the Council to the West a great disgrace and danger to the East. The State authorities, on their side, now that they had learnt from the declaration of Leo's legates that a formula of the first kind would in no case meet the approbation of Rome, but would merely lead to a schism between the East and the West, no longer glossed over the "status controversiae," but, decidedly taking Leo's part, set it forth exactly as it was. Previously they had said,—Dioscurus rejects the doctrine of the two natures; but the formula teaches it, namely, To Ck rwv. Bvwv <f>vaewv. Now, however, they said,—Dioscurus also expresses his readiness to accept the e/ e Bvwv <pvaea>v, but not the Bvo <f>vaei<; in Christ: Leo, on the contrary, teaches the latter. Whom, then, are they disposed to follow, Leo or Dioscurus? And when the cry resounded,—We believe as Leo believes (whose letter, in fact, had been already subscribed); they reiterated their demand, that an addition should be made to the formula from Leo's letter,—that they, for example, should add, —In Christ are two natures, unchangeably, undividedly, and without mixture, united. The matter was thus again led into a path, in the pursuance of which alone an union of all was attainable,—into the path of a formula which should include the most important propositions of Leo's letter, and to which, therefore, no one could object who had subscribed the letter itself. For the reasons just given, the Commission now chosen must necessarily start with the best possible prospect of arriving at a conclusion which should meet with the approbation of all.

Note 26, page 101.

'Ofio\oyeiv eKBiBdaKop-ep epa Kal Top avrbv vlbv Top K. i)fMav I. X. re\eiov, rbv aiirbv iv debrrjri, KaX reKetov, Top avrbv iv dvdfxinroTifriofioovatop ru\ irarpl Kara Ttjp deorrfra, Kui ofioovaLov Top avrov rjfUP Kara Ttjp avdpayiroTrjTa, Kara iravra Sfioiop rjfiip ^&)pt? dfiaprla<;—e« Map. rrjs irapdepov, rfj<; deoTokov—era Kat Tw avrbv xpurrbvex Bvwv <f>vaeojp (al. eV Bvo <pvaeaiv) aavyyyrw<! arpkirra>s, dBiatpera>s, dywptarw? yvwpi^o/u^pop" ovBap-ov rfjs rwv <pvaewv Biacpopas dprjpr)fieprj<; Bui rrjp epoxriv, aa)^ofieprj<i Be fwWov T?)? Ibiottjtos €Karipa<; <pvaea><;, Kal ep irpoaooirov Ka\ filap viroaraaiv avvrp€yovarj<i} Ovk eis Bvo irpoaunra p-epi^bfiepop rj Buupoiifiepop, aW' epa Ku\ Top avrbv vlbv, etc. That the Greek version of the formula should have ex Bvwv <pvaewv (to which Dioscurus also agreed), and the Soman version, on the contrary, "in duabus naturis," can, of course, scarcely be regarded as an accident, when considered in connection with the history of the Council. For, in the case of the first formula, which was rejected, the entire dispute concentrated itself on the particles e« and iv—which should be adopted. The Romans, in particular, rejected ex. It is also true, that eii Bv&p <f>vaea>p suits the verb yiwpiCppxvov better than ei» Bvo <pvaeaiv,—which is so far, therefore, an argument for the genuineness of the former. Perhaps, also, the choice of ex was partially dictated by a wish to humour the ear of the Monophysites. But as far as the actual thought is concerned, Monophysitism is excluded not merely by the verb yvwpityfievop (ex Bv&p <pvaeoap), but also by a number of other determinations contained in the symbol. If Christ is cognised, or becomes cognisable, from or out of the two natures, the said natures must surely exist together in Him. For there is certainly, in this case, no reference to the natures "in abstracto." But with respect to the Latin formula, we must also allow, that it is as little open to the charge of falsification, on the ground of its "in," as the Chalcedonian, on the ground of its ex. For, as ix was necessary on account of the verb yva>pi^ofiepop, so was " in" necessary on account of the verb "agnoscendum," which is not identical with yva>pity/iAvov. The Latin formula has,—"Christ is to be recognised as the Son in two natures;" the Greek has,—" Christ is to be cognised as Son out of or from two natures :" both evidently contain substantially the same thought. The Latin formula is merely a free, but substantially faithful translation; the tone of which, perhaps, hints more distinctly at the subsistence of Christ in two natures:—on which account it was undoubtedly more agreeable to the Roman type of doctrine.

Note 27, page 104.

A third form of the Unio is further excluded by the term <urvyxyrm,—the form, namely, which treats the two natures, as it were, as the constituent elements of a chemical process, in the result of which both continue to have a certain kind of existence (and the pure doctrine of conversion leaves neither the one nor the other an existence). This result, however, in which the two natures continue to exist, is not conceived as a new, third substance; for even the doctrine of the Church speaks of the Person of Christ as compounded of the two natures (avvdero^); but as of such a character, that the one nature is affected, tempered, as it were chemically bound and saturated, by the other,— the two forming thus one new third substance (compare above, pp. 77 ff., Leporius). To the same point might the monophysitic (Severian) view arrive,—the view, namely, that Christ had a nature compounded of the divine and the human, <f>vat^ avvdero<;, which, at a later period, was frequently controverted, —for example, by S. Maximus, John of Damascus, and the Scholastics. The Church, on the contrary, used this expression regarding the personality alone.

Note 28, page 112.

The Logos-doctrine, in its day, rendered the Church the important service of describing the relation of the divine principle in Christ both to the Father and to the humanity of Jesus. On the one hand, the idea of the Logos as the principle of revelation, which is itself God, rendered it easier to say that there was a divine principle in Christ; and, on the other hand, it offered a welcome link of connection for the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos, in so far as, according to it, the Logos found in the rational nature, with which every man is endowed, an element related to, or even derived from, Himself. At the same time, in another respect, the doctrine of the Logos brought with it its own peculiar difficulties and dangers; and was therefore more and more completely driven into the background, the greater definiteness was given to the doctrine of the Church. For example, as respects the doctrine of an immanent Trinity,— so long as the Logos was regarded simply as the Principle of Revelation, or the Word, or Reason, the possibility of vacillation between Sabellianism and Subordinatianism was not quite set aside. Furthermore, in consequence of the universality attributed to the Logos as the Principle of Revelation,* the boundary line between His ante-Christian and Christian kingdoms, instead of being clearly defined, was hazy and blurred;—especially was this the case, when no reason could be assigned why the incarnation and work of Christ were necessary, and why the proper and true reign of the Logos began with, instead of anterior to, the coming of Christ. Those vague theories of the \6yos trirepfiiiTtKos, which obliterated the features of historical Christianity, needed to be limited, and the degree of the participation of humanity prior to the time of Christ, in the Logos, to be carefully defined, in order that nature might not be made to anticipate grace. We have seen, that from the third century onwards, the Church warded off the danger with which that Logos-doctrine threatened the Trinity, partly by the substitution, and partly by the explanation, of the word "Son," in the sense of a true divine hypostasis, for the expression " Logos," in the usage and symbola of the Church. As to the other matter, it was indispensably necessary that a much more precise distinction should be drawn between the divine and the human, between nature and grace, than the Logos-doctrine of the second century had really accomplished.

Note 29, page 125.

With Nestorianism, on the contrary, the case was a different one. Having fled out of the way of the persecutions of the Court of Byzantium into the interior of Asia, and thus come under the rule of heathen monarchs, the Nestorians and their system passed more and more beyond the horizon of the Church. Polemical works, it is true, still continued to be written against Nestorianism;—for example, besides Cassian, by Vigilius of Tapsus, Boethius, the Constantinopolitan monk Leontius, the presbyter Anastasius, and others. But there were no continuous * " Durch das Offenbarungsprinzip des Logos in seiner Allgemeinheit."

colloquies, enlivened by the starting of new points, and furthering the development of the question in both its aspects: the Church remained, on the whole, ignorant of the course taken by the doctrine amongst the Nestorians. Its polemic, therefore, was almost solely with the old form of Nestorianism, which, in consequence, constantly acquired features of a more mythical character. It had in itself, however, enough dualistic elements.

Note 30, page 127.

A different opinion was expressed, for example, by Amphilochiusof Iconium (A. Mai, Tom. vii. p. 15, a), who not merely denied that the deity suffered in its own essence, but also rejects the statement, that the deity suffered in the flesh, or through the flesh. We can only say that Christ suffered. The Logos did indeed appropriate to Himself that which affected His temple, but He did not Himself suffer thereby. For further information, see Baumgarten-Crusius's "Compendium der Dogmengeschichte," pp. 203,204 ; Baur's " Trinitatslehre" ii. pp. 61-68. The necessary consequence of the ecclesiastical recognition of this proposition was, that the idea of personality, even as applied to the Father and the Spirit, was formed in analogy with that of the personality of the God-man, and that the distinctions in the Trinity, therefore, approached nearer to Tritheism. It was, consequently, neither an accident, nor solely the effect of the Aristotelic philosophy, that during the sixth century important Monophysites, such as Johannes Askusnages and Johannes Philoponus, turned to Tritheism, in opposition to which the Monophysite Damian then set Tetradism. That the conception of person, in the Trinity, was otherwise viewed in the Church at an earlier period, we have shown in vol. i., pp. 904—938. Opposition was also raised to it by teachers of the Church; for example, by Eulogius of Alexandria (A. Mai vii. 18), and Anastasius Sinaita (Galland. xii. 240; "De Trinitate"), who tried to bring back the Christian mind to the point of view which obtained in the fourth century.

Note 31, page 143.

In illustration of this statement, it may perhaps also be appropriate to mention here, that a number of Monophysites, subsequently to the ninth century, taught that He who was born of Mary was perfect God, perfect, complete man, and had one personality formed out of two personalities, and one nature out of two natures (Assem. l. c. ii. 125). So the Patriarchs Theodosius, Johannes (ahout the year 969), Athanasius,1 and Dionysius V. (similarly the Nestorians; see above, pp. 77, 78). It is scarcely correct simply to say, with Assem. and others, that they interchanged the terms, nature and personality, in Christology, and did not do so in the Trinity. They rather taught, on the principle of Aristotle, that a nature (the Koivov, " universale") cannot be conceived without a personality, without an individual being, in which it subsists; and that, consequently, the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon, when they teach two natures, ought also to teach that there were two persons. They, the Monophysites, on the contrary, are consistent, in that, whilst allowing that one nature may appear in several persons (as in the Trinity), they maintain that a nature must necessarily subsist, at the very least, in one person: on the other hand, it is not enough to hold that in Christ there were two natures, for two natures would necessarily imply two persons; but the distinctive essence of the incarnation is, that two natures and two persons through it became one. Christ's one nature and person, therefore, after the incarnation, in that it was composite or a synthesis, comprised both natures and persons in itself as in the whole (compare Assem. ii. 137, 152). "Fieri nequit, ut natura sit nisi in persona." For there is nowhere to be found a "natura absque persona" (except in an individual being, Isikov). Similar was the view taken by the Nestorians (see above, pp. 76 ff.), who, even earlier than the Monophysites, directed their attention to Aristotle, and occupied themselves with the problem —How one person could be formed out of two hypostases or inroKelfieva, out of two distinct and independent existences?

Note 32, page 145.

Compare Galland. Biblioth. T. xii.; Rustici diaconi disputatio contra Acephalos, pp. 39-76 (about the year 550); Anastasii Sinaitae, Patriarchal Antiocheni, oratio iii. de divina oeconomia, i.e., incarnatione (about the year 570), pp. 246-251; Eulogii Alexandrini (about the year 580), capita vii. de duabus naturis, etc., p. 310; Leontii Byzant. scholia de sectis, pp. 625 ff. 644 ff. (about 610); Ejusdem Libri tres contra Eutychianos et Nestorianos, pp. 660 ff.; Ejusdem solutiones argumentationum Seven, 708-715; Ejusdem dubitationes hypothetic^, 715-718; Leontii Monachi Hierosolymitani (about 610), apologia concilii Chalcedon. 719-737. See further, A. Mai, Tom. vii. pp. 10 ff.; cap. vi. p. 18; cap. xi. pp. 40 ff.46, 52 ff.; Leontii quaestiones adv. eos, qui imam dicunt naturam compositam J. Christi, pp. 110-155; Anastasius presbyter contra Monophys. 192 ff.; Eustathii monachi ep. ad Timoth. Schol. de duabus naturis contra Severum, pp. 277-291; Boethius de duabus naturis, etc. (see below; about the year 510); Justinianus imperator contra Monophysitas, 292-313; Joannes Damascenus, de natura composita, adv. Acephalos. Nicephorus and Gelasius have been mentioned above. Amongst the acutest polemics against the Monophysites, may be mentioned several writings of S. Maximus, Opp. T. i. ii. ed. Combefis.

Note 33, page 148.

Compare Niceph. Eccl. Hist. L. xviii. c. 47, 49. Well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato, and especially of Aristotle, he endeavoured, in his AiavrryrrY; (Arbitrator, Schiedsrichter), to show that the view he entertained was dialectically necessary. One may speak of essence or nature in a double sense,—firstly, as a common idea, or common image, without reference to any concrete existence; or secondly, it may be conceived as the generic nature or substance, which exists in individuals, which acquires an independent existence in each individual, but which has no existence save in such separate individuals: and what each of these individuals has, it alone has; for by that which it thus has, it is distinguished from others. Such also is the teaching of the Church on the subject of the Trinity. The three subsistences, or persons, are realiter distinguished by their individual peculiarities. What else, then, can the one divine nature be, but the common or generic idea, which has no real existence, and is distinguished from each of the persons solely in thought. This usage of the word "Nature," according to which it denotes the general nature which has assumed an individual form, or the nature in the form, in which it pertains to no other individual, is followed also in the doctrine of the unity of the deity and humanity in Christ. For, not the common deity or divine nature, the idea of which we think in the Trinity, became incarnate;—otherwise, the Father and the Spirit must also be held to have become incarnate: nor, again, was the common generic humanity assumed by the Logos;—otherwise, we should have to conceive Him united with all men, even with those who are yet to come. Indeed, this general nature exists solely in the form of a conception; there is no real divine nature, save as it is found in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Spirit. Now, that divine nature which subsisted in the person of the Son, we say, became incarnate, and assumed, not the generic or general human nature, but alone humanity as contained in a particular individual.—According to this position, the universal general nature individualizes itself eternally in itself; nay more, exists solely in the form of individuals.

Note 34, page 150.

Anastasius Sinaita 1. c. c. 10-12:—Substance is not a particular nature, but the universal nature. Christ took upon Himself our whole substance (totam massam nostram), and became the firstling of our nature. For, because it was His will to deliver the whole of that which had fallen, and the entire race had fallen, lie submerged Himself entirely into the entire Adam; He, the Life, penetrated into that which was dead—He penetrated the entirety of that with which He was united, animating the whole, as it were, like the soul of a great body. Hence the human race is termed the body of Christ: Christ is conceived to permeate the whole equally, and yet He dwells peculiarly in each particular member, according to the measure of its faith; for each member is a separate individual; and what holds good of it, does not hold good of the corporate body. When the Apostle speaks of the body and its members, he describes, indeed, the distinction between the genus and the individual; but in that he designates us the body of Christ, and not His "genus," he meant to teach, that Christ was united with the universal generic substance of humanity, not with a particular individual; for otherwise we should not be called His body and His members. He desired to constitute us all and entirely His garment or body. He was both God and man, but neither a God nor a man: as God and man He is characterized by more general names; for He consisted not of particular hypostases, but of general substances. (We

P. 2.—VOL. I. 2D

see here clearly, that Anastasius, as little as the Monophysites, draws a distinction between individuality and hypostasis; he therefore feared, that to concede the individuality of the human nature, would lead to a double personality.) Nor can we say that He was a part of the substance; for the parts of substances are themselves substances, and that which we call a part has in all respects the character of the whole: consequently, He must be styled the Whole (dynamically ?), and not a part; for we cannot speak of dividing a substance, as we speak of dividing a ball. Christ became man, therefore, not by assuming a part of human nature, but the whole.—So also, it is not allowable to say, that He assumed merely a part of the Divine substance, to wit, the Son. For the distinction of part and whole cannot be applied to God. As Son also, God is not a "natura particularis specialis" or "singularis" (Orat. i. de S. Trinit. c. 18, p. 240). And Rusticus says (ibid. p. 40),—The divine nature of Christ included also the Father and the Holy Spirit; and His human substance included the remaining men. This is connected with the older doctrine, that Christ atrapy^v dveKafit Tov rjfierepov <f>vpdftfiros : this wnapyrj, however, is through Him also an apyrj,—a beginning and principle of an universal kind, an universal power of rebegetting all, through His new humanity. John of Damascus gave this idea the following turn,—All persons, indeed, did not die and rise again in Christ, but still our entire nature died and rose again in Him (L. iii. c. 6, p. 213, ed. Lequien). Consequently, not merely a man, nor the nature of a single man, nor, again, we ourselves as to our personality, but we, as to our nature, were assumed by the Logos. We, as to our nature, rose again in Him, ascended up to heaven, and so forth. Theodore Abukara, who belonged to his school (Opuscula ii. pp. 386 ff.), sought to connect the universal signifi cance of the humanity of Christ with the fact of His being a single, individual human existence. We cannot say that the humanity of Christ, and the body of Christ animated and endowed with intelligence, were the same thing. When we say, —He took upon Himself humanity, we mean, the humanity of us all, who are men; whereas His body and His soul were specially His : otherwise, He would not have been of the like substance with us, or the body of the eternal Son must have been the body of us all, who are men. He does not, in this conneotion, regard the general as a nonentity, as a mere thing of thought; but it is incorporeal, it does not helong to the world of the senses, it is universal; and this incorporeal existence first becomes visible by means of the Ibl6tt)t€<; opurriKal, the individualizing predicates. These ideas show us, further, how physical was the conception of redemption which prevailed at this period. Theodore Abukara says (vi. 452),—A lemon seed dipped in honey is said, when planted, to communicate its sweetness to the fruit; even so Christ, when He assumed humanity in the state in which it was prior to sin, and dipped it in the honey of His deity, gave us also to share in its sweetness, &>? ol Kokkol Tov ireKOpOS rp air avra>v Kapira> Kal Kara Sia^o-^fjv (per traducem).

Note 35, page 150.

Compare Theodore Abukara l. c. ii. 398 ff., and the passage quoted in Euthym. Panopl. P. i. Tit. vii. Their opponents endeavoured to drive the adherents of the Council of Chalcedon into a corner by asking,— Did the eternal Son assume a general essence or thing (koivov ri irpa<y/xa, Tov KadoKov dvdpamov), or a p^piKov Ti, a something individual? If they answered,—The universal man, or the generic substance: then they were met by the objection,—But that does not fall within the range of the senses; how can an incorporeal thing unite itself with a corporeal? Christ would then remain invisible, even as the general nature remains invisible? And inasmuch as the general appertains to several subjects, Christ would have had many hypostases: indeed, Christ would then have been of an altogether different nature from us, for we are drop-a. If, however, they answered, —The Son assumed a fiepiKov avdpwirov: the objection was raised,—That leads to two hypostases, after the manner of Nestorius. The teachers of the Church replied,—It is neither of the two; on the contrary, we must rather say,—He assumed <f>vaiv fiepiKov avdpdyirov, that is, drofiov, in that He became the hypostasis thereof. The nature of this individual man was, it is true, Koivt), ev drofia > Se.

Note 36, page 155.

Monophysite National Churches still exist even at the present day, as well as scattered congregations. The latter are found chiefly in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia, and are still designated Jacobites; the former, in Armenia, Egypt, and Abyssinia. The Abyssinians continue to the present day, as it were, fascinated by the precise question which occupied the attention of the old Monophysites. Their Metropolitan (Abuna) is still subordinate to the Alexandrian (the Coptic) Patriarch. That one nature was constituted out of two, is their universal doctrine: the mode of this constitution is still a subject of reflection and controversy. As the Jacobites, consciously treading in the footsteps of Ephrem, assigned to the Holy Spirit a great role, in connection both with the Holy Eucharist and with the Incarnation—the role, namely, of the connective principle of the Logos and the humanity, or of the elements, in the Eucharist; so were the three Christological theories prevailing in Abyssinia connected with the doctrine of the Holy Ghost (i. 286). The first view, which is diffused in Tigre, and which originated with one of the last Abunas from Egypt, is the following,—By the Holy Ghost, with which Christ was anointed, we are to understand His deity, which did not need the help of the Holy Ghost, in that it was in eternal possession of it. The deity of Christ itself, therefore, was the bond between the human and the divine natures, and constituted the two one nature. Jesus anointed Himself, and not another (compare p. 141). The second view, which prevails in the provinces of Godsham and Lasta, represents the union of the divine with the human nature as having been effected by the Holy Spirit. The third view, which prevails in the remaining provinces and in Shoa, maintains, that the man Jesus, from the moment of His conception, was united, indeed, with the deity, but received the Holy Ghost as a gift of the Father, precisely in the same manner as we receive Him, in order that He might be able as a man to accomplish the work of redemption. The anointing with the Holy Ghost, they term the third birth of the Son. This third view, which reminds one of Adoptianism, and manifestly lays greater stress on the true humanity of Christ than do the other two, is not able to allow to the God-manhood, in the first instance, more than a potential existence, and employs the phrase, "Third Birth," to express the idea, that the advancing realization of the divine-human life brought with it a something actually new. But by appealing to John iii., where the birth from the Holy Spirit is designated a new birth, the adherents of this view approximate to those who attribute to Christ also a participation in human impurity, derived from Mary. They do not appear, however, to have followed out this course to its results: indeed, the prevailing cultus of Mary would hinder them from doing so.—Some appear to hold, that the union of the two natures into one substance was first accomplished subsequently to the ascension, or that it awaits the close of the day of judgment (p. 110). Here, therefore, we have an attempt, on a monophysitic basis, not merely to establish a distinction between the two aspects, but even to construct a continuous, advancing process of actual humanification, and thus, by the adhibition of the doctrine of the anointing with the Holy Ghost, to do justice to the demand for a veritable human development. The act of incarnation posited, at first, merely the divine-human potence: ere the God-manhood could become an actuality, the anointing must take place, thaUis, the humanity must undergo development and progress. The relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit is not, it is true, further explained: the Monophysites do not teach, with the Greeks, that the Holy Spirit proceeded also from the Son. At the same time, it would appear that some (p. 105) regard this anointing, which affected the humanity of Christ, merely as a consecration to, or equipment for office, and attribute to it, therefore, no constitutive significance for the Person of Christ: others, on the contrary, represent Christ's participation in the Holy Ghost as rather analogous to our own.

The Armenian Monophysites principally adhered to Julian of Halicarnassus, perhaps even from the time of Barsumas (Assem. ii. 292, 296). Such also are their Christological views even at the present day (compare Ass. Diss- de Monophys. ii.). According to Barhebraeus, they maintain that, coincidently with the union, the body of Christ became perfect; that it did not gradually grow; that it was neither capable of experiencing suffering nor harm, neither mortal nor created, nor of a circumscribed form. Circumcision He underwent merely in appearance; He merely appeared to take food, and in reality never ate at all, save in the sense in which He ate in the presence of Abraham. (Under Athanasius, in the year 726, the Armenian Catholicos Johannes united himself, for the time, with the former, but they very soon went back to the doctrine of Julian. On the contrary, the Syrian Jacobites and the Egyptian continue in churchfellowship with each other. The old sects have almost entirely disappeared from among the Monophysites of the present day.) They styled themselves Diakrinomenoi (BuiKpivopevot), that is, Protestants against the Chalcedonian Symbol. In analogy with that Armenian tendency, is the doctrine held by some Abyssinians, that human souls in general are not developed along with the body, but enter the body, complete and perfect, from the fortieth day. Even Xenaias had assumed this to be the case, as in all men, so also in Christ. Other Monophysites, however,—as, for example, Dionysius, Bar Salibi, Johannes of Dara, James of Sarug, James of Edessa, etc.,—differed from Xenaias on this point, and taught that the Word united Himself with the body and soul at the same moment (Assem. ii. 158, 159).

Many Monophysites—as, for example, Bar Salibi and Barhebraus—assumed, indeed, the real presence of Christ in the Holy Eucharist, but denied the conversion of the elements. Their view seems rather to have been that of Ephrem and the mystical school of Syria. The prototype of the Unio of Christ with the elements, is the Unio of the Word with the flesh. Through the Holy Ghost, bread and wine are appropriated by the body and blood of Christ. The Holy Spirit descending on the altar (as in the incarnation in the Virgin), constitutes the elements the body and blood of the Word of God (Assem. ii. 190), and gives them quickening, enlightening, fermenting virtue. Not, however, through their own nature are bread and wine, body and blood, but through the descending grace of the Holy Ghost (p. 293 ff.). Anastasius Sinaita and the Abbot Ruprecht of Deutz also took this view. James of Sarug, on the contrary, as it would seem, adopted the doctrine of transubstantiation (ii. 194).

Note 37, page 157.

Opp. Dionysii Areop. cum scholiis S. Maximi, etc., edidit Balth. Corderius, Antw. 1634, pp. 500 ff. De div. nom. c. 2. Engelhardt's "Die angeblichen Schriften des Areop. Dionysius, iibersetzt und mit Anmerkungen begleitet," Sulzbach 1823, 2 Thle. Engelhardt supposes these writings to have originated in the fifth century, and that their Christian author must have been closely connected with the school of the Platonist Proclus. What we observed above in connection with Barsudaili, and the esteem in which the Areopagite was held amongst the Monophysites, speak for the connection of the author with these latter. Hierotheus was professedly the teacher of Dionysius (de div. nom. c. 3); and under the name of Hierotheus, Barsudaili wrote the work in which he taught the transition of all things into the divine nature. Such is the account given by Barhebrreus (Assem. ii. 293, 30 ff.). Among the Monophysites, the writings of the Areopagite were much used (Assem. ii. 295, 207, 302, 307, and especially pp. 120,121), translated and commentated. It is possible that Barsudaili's fiction,—a fiction to which he may have been led by the Origenism which prevailed in many of the monasteries, and which formed a bridge to Neo-Platonism,—may have given rise to the spread of Neo-Platonism in a Church form, under the name of the holy disciple of Hierotheus.

Note 38, page 177.

The affair of Honorius belongs, as is well known, to the causes celebres. Those who believe in an infallibility of the Pope, independently of a Council, appear here to be in greater perplexity than those who attribute infallibility to a Pope in conjunction with an (Ecumenical Synod. The former endeavoured to escape from the difficulty in two ways, both of which, however, may be now said to have been abandoned. Some— as, for example, Onuphrius, Bellarmine and Gretser, Baronius, Binius, and Schott—make a desperate attempt to deny the fact of the condemnation of Honorius as an heretic, by tracing it to a falsification of the Acta of the Sixth Council: they also treat the letters of Honorius contained in those Acta as spurious. The most, however, regard this expedient with no confidence. A whole series of later Synods, both oecumenical and recognised by the Romish Church, repeated the condemnation; and several Popes, particularly Leo n., expressly approved of the condemnation. It is a fact, historically so well established in all directions, that it can only be called in question at the dangerous price of an universal undermining of the credibility of Church traditions. It is also clear from the Disputation of Maximus, which followed a few years later, that Honorius wrote a letter, in which he declared himself opposed to the duality of wills.—Others say, that Honorius was indeed condemned, but unjustly; and therefore, in point of fact, call in question the infallibility of (Ecumenical Councils which agreed with Popes, for the sake of asserting the infallibility of the Papacy. They say,—That Honorius was orthodox, is evident from the testimony of his secretary, given by Maximus at the close of his disputation. He did, indeed, teach one will, and reject the duality of wills; but his opinion really was,—that it is not right to teach the existence of two human, self-contradictory wills :—an almost ludicrous vindication of his honour. Of two human wills, no one had ever spoken; it is out of place, therefore, to mention it here. Honorius, moreover, did not merely assert that there could not be two contradictory wills in Christ, a divine and an evil human will; but generally, that there could not be two wills of any kind in Christ, because there could only be one who willed. What weight can be attached to the testimony of a secretary,—a testimony probably dictated by interest,—in face of the original documents which have been preserved, and of all the CEcumenical Synods which have regarded the view of Honorius as an heresy? He differed from Sergius, it is true, in so far as he did not teach the unity of the evipyeia: nor did he teach that there were two ivepyeiai; but rather asserted the doctrine of two natures, especially in his second letter. He never, however, gave up the unity of the will, nor conceded that the will is a matter of the natures, and follows them: he attributed the one will to the one volitional agent, namely, to the person; though he, at the same time, supposed that this one volitional agent which had taken up human nature into Himself, employed it as His organ, and may thus be said to have worked theandrically. From this point of view, it is of course, as Honorius pleaded, foolish to speak of one activity or of two. For, if it be established that the will, as theandric, is one, it must, agreeably to its nature, develop very many modes of activity, and not merely one or two. We see, therefore, that to evade the question of the unity or the duality of the evepyeta, as irrelevant, was very plainly in accordance with his monotheletic point of view. But, indeed, these letters contradict the orthodoxy of a later period, in many respects. Like Theodore of Pharan, Honorius, along with Sergius, concluded, that if there were two wills, there must be two volitional agents: he, however, confessed but one will, because the nature, and not the will (Schuld, guilt (?), in the German), was assumed by the deity. Two wills in the same subject, he urges, must needs come into conflict: if they did not come into conflict, they would converge into one will, if the person were one. The will, he esteems a matter of the personality, not of the nature: for him, therefore, to have granted two wills, would have been to grant two personalities. Hence he does not refer the words, "Father, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt," to a human will, which required to be subjected to the Father; but says,—Christ gave utterance to these words in the name of us sinners, not in His own name: we must not, therefore, deduce therefrom the continuous existence of a proper human will in Christ. By the act of incarnation, the human will was made completely one will with, or a determination of, that of the Logos. Finally, he agrees with Sergius in saying, that the human nature of Christ stood in the relation to the divine of a purely passive organ; that it did not separately, or of its own impulse, will any motion, contrary to the hint of the Logos hypostatically united with it, but was in all cases, both as to occasion and manner, determined by the Logos. Against this position, Maximus had decidedly protested. Now, as there is no historical notice whatever of a retractation on the part of Honorius (and if he had retracted, the memory thereof would have been imperishable), no course is open, but to say,—Honorius erred, and gave currency to a heresy, merely as a private individual; not, however, publicly or as a Pope:—an expedient which does not further concern us in the present connection, but which has been thoroughly, and in detail, discussed in the learned treatise on the Monotheletes, in the Instructiones historico-theologicae Jo. Forbesii a Corse (see pp. 222-291, especially pp. 288 ff.). He shows that the letters of Honorius bear the character of an "Epistola Decretalis." But the difference between the Synod, when it taught that the will of the Logos, who constituted the personality, had both the power of initiative and decision; and Honorius, when he asserted, "One will of the person," was less than it appeared: Maximus, on the contrary, differed more widely from both.

Note 39, page 182.

This is also the point in the Symbol of Chalcedon on which Maximus of Aquileia leaned for support at the Lateran Synod. (Mansi x. 1060, 1061.) That the Synod of Chalcedon meant to teach the existence of a special human will, although it did not expressly say so, was taken for granted by him; and yet that was just the subject of controversy. The old symbols do not say, "One will;" nor do they deny that there were two wills; therefore (such is the conclusion drawn), they are favourable to two wills (p. 1057). That even Nestorius professed to maintain one will alone—this was no warning against Dyotheletism, that was of no advantage to the Monotheletes. Now, they said,—Nestorius, who taught one will, has been condemned; therefore, Monotheletism also is condemned. In strict justice, all that could be said was,—the old Synods did not express any judgment on the matter of the unity or duality of the will; and therefore, neither of the parties can be regarded as condemned by them. Although the Lateran Synod appealed to the twelve anathemas of Cyrill, as sanctioned by the Synod of Ephesus (Tom. x. 1040, 1041), thus recognising them as of authority, still, after what has previously been advanced, there can scarcely be a doubt, that Cyrill was far nearer sharing the fundamental intuition of Monotheletism:—indeed, his fourth anathema forbids that which the Dyotheletes did; namely, referring one set of the words of Christ to Him as a man, considered by Himself, apart from the Logos; and other words, as befitting God, to the Logos alone. Furthermore, the Synod of the year 553, fourteen determinations of which (Mansi x. 1045) were also publicly read at the Lateran Council, anathematized, in its seventh canon, the use of the number two, so far as those who spoke of a duality meant two <f>vaei<; IBioviroararot: the formula, "one incarnate nature of the Logos," it did not condemn in itself, but merely when it denoted the extinction either of the divine or of the human nature, or their commixture; it commanded also that their worship should be but one. Theodoret's writings, however,—not merely his Twelve Chapters, but all that he had directed against Cyrill and the Synod of Ephesus,—were condemned; and a man was thus condemned who unquestionably shared the fundamental intuition of Dyotheletism.

Note 40, page 191.

Mansi x. 745 f. It is not clear whether he referred that exchange (aiTtoWt?) merely to the object, the content of the

will, or also, for example, to divine attributes. If we bear in mind the distinction drawn between the communicable and the incommunicable in God (in which, probably, we may trace the influence of the cataphatic and apophatic theology), we shall see that the exchange in question cannot have referred to the latter also, in Christ. Indeed, the communicable element already dwells in the humanity of Christ, in the form of the created divine element; and therefore our safest course is to refer the exchange to a community in the object of volition. Compare above, the disputation with Pyrrhus. At the very utmost, all that he can further have connected herewith, was a nominal "Communicatio Idiomatum," that is, a transference of names.

Note 41, page 191.

Ibid. '0 air6f>pijro<; rpenros T^s els aWrj\as r&v Xpurrov cpveea>v irepi%<opqaeoK (p. 753). In this way, as indeed in general, by the force of his dialectics, Maximus contributed largely to the fixing of the doctrine of the Church. He may be regarded as the originator of the doctrine of the irepixa>prjais,' in part also of that of the avrlBoai<!; and he endeavoured also, to draw a clearer distinction between the ideas of person and nature. The natures (even the divine) are not hypostases in themselves. Neither of them, indeed, is without an hypostasis (awirixrraroC), but in an hypostasis (ewiroararoi, ivinrapmoi); and the hypostasis, although not itself a nature, is yet not withoat, but in, a nature (evovau><;). Compare S. Maximi Confess. I Opp. T. ii. ed. Combefis. Par. 1675. Ilepl dejfidTo>v Bvo rov wo? Xpurrov (p. 98 ft".). Full light is first thrown on these principles, in their bearing on his mode of thought, by the further proposition laid down in his Scholia to Gregory, —That God is the inr6ara<ri<i of all believers (compare Append- to Jo. Scotus Erigen. ed. Gale). But on this point we shall make additional remarks subsequently. He employs the expression,— The Son is the hypostasis of the two natures; that is, probably, . the real or substantial principle of their particular or individual subsistence.—He devoted, altogether, much attention to the subject of the possible forms of Unio. There is unity of essence between persons, individuals (for example, of the same genus); there is hypostatic unity between different substances,

as body and soul. There is an union of relation (j<ara a^i<nv), where different yv&ficu combine to form one will (or one object of will?). Juxtaposition takes place in the case of boards; mortising, in the case of stones; intermixture, in the case of different fluids; kneading together, in the case of fluids and solids, as flour and water; a mixture, in the case of diverse substances, which are melted; acervation, in the case of solids, and so forth. An union of essence has place between beings which remain different as to their hypostases (the Trinity); the r/hypostatic union, on the contrary, has place between beings which | continue different in essence. The distinction between the human and divine substances he aims, it is true, at preserving; as also that between their partially opposed attributes; but, hike Anastasius, he differs from the adherents of the Council of 'iChalcedon, in that he considers human nature to have some . elationship to the divine. In God there is a fiedei<rbv, a something in which the creature can participate: there is also an aspect of man's being in which he can participate in the divine '(a fiere^ov). His view of this, however, was not that of the Monotheletes, neither as respects the perfected Christ, nor as respects the beginning of His humanity;—the Monotheletes, namely, conceived the human to be merely passively susceptible of receiving the divine fulness or communications: Maximus, on the contrary, conceived the human to be essentially free and active; indeed, his view leads rather to a duplication or multiplication of divine being, than to an action of God by means of human organs. He maintains creatianistically that there are independent existences besides God, and thus is opposed to the divine immanence; though he conceives created beings to derive their true essence from God. Such a duplication of the divine was effected in Christ, in that a pure Adamitic humanity existed in Him, alongside of the Logos. Little was thus done, however, for the assertion of the unity; as is most strikingly evident from the formula employed by him,— "Christ is the two natures." The real issue of his deification of the true human, is rather to strengthen the duality than the unity. If we further take into consideration, that the Logos is present with believers also, as to His omnipresence, and that the pure humanity of these latter likewise sets forth a cosmical divine element, we shall be unable to see what specific significance can be attributed to Christ, or, what is the peculiar force of the union between the Logos and the humanity of Jesus. It is true, Maximus designates it hypostatical; but he holds God to be the hypostasis_of -all believers, their higher, true personality. According to him, therefore, the volitions and sway of the Logos continue supramundane; whereas the human will is finite. Dualism, consequently, keeps its ground, and it is a mere assertion, when he supposes that, on his theory, Christ is inroar<uTK avvdero<; Ttjv <f>vaiKrjv rwv aKpa>v Biaipe<TiV iv eavrm Kclt axpav Karavrl^ovaa teal els ev ayovaa rfj Twv olKeiwv ivuxrec pepuv.

Note 42, page 193.

Mention deserves to be made, in this connection, of a fragment (Mansi xi. 597 ff.), professedly from a very old Codex of Homilies by Athanasius, on the passage, "Now is My soul troubled" (John xii. 27), which was laid before the Sixth CouncU by Cyprian bishops, and was recognised by the Synod, though with doubtful right (see vol. i. 1072, 972 of this work), as Athanasian. In a spirit thoroughly other than dyotheletic, and with the intent of asserting for Christ a true human development, this fragment teaches the existence of a duality in Christ, during His earthly life, such as is certainly to be substantially allowed. Whereas Dyotheletism eternized the duality, representing it as an abiding duality of the divine and human will, here, a merely temporary duality is taught—a duality, namely, between the will of the Logos to become incarnate and to redeem, which was constantly, and on principle, the will of His life ; and the will of the flesh, which, although blameless in itself, was yet destined to be sacrificed. The author starts with the position, that it was necessary for Christ to resemble us, in order that we might become like God. Wherefore, condescending to take our likeness, it behoved Him to become like to us chiefly in that in which we needed transformation, to wit, in the passible, in order that He might raise us above passibility. Not, indeed, as though the deity had undergone a transmutation, but the passivity, which arose from the corporeal and psychical motions, was vanquished, and was participated in by Christ in order that it might be vanquished: it was vanquished, moreover, in order that the entire substance of the human race, in agreement with its relationship, might receive the blessing. For, beginning with Him, we all are transformed from being merely passive, are exalted above suffering and passion,, and are set forth as those who are alive from the dead. Therefore let no man fall into error when the Lord, who is at once God and man, says, "Now is My soul troubled." For this happened because the deity permitted it (elKovarj<;); the flesh, however, being stirred up, resisted (iyeipofihn>)<;). It was possible, indeed, for the deity to have prevented that agitation; but it was the divine -will to permit it, in order that the resemblance to us might not be destroyed. As a simile, the relation between water and the honey mixed therewith, may be employed. When the flesh of the Lord was excited, there was, as it were, a predominance of the water, which is mixed with the honey; on the other hand, when the deity came into view, and manifested its power in miracles, it was as though the sweetness of the honey had overpowered the water. For it was in the power of the deity, at one time, to allow the flesh to have the upper hand (to ir\eovaaai), at another time to rule it, and to do away with its passivity and weakness. Of the latter exercise of power, we have an illustration in the fasting in the wilderness; of the former, in the hunger felt by Jesus after the forty days were passed. The flesh predominated, in order, both that there might be opportunity for temptation, and that the tempter might be put to shame. Therefore did He bear the agitation felt by the flesh at the approach of death; for how could He have been obedient, instead of our obedience, had He not carried a contradiction within Himself (evavriwpa) and overcome it? When a contradiction of the flesh arises in us, and we, overcome by the flesh, transgress the command, sin overtakes us. In the Lord also, a contradiction must needs arise from the flesh; but it was equally necessary that, by His obedience, He should overcome the contradiction. For, although He was God, He was in the flesh, and accomplished His obedience in the flesh ( aapKa), and overcame the will of the flesh by the will of the deity, as He said,—" I came down from heaven, not to do Mine own will, but the will of My Father." He also terms the will of the flesh His own will; for the flesh was His own: for the divine will of the Son was not separated from that of God. But the will of the flesh must needs move, in order that it might be subjected to the divine; and thus, through this marvellous obedience of Christ for us, the collective disobedience of men was done away with. In like manner, he adduces the words,— "And what shall I say? Father, save Me from this hour,"— as words which Christ spake agreeably to the motion of His flesh. But the next following ones,—" Yet for this cause have I come to this honr,"—reveal to us again the conquering deity, so that the divine will scarcely permitted the fleshly will to appear. He thus manifested, on the one hand, the reality of His flesh, and on the other, its subjection. Further, how did He esteem sufferings? Not as a dishonour and disgrace, but as an honour to Himself and the Father; and He rather sought than avoided suffering: "Father, glorify Thy name!" For my part, says He, I will decline no suffering; opposition shall yield, and that shall conquer which cannot be opposed. For the fleshly nature resisted death; and, indeed, so it needed to do, for the sake of the truth and reality of the incarnation. But the divine will chose the salvation of the world, which was effected by death: He thus showed that He had fulfilled the words, "To do the will of Him that sent Me." There is no man who has not in some point, or for some length of time, broken away from the divine will: in Christ alone, did the divine and human wills continue inseparable; and if we follow Him, we shall secure in His likeness, a saving union with God. Thoughts similar to these we shall find occurring in the writings of the Monotheletes.

Note 43, page 194.

This, I believe, is the true significance of the monotheletic doctrine of the gnomic will of Christ, against which Photius wrote in the ninth century. Thus understood, it is a remarkable attempt, in an unexpected quarter, to assert for the humanity of Christ more complete truth than had hitherto been conceded it, and to leave room for a real human development. They spoke of the yva>fin of Christ as ftovKevriKrj, deliberative, as one that discerned opposites (twv dvriKeifievwv KpiTiKi)), as one that inquired into the things of which it was ignorant (dr/voovfievcov ^rjrrjriKrj, Mansi x. 741), as one that chose and formed purposes. This reminds one of the doctrine of the Agnoetes; as also, to a certain extent, of Nestorianism. For, so long as each volitional process lasted, they supposed the humanity to act for itself, after its own manner; and although they considered the process to issue in a divine-human unity, yet, during the continuance thereof, the bond between the human and divine natures was merely a relative one—merely a relatedness to each other of two relatively independent natures. At this point, we see again that Monophysites defined the two natures in such a manner as to constitute them two persons, so far as they cannot yet be said to have been united. They regarded the problem also as one of the union of two persons; because, in their view, natures exist solely as personal (in their sense of the term). This their position was concealed, indeed, so long as the humanity was conceived to have originated with the incarnation, and the idea of a pre-existent humanity, with which Eutyches was frequently reproached, denied—denied, moreover, in such a tone, as to imply that the very commencement of the incarnation brought with it an absolute personal union. But it came to light, when efforts were made to represent the union of the two personal natures, or of the two persons, as the result of the historical process of the life of Christ. The doctrine of the gnomic will is, consequently, not a thing of trifling significance. Monophysites, in it, attempted the solution of the same problem that was presented to, but not solved by, the Nestorians—the problem, namely, how to constitute one person out of two. It is, therefore, both natural and remarkable, that they also speak of a a^eriKrj eva>ats, besides employing other Nestorian formulae; though they naturally applied such terms merely to the time during which the process lasted. The older Nestorianism, however, did not conduct the process so surely to its goal. Other Monotheletes appear to have striven to secure the unity of the will by denying to the divine nature, apart from the incarnation, any will at all (that is, probably, any single concrete act of will), by representing it as itself without will, and as attaining actualiter to will in the humanity of Christ (l. c. 741). We should then have the formula,—The divine is to be conceived as the essence, the humanity as the actuality of this essence, as its form or ivepyeia.

Note 44, page 206.

Monotheletism, proscribed in the Empire, maintained its existence in the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon among the Maronites (" Two natures, one will, and one activity"). The Maronites are said to have derived their name from a saintly Abbot Marun. Even Theodoret was acquainted with such a name long prior to the Monotheletic Controversy;—a circumstance which later Maronites, in turning to the Latin Church, allege as a proof of the continuous orthodoxy of their nation. According to others, they were formerly designated Mardaites (compare Richard Simon's "Histoire critique des dogmes, etc.," 1711, pp. 147-164; Neanders Kirchengeschichte, vol. iii. p. 276; Joh. Damasc. i. p. 528; Philipp Wolffs "Die Drusen und ihre Vorlaufer," pp. 234 ff.; Klose, Zeitschrift fur historische Theologie, 1850, pp. 334 ff.). Mention still remains to be made of some hybrid forms which existed in the same district, and which cannot strictly be termed Christian heresies:* they were rather modifications of extra-Christian religions by Christian influences; as, for example, Manichaeism in the third century. The Druses give their Muhammedanism a garnish of Christian ideas. The Egyptian Khalif Hakem is revered by them as an incarnation of God. The author of the system, and the proper head of the sect, was Danasi (Wolff, pp. 263 ff.). When Muhammedanism and Christianity came into contact with each other, the result was, that adherents of the former began to teach incarnations of various kinds, and the adherents of the latter struck into an Unitarian tendency. An illustration of the former result i3 furnished by the Nossairites, who believe that God appeared in the form of Ali, to whom they attribute even an existence before the creation of the heavens and the earth, and, indeed, in general transfer the predicates of Christ.—The Romish Church has made repeated, and not quite unsuccessful attempts, to win over the Maronites ;—for which reason older Roman Catholic writers are used to be very mild in their judgments regarding them. Great concessions were made to them; for example, independent right of ordination, their own liturgy, the marriage of the priests, communion in both kinds, and a constitution incompatible with the Curial System.—Traces of Monotheletism may be found elsewhere also, subsequently to the seventh century; amongst those who show such traces, may be particularly mentioned the Armasites, from Harmasius iu Egypt (cf. Joannis Damasceni Opp. i. 528).

* See a note on the idea of Heresy in the first volume of the First Division of this work.—Ta.

P. 2.—VOL. I. 2 E

Note 45, page 221.

When opposing the Monophysites, he frequently draws the conclusion, that they cannot maintain the unity of the will, unless they also concede the unity of the essence or nature. For that which is different in point of will, is different also in point of essence; and that which is not the' same in essence, cannot be the same in will. But the same line of argument must lead to the conclusion, either that Christ, if He consisted of two opposed substances and wills, could not have been constituted one person by one and the same hypostasis of the Logos; or that, if the two natures could have, and really had, one and the same hypostasis, they could not have been different in essence and will.—Indeed, at a subsequent opportunity, he actually, though unconsciously, assigns to the humanity its own hypostasis. Not merely (see above) in that he recognises the existence in Christ of the general human nature, along with the accidents which constituted Him the particular man He was; —in other words, he did not merely attribute to it that which, in his view, made up the general idea of hypostasis. What he would thus have attributed, was but very inadequate, and scarcely sufficient to constitute an individual, much less a personality. He says, however (L. ill. 19; iv. 1, 2),—"The human soul of Christ accompanied the world-ruling Logos, not merely with its thought and knowledge, and was not a mere indigent human soul; but it knew also, that it was Qeov vow. In heaven, it keeps up a remembrance of its earthly course: it knows and sees that it is, and deserves to be, worshipped; for it knows itself to be the humanity of God; it knows that it is hypostatically united with the Logos." To the humanity, by itself, is thus attributed a certain independent self-knowledge; and not merely, as it were, a self-knowledge through the medium of a substitute, of the Logos as its hypostasis. The hypostasis of the Logos, therefore, on this view, is not the personal centre, but merely the vehicular principle.

Note 46, page 223.

Lib. iii. cap. 16. The Monophysites ask,—"Is the human substance one?" Inasmuch as this question is to be answered affirmatively, they draw the conclusion,—Therefore, two natures can become one nature, or one substance, in Christ also. But, if there continued to be two natures in Christ, and if Christ is to be called a double nature because He was constituted of opposites, then is man also a double nature, and not one substance, because he is constituted of body and soul. In that case, however, Christ ought to be termed a triple nature, because He was compounded of body, soul, and Logos. To this he replies, besides what we have given in the text,—That in answering the question, Of what substances was Christ compounded? we must look, not to the more remote stamina or elements, but to the next unities or syntheses,—for example, to the unity or synthesis, humanity.—That in Spain, at a Synod of Toledo held about this time, the existence of three natures in Christ should have been affirmed (though the Romish Church objected thereto), we may suppose to have resulted from the very strong spirit of opposition to Monophysitism. This circumstance was probably, also, a prognostic of the Adoptianist movement.

Note 47, page 227.

It deserves to be noticed, how very far this form of Christology was from having been interwoven and thoroughly blended with the doctrine of the Trinity. When their eye rests on the latter, they speak as though the Logos had not merely remained what He was, but had also not even become something which He was not prior to the incarnation. If the Logos, not merely prior, but even subsequently, to the incarnation, had, both formally and materially, one will with the Father and the Spirit; and if, on that account, His will could not become a divine-human will, because, otherwise, the Father and the Spirit must also have had a divine-human will,— plainly, the tie which connected the Logos and His will with the humanity, regarded in the light of the Trinity, was a very loose one; and one can scarcely see that it is right to speak of the Logos having constituted the humanity His own, of the vov<; and will of Jesus having become the vow; of God; or, indeed, in any other than a figurative sense, of man having become God, and not merely of God having become man. It is true, the tie, whose looseness in the system of the Damascene is betrayed by the frequent use of the expression avvd<f>eia (for example, in lib. iii. 15, p. 235), was endeavoured to be drawn closer, by representing the hypostasis of the Son, as the bond of union between the two natures. But if this idea had been followed out, it would have been found, that it was not so much the divine nature of the Son, as His hypostasis, and His hypostasis alone, that had assumed humanity:—the consequences of which representation we shall see at a later period. How far this idea was approveable, relatively to the Trinity (namely, as forefending the conclusion, that the Father and the Spirit also assumed humanity, because their nature was the nature of the Son), we have shown above. In another aspect, however, it gave rise to new difficulties. For, inasmuch as the will was supposed to appertain to the common divine nature, in absolute identity, the act of incarnation must either have been an act of will,—in which case it must be described as the act of the common nature; or it must have pertained to the hypostasis of the Son alone, and not to the common nature,—in which case it was not an act of will. But if it were not an act of will, it was a physical act;— and such a conclusion would be more dangerous to the creatural element in the Person of Christ, than Monophysitism itself.

Note 48, page 233.

i. 486:—re\evratovBiaBpas To Ttoikixov ei? ainov ayvaxrrGJ? Karapra Top irepi Mova£o<; \6yov.To 7779 07071-r79 pv<rrqpiov •rrdvrmp inrepaipei rwv yeyovorwv rov vovv, irpb<; iravra To fiera Seov rv<f>\6v airepya^op^vov. This divine blindness of the soul, to all that is not God the Monas, is also designated, the "Monachy of the soul." To beginners, Christ appears in the form of a servant; but to those who follow Him to the Mount of Transfiguration, He appears in that form of God which He had before the world was. In their knowledge, and in their virtues, His second coming takes place; and the Holy Gospels, His garments, appear to them white and shining (i. 418, 450487).—The Logos, who as God, in the beginning with God, earned within Himself a<upeis Kcu yvpvoi><; Tous T»7? a\t)deias irepl Twv o\a>v Tvttoix;, without cuviyfia and irapafioj, becomes flesh in manifold forms for the good of men, who cannot lay hold on the naked ideal world in pure spirit. Kara yap Ttjv irpwrrrpi irpoaj3o\i)v oil yvfivw irpoaj3d\\ei Aoy(j> o rj/A€repo$ vow; aX\a Aoy<p aeaapKaspkvta. The beginning of the pjidrjreia is necessarily 71,/30? odpKa,. But gradually irpoafialvovres Tj> vrveufiari, Kiu To irayp ra>v pijfiaroyv (the Holy Scriptures) Toi? Xe7rrorepoi<; dewprjfuiaiv airoi-iovres ev Kadapw kadapws Xpiarw fivofie&a Kark To Bvvarov avdpanroK, el<t To ovvaadai \eyeiv "ovKeTl Kara aapKa" (2 Cor. v. 16),—Su\ Ttjv airKrjv 7rpo? Ton Aoyov xi/jpls Tcjv en-' avrw Ka\vfifiarwv Tov vobs Itpoo/3o\t)v. Compare futher especially i. 502, § 73.

Note 49, page 235.

The Mysticism of Maximus was preceded, not merely by the hierarchic-ecclesiastical Mysticism of the Areopagite, but also by the subjective, ascetical piety of the nobler and older forms of Monachism, the representatives of which were men like Macarius the Elder, Marcus Eremita, Johannes Climacus (sec. 5 and 6; compare Gass I.e. pp. 53 ff.). They also strove after an immediate union with God (ydfws, <rvyKpaai<; with the Holy Spirit, <yevai<; airb &eov, after divine fie&rj, after the irradiation of the hypostatic light, after commixture with the substance of God—ovfupvpeodai Qea>—). The stages of cleansing, purification, and elevation are regarded by them solely as subjective states of mind, and are not connected with objective Church rites: the objective sacraments they treated as mere symbols of subjective states, as subjective sacraments. (So fasts and tears, so mystical joy, which correspond to Holy Baptism and the Holy Eucharist.) Nor was any essential position assigned to Christ; He is merely an example. Maximus, on the contrary, endeavoured to combine this subjective Mysticism with that of the Areopagite, as a comparison of his Mystagogy (ii. 489-529) with the "Capita de charitate," and the "Capita theolog. et ceconom." i. 394-634, clearly proves.

Note 50, page 238.

The lucific material glorifies man. This physical feature of the Greek doctrine of grace, manifested itself quite at an early period, in the description given of the influence exerted by Christ on our race, even through His very birth, and so forth (see above; compare especially, Theodore Abukara Op. ed. Gretser, c. vi. p. 452). It is said, that if the seed of a melon be dipped in honey, the sweetness thus given to the seed, will be communicated to the fruit. Ovtid Kal 6 Xpurrbs Ttjv <pvaiv £K Tj)? e\auiy&>wy 7rotori/rOS, rffov v ex Tj}? afiapTias a.7T0Kadapas Bui Tov aryiov /SaiTrioytaTO?, avekafiev aurrjvaypainov oiaKcurjv Kai f«rrWi| To irpinepov. Kal efiftdyfras avrrjv To» pA L -rij? fleonp-o?— fjTOi fiereBa>Kev Tj/>liv Tt)? y\wevrnros, &>? 01 Kokkol Tov ireirovos Toi a7r' airrwi' Kapira), Kal Kara, BiaBoyrjv (per traducem). There is an exact correspondence between this physical mode of thought, which through so long a period determined the character of the conception of sin and grace, and the Christological predominance given to the nature compared with the personality.

Note 51, page 257.

L. v. 1 :—" Qui illum sibi ex utero matris scilicet ab ipso conceptu in singularitale Sucr persona ita univit atque conseruit, ut Dei filius esset hominis filius, non mutabilitate naturae, sed dignatione, similiter et hominis filius esset Dei filius, non versibilitate substantiae sed in Dei filio esset verus filius.—2: credimus verum et proprium Dei filiuni, ac verum Deum, qui secundum formam Dei bis genitus est; primo, videlicet et Patre sine carne absque matre; secundo vero ex matre cum carne sine patre. Illum verum Deum ex utroque parente ineffabiliter genitum credimus, cui Pater per David loquitur; ex utero ante Luciferum genui te.—3: et ex Deo Deus et homo ex homine in singularitate persona) unus atque idem sit Christus Dei, sicnt quit-unique homo ex anima de nihilo creata et carne, ex utroque parente formata unus est utrisque parentibus, patris sui videlicet et matris filius." In the Son of God, therefore, the Son of man was an actual Son; more precisely, in the "singularitas" of the "persona," but not in the "natura filii Dei;" and yet there was but one Christ, because the "singularitas personae filii Dei"— His Ego without the nature—was also the Ego of the Son of man (" dei filius—hominis filius esset"): hence, too, the Son of man became "in Dei filio verus filius," and did not continue a mere assumed nature. (Compare above, Note 15.) Adoptianism was by no means interested in merely keeping God and man apart. Such an interest operated merely to the extent of keeping the natures apart: which same anxiety seemed to possess the teachers of the Church also; for they did not allow that an union of the natures, and of that which pertains to them, had taken place, but solely an union in the sphere of the LnrooTaaet?. Adoptianism, it is true, denied that either the nature of the Son of God assumed humanity, or that auy part of the divine nature was really bestowed on the human nature, to be its own—to be, as it were, a natural possession. Looked at from another point of view, however, the reason why Adoptianists thus kept the natures apart, was the desire to assert the completeness of the humanity of Christ, without which, indeed, the incarnation itself could not be said to be complete. But they furnished a counterpoise to the segregation of the natures, by teaching that the Ego of the Son of God was also the proper Ego of the Son of man. In this way, they deemed themselves, by one and the same principle, to have established both the completeness of the humanity of Christ, and its unity with the Son of God at the inmost centre of its being; and yet, at the same time, a place remained for that process of adoption, by which the human nature became assimilated to the divine nature. Their opponents failed to perceive that, relatively to the personality, their own doctrine of the union fell short of that embodied in Adoptianism. They sought merely to connect the Son of God with the human nature, and substantially returned to Cyrill's view of the matter, as Nedner has correctly perceived (p. 426). Compare Paulin. l. c . i. 12; iii. 25; ii. 4.

Note 52, page 262.

Alcuin. opp. ii. 567 ff. cap. x.:—In uno eodemque Dei et hominis filio in una persona duabus quoque naturis esse plenis et perfectis (the Ablatives instead of the Accusatives are Spanish Latin) dei et hominis domini et servi visibilis atque invisibilis, tribus quoque substantiis, verbi scilicet animae et carnis, ut credatur in una eademque dei et hominis persona et homo deificus (—ficatus) et huraanatus deus.—Talis enim erat illa susceptio, quae et deum hominem faceret et hominem deum (cap. xi.). He was, as a man, "servus," but as the "filius dei" He was "dominus servi," that is, Lord of Himself, which is not selfcontradictory; for "adoptivus" is in reality "adfiliatus" (cap. xii.). This did not imply an abasement, but merely a condescension, because it was fitting and needful that the deliverance "de dominatu antiqui hostis" should be effected "justitia potius, quam potestate." This ethical method of atonement is done away with, if, with Beatus and Etherius, we deny to Him a humanity like our own (p. 568). Servitude, they urged, must not, as their opponents supposed, be attributed to Christ, in the sense that He was disloyal to the law, and regarded it as constraint from without. On the contrary, they deemed the predicates, " servus" and "adoptivus," perfectly compatible with each other; and "adoptio" was held to involve delight and freedom in obedience, in opposition to the servile spirit of the law. The spirit of adoption gives the "forma bene agendi, ut possit agi, quod docuit" (cap. xiv.). From this it is clear, that, unlike Felix, they could not have dated the "adoptio" first from the resurrection.—In the writings of Elipantus, there is not yet a trace of the formula, "nuncupativus deus ;" it first occurs in those of Felix.

Note 53, page 267.

Even the Diaconus Paschasius (he died in the year 512), in his time, had said, in his "Libri ii. de Spiritu Sancto contra Macedonium" (compare Cave hist, liter, p. 318),—" In Christo gemina substantia sed non gemina persona est, quia persona personam consumere potest, substantia vero substantiam non potest, siquidem persona res juris est, substantia res naturae" (ii. 4). To this passage the Council of Frankfurt expressly appealed. This remarkable passage takes apparently for granted, that the only personality attributable to the man is a " persona juris,"—not, however, a physical personality; and that this "persona juris" might lose its existence in a higher personality. Alcuin (c. Felic. ii. 12) says,—"In adsumptione carnis a Deo personaperit hominis, non natura:" comp. Paulin. i. 12, ii. 4; whose words remind us thoroughly of Peter the Lombard.—Such an extinction implies, indeed, that a personal human nature existed, at all events, a moment prior to the actual Unio and its results, that is, prior to the incarnation :—which is a remainder of Cerinthianism. But, supposing personality to be necessary to the completeness of the human nature to be assumed, there seemed to be no other course open than to posit its existence for a moment, and then to allow it to be extinguished. To the same purport, Innocent III. remarked in a Decretal,—" quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis" (compare Thom. Aq. Opp. xii. ed. Antwerp, p. 27. Not till a later period was the doctrine taught, "persona non pneintelligitur assumtioni, sed est terminus assumtionis"). Thomas endeavoured to give these words the following meaning,—" persona divina unione impedivit, ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet, which it would have had apart from the Unio."

Note 54, page 295.

In Anselm's view also, the universal is, it is true, in general an actuality, and the individual, though its form of manifestation, is not its reality (see Hasse's Anselm v. Canterbury, 1852, ii. 98). Anselm's division of truth (the true) reminds us also of Erigena's Divisio (l. c. p. 112). Anselm too says,— "It is one word by which God gives expression to Himself and to the creature" (p. 151). In its cause, the effect is still one with the cause. In the absolute Spirit, things are not what they are in themselves, but what He Himself is. Their egress out of their eternal ground first gives them a kind of independence over against absolute Being; though it also involves them in the alternations of a process, of which nonentity as well as entity is ever predicable, and which really is, only in so far as it follows and approaches near to, its true being (p. 152). With the same thought with which God thinks Himself (se ipsum), He thinks also the creature; for He cannot think Himself, without thinking Himself as that which He is, to wit, as the ground of other beings, of beings which are grounded and rooted in Him. For the Non-Ipsum, the thought of the creature, appertains to the Ipsum itself, so far as, whilst lying in its cause, the effect is not yet an effect, but itself also the cause. In God, things are not yet things, but a determination of the (creative) thought of the Creator. Anselm, however, tries to distinguish between this thought or conception of the world, and the creative act by which the world was realized, in order to be able to posit an existence veritably other than God. But his efforts are in vain; for God must necessarily think the world as that which it actually becomes (l. c. pp. 217, 218). Nor does Hasse's suggestion clear up the difficulty, namely, that as Spirit, God was, in Anselm's view, the most concrete existence—being, life, thought, and so forth; for which reason God comprises the totality of all being, and at the same time embraces this totality of being in the unity of His own Self. For, if the totality of those momenta, in their infinite fulness, be the world, and if God constitute the unity of the world, no real duplication of being has been effected; but God is simply the unity of the world, and the world is the pleroma of God. By the aid of the categories of being, life and thought, we shall never arrive at anything more than a play of distinction between God and the world. If the divine thought finds the world already existent in the divine being (the Ideal World of Erigena), then the idea of creation must necessarily be resolved into that of the self-cogitation of God. An ethical conception of God alone, can prevent our regarding the totality of the momenta which form the world as infolded immediately in the being of God, and viewing the self-cogitation of God both as His self-actualization, and as the realization of the above-mentioned momenta of His being, that is, of the world: through such an ethical conception alone, can the distinction and the unity of God and the world be secured.— Further, the theology of the Middle Ages long bore the traces of the (Erigenistic) predominance of knowledge over the will (see below, p. 305 f.). In consequence of the cognitive faculties being directed to the being of God, not to the will of God, which determines also His being, everything, not even excluding the work of creation, was considered onesidedly from the point of view of necessity. By the necessity of His physical being, God is, according to this principle, the primal ground of a world; and it is quite impossible to think God without thinking the world as posited in and with His being, instead of, as posited by His will. Anselm, who considered the most general purpose of God in creation to be the manifestation of His thoughts, might readily have gone on to demand also the manifestation of that thought whose content and substance is God Himself (L c. p. 224). But such a demand would not have been so favourable to Christology as it might at first seem. On this view, all mundane beings are essentially mere momenta of the totality; but the unity cannot coincide with a momentum of the totality. It would be another matter if Christ were not an individual mundane being, but merely the true universal humanity itself; and if the individuality of Christ, that which distinguished Him from all others, consisted solely in His unique connection with the Verbum. He came not far from taking up this position in his " de Fide Trin." c. 2,l. c. p. 105.

Note 55, page 311.

This question was made the subject of detailed discussions between Boscellin and Anselm, about the year 1092. Roscellin's Nominalism led to Tritheism; and he tried to justify this Tritheism theologically, by maintaining,—that if we regard the persons in the Trinity, not as " tres res per se (separatim)," or as three individuals, but conceive them in conjunction with a common nature, we must allow that Father and Spirit also became man. All that we can say, therefore, regarding the three persons is, that they are one in power, and in will (aims); for otherwise, it is impossible that the Son alone should have become man. Similarly also Gilbert de la Porret. Anselm now rejects Tritheism: the three persons are merely three relations in God (even as, at a later period, Innocent III. Epistol. T. i. Paris 1682, p. 544, doubted whether it were right to apply "nomina propria" to the three persons. The Church teaches numerically one God: the unity of the persons consists not alone in their belonging to one genus (it is not a merely generic unity); but it aims at a perfect unity—an unity, namely, realized by means of the three persons, which are related, and belong, to each other). To that objection of Roscellin, Anselm, however, replied,— For Roscellin, who divides the entire God into three individuals, it would be necessary that all the three persons should become man in order that there might be any true incarnation at all: but not for the Church; for the Church believes that the very same God was in the Son that is in the Father, though in a different relation; and it further recognises distinctions in the one God, so that there is no necessity for all that is attributable to the entire God in the Son, being also attributed to the Father. Anselm, however, goes still further. He says that it was impossible for the Father and the Spirit to have become man, at the same time with the Son. They could only have done so for the sake of their common nature. But the Church teaches that the incarnation merely accomplished the union of the divine and human personalities; that, therefore, it did not affect the divine and human natures. The divine person became man, and formed one person with the humanity assumed; but not the nature. Otherwise, the deity must be held to have been transformed into humanity, and humanity into deity. Anselm, therefore, decides that, not the divine nature, but the person, of the Son became man ;—a decision, the consequences of which were not as yet clearly seen by himself. He concludes with saying,—But if the divine person alone, and not the divine nature, took part in the incarnation, it is plain that we cannot speak of the three persons having become man in Christ, unless we hold that several persons could become one person (compare Hasse's "Anselm v. Canterbury," ii. 291-305). In the following century also, Abaelard designated this a disputed point; and in his " Sic et Non" adduced the authorities for and against. Gilbert de la Porret, whom we mentioned above, wished to distinguish between deity (the essence, the nature of God) and God: not the former, but God alone, that is, the person, and indeed the person of the Son, did he consider to have become man (compare Baur's "Trinitatslehre," ii. 516, 517).

As at this point, so also at another (as Anselm himself saw), Christology was affected by the controversy between Realism and Nominalism, even at its very commencement (see Hasse's Anselm, p. 105; Anselm, "de Fide Trin." c. 2). Anselm remarks,—Whoso knoweth not that man is something, even apart from single individuals, will, of course, represent to himself merely a single person, when he hears speak of man; and how will he understand the declaration,—the Logos took upon Himself man, that is, another nature, not another person 1 Nominalism was necessitated to insist on the personality of the human nature, because it regarded the common human, the generical human, not as real, but as a mere subjective product of the mind, and considered the reality of the humanity of Christ to consist solely in its individuality. This was the case, however, merely in the rough beginnings of Nominalism, when the Platonic u Universalia ante Rem" were put in strong contrast to the nominalistic "Universalia post Rem." At a subsequent period, Nominalists themselves conceded "Universalia in Re," and justly regarded this concession as involving a heightening instead of a lowering of the significance of individuality.—From what has been advanced, we see how it was possible for Realism to arrive at the view just mentioned, that the humanity of Christ was merely the general human nature, without any individual specialty whatever:—a view which might be employed in the construction of a mystical Christology, so long, namely, as, a distinction not being drawn between personality and individuality, it was deemed necessary, in denying the former, to deny also the latter to the humanity of Christ

The question might then readily arise, which was put by Innocent III. (p. 545),— Whether a proper name should he given to the humanity of Christ? Realists could never advance beyond this question until they acknowledged the humanity of Christ to be, not merely the universally human, that which remains after abstracting what is peculiar to individuals, but the realization of the true idea of humanity,—which idea came far more clearly to light in Him than in the Adamitic humanity;—but that once acknowledged, the humanity of Christ would have been seen to be possessed of a distinctive, and therefore of an individual character. It would then, it is true, be an appearance towards which the idea of humanity, as it existed in the Divine mind, eternally tended. The manifestation of that idea in an actual person, must accordingly be held to have formed part of the original idea of the world. Inasmuch, however, as at this point an historical personality was deemed to have been founded in the divine ideal world itself, and to have formed a constitutive momentum thereof, Plato's system of the ideal world, treating, as it did, persons as accidents, was broken through in one important respect: the ideal world must now therefore be converted into a divine counsel, the objects of which are persons, history, and an ethical organism of persons, instead of the immoveable, abstract ideas of Plato. We shall soon see, that even as early as the twelfth century, one party struck into this path (see below, pp. 322 ff.).

Note 56, page 328

Of Christ, as not merely a brother, but "quasi alter Adam, caput et principium omnium in ipso resurgentium," he speaks in his work entitled, "de Immanuele" (1. i. cap. x.). In the "de Incarnatione," he carries the idea out further,—It was necessary for the Son to become man; not to the entire Trinity did the satisfaction need to be offered, especially not to the Son, but to the Father. The Father it was who demanded punishment: He therefore could not at the same time become man and pay the penalty (cap. ix.). Further (cap. x.),—Ratio exigebat, ut ruinae nostra reparator per exinanitionem descenderet de similitudine Dei ad similitudinem lapsi: Filius autem est imago et figura patris; which the Holy Ghost is not. Adam, indeed, by his attempt to purloin Wisdom, sinned specially against the Son, who is the Wisdom of God; but how beautiful was the relation, that the Father should have willed to avenge the " injuria Filii," and the Son to forgive it, nay more, to effect its pardon with the Father!" Divisit itaque inter se summa illa personarum trinitas, unus Deus, negotium salutis humanse, ut unam eandemque hominis culpam Pater puniret Filius expiaret, Spiritus Sanctus ignosceret." Both Richard de St Victor and Ruprecht of Deutz, therefore, keep to Anselm's theory of the atonement; the Lombard, on the contrary, gave it up, because he considered the human nature of Christ alone to have acted a mediatorial part. Richard apparently had in view the objection, that if the Son of God also, in Christ, offered satisfaction, the Son would have been paying Himself; or, in other words, that the satisfaction was offered merely in appearance, that the whole matter was purely epideictic. But instead of passing on to the answer given by the Lombard, which emasculated the significance of the work of Christ, and suspended the incarnation itself,—the answer, namely, the man Jesus alone redeemed us,— Richard endeavoured to overcome the difficulty by distributing the different momenta between the three persons of the Trinity —a course which pretty plainly leads to Tritheism. He then proceeds to say,—That our only help lay in an incarnation of God, was seen by the ancients, both under Judaism and Heathenism. Saint Dionysius, when asked by Paul in Athens, whether the altar was meant for a spirit of the gods, or for a man? answered,—The Unknown One must be true God and true man. But who ever ventured to supplicate such an act of condescension? (cap. xiii.).

Note 57, page 329.

"Cesset jam ironia, dicatur jam de sententia! dictum est hoc exprobrando: dicamus modo hoc gloriando, et glorificando et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, ex quo factum est, per quem factum est, in quo factum est totum, quod propter nos factum est. Die, impie Zabulon, qui valet nunc fraus tua? Plus est, quod contulit nobis Christi misericordia, quam nobis abstulit illa tua fraudulenta malitia. Ecce homo factus est, quasi Deus, sciens bonum et malum, quod tu fraudulenter promisisti. Ecce homo factus est verus Deus, quod tu quidem nee cogitare potuisti." It deserves mention further, that Richard rightly saw that the birth from a virgin was not necessary in order to secure the purity of Christ (de Imman. i. 11). "Si Immanuel noster de utroque sexu nasci voluisset et hoc ratio exigeret, utrumque ad mundam prolem seminandam purgare potuisset" (as must, at all events, have happened in the case of Mary). But, "si de utroque (sexu) carnem assumeret, utique et a proprietatis suae similitudine longius recederet, et ad nostram minus appropinquaret;" it was part of His distinctive character to have God alone for His Father.—On the other hand, Richard's teaching regarding the knowledge of Christ in His childhood, is less satisfactory: he attributes to Him perfect knowledge (de Immanuele ii. 18 ff., i. 15); though he wished to combine therewith the fact of growth. Nor did he, like the Greek theologians, refer the growth merely to the display of the knowledge, but held that the Son of God tasted human life by degrees, and by gradual experience became acquainted with that which appertains thereto. To this question, Hugo de St Victor also devoted an entire treatise, entitled, "De anima Christi." He puts the question in a more general form:—If we assume the wisdom of Christ to have equalled the divine, do we not lessen the distinction between the Infinite Creator and the creature? His answer is as follows :—The soul of Christ is not equal to God, for it neither is, nor becomes, the Wisdom of God; but this Wisdom, in which all participate who are wise, according to the different degrees of their susceptibility, dwelt entirely and bodily in the soul of Christ;—not, therefore, in such a manner that the half was in it, and the half outside of it. And thus it possessed the entire Wisdom of God, but was it not. But in this way the problem of Christology was scarcely touched, for the question still remains,—Wherein consisted the communion and unity of the soul of Christ with Wisdom? He also himself felt this at the close, but merely adds—Christ's soul was completely wise; it did not merely receive of, but embraced the fulness of wisdom (comprehendit). How that was possible, he does not show.

Note 58, page 331.

Q. iv. 2. Innocent HI. said in one of his Decretals, "Quod persona Dei consumpsit personam hominis." The human nature would of course have had a personality of its own, independently of the incarnation; yet, strictly speaking, that which did not yet exist could not be consumed. What Innocent says, therefore, could merely mean,—" persona divina sua unione im~ pedivit, ne humana natura propriam personalitatem haberet" (p. 29"). Cajetan, in his Commentary, reminds his readers, in connection with this matter, that, according to Thomas, a "natura singularis" is incomplete without personality, and seeks and finds its goal or consummation in "personalitas;" whether the "personalitas" be its own or a strange one, lent to it. Now the human nature in Christ, Cajetan goes on to say, "assumta ad personalitatem divinam totum appetitum personalitatis plus quam satiatum ac consummatum habet et consequenter quiescit absque appetitu quocunque alterius personalitatis." Hence, strictly speaking, the human nature had already been, and not toot, hindered in the production of a personality of its own (p. 29").

Note 59, page 346.

In connection with this dogma, Duns Scotus rendered special service in Paris and Cologne, as an antagonist of the school of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great (compare "Rosarium St. Maria," in the Appendix to Liber iii.). It is worthy of note, that the main reason for the birth of Christ from a virgin, recognised in the ancient Church, was thus given up. For Mary is represented as having been the fruit of a marriage, and yet, at the same time, sinless (compare L. iii. Dist. iv., and L. iv. Dist. ii., Q. 2, 11). In the proportion in which the later Roman Catholic dogmaticians were unproductive relatively to Christology, especially after the Reformation, in that proportion did the doctrine of Mary grow rankly and apace. It assumed more and more distinctly the character of a dogma, and absorbed the energies that should have been devoted to Christology. Raymund Lullus, in particular, distinguished himself in this respect: compare Libro de la Concepcion Virginal, compuesto por el iluminado Maestro Raymundo Lullio, traduzido por Don Alonzo de Zepeda en Brusselas 16G4. In this work, he shows that Christ was the final cause of Mary; but it was necessary for the final cause, in order to arrive at actuality, to infuse itself into Mary at the very commencement of her existence, and by this infusion of His goodness, greatness, virtue, wisdom, and so forth, to make the human nature of Mary holy, the new creation (recreatio) required to begin with the rise of Mary, not of Christ. And, indeed, even apart from sin, this would have taken place in Mary, and Christ would have been born of her. To suppose that Mary was not free from sin, not even from original sin, is to put her on a lower stage than Adam prior to the Fall. But, inasmuch as the " causa finalis," Christ, operated at her origin in the manner described, Lullius deems her to have constituted an integral element of His historical actuality. The most famous Mariologian of recent times is Perron.

Note 60, page 359.

Whereas the Lombard devoted much attention to the question,—Whether the divine nature or the divine hypostasis assumed human nature (Q. iii. 1, 2)» Thomas arrived at the conclusion,—Not the divine person, but the divine nature, assumed human nature; though the personality was the real goal of the assumption (terminus assumtionis). He deems the personal union of the Word of God with a man to be the highest of all possible forms of union for both, and herein lies Christ's specific dignity. At the same time, in the view of Thomas, there was also a certain union of the divine nature with the human, so far as the latter was susceptible thereof; and in this aspect, Christ is related to all those who are, at all events to some extent, partakers of the divine nature. Thomas, therefore, cannot be classed among those who, with the notion of making the problem of Christology easier, say,—The divine nature did not assume the human nature, but merely the divine person, without the divine nature (see above; compare Abraham Calov. Systema loc. Theol. Tom. vii., Vit. 1677, p. 148).

Note 61, page 367.

Concerning the German Reformers, we shall have to speak at a later period. Suffice it to adduce, in this connection, of Melanchthon, Opp. T. iv. 1564, ed. Wittenb. pp. 338 ff., ii. 318, 319, 232, 242, i. 149, 160, He requires that we consider the work of creation also in the light of that highest revelation, the incarnation. For it was God's purpose to be known and loved by the world; and the incarnation of God first brought this knowledge in perfection. God was moved by love to create, in order that He might communicate Himself to the world : this self-communication attained completeness in the incarnation. The final P. 2.—Vol. i. 2 F

cause of creation (causa finalis creationis) was (so he remarks on Colossians i. 16 ff.), not the Son of God, but the God-man, " quia haec copulatio divinae et humanae naturae est summum opus Dei et in hac copulatione conspicitur multiplex sapientia Dei et immensus amor erga genus humanum." He takes particular pleasure in urging, that the purpose of His mission was the union of spirits to the Church, of which He is the Head "efficacia, perfectione, ordine et merito." Such passages in the works of the Reformers are the more worthy of remark, as, their attention having been predominantly concentrated on the doctrines of sin and of redemption, no evidence against the principle in question can be drawn from their silence. Those who attach importance to the absence of any such laying of stress on this point in the works of the Reformers, as we find in the works of men like Andr. Osiander (who was thoroughly baptized into the spirit of Luther) and Schwenkfeld, should take into consideration, partly, the doctrine of predestination, which, at first, was common to all; and partly, the doctrine of the Reformers, regarding the unconditioned necessity of Christ and His work to the redemption of men. On the ground of both these doctrines, they could not but regard the coming of Christ as eternally predestined, and not merely contingent on an event like sin. Moreover, they had no doubt that Christ, as the Head of His body, continued, even after He had overcome sin, to stand in an essential relation to humanity; and that is the real kernel of the present question.

Note 62, page 374.

His scepticism did not even halt at the moral law. If God should actually command him to hate Him, or to steal, that which we now consider sin would then be meritorious. In his Sent. L. ii. 19, ad dubium 3, 4, ed. Lugd. 1495. Similarly also in his Centilogium, Concl. 5. Instead of conceding the possibility of a knowledge of the necessity or fitness of the incarnation, he maintains, in his Centilogium theologicum, Conclusio 6, 7,—"Deus potest assumere omnem creaturam sive omne aliud a Deo in unitate suppositi." Faith, it is true, teaches that He assumed one nature alone, namely, the human; but "non includit contradictionem, Deum assumere naturam asininam—et pari ratione potest assumere lapidem et lignum, etc." With the utmost frivolity and indifference to all religious interests, he then investigates, what significance the doctrine of the " Communicatio Idiomatum" would retain, and what results would follow, if God had assumed such another natura. He adduces the arguments pro and contra; and at last ends with saying, that in view of the "potentia absoluta" of God, the most absurd statements have a certain truth; though the "potentia ordinata," as it is taught by the Church, sets a limit to such absurdities. As the "Communicatio Idiomatum" may be hypothetically extended to irrational inanimate beings, so, he goes on to say (Centil. Concl. 13), may it be extended to the individual parts of Christ, with quite as much truth and right as to the human nature in general:—one might, therefore, say, —Christ's head is Christ's foot; Christ's eye is Christ's hand. "Sicut est haec (propositio) vera: Deus est homo ratione assumtionis naturae, sic hsec est vera: Deus est caput ratione consimilis assumtionis. Et consimiliter potest probari, quod— Deus est pes. Tunc sic: iste Deus est pes Christi, iste Deus est caput Christi, ergo caput Christi est pes Christi." After having discussed the reasons for and against in detail, and decided that such propositions are true, he says,—Some, indeed, maintain that the "Communicatio Idiomatum" did not take place relatively to the "assumtio" of such individual parts: but still it is probably to be conceded. Let each choose what pleases him best. Other propositions which he proves are the following:— Concl. 19: Natura humana assumta est rationale animal, non homo; ex aggregatione s. assumtione humanae natura? in imitate suppositi divini animalia tria resultant.—20: Unum et idem corpus numero est in uno loco (i.e., ccelo) extensive et in alio loco (i.e., in sacramento) non extensive.—22: Non est dare maximum locum, quem corpus Christi non posset implere.—25: Corpus Christi potest esse ubique sicut Deus est ubique; for coexistit totum corpus Christi cuilibet parti hostiae parvse consecratae.— Unde si esset aliqua magna hostia replens totum mundum, aeque faciliter posset totum corpus Christi coexistere cuilibet parti hostiae consecratae (cf. Quotlib. Iv. xx.-xxxix.).—35: Aliquis homo fuit ab aeterno cujus humanitas incepit esse.—36: Aliquid totum fuit ab aeterno, cujus quaelibet pars incepit esse.—37: Aliquid totum in aliquo instanti fuit, in quo nulla ejus pars fuit.—38: Homo Christus fuit aliquid quando nihil fuit homo Christus. Further, With reference to Dyophysitism and its consequences, he says in Concl. 40: "Deus habet duas voluntates et duos intellectus et duas scientias.—41: Deus vult aliquid quod Deus non Volt. Deus intelligit aliquid quod Deus non intelligit; Deus scit aliquid quod Deus non scit." The proofs advanced by him for the truth of these propositions, he does not regard as scientific: his intention was merely to show, that they necessarily follow from the doctrine of the Church, and must, therefore, be valid. His procedure is purely one of formal logic. But as he manifests ho interest whatever in the religious bearings of the matter, and gives the reins to his logic, it is doubtful whether he were merely desirous of exhibiting his logical skill in a piquant manner, or whether he wished to lay bare the contradictions in the doctrine of the Church. At all events, he was bent on overthrowing every imagination of being able to know anything in the sphere of faith In Sent. L. iii. Q. 1, it is true, he defends some of the determinations arrived at by the Church, on the subject of Christology, against certain attacks; but he disclaims at the outset, any intention of proving their truth. He there employs, for the "Unio," the image of "forma" and "materia," which may be united with each other without ceasing to be what they are: not, however, as though the human and divine natures became " per se unum," as do "forma" and "materia;" we must further employ the image of substance and accident, which are merely "unum per accidens." The human nature remained impersonal, even in the "Unio" (ad 18um dubiuin). Most of the traditional questions he leaves uninvestigated, but occupies half of his brief treatise on Christology with proving, —that to one of the three Divine Persons, indeed, something may appertain, which does not appertain to another; that, in particular, the element which constituted the person of the Son might be the vehicular principle of Christ, that which consummated His personality,—because it was the personality, and not the nature (essentia et proprietates), of the Son, that united itself with the human nature and made it personal. Nevertheless, it was possible for the three Divine Persons to assume this human nature, because it did not receive the divine personality as its own, but was merely sustained by it.


Note A, page 19.

"Wird nun aber näher darauf geachtet dass das Ausgezeichnete in Christi menschlicher Natur, dem sich die besondere Sympathie der allgegenwärtigen göttlichen zugewendet hat, auf Erden nicht sowohl in physichen Vorzügen bestehen kann, als in moralischen, namentlich darin, dass auch dieser Mensch eine Sympathie für das Göttliche hat, jedoch auf dem Grunde zweier entgegengesetzter Substanzen, mithin so; dass nicht die Substanzen einander zugewendet Einigung unter sich suchen könnten, sondern nur so, dass jede von beiden innerlich für sich bleibend doch namentlich Dasselbe will wie die Andere."

Note B, page 68.

"Dieser Wille ist zwar mehr nur als der Machtwille gedacht, weniger als allmachtiger Liebeswille, aber doch hegt darin schon der Gedanke an eine Macht des Logos über seine eigene Natur eingehüllt."

Note C, page 72.

"Fand er in der antiochenischen Formel , die Löslichkeit des Logos von der Menschkeit noch nicht ausgeschlossen, zu sehr alles auf den Willen, nicht auf ein beharrliches festes Sein gestellt, so lag ihm ja die Möglichkeit offen, das Ethische substantiell als die innerste wahre Natur in Gott zu denken."

Note D, page 129.
-Bringt die göttliche Mittheilung nur die Vollen-

dung der Natur selbst, so ist das Mitgetheilte zu dieser vollen Natur zu rechnen, und gehört es nicht zu dieser Natur selbst, so bringt es, gleichwohl ihr mitgetheilt, die Natur aus ihrem eignen Wesen heraus, und selbst die Aufhebung der menschlichen Unvollkommenheiten ist dann gleichsam eine bleibende Ekstase oder Entrückung der Menschheit aus ihrem eigentlichen Wesen und nicht ihre eigene Vollendung."

Note E, page 148.

"Alles actu existirende muss nach ihnen als Besonderes existiren; das Allgemeine existirt nicht etwa blos auch in Besonderem, sondern nur als sich Besonderndes."

Note F, page 158.

"In den Dingen, die der Gestalt nach mangelhaft sind, ist sie die gestaltende Gestalt und Princip der Gestalt; aber nicht minder in den Gestalten auch der Gestalt ermangelnd, weil über alle Gestalt. Sie ist das Wesen, das allen Wesen ganz und gar innewohnt ohne Befleckung, und zugleich über alles Wesen ganz und gar erhaben."

Note G, page 159.

Er will das Eine in der Bewegung, im Processe schauen. Allein dieses ist nur möglich bei realem Unterschiede der Momente, während hier die Unterschiede nicht durch die Einheit gesetzt, sondern empirisch oder traditionell aufgenommen, und in die unterschiedslose Einheit wieder versenkt werden. So behalten sie nur die niedentung, eine niedrigere noch nicht zur höchsten Einheit aufgestiegene Bewusstseinsstufe zu bezeichnen."

Note H, page 172.

"Ist und bleibt die Einheit unwandelbar und ungetheilt, so bleibt es auch die Zweiheit dessen was in unwandelbarem Unterschied sich darstellt und in ungetheilter Anderheit zusammenleuchtet."

Note I, page 182.

"Sondern auch das Resultat ist ein Doppeltes, in

soweit es nicht ausserhalb seiner ist, sondern auf seine Person selbst sich bezieht, obwohl die beiderseitige Thätigkeit in demselben Objekt zusammentreffen kann."

Note J, page 188.

"Dieses wie die Lehre von Christi gnomischen Willen zeigt, wie im monothel. Streit unter deKrjfia auch die Actualität der Intelligenz verstanden wird, besonders später, vgl. Baur."

Note K, page 240.

"Die Einheit dieses scheinbaren Gegensatzes und das Wort des Räthsels ist der Geist. Er ist wirklich in sich seiendes Wesen, und doch zugleich in dieser sich selbstbehauptenden Reflexion in sich auch allegemein Wesen, das für Andere sein will. Oder genauer: die Wahrheit des Geistes, das Ethische ist erst im Stande über jenen Gegensatz des unmittheilsamen sich selbst behauptenden und des mittheilbaren Wesen zu erheben, über den Gegensatz des jüdischen und des heidnischen Gottesbegriffes."

Note L, page 261.

"Er lässt das Christum begründende Prinzip in der Art das Ich dieser Gesammtperson sein, dass der Menschensohn das Ich, das freilich zu seinem Begriffe gehört, habe in dem Gottessohn."

Note M, page 286.

u Als die Wahrheit der Welt und als Gottes des

Erscheinenden Zweck der wahre Mensch, genauer, die spekulative Gotteserkenntniss des menschlichen Geistes und die Seligkeit darin bezeichnet."

Note N, page 294.

u In dem historischen Christus kann daher Gott nur in einer Weise sich offenbart haben, welche zugleich eine Negation davon ist, dass er wirklich in ihm hervortrete, d. h. er kann nur in dem Bilde sich zeigen, welches einen Willen ausdrückt, für gegenwärtig zu gelten, zugleich mit der Forderung an die Menschen, durch das Bild sich anregen zu lassen, um in Negation des Bildes sich in das Bildlose oder Urbildliche zu schwingen."

Note O, page 313.

"Was das Wort annahm, das war nicht eine aus Seele und Leib zusammengesetzte Person und das Wort empfieng keine menschliche Person, sondern Leib und Seele empfangend, hat es sie unter einander und mit sich selbst geeint, und indem es sie einigte, empfangen. Aber wie ist, das wäre die Hauptfrage, dieses Empfangen und diese Einigung zu denken?"

Note P, page 377.

"Die ganze Vergangenheit der geistigen Welt versammelt sich wieder im Bewusstseyn besonders der deutschen Menschheit, um das grosse Werk möglich zu machen, das geboren werden sollte."